CourtListener 10786721•In re T.F. CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/10/26 In re T.F. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re T.F., Jr., et al., Persons B343899
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
_____________________________
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 20CCJP01899H-L)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
T.F., Sr.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Reversed in part and
affirmed in part.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly A. Roura, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Lillian F. Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
******
T.F., Sr. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders
exerting dependency jurisdiction over five of his children,
obligating him to comply with a case plan, and failing to include
an explicit finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et
seq.) did not apply.1 We conclude that substantial evidence does
not support the juvenile court’s finding that father’s substance
abuse places the children at risk of harm, but conclude that the
court’s imposition of father’s case plan was within its discretion
and that the absence of an express ICWA finding is harmless.
We accordingly affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Father has 15 or 16 children with six different women. Of
those, father has five children with A.B. (mother)—namely, twins
T.F. and T.F., Jr. (born May 2019); Tr.F. (born September 2020);
and twins Di.F. and De.F. (born February 2022). Two of the
children have special needs.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
B. Prior dependency case
In April 2020, the Los Angeles Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the
juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over father and
mother’s two oldest children (the older twins) and, after Tr.F. was
born, a supplemental petition reaching him, both on the grounds
that (1) father and mother had engaged in a violent altercation
where father pushed mother and mother pepper-sprayed father,
thereby exposing T.F. to the toxic pepper spray, and (2)
mother and father had a “history of substance abuse” and were
“current abuser[s] of marijuana,” which rendered them
“incapable of providing care for the children” and placing the
children “at risk of serious physical harm.”2 The juvenile court
did not sustain the allegation regarding father’s substance abuse,
even though father admitted to smoking marijuana three times
per week. In January 2022, the juvenile court terminated
dependency jurisdiction with an exit order awarding mother full
legal and physical custody of the older twins and Tr.F., but
providing that father would have monitored visitation with the
children.
C. Father’s visitation with the children
From 2022 through 2024, the children continued to live
with mother. Because mother prevented father from exercising
his visitation rights under the exit order, father only visited the
children a few times; some of those visits were unmonitored,
which violated the exit order. Except for these visits, father was
not involved in the children’s lives.
2 The petition also included mother’s older children L.P. and
C.H. Neither of these children nor their respective fathers are
parties to this appeal.
3
D. Facts underlying the current dependency case
On April 21, 2024, mother left a marijuana-laced brownie
in the microwave of her residence while she took a nap. L.P.,
mother’s oldest child (age 12 at the time), ate the brownie and
vomited. The fire department responded, and found that the
house was filthy.
Mother admitted to regularly smoking marijuana.
In May 2024, father stayed overnight with mother and the
children without a monitor. He appeared sober during this visit.
On May 17, 2024, father tested positive for marijuana and
cocaine. Father freely admitted that he regularly used
marijuana, and had no explanation for the positive test for
cocaine. There is evidence that father discussed using a drug
called “lean” and also drank alcohol.
II. Procedural Background
A. The petition
On May 29, 2024, the Department filed a petition once
again asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction
over father’s and mother’s five children due to (1) mother
“creat[ing] a detrimental home environment for the children,” as
evidenced by her leaving the marijuana brownie in reach of L.P.,
(2) mother’s substance abuse, (3) father’s substance abuse, (4)
mother and father having unmonitored visits in violation of the
prior exit order, and (5) father’s mental and emotional problems.
The Department alleged that all five allegations placed the
children at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger,
thereby warranting the exercise of dependency jurisdiction under
subdivision (b)(1) and, as to the violation of the exit order,
subdivision (j) of section 300.
4
In the seven months between the filing of the petition and
the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in late December 2024,
father tested positive four more times for marijuana and was a
“no show” at 11 tests. Father had once stated that he would not
show up for a test if he believed he would test positive for a drug
other than marijuana. Mother did not allow father to visit the
children at all during this period, except for a single, monitored
visit in December 2024.
B. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing
On December 23, 2024, the juvenile court held the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court sustained the
allegations that mother had created a detrimental home
environment and that father suffered from substance abuse, and
dismissed the other allegations. The court removed the children
from father’s custody and placed the children in the “home of
mother,” with father to have monitored visitation. The court
ordered the Department to provide father with reunification
services, and ordered father to have drug and alcohol testing, to
attend a 12-step alcohol program, to attend individual counseling,
and specified that the Department is to provide him with
transportation and housing assistance.
C. Father appeals
Father filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, father argues that the juvenile court (1) erred in
sustaining the substance abuse allegation, (2) abused its
discretion in imposing the case plan, and (3) did not make a
finding that ICWA did not apply in its dispositional order.
5
I. Jurisdictional Finding
Dependency jurisdiction may be exercised under
subdivision (b) of section 300 when a child “has suffered, or there
is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical
harm or illness, as a result of” a parent’s “inability . . . to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . substance
abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).) As pertinent here, this requires
the Department to prove that “(1) substance abuse (2) makes a
parent . . . unable to provide regular care for a child and (3) this
inability . . . creates a substantial risk” “the child” may “suffer
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th
520, 558.) What is more, the risk of harm to the child(ren) must
exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re M.M. (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719.) We review a juvenile court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (In re J.A. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046.) Although review for substantial
evidence requires us to view the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s ruling (ibid.), it does not permit a factual
finding to stand if it is based on speculation (In re Steve W. (1990)
217 Cal.App.3d 10, 22).
Father argues that there is insufficient evidence that he
suffers from “substance abuse” or that, even if he did, that his
substance abuse places any of his children at substantial risk of
serious physical harm or illness. The Department argues that
father’s challenges are not cognizable on appeal because
dependency jurisdiction over mother’s and father’s children will
remain valid even if the finding regarding father’s substance
abuse is overturned. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283
[“where jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents
but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be
6
rendered moot”].) However, we may exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of a parent’s challenge to a particular finding of
the juvenile court if it could have consequences beyond
jurisdiction in this case (id. at p. 285; In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th
1042, 1054), and we do so here because the finding father attacks
is what moves him from a non-offending to an offending parent.
(Accord, In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613
[exercising discretion to hear an appeal on this basis].)
Substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
finding that father’s substance abuse (which we will assume to be
established) poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
the children. Between 2022 and the December 2024
jurisdictional hearing, father rarely if ever saw the children, as
the juvenile court acknowledged; more to the point, there is no
evidence they were ever left in his care without another adult
present. If the children were never alone in father’s presence due
to the fact that he never had physical custody of them and was
only permitted monitored visits, any substance abuse issues he
may have did not pose a risk to them. The juvenile court found a
“current risk” to the children due to the uncertainty about
whether father was still using drugs, but that reason improperly
equates substance abuse with risk arising from such abuse. The
children’s counsel argued that the jurisdiction was warranted on
this basis to account for the “future risk” to the children, but this
ignores that the proper standard is the existence of risk at the
time of the jurisdictional hearing and that “future risk” was,
without more, speculative.
Because there is not substantial evidence of risk, we need
not consider whether there is substantial evidence of substance
abuse. We accordingly vacate this finding.
7
II. Dispositional Order
A juvenile court may make “all reasonable orders for the
care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of
[a] child” subject to its dependency jurisdiction. (§ 362, subd. (a).)
This power extends even to parents who are not alleged to be
offending in the underlying petition. (In re Briana V. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) Because a juvenile court has “broad
discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the
child’s interests,” we review solely for an abuse of that discretion.
(In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
father to drug test, to attend a 12-step program, or to participate
in individual counseling. Even without a jurisdictional finding
that father has a substance abuse problem that places the
children at risk, the record contains substantial evidence that
father regularly uses marijuana, occasionally uses cocaine and
alcohol, and may use other substances as well. Because the
disposition order permits visitation, requiring father to drug test,
attend a 12-step program and attend individual counseling
directed toward those issues is reasonable and within the court’s
broad jurisdiction. Father complains that the juvenile court
erred by mistakenly asserting that the juvenile court in the
earlier dependency case had sustained a finding of substance
abuse against father; not only is father incorrect in his reading of
the juvenile court’s comments in this case, but this is ultimately
irrelevant because the record in this case is sufficient to justify
the case plan the juvenile court imposed upon father.
III. Absence of an ICWA Finding
Under ICWA, the juvenile court and the Department have
both an initial and ongoing duty to inquire whether a child for
8
whom a petition has been filed is an Indian child, including
inquiring with extended family members regarding potential
Indian status. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) The juvenile court must
evaluate whether this duty has been discharged. (In re Asia L.
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506; In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 695, 705, fn. 5.) Ideally, this is an express finding,
but it may be implied. (Asia L., at p. 506.) However, the absence
of a finding—while error—is harmless unless it is shown that the
juvenile court would have found noncompliance had an express
finding been made. (In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
1401, 1413-1414 [juvenile court’s failure to make express ICWA
finding harmless due to absence of showing that ICWA applies].)
Although father, as a non-offending parent, still has
standing to raise deficiencies with ICWA compliance (In re T.G.
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 291-292), he has nowhere argued that
the absence of an ICWA finding was prejudicial. He points to no
deficiencies in the Department’s or juvenile court’s ICWA
inquiries. And no deficiencies leap out at us in the record: The
Department asked mother and father several times about their
Indian heritage, asked several of their relatives, sent informal
notices to all possible tribes identified by those relatives, and
then followed up with those tribes to confirm whether any child
was an Indian child. No tribe said they were. (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1134, 1141; id. at p. 1153 (conc. opn. of
Kruger, J.); In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1185.)
9
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding as to father
is reversed. The court’s order is otherwise affirmed in all
respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
I concur:
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
10
In re T.F. Jr. et al.
B343899
BAKER, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I would not exercise this court’s discretion to decide T.F.’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting only one of
the counts in the juvenile dependency petition. I do not believe
that T.F.’s status as an “offending” parent is alone sufficient to
warrant deciding an issue that will not affect dependency
jurisdiction over the children (see, e.g., In re Briana V. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 297, 308)—when T.F. was the subject of another
adverse jurisdiction finding just a few years earlier and when
today’s opinion for the court goes on to (properly) affirm all
aspects of T.F.’s case plan even though it reverses the petition
count alleged against him.
I agree, however, with the opinion for the court’s holding
that the absence of an express Cal-ICWA finding on the record at
the jurisdiction and disposition hearing does not warrant
reversal, conditional or otherwise.
BAKER, J.
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