CourtListener 10786081•People v. Hall CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/9/26 P. v. Hall CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085150
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD299137)
SHAUN HALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Shaun Hall was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary, and
receiving stolen property. He then pleaded guilty to failure to register as a
sex offender and providing false information on a sex offender registration
form. The trial court enhanced Hall’s sentence based on a 2007 robbery,
which he admitted as a strike prior. Considering the seriousness of the
current offense and Hall’s extensive prior criminal history, including a 2013
conviction for pimping a minor under the age of 16, the trial court declined
Hall’s motion to strike the strike prior under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), and Penal Code1 section 1385.
Hall appeals his sentence, arguing the trial court abused its discretion
by declining to strike the strike prior. He claims he falls outside the spirit
of the Three Strikes law because he was a juvenile at the time of the 2007
offense, no weapons or force were used, and it was remote in time from the
2023 offenses. Hall also asserts that the trial court misunderstood the nature
of the 2013 conviction for pimping a minor under the age of 16 and thus
erroneously evaluated the seriousness of that prior conviction. Finally, Hall
faults the court for failing to appreciate that his 2013 conviction was remote
at the time of sentencing, and his more recent offenses were principally for
failing to register as a sex offender.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
strike the 2007 strike prior and expressed a correct understanding of Hall’s
2013 conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between 3:15 and 3:30 a.m. on a May morning in 2023, Hall and a
codefendant attempted to break into a home in the College Area
1 Further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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neighborhood of San Diego. The resident was still awake and, hearing the
front door open, began to play loud music to let them know she was home.
Apparently hearing the music, Hall and his companion ran away from her
house.
Later that morning, another woman who lived nearby woke up to a
light shining into her window. She looked outside and saw two men behind
a nearby trashcan.
At about 4:00 a.m., police officers responded to a call about two men
breaking into homes in the area and apprehended Hall. He was carrying a
backpack belonging to a third victim who lived nearby.
Hall was charged with: (1) first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a);
count 1); (2) attempted burglary (§§ 664, 459; count 2); (3) receiving stolen
property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 3); (4) failure to register as a sex offender
(§ 290.018, subd. (b); count 4); and (5) providing insufficient or false
information on a sex offender registration form (§ 290.018, subd. (k); count 5).
The information alleged that Hall had a prior strike juvenile adjudication for
a robbery in 2007. A jury found Hall guilty on counts 1 through 3. Hall pled
guilty to violating counts 4 and 5. Hall also admitted the 2007 robbery
conviction constituted a prior strike for purposes of the Three Strikes law.
(§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12.)
Hall filed a motion to strike the 2007 strike, arguing the offense was
remote in time, was committed when he was 16 years old, and did not involve
violence. He further argued the current offenses did not involve violence, and
punishment under the Three Strikes law would be disproportionate to the
severity of his current crimes.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel emphasized Hall’s difficult
upbringing, stating, “He was born in prison. His mother was incarcerated
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throughout his life. His father was incarcerated throughout his life. He
never had a role model.” Counsel argued Hall’s most recent convictions were
for failing to register as a sex offender. Counsel explained that Hall was now
“prepared to take advantage of resources that will be available to him in state
prison that he potentially was not mature enough to understand the
importance of previously.”
There was some confusion about Hall’s 2013 conviction for “pimping a
minor” under the age of 16. (§ 266h, subd. (b)(2).)2 The court asked whether
“the strike offense was the 2014 one,” and defense counsel responded that the
only strike offense was the 2007 robbery. The court then asked, “And the
offense in 2017,[3] the human trafficking, is not a strike?” Defense counsel
clarified the offense Hall pled to was pimping and not a strike. The probation
officer noted that the juvenile strike prior “was just part of the Complaint”
in the 2013 matter. The court added, “I really thought the 266 was a strike.
So that’s my problem as I’m looking at a very serious offense in 2017. That’s
where I get—it’s one thing if he never did anything bad after the robbery as
a juvenile, but it’s not true. This was a very serious offense in 2017.”
The trial court denied Hall’s motion, finding that Hall’s criminal
history reflected “violation after violation after violation with no attempt on
[Hall’s] part to even get beyond it. . . . Every time you get out, you don’t even
show up for probation, you cut off your GPS monitoring, you commit new
2 In his reply brief, Hall argues he was convicted of “pimping an adult
prostitute” in violation of section 266h, subdivision (a). The probation report
makes clear he pled guilty to “Ct 2 w/ PC266h(b)(2).” Section 266h,
subdivision (b)(2), specifies that “the person engaged in prostitution is under
16 years of age.”
3 Although first defense counsel and then the court referred to a “2017”
offense, the parties agree they were referencing the 2013 offense.
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offenses. You have violations in every single case.” The court found that
“breaking into somebody’s house when there are people in there . . . [is a] very
serious crime[], because terrible things happen when you go into a person’s
home at 3:00 in the morning. You can get shot. They can get beat up. It’s a
terrible idea.” The court also noted Hall had not made efforts at
rehabilitation, observing, “You admit in your report you have never bothered
to get a job in your entire 33 years of life. You have always chosen crime over
finding gainful employment. You have always chosen drugs and alcohol over
sobriety. You have never complied with probation conditions or parole
conditions in your entire life since you were 13 years old.” The court
concluded, “[Hall’s] criminal history in my view is too aggravated. He has not
complied with probation, parole, et cetera; and the current offenses were very
serious offenses. And in looking at that criminal history, that pimping charge
with a minor is a very, very serious charge that he had recently. So I do not
think striking the strike is appropriate.”
Although Hall stipulated to circumstances supporting an upper term
sentence, the court “decided to give [Hall] the mitigated middle term because
of his childhood situation.” It thus sentenced Hall to an aggregate term of
9 years and 4 months in state prison, consisting of 8 years for count 1 (4 years
doubled based on the prior strike), a consecutive 1 year and 4 months on
count 2, and concurrent terms on the remaining counts.
DISCUSSION
“While the purpose of the Three Strikes law is to punish recidivists
more harshly [citation], not all recidivists fall within the spirit of that law.”
(People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140.) A trial court therefore
has the discretion to strike a prior conviction in the furtherance of justice.
(§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) When considering
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whether to do so, the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects,
the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).)
We review a trial court’s decision not to strike a strike prior for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony).)
“[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational
or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
“[T]he [T]hree [S]trikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it
carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and
requires the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the
law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these
sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Id. at p. 378.) “In light of
this presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances,” including
“where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss,” “where the
court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss,” or where the
Three Strikes law has created “ ‘an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd”
result’ under the specific facts of a particular case.” (Ibid.)
Hall first argues “the 2007 conviction falls outside the spirit of the
Three Strikes [l]aw” because (1) he “committed the robbery when he was a
minor still living in [sic] and influenced by the dysfunctional and abusive[4]
family”; (2) “no weapons or force w[ere] used in the crime,” but “[i]nstead,
4 We note Hall does not cite to any allegations he was abused.
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the robbery was accomplished by Hall’s companion whose gestures suggested
to the victim that he had a gun although he did not actually have one”; and
(3) “the strike offense occurred some 17 years prior to the sentencing which
was more than half of Hall’s 33-year life span up to that time.”
The record reflects that the trial court considered these factors as part
of “the nature and circumstances of his . . . prior serious and/or violent felony
conviction[]” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161), but found that other
relevant factors ultimately weighed against striking the strike prior. In
particular, the court relied on the seriousness of the current offenses and
Hall’s criminal history.
The court decided that Hall’s current offenses were serious, as burglary
of residential buildings creates a possibility of violent confrontation. Hall
generally claims the “sentence . . . was greatly disproportionate to the crime
of conviction,” but fails to explain why. The jury expressly found the burglary
was of the inhabited portion of a building, within the meaning of section 460,
subdivision (a) and that another person, other than an accomplice was
present in the building, making the offense a “violent felony” for purposes of
section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21). We think the court’s assessment was
reasonable. (Cf. Taylor v. U.S. (1990) 495 U.S. 575, 588 [“The fact that an
offender enters a building to commit a crime often creates the possibility of a
violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or
some other person who comes to investigate. And the offender’s own
awareness of this possibility may mean that he is prepared to use violence if
necessary to carry out his plans or to escape”].)
The trial court also determined, and Hall does not dispute, that he has
an extensive criminal history and that “[h]e has not complied with probation,
parole, et cetera.” The judge could properly consider Hall’s long and
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persistent history of criminal behavior and failure to comply with the terms
of his release. (See People v. Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 717 [Three
Strikes law is intended to govern sentencing of a “ ‘revolving door’ career
criminal”].)
The court emphasized Hall’s 2013 conviction, concluding, “that pimping
charge with a minor is a very, very serious charge that he had recently.” Hall
notes the judge’s initial confusion regarding this offense, arguing that she
mistakenly concluded he had been convicted of a second strike offense. We do
not think the record supports this view. Although the court initially asked
whether the 2013 offense was a strike offense, it apparently accepted defense
counsel’s and the probation officer’s explanations. After that exchange, the
court referred to the pimping conviction as “a very serious offense,” and a
“very, very serious charge,” but not a “strike,” “serious felony,” or “violent
felony.” (§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c).)
In his reply brief, Hall argues he committed the 2013 offense “some 11
years before the sentencing hearing held in November 2024,” and all of his
convictions from 2013 “until his present offense were for either petty theft
or failing to register as a sex offender.” Again, the record reflects the trial
court considered these circumstances. Failing to register as a sex offender is
generally relevant to a court’s decision not to strike a strike. (See Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [defendant’s “two prior convictions for failing to
register” supported the trial court’s decision not to strike defendant’s prior
strike].) And the court could have reasonably considered Hall’s failure to
register as symptomatic of his persistent failure to comply with the terms of
his release. Further, while they were less serious offenses, the court noted
that Hall continually reoffended between his 2007 strike and 2013, and
between 2013 and the current offenses. At best, Hall points to facts that
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suggest reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike his 2007
prior; that is not enough to establish an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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