CourtListener 10785291•Finley v. Gantz CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/6/26 Finley v. Gantz CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ELIZABETH J. FINLEY et al., D084145
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
ERIK GANTZ, 00004914-CU-BC-CTL)
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Dinsmore & Shohl, John H. Stephens and George A. Rios III for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall, Rebecca L. Reed
and Megan E. Dawson for Defendant and Respondent.
Elizabeth J. Finley and Cynthia A. Adams appeal an order awarding
Erik Gantz $615,118.37 in prevailing party attorney fees and costs pursuant
to Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717).1 They contend the trial court erred
1 All references to section 1717 refer to section 1717 of the Civil Code,
and all other unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code.
both in deciding section 1717 warranted an award of fees and costs, and in
awarding fees and costs in an amount they assert is excessive. We disagree
with both contentions. Hence we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is discussed at length in our prior opinion in Finley, et al.
v. Gantz (May 30, 2025, D082623) [nonpub. opn.] (Finley). As set forth in
that opinion, Finley and Adams initiated a lawsuit the focus of which was the
construction, presence, and use on Gantz’s property of a deck and gazebo that
affected views from and to Finley and Adams’s property.
In the lawsuit, Finley and Adams asserted two claims: one for breach
of contract and the other for nuisance. The breach of contract claim was
premised on a set of covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) that had
come into existence when the neighborhood was first developed as well as on
a proposed amended set of CC&Rs that was put to a neighborhood vote
during the period of construction. Referring to these instruments collectively
as the CC&Rs, the operative complaint (complaint) alleged the “CC&Rs are
valid and enforceable contracts between” the parties. In addition, it specified
several restrictions common to both sets of CC&Rs2 that Gantz’s construction
and use of the deck and gazebo allegedly had breached. The complaint’s
nuisance claim likewise was premised on both sets of CC&Rs, and it included
an allegation that Gantz’s “conduct and breach of the CC&Rs . . .
constitute[d] a nuisance pursuant to California Civil Code section 3479
2 Some of the amended CC&Rs Gantz was accused of violating were
identical to their analogs in the original CC&Rs. The other amended CC&Rs
he was accused of violating were similar to their analogs in the original
CC&Rs.
2
[defining what constitutes a nuisance]3 in that it interfere[d] with [Finley
and Adams’s] comfortable enjoyment of life and property.”
In support of both claims, the complaint invoked a provision in the
amended CC&Rs that was not present in the original CC&Rs, stating that:
“In the event legal action is commenced to enforce the provisions of [these
CC&Rs], the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs of suit and reasonable
attorney fees” ( fee and cost shifting provision). The complaint also included,
in its prayer for relief, a corresponding request “for reasonable attorney fees”
and “for costs of suit incurred herein.”
The matter proceeded to a five-day bench trial, at the conclusion of
which the trial court (Sturgeon, J.) issued a statement of decision. In
portions of the statement of decision addressing the breach of contract claim,
the court held that Gantz’s construction and use of the deck and gazebo
(1) did not breach the original CC&Rs because those activities did not violate
the restrictions from that instrument that Finley and Adams had placed in
issue; and (2) did not breach the amended CC&Rs (a) because the
methodology used to tally votes consenting to the amended CC&Rs rendered
that instrument invalid and (b) because, even if the votes had been tallied
appropriately, Gantz’s construction of the deck and gazebo was substantially
complete before the vote took place.
3 Section 3479 states: “Anything which is injurious to health, including,
but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable
lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street,
or highway, is a nuisance.”
3
After issuing its statement of decision, the court entered judgment
against Finley and Adams, and in favor of Gantz, on both claims.
Finley and Adams appealed the judgment and we affirmed. We held
the trial court had not erred in concluding that the original CC&Rs had not
been breached, that the amended CC&Rs could not have applied because of
the timing of the vote4 (and thus could not have been breached), and that
Gantz had not created a nuisance. (Finley, supra, D082623.) In addition, we
held that: “Our analysis of Finley and Adams’s nuisance claim dispenses, not
only with that claim, but also with the breach of contract claim to the extent
it is premised on . . . [language in] the original CC&Rs that proscribes any
activity that “ ‘may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the
neighborhood.’ ”5 (Ibid.)
Meanwhile, during the pendency of Finley, supra, D082623, Gantz filed
in the trial court an application for an award of attorney fees in the amount
of $598,051.50,6 plus costs in the amount of $63,153.79, pursuant to section
4 In Finley, supra, D082623, we concluded it was unnecessary for us to
address the trial court’s alternative holding that the amended CC&Rs were
invalid. (Ibid. [“We need not wade into the parties’ dispute regarding the
validity of the amended CC&Rs because . . . we conclude that construction of
the deck and gazebo was substantially completed prior to the dates that
Finley and Adams say the amended CC&Rs took effect].”])
5 This restriction appears in identical form in paragraph 3 of both sets of
CC&Rs, and states in its entirety that: “No noxious or offensive activity shall
be carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be
or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood.”
6 The initial amount of attorney fees that Gantz sought in his application
was $586,188.50; however, when he filed reply papers in support of the
application, he increased this sum to $598,051.50 in order to include fees he
had incurred in preparing the reply papers.
4
1717.7 Finley and Adams opposed the application, contending that section
1717 did not warrant an award of any fees or costs and, in all events, that the
magnitude of the fees and costs requested was excessive.
The fee motion was heard by a judge (Smyth, J.) other than the judge
who had presided over the trial, Judge Sturgeon having retired in the
interim. He considered the argument that section 1717 did not warrant an
award of any fees or costs. But, on the basis of a reasoned analysis, he
rejected the argument.
Then, after analyzing detailed time records and other evidence that
Gantz had submitted in support of his application, the court concluded that,
although the submission was “above reproach,” it nonetheless was
appropriate to reduce the hourly rate charged by the partners who worked on
the case, and therefore it reduced the fee award—by $53,451.00—to
$544,600.50.
7 In the same application, Gantz also requested an award of $374,010.50
in costs (including a portion of his attorney fees) pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 998. So doing, he acknowledged that this amount was
duplicative of a portion of the fees and costs he was seeking pursuant to
section 1717, that he was not entitled to a double recovery, and that a
favorable ruling on the section 1717 component of his application would moot
the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 component of the application. Finley
and Adams opposed both components of the application in the trial court, and
they continue to oppose both components on appeal. The trial court
concluded Gantz was entitled to certain fees and costs pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 998, but does not appear to have increased the
amount of the fee award as a result (presumably because doing so would have
resulted in some fees and costs being counted twice). Our affirmation of the
trial court’s ruling awarding fees and costs sought pursuant to section 1717
renders it unnecessary for us to consider whether some of those fees and costs
are also recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.
5
Thereafter, the court proceeded to consider principles of apportionment
(i.e., whether a portion of the reduced fees applied only to matters beyond the
scope of the fee and cost shifting provision), and concluded that
apportionment was not warranted under the circumstances of this case. At
the conclusion of the fee/cost proceedings, the court amended the judgment to
award Gantz $544,600.50 in attorney fees and $63,153.79 in costs.8
II. DISCUSSION
Finley and Adams contend the trial court erred both in deciding section
1717 warranted an award of fees and costs and in awarding fees and costs in
an amount they assert is excessive. In addressing these contentions, we
begin with the observation that: “ ‘ “On review of an award of attorney fees
after trial, the normal standard of review is abuse of discretion. However, de
novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination
of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context
have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of
law.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘it is a discretionary trial court decision on
the propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, but a
determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is a question of law
8 The award of costs set forth in the amended judgment is $70,517.87.
The $7,364.08 difference between this amount and the $63,153.79 amount
awarded pursuant to section 1717 represents recoverable costs determined in
parallel proceedings in which the trial court addressed a motion by Finley
and Adams to tax costs.
6
to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner
Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751.)9
A. Entitlement to Fees and Costs
Turning to the first of Finley and Adams’s two contentions, we
commence our analysis with the text of section 1717:
“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred
to enforce that contract, shall be awarded . . . to the
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be
the party prevailing on the contract . . . shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”
(§ 1717, subd. (a).)
Interpreting this language, our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
“primary purpose of section 1717 is to ensure mutuality of remedy for
attorney fee claims under contractual attorney fee provisions.” (Santisas
v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 610 (Santisas); see also Trope v. Katz (1995)
11 Cal.4th 274, 285, 289.)
Sometimes, as here, “a person sued on a contract containing a provision
for attorney fees to the prevailing party defends the litigation ‘by successfully
arguing the inapplicability, invalidity, unenforceability, or nonexistence of
the same contract.’ ” (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 611.) “To ensure
mutuality of remedy in this situation, it has been consistently held that when
9 Some reviewing courts have said the amount of an attorney fee award
should be reversed for an abuse of discretion if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd.” (Wash v. Banda-Wash (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 561, 573.)
Others have gone so far as to say the amount of a fee award should be
reversed only if it shocks the conscience, suggesting that passion and
prejudice influenced the court’s determination as to the fees. (Dragones
v. Calkins (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1085.) We conclude that, in the
circumstances presented in this case, no error occurred irrespective of which
formulation is applied.
7
a party litigant prevails in an action on a contract by establishing that the
contract is invalid, inapplicable, unenforceable, or nonexistent, section 1717
permits that party’s recovery of attorney fees whenever the opposing parties
would have been entitled to attorney fees under the contract had they
prevailed.” (Ibid.)
In this case, given the existence of the fee and cost shifting provision in
the amended CC&Rs, Finley and Adams would have been entitled to recover
fees and costs from Gantz under the amended CC&Rs had they prevailed on
the portion of their breach of contract claim in which they alleged that Gantz
had breached the amended CC&Rs. But they did not prevail on that portion
(or any portion) of the breach of contract claim. Instead Gantz did, because
he succeeded in persuading the court that the amended CC&Rs were invalid
(due to issues pertaining to the vote tally methodology) and/or inapplicable
(due to issues pertaining to timing). Thus, by operation of the mutuality
principle articulated in Santisas and Trope (see ante), Gantz is entitled to
recover fees and costs from Finley and Adams.10
10 In an effort to avoid the effect of Santisas, Finley and Adams argue the
mutuality principle is not triggered under the unique circumstances of this
case because the court’s finding that the vote on amending the CC&Rs
occurred too late to render that instrument applicable to construction of the
deck and gazebo means that, even if they had prevailed in establishing that
the amended CC&Rs were valid, they would not have been entitled to fees
and costs. But the applicable inquiry under Santisas is not whether Finley
and Adams would have been entitled to fees and costs if they had prevailed in
establishing that the amended CC&Rs were valid. Rather, it is whether they
would have been entitled to fees and costs if they had prevailed in
establishing that the amended CC&Rs were breached. (Santisas, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 610.)
8
B. Amount of Fees and Costs
To say Gantz is entitled to recover fees and costs he incurred in
defending against Finley and Adams’s claim that he breached the amended
CC&Rs is not to say he is entitled to recover all fees and costs he incurred in
relation to the claims in this case. Seizing on this distinction, Finley and
Adams argue that, for a variety of reasons, the amount should be whittled
down.
1. Apportionment
One of Finley and Adams’s arguments in support of reducing the
amount of fees beyond the level to which the trial court reduced them is that,
“at best, [Gantz] may only recover attorney fees and costs relating to [claims
that Gantz breached] the amended [CC&Rs]” (italics added)—i.e., as
distinguished from fees and costs relating to claims that he breached the
original CC&Rs or caused a nuisance—because it is only the amended
CC&Rs that contain a provision entitling the prevailing party to an award of
fees and costs and because that provision is narrowly drawn. Thus, for
example, with regard to fees and costs Gantz incurred in defending against
their claims that he breached the original CC&Rs, Finley and Adams cite
Brittalia Ventures v. Stuke Nursery Co., Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 17 for
the proposition that the fee-shifting provision in one contract must not be
used as a basis on which to award fees incurred with regard to claims
alleging the breach of a different contract.
Similarly, as to the fees and costs Gantz incurred defending against
their nuisance claims, Finley and Adams cite Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, for the proposition that, “[w]here a cause of action
based on [a] contract providing for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes
of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees
under section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action” (id., at p. 129,
9
italics added), and the court may apportion out fees for the non-contract
claims; and they allege that the fee and cost shifting provision in the
amended CC&Rs “is not broad enough to include an award of fees for the tort
cause of action for nuisance.” These assertions are, in essence, an argument
for apportionment of fees and costs among and within causes of action.
But the apportionment argument is not persuasive in the
circumstances of this case because the CC&Rs that Finley and Adams placed
in issue in the complaint were restrictions that were common to both sets of
CC&Rs and because one of those common restrictions, by its terms, literally
forbade creation of a nuisance. (See ante.) Thus the tasks that Gantz’s
attorneys performed to defend against Finley and Adams’s claims that he had
created a nuisance and the tasks they performed to defend against the claims
that he had breached the original CC&Rs were inextricably intertwined with
the tasks they performed to defend against the claims that he had breached
the amended CC&Rs.11 Consequently, the fees and costs were not subject to
apportionment (see Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1177-1178 [referencing the “[m]any cases address[ing]
the issue of attorney fees in the context where claims are ‘so intertwined as to
make it impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorneys’ time’ ”
11 In furtherance of the apportionment argument, Finley and Adams
assert that they alleged nuisance both “as a breach of contract claim
pursuant to [one of the restrictions in the original CC&Rs (see ante, fn. 5)]”
and as “statutory tort claims pursuant to Civil Code section 3479,” and that
fees and costs incurred in defending against the statutory nuisance claims
should be excluded from an award of fees and costs pursuant to a contractual
fee and cost shifting provision. But they then undercut this argument by
acknowledging that what they characterize as the claim for “breach of
contract for nuisance is premised on [their] establishing the tort of nuisance.”
10
“into compensable and noncompensable units”]); and the trial court did not
err in so concluding.
2. Matters Allegedly Not Resolved
Another argument Finley and Adams make in their effort to reduce the
award of fees and costs is that the court did not rule on all of the issues they
presented. In support of this argument, they assert: that the trial court “did
not decide whether the deck and yurt violate the [original CC&Rs’] view
protections”; that the court’s failure to decide this issue means the issue did
not yield Gantz a favorable result; and, therefore, that they should not have
to pay whatever portion of fees Gantz incurred in connection with this issue.
But in fact this issue was decided, and it did yield Gantz a favorable result.
(See Finley, supra, D082623.)
3. Fees Prior to Filing
Finley and Adams also argue that any award should exclude attorney
fees (totaling $11,535 over the course of nine months) that Gantz incurred
between the date that Finley first wrote to him to express concerns about the
deck and gazebo and the date the lawsuit was initiated. They base this
argument on the fact that the fee and cost shifting provision, by its terms, is
triggered only “[i]n the event [that] legal action is commenced to enforce the
provisions of [the amended CC&Rs].”12 But the fact that such a provision is
triggered only if litigation is commenced does not necessarily mean that fees
incurred before the litigation is commenced do not come within its scope, and
the fact that an attorney performs a task before a lawsuit is initiated does not
12 Although Finley and Gantz contend it was error for the trial court to
award attorney fees that Gantz incurred in connection with tasks performed
before the lawsuit was initiated, they do not suggest that such tasks, or the
amounts of time or fees corresponding to such tasks, were unreasonable.
11
perforce render that task any less useful for the ensuing litigation, or any less
reasonable, than that task would have been had the attorney waited until
after the lawsuit was initiated before performing it. (See, e.g., Stokus
v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 655 [“nothing in . . . section [1717]
precludes compensation for fees incurred prior to filing the complaint, where
fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred at that time by the prevailing
party”; “ ‘if suit is filed, there is no sound reason why the trial court should
exclude these prior services in determining a reasonable fee merely because
performed before the action is commenced”].13)
4. Fees on Fees
In addition to the arguments discussed above, Finley and Adams also
argue that any award should exclude attorney fees or costs that Gantz
incurred in litigating whether, and in what amount, fees or costs should be
awarded. But they articulate no sound rationale as to why such fees should
be considered unreasonable under the circumstances presented in this case.
As noted ante, the fee and cost shifting provision states that, if
litigation is commenced to enforce the provisions of the amended CC&Rs,
“the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs of suit and reasonable attorney
fees.” Such litigation was commenced. Gantz was the prevailing party. By
operation of the fee provision, the fact that he was the prevailing party
entitled him to reasonable attorney fees. Yet, because Finley and Adams
13 Finley and Gantz endeavor to distinguish Stokus by pointing out that it
was an unlawful detainer matter and that the pre-filing fees in that case had
been incurred during the pendency of two previous cases pertaining to the
same tenancy. But neither of these circumstances undercuts the soundness
of the principles espoused in Stokus, as applied to the circumstances of this
case.
12
vigorously resisted this entitlement, he was put to the additional expense of
incurring yet more attorney fees to justify his entitlement.
Under the circumstances presented, it was not unreasonable for Gantz
to incur the additional attorney fees necessary to overcome Finley and
Adams’s resistance—or for the court to include such fees in its award. (See
generally Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 580 [“it is
well established that plaintiffs and their attorneys may recover attorney fees
for fee-related matters”]; Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 632–633
(Serrano) [“ ‘absent facts rendering the award unjust, parties who qualify for
a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent, including those on fee-
related matters’ ”]; Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. (1987) 190
Cal.App.3d 1051, 1062 (Bruckman) [stating “it has been held that when an
amount of attorney’s fees is statutorily authorized, the reasonable expense of
preparing the application for fees should be included in the award” and
affirming award of prevailing party attorney fees pursuant to the statutory
authorization furnished by section 1717]; Estate of Trynin (1989) 49 Cal.3d
868, 874–875 (Trynin) [citing Bruckman and section 1717 in support of
statement that, “[w]here the right to counsel fees is based on statute,
recovery for fee-related services has been consistently allowed”]; Ketchum
13
v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 (Ketchum); Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d
at p. 639.)14)
5. Additional Arguments
Finley and Adams make a variety of additional arguments in which
they assert in fleeting and conclusory fashion that the defense was
overstaffed, its experts were unqualified, there were too many meetings, the
judge who awarded fees and costs was ill suited to do so (having not presided
at trial), and the fees were “excessive,” “exorbitant,” “astonishing,”
“staggering,” and “shocking,” especially when juxtaposed against the
magnitude of the damages that Finley and Adams had sought or of the
amount it would have cost for Gantz to remove the deck and gazebo.15 But,
14 Finley and Gantz endeavor to distinguish Ketchum and Serrano, supra,
on the basis that the fee awards in these cases were premised on statutory
fee-shifting provisions applicable to anti-SLAPP or private attorney general
(Serrano) proceedings. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141 [fee
award pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16]; Serrano, supra 32 Cal.3d at
p. 639 [fee award pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc., § 1021.5].) We agree with
Finley and Gantz that these provisions have the salutary effect of
“encourag[ing] public participation in matters of public significance” and
“encourag[ing] attorneys to represent indigent clients.” But we do not agree
that the fact that contractual fee-shifting provisions rendered enforceable by
application of section 1717 are not rooted in such lofty objectives precludes
awards of fees on fees in the section 1717 context. (See generally Bruckman,
supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1062; Trynin, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 874–875.)
15 Although (for reasons discussed post) we need not address the
argument that the award was excessive because it dwarfed the magnitude of
relief that Finley and Adams sought, we note that, even if this argument
were adequately supported, it would not succeed. (See Harman v. City and
County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 421 [“[t]here is ‘no
mathematical rule requiring proportionality between compensatory damages
and attorney’s fees awards’ ”].)
14
inasmuch each of these arguments consists of little more than a sentence or a
sentence fragment, and inasmuch as none of these arguments (as presented
in Finley and Adams’s opening brief) is supported with citations to the
record, they need not be addressed. (Helm v. City of Los Angeles (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1228 [“It is not our role to scour the record to find
evidence to support [a party’s] contention . . . . That burden is [the party’s]
alone.”]; WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must
supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record. Rather than scour the record unguided,
we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when
it is not supported by accurate citations to the record. [Citation.] Similarly,
we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent
legal authority.”].)
Finley and Adams’s final argument is an invitation to this court to
evaluate “[w]hether . . . passion and prejudice influenced the [trial court’s]
determination” of the award of fees and costs, and to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court. We find in the record no basis on which to conclude
the award was influenced by passion, by prejudice, or by any other variety of
bias, and we decline the invitation to substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court.
15
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Gantz is entitled to costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
16
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