CourtListener 10782866•People v. Parra CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/2/26 P. v. Parra CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086372
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR-19-000322)
v.
MARIO JAVIER PARRA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Nancy A.
Leo, Judge.
Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Brook A.
Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Mario Javier Parra was convicted by jury of the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder of Omar Castaneda (Pen Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a);
count 1); the attempted voluntary manslaughter of Jovina Mendoza (§§ 664, 192,
subd. (a); count 2); discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 3);
two counts of first degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (a); counts 4 & 5); active participation
in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 7); being a felon in possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 8 & 10); and unlawful possession of ammunition
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); counts 9, 11 & 12). The jury also found true gang enhancements
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) as to counts 1 through 5 and 8 through 11. It also found true
firearm use enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) as to
counts 1 through 3, based on a principal’s personal and intentional discharge of a firearm
causing great bodily injury, and subdivision (b) as to counts 4 and 5.2 Parra was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 years to life in state prison plus a determinate term
of 20 years eight months.3
Parra raises multiple claims on appeal. First, he contends the trial court erred in
denying his Batson/Wheeler4 motion, challenging the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges against two jurors based on their sexual orientation. Second, he argues that
the gang enhancements and the substantive gang offense must be reversed considering
1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 Parra was tried jointly with codefendant Carlos Alejandro Armenta Bautista, Jr.,
who alone was charged with making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 6). Bautista
is not a party to this appeal.
3 The reporter’s transcript reflects the trial court imposed consecutive terms totaling
20 years plus 25 years to life, although at one point the court stated the aggregate term
imposed was “22 years, eight months plus 25-to-life.” The discrepancy, which is also
reflected on the abstract of judgment, appears to result from a clerical error in calculating
the aggregate determinate term. Because we conclude the matter must be remanded for a
full resentencing hearing, we need not order correction of the record.
4 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.
2.
the amendments to section 186.22 enacted by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333). Third, he asserts the trial court erred by instructing the jury
on the kill zone theory of attempted murder. Fourth, he contends there is insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. Fifth, he
claims the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on accomplice liability (CALCRIM
No. 335) for counts 8 through 11. Sixth, he argues the prosecutor committed misconduct
during her comments in closing argument. Seventh, he contends the court’s rulings
improperly prevented him from impeaching a key prosecution witness with the witness’s
prior inconsistent statements. Eighth, he asserts the court improperly excluded a defense
expert from testifying as a sanction for delayed discovery of the witness. Ninth, he
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the firearm use enhancements
attached to counts 4 and 5. Tenth, he argues the court erred by failing to instruct the jury
on unanimity as to count 12. Finally, he contends that his sentence on count 2 for
attempted voluntary manslaughter is unauthorized.
We reach the following conclusions: First, Parra’s challenges to the trial court’s
use of and instruction on the kill zone theory as to count 2 do not support reversal of his
convictions for premeditated attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter.
Because the jury did not convict Parra under the kill zone theory, any errors in giving or
modifying the instruction were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we agree
with Parra that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction on count 2 for
attempted voluntary manslaughter, and that conviction must be reversed. Second, we
conclude the court’s use of the pre-Assembly Bill 333 pattern jury instruction was
prejudicial. This requires reversal of the gang enhancements, the substantive gang
offense (count 7), and the related section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1)
gang-related firearm use enhancements. Third, we conclude, consistent with a claim by
the Attorney General, that Parra’s sentence on count 1 is unauthorized. The court
imposed a determinate term of seven years for the premeditated attempted murder of
Castaneda, but the statutory sentence is an indeterminate term of seven years to life.
3.
Finally, we have considered Parra’s remaining claims and find them either meritless, or
moot in light of our conclusion that a full resentencing hearing is required on remand.
(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) We therefore affirm the judgment in
part, reverse in part, and remand the matter to the superior court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 12, 2021, by a second amended information, the Stanislaus County
District Attorney’s Office charged Parra with the following crimes: the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Castaneda and Mendoza, respectively
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1 & 2); discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle
(§ 246; count 3); two counts of first degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (a); counts 4 & 5);
active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 7); two counts of
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 8 & 10); and
three counts of unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); counts 9, 11 &
12). As to counts 1, 2, and 3, it was alleged that a principal personally used and
intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53,
subds. (d), (e)(1).) As to counts 4 and 5, it was alleged that Parra personally used a
firearm during the commission of the offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) And, that
counts 1 through 5, and 8 through 11 were committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
On July 29, 2021, the jury found Parra guilty on counts 1, 3 through 5, and 7
through 12, and found true the firearm and gang enhancements alleged as to those counts.
With respect to count 1, the jury further found that Parra acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation in the attempted murder. As to count 2, the jury acquitted Parra of
attempted murder but convicted him of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a)).
On April 21, 2023, the trial court sentenced Parra.
A timely notice of appeal followed.
4.
The Olympia Street Drive-by Shooting (Counts 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9)
On February 19, 2018, at approximately 1:53 p.m., Omar Castaneda was driving
his pickup on Olympia Street in Modesto when he stopped at a friend’s house. His
girlfriend, Jovina Mendoza, was in the passenger seat. Castaneda was an active Sureño
gang member.
Castaneda parked facing south on the left side of Olympia Street, got out of the
truck, and went inside. Mendoza stayed in the truck, where the radio was playing loudly.
She was sitting on her knees, facing the driver’s side, hunched over the center console,
and using her phone as she waited. A few minutes later, Castaneda returned and quickly
got back into the driver’s seat. Almost immediately, he heard “a lot of bangs.” Mendoza
had been shot.
Castaneda did not see who fired at his truck or know the reason for the shooting.
Mendoza did not see or hear the gunshots but felt a stinging sensation in her thigh as they
drove away. Castaneda quickly drove her to the hospital, where she was treated for a
gunshot wound to her right buttock.
Castaneda testified he could not distinguish between old and new damage because
his truck already had bullet holes from a prior shooting. Mendoza, however, testified that
four bullet holes in the passenger door, depicted in People’s Exhibit No. 10, were new.
She also observed fresh rips in the seat fabric where she had been sitting.
J.M. was sitting in a parked car at his cousin’s residence nearby when he heard
gunshots and ducked down. He saw a gold brown sedan speed away northbound toward
Richie’s Market.
T.W. was hanging out in front of his brother’s residence on Olympia Street. He
saw a silver GMC Silverado heading south on Olympia Street with loud music park
across the street. A northbound four door sedan with four occupants then pulled up
alongside the truck, stopping in the middle of the street as the vehicles faced opposite
directions. T.W. saw the glint of a gun and then a flash from the rear passenger window.
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He ducked as four to five gunshots rang out. T.W. observed the sedan speed north while
the Silverado drove south.
Sergeant Darwin Hatfield of the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department recovered
three .223-caliber shell casings and a copper jacketing fragment. He opined that the
bullets could have been fired from any of several types of rifles, including an AR-15 style
rifle. He specifically opined that the casings “came from a .223 caliber-sized handgun.”
Hatfield also observed “acceleration marks” on the roadway consistent with rapid
movement in both the northbound and southbound directions of the 1700 block of
Olympia Street.
Deputy Barry Ballance of the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department contacted
Castaneda at the hospital and observed bullet holes in his pickup. Castaneda first stated
that he was driving with Mendoza when a small sedan fired at him, but moments later
said he had been outside the truck when the shooting occurred. He described the suspect
vehicle as a small, brownish four-door car.
Sergeant Tom Letras with the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department reviewed
surveillance footage from Richie’s Market, located on Olympia Street and Butte Avenue.
A light brown Toyota sedan was depicted turning from westbound Butte Avenue onto
southbound Olympia Street at 1:53 p.m., returning two minutes later. A still image
showed a driver in a red hoodie with white drawstrings, but the license plate was
unreadable.
Sergeant David Thompson with the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department
identified the license plate of the suspect vehicle.
Detective David Corder of the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department testified
that two days before the shooting, he saw the Toyota parked at a residence on
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Glenn Avenue, with Parra standing nearby.5 Parra was wearing a red zip-up sweatshirt
with white drawstrings.
On March 1, 2018, Corder observed the suspect vehicle while on patrol and
initiated a traffic stop. Alberto was driving, Elias Ruis was in the front passenger seat,
and Parra was seated in the back. Parra was wearing a red True Religion hoodie with
white drawstrings. A .223-caliber spent shell casing was recovered from underneath the
back seat.
Thompson believed Parra was the driver in the surveillance video still based on his
clothing. However, he acknowledged that Instagram photos depicting Alberto, or
possibly his twin brother, appeared to show Alberto wearing a similar sweatshirt to the
one Parra was wearing. The Instagram photograph or post was dated just six days after
the shooting.
Hector Lopez, a former affiliate of the Deep South Side Modesto (DSSM) gang,
testified under a plea and immunity agreement. Lopez was a passenger in the Toyota
during the shooting. He explained that earlier that day, he, Parra, Carlos Bautista, and
Luis Casarez were hanging out at a residence. Parra borrowed Alberto’s car, and the four
left to transport “the pistol AR, the mini AR.”
Parra drove down Olympia Street, where Castaneda lived.
Castaneda was a known Sureño. He had previously taunted Parra and his companions by
flashing gang signs at them and waving a gun in their direction.6
After spotting Castaneda’s truck, Parra made a U-turn, saw Castaneda approaching
his truck, and asked, “ ‘Well, who’s going to shoot him?’ ” Lopez handed the gun to
Casarez, who was seated in the rear right seat. When Casarez hesitated, Parra told him
5 We refer to Alberto Bautista by his first name throughout the remainder of this
opinion since he shares the same last name as Parra’s codefendant, Carlos Bautista. No
disrespect is intended.
6 Lopez testified that one of the taunting incidents may have occurred just prior to
the shooting, but admitted some confusion as to the temporal proximity of events, stating
that the taunting occurred on multiple occasions.
7.
that he was going to do it and that “ ‘he was a b[****] if he didn’t .…’ ” Parra then
slowed or stopped next to the truck, and Casarez fired up to five shots.
Lopez stated that following the shooting, they threw some of the expended shell
casings into a canal on Dallas Street.
The Avon Street Home Invasion (Counts 4, 5, 7, 10, 11)
On April 11, 2018, A.M. was visiting his friend, M.M., at her residence on Avon
Street. Just before midnight, they were about to eat when they heard persistent knocks at
the front door. M.M. asked who was there several times but no one answered. Moments
later, they heard a window break and the front door being forced open. A.M. and M.M.
ran to separate bedrooms.
In her bedroom, M.M. tried to call 911 but was too flustered to unlock her phone,
so she threw it under the bed. An intruder, later identified as codefendant Carlos
Bautista, entered the bedroom, pointed a small handgun at her, told her not to look at him,
and struck her on the head with the gun three times. She described him as chubby, with
long, curly hair, wearing a black shirt and dark jeans.
Meanwhile, A.M. was in another bedroom when an intruder entered, hit him, and
took his phone. He could not see the assailant.
Bautista dragged M.M. into her brother’s room by her hair, threw her on the floor
next to A.M., and held them both at gunpoint. M.M. thought she was going to die.
Bautista pressed the gun to the back of A.M.’s head, threatened to kill him, and
demanded money and car keys. When A.M. looked up, he was struck in the head with
the gun and punched in the stomach. Bautista took rings from A.M.’s fingers and
threatened to cut them off if they did not hand over money.
M.M. heard other intruders ransacking the residence. Another man entered the
room and warned that someone was outside. Before fleeing, the intruders took M.M.’s
car keys and told her not to call the police.
A.M. lost rings and his phone; M.M. lost her keys, purse, phone, and passport.
Both later viewed photo lineups and identified Bautista as the “chubby” intruder. M.M.
8.
was 80 percent certain, noting his long hair obscured part of his face, while A.M. was
certain of his identification.
Officers found a loaded handgun magazine on the front porch of the residence, and
a 9mm handgun, without a magazine, on the other side of the back fence along Sonora
Avenue. A shoeprint was located near the gun. Latent palm and fingerprints recovered
from a baby monitor camera that was inside the residence matched Bautista’s prints
through a database search, which was later confirmed by examiners.
On March 24, 2018, prior to the Avon Street robbery, Detective Brock Dias with
the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department followed Parra, who was driving a white
Infiniti, to Bautista’s apartment complex. Bautista was one of the passengers in Parra’s
vehicle. Dias surreptitiously installed a GPS tracking device on the vehicle.
Data from the GPS tracker showed the Infiniti leaving 1381 Inyo at 11:00 p.m. on
April 11, 2018. It arrived on Avon Street at 11:20 p.m., was on Sonora Avenue at
11:26 p.m., returned to Avon Street between 11:37 p.m. and 11:43 p.m., and then went
back to 1381 Inyo at 12:39 a.m. These time frames coincide with the home invasion on
Avon Street.
At 12:54 a.m., the vehicle arrived at Bautista’s residence. At 1:37 a.m., it was at a
Denny’s restaurant, where surveillance video showed Parra, Bautista, and Lopez arriving
together and leaving at 2:30 a.m., before returning to Bautista’s residence at 2:35 a.m.
Lopez admitted he was one of the three perpetrators who entered the Avon
residence. He testified that earlier that day, he and Bautista were together when Parra
arrived and suggested robbing a residence where pounds of methamphetamine were
supposedly stored in a safe. Bautista agreed, but they needed another person, so they
recruited nongang member Kai Fierra.
Parra drove the group in the white Infiniti. Bautista may have been armed with a
nine-millimeter handgun.
Parra drove to an acquaintance’s residence on Inyo Street and retrieved a mini-AR
from the trunk of a parked car. After stopping at a smoke shop on Crow’s Landing, he
9.
drove the group to the Avon Street residence, where he remained in the car while the
others went inside. Bautista carried the nine-millimeter handgun and Kai had the
mini-AR. Bautista broke a window with his gun, dropping the magazine in the process,
and Lopez then kicked down the front door.
Inside, Bautista yelled at the victims and forced them into a bedroom, while Lopez
and Kai searched for the safe, which they eventually found in a back room. Lopez saw
Bautista strike a victim and take his ring, and Kai removed valuables from a closet.
When Lopez thought someone was arriving, he told the others it was time to leave. They
fled out the back, jumped the fence, and ran to Parra’s vehicle. Bautista, who struggled to
get over the fence, dropped his gun in the process.
Lopez testified that the safe was empty. The group left it, along with the other
stolen property, with Kai. Kai stayed behind while the others went first to the smoke
shop and then to Denny’s. After the home invasion, Parra sold his vehicle to a friend.
Unlawful Possession of Ammunition (Count 12)
On January 3, 2019, during the course of an investigation, the Stanislaus County
Sheriff’s Department Air Support Unit observed Yobani Yepez and Oleg Arreola passing
guns and ammunition over the fence between 1309 and 1313 Inyo Avenue to a transient.
They wrapped the items in a blue tarp and attempted to bury them.
During a subsequent search, deputies recovered an AR-15 style rifle, multiple
handguns (including a Glock), magazines, several boxes of .223-caliber ammunition, and
both live and spent .223-caliber casings. The prosecutor told jurors that count 12 was
based on all the ammunition recovered from 1309 and 1313 Inyo Avenue on January 3,
2019.
Sheriff’s deputies observed several vehicles parked in the driveway of 1309 Inyo
Avenue, including a green Range Rover SUV and a black Infiniti sedan. Documents with
Parra’s name were found in the Range Rover. A hidden compartment in the center
console of the black Infiniti contained cash, a cell phone, two handgun magazines, and a
10.
baggie of live ammunition. Lopez testified that Parra drove a gray Infiniti with a stash
spot in the center console.
A bedroom in the residence at 1309 Inyo Avenue contained clothing and
paperwork with Parra’s name on it. Days later, Parra was seen wearing one such item,
specifically, a hoodie with the word “Cookies” on it. Photographs posted to Parra’s
Instagram account showed Parra in what appeared to be the same bedroom, holding
handguns and wearing clothing later found there.
After the search, deputies surveilled the residence on 1309 Inyo Avenue, believing
that Parra would return there because he likely lived there. When he did, he was arrested.
The Gang Evidence
The prosecutor theorized that Parra and codefendant Bautista were members of the
DSSM Norteño criminal street gang and that the shooting and the robbery were
committed for the benefit of the gang. Witnesses who testified for the prosecutor
explained that DSSM is a subset of the larger Norteño criminal street gang, which
operates under the Nuestra Familia (NF) prison gang.
Based on a hypothetical mirroring the February 19, 2018 shooting, Stanislaus
County Sheriff Detective Brock Dias, the prosecutor’s gang expert, opined that the
offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote or further gang conduct. He
explained that the crime would instill fear in rival Sureños and enhance the perpetrators’
reputations. In addition to the hypothetical, Dias also offered opinions based on the facts
of the case, testifying that the crime elevated DSSM members and, because it was carried
out by three DSSM gang members, was committed “in association with other gang
members.” He added that such an offense would help the Norteño gang protect its
territory, which was important for revenue-producing crimes such as drug sales, and for
recruiting new members.
With respect to the home invasion, Dias testified that such a crime would benefit
the entire gang because proceeds from the robbery would be taxed and sent to jail to
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support members of the NF. He further explained that the offense would enhance the
perpetrators’ reputations by demonstrating a willingness to put in work for the gang.
Dias explained that such a crime would also be committed in association with the gang,
given the perpetrators’ claimed membership in the gang.
The prosecutor presented detailed evidence demonstrating that Parra was an active
DSSM gang member at the time of the crimes. Dias testified that Parra used the gang
monikers “P” and “Money” and had several DSSM-related tattoos, including a script “D”
on his ring finger (symbolizing “marriage” to the gang), a Monopoly man on his hand
(representing the pursuit of money), and the one dot/four dot symbol on his face. He was
known to flash DSSM hand signs and to tag (graffiti) DSSM territory with his moniker.
Between 2016 and 2018, law enforcement contacted Parra multiple times. On
those occasions, he admitted active DSSM membership, was observed with gang tattoos
and clothing, was in the company of other Norteño gang members, or was otherwise
documented as an active DSSM gang member.
Lopez testified that Parra, Bautista, and Casarez were all active DSSM gang
members. When he was active in the gang, Lopez observed Parra and Bautista throwing
gang signs, and that Parra would often tag DSSM gang indicia.
As to Parra specifically, Lopez stated that he recruited younger individuals into the
gang and directed them to commit crimes. Lopez explained that younger members were
expected to “put in some type of work” for the gang by committing home invasions and
shootings. In the context of drive-by shootings, younger members were expected to take
possession of the gun because, if caught, they would only be sent to juvenile hall.
DISCUSSION
I. Codefendant Bautista’s Batson/Wheeler Motion
Parra contends the trial court erred in denying his codefendant’s Batson/Wheeler
motion, arguing that the totality of the circumstances supported an inference the
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against two jurors in same-sex relationships
with a discriminatory purpose. The Attorney General responds that the claim is forfeited
12.
and, in any event, lacks merit. Parra further argues that, if the claim was not preserved,
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to join in Bautista’s Batson/Wheeler motion. We
conclude the Batson/Wheeler motion was properly denied.
A. Forfeiture/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Attorney General argues that because Parra failed to join in Bautista’s
Batson/Wheeler motion, Parra has forfeited his claim.
Parra acknowledges that he did not object or otherwise join in codefendant
Bautista’s Batson/Wheeler motion, a circumstance that generally results in forfeiture.
(See generally People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1048 [failure to timely join a
codefendant’s motion forfeits appellate review]; see also People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 316 [failure to make a Wheeler motion forfeits appellate review of a claim
that certain groups of prospective jurors were improperly excluded from the petit jury].)
However, Parra argues that his claim was not forfeited because (1) waiver and
forfeiture principles do not apply to Batson/Wheeler motions; (2) his counsel and
Bautista’s counsel acted jointly during voir dire; and (3) any objection would have been
futile in light of the trial court’s denial of Bautista’s motion.
Contrary to Parra’s assertion, Batson/Wheeler claims must be timely raised or they
are forfeited. (See People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 662 [“In order to
preserve a Batson/Wheeler claim based on the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges, the
defendant must make a timely objection”].) We also reject Parra’s contention that his
claim was preserved through his codefendant’s objection. As courts have explained, “a
defendant cannot take advantage of objections made by a codefendant in the absence of a
stipulation or understanding to that effect.” (People v. Cooper (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 200,
205.) Parra identifies no portion of the record suggesting that such a stipulation was
made or such an understanding occurred here.
Nevertheless, we accept Parra’s assertion that any objection would have been
futile, thereby excusing the lack of a timely objection. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 44
Cal.4th 758, 793 [“A litigant need not object, however, if doing so would be futile”].)
13.
Our conclusion is based not on the trial court’s finding that Bautista failed to make a
prima facie showing, but on the fact that any objection by counsel would have been
substantively meritless. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [counsel’s failure to
make a futile or unmeritorious objection is not deficient performance].) As explained
below, our conclusion forecloses Parra’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Background
On May 27, 2021, jury selection commenced. Because of the pandemic, voir dire
was conducted in five groups of approximately 19 to 20 prospective jurors over several
days, rather than with a single larger panel of 100. During the initial stage of voir dire,
prospective jurors were asked about their occupation, marital or relationship status, the
occupation of their spouse or significant other, their city of residence, whether they had
children and if those children were adults, their children’s occupations, and any prior jury
service.
No questions were asked regarding sexual orientation, and prospective jurors were
not asked to identify their gender or the gender of their spouse or significant other.
Consequently, the record does not reveal the sexual orientation of most prospective
jurors. For example, some prospective jurors either did not indicate whether they had a
significant other or stated that they did not have one, while others referred to a spouse or
partner in gender-neutral terms.
Prospective Juror G.C., questioned as part of the fourth panel, stated that she was a
retired preschool teacher living in Modesto with her spouse, whom she identified using
female pronouns. She also stated that she had three adult children and had never
previously served on a jury. When asked during defense voir dire whether she could
reach a verdict based on the evidence even if the defendant did not testify, she responded,
“I think I could just look at the evidence and make a decision without hearing him
testify.”
Prospective Juror C.M., part of the fifth panel, identified herself as a nanny, stated
that she had a girlfriend, and confirmed she had never served on a jury. During voir dire,
14.
she indicated she would deliberate based on the evidence but remain open to opposing
views. When asked about her experience living in Modesto, she explained that she had
lived there briefly and had not left due to concerns about violence.
In response to the prosecutor’s questioning, C.M. disagreed with another juror’s
statement that gang members do not attend baseball games, commenting: “I feel they
could possibly go to a baseball game. I think it’s ignorant to say they wouldn’t. I feel
they could be part of normal society.” When asked whether gang members who
committed a robbery at a baseball game because the victim was wearing the wrong color
would be engaging in gang activity, C.M. answered affirmatively.
The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse C.M. shortly after she
was seated in the jury box. After C.M.’s excusal, the trial court continued to refill the
jury box as challenges were exercised. Initially, 20 prospective jurors were seated, but
after repeated strikes only four remained. Another 16 jurors were then called, followed
by 11 more when the panel again dwindled. Prospective Juror G.C. was among the latter
group. As the defense exercised additional challenges, the prosecutor passed four times,
used a peremptory challenge, and then passed again.
Eight new jurors were called into the box. The parties alternated challenges, and
with her fourth peremptory in that sequence, the prosecutor excused G.C. After G.C. was
struck, counsel for codefendant Bautista asked to approach to make a Batson/Wheeler
motion, which the court deferred.
During a break in the proceedings and outside the presence of the jury, Bautista’s
trial counsel made a Batson/Wheeler motion based on the prosecutor’s strikes of C.M.
and G.C., arguing that both appeared to be members of a protected class based on their
references to female partners. The prosecutor responded, “I don’t know what [G.C.’s]
sexual orientation is.” The trial court denied the motion, finding no prima facie showing
of discrimination.
Trial counsel explained that G.C. had mentioned her girlfriend’s profession, and
both G.C. and C.M. stated that they lived with their girlfriends. Trial counsel stated,
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“Those are, as far as I know, the only two people with a different sexual orientation, and
both of them have been stricken.” The court again denied counsel’s motion, finding no
prima facie showing.
Voir dire then continued, and a jury was ultimately sworn.
C. Applicable Law: Batson/Wheeler
Our federal and state constitutions prohibit a prosecutor from striking a
prospective juror based on personal characteristics that are unrelated to the ability to
serve impartially, such as race, sex, ethnicity, or as relevant here, sexual orientation.
(Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522,
538 [the systematic exclusion of women from juries violates the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution; People v. Douglas (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1162, 1169 [“excluding prospective jurors solely on the basis of sexual
orientation runs afoul of the principles espoused in Batson and Wheeler”].) The
“[e]xclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and
Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal.” (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1150, 1158.)
It is presumed that the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges in a
constitutional manner. (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 755.) In evaluating a
Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court applies the three-step framework set forth in
Batson. (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 885–886.) “The ultimate burden of
persuasion [as to discriminatory purpose] rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent
of the strike.” (Id. at p. 886.)
Applying this three-step analysis to the instant case, Parra was required to
establish the following: First, he had to make a prima facie showing by producing facts
sufficient to support an inference that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent in
striking the prospective jurors. Second, if that showing was made, the burden would shift
to the prosecutor to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. Third, if such a
reason was offered, the court was required to evaluate the prosecutor’s stated rationale
16.
and determine whether Parra demonstrated “it ‘ “[is] more likely than not that the
challenge was improperly motivated.” ’ ”7 (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044,
1071.)
We review the trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion at the first step for
substantial evidence. (People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 772 (Battle).) “In
conducting our review, we remain mindful of the ‘low threshold’ showing required
for Batson’s first step. [Citation.] This step should not ‘be so onerous that a defendant
would have to persuade the judge—on the basis of all the facts, some of which are
impossible for the defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge was more likely
than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’ [Citation.] It is satisfied simply by
evidence sufficient to permit us to draw an inference that discrimination may have
occurred.” (Id. at p. 773.)
“In establishing a prima facie showing, a defendant has the burden of
demonstrating that the facts and circumstances of the case raise an inference that the
prosecutor excluded prospective jurors based on [a protected characteristic].” (People v.
Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 223, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v.
Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 834; see People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 430,
fn. 15 (Rhoades) [“it was defendant’s burden to make the record necessary to support his
motion”]; People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 916 [the moving party has the burden to
“ ‘ “make as complete a record as feasible” ’ ” to support a prima facie showing].)
In determining whether this initial burden has been met, courts consider the
totality of the relevant circumstances. (Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 773.) “Certain
7 In 2020, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 3070) which enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 (Stats. 2020,
ch. 318, §§ 1, 3). Among other changes, the statute requires the trial court to sustain a
party’s objection to the dismissal of a prospective juror if “there is a substantial likelihood
that an objectively reasonable person would view … sexual orientation … as a factor in
the use of the peremptory challenge .…” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) Because Assembly Bill 3070
only applies to jury trials occurring on or after January 1, 2022, and Parra’s trial occurred
in 2021, it does not apply to his case.
17.
types of evidence are especially relevant to this inquiry, including whether the prosecutor
has struck most or all of the members of the venire from an identified group, whether a
party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against members of that group,
whether the party has engaged prospective jurors of that group in only desultory voir dire,
whether the defendant is a member of that group, and whether the victim is a member of
the group in which the majority of the remaining jurors belong.” (Ibid.) However, the
prosecutor’s statement of reasons for excusing a prospective juror is irrelevant at the
first step and cannot be relied upon in determining whether a prima facie case of
discrimination has been made. (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390.)
D. Analysis
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that “ ‘[a]lthough circumstances may be
imagined in which a prima facie case could be shown on the basis of a single excusal, in
the ordinary case … to make a prima facie case after the excusal of only one or
two members of a group is very difficult.’ ” (Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 776.) The
instant case provides a textbook example of this principle.
We conclude that the existing record does not support a reasonable inference that
the prosecutor excused prospective jurors based on sexual orientation. Although C.M.
and G.C. were the only two prospective jurors who made statements suggesting they may
have been in same-sex relationships, there is no evidence establishing that they were the
only nonheterosexual individuals in the venire.8 Absent a more complete record, any
such inference would rest on speculation rather than evidence.
The record reflects that G.C. remained in the jury box through multiple rounds in
which the prosecutor declined to exercise a peremptory challenge. Indeed, after excusing
C.M., the prosecutor passed on the panel four times, then exercised a peremptory against
8 We accept, for purposes of analysis, that C.M. and G.C. are women, though they
did not identify themselves as women on the record. We further accept, consistent with
Parra’s framing of the issue, that their participation in same-sex relationships is relevant
to an inference regarding their sexual orientation.
18.
a different juror before passing again. Eight new jurors were then called into the box. As
the parties continued alternating challenges, the prosecutor used three additional strikes
before exercising her fourth to excuse G.C. In total, the prosecutor passed on the panel
five times while G.C. was seated, such that had the defense also passed, G.C. would have
been sworn as a juror.
“ ‘[T]he prosecutor’s passes’ do not ‘themselves wholly preclude a finding that a
panelist is struck on account of bias .…’ [Citation.] A delay in striking these jurors could
also align with a strategy to avoid detection of [sexual-orientation-based] strikes.”
(Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 777.) However, Parra fails to offer any evidence
demonstrating that “such a strategy existed here.” (Ibid.) Here, the record suggests that
the prosecutor’s decision to excuse G.C. and C.M. was not based on their sexual
orientation, but rather reflected a considered assessment of the evolving dynamics among
the prospective jurors, including their personalities and voir dire responses, as the panel’s
composition changed in response to the parties’ use of peremptory challenges.
Parra observes however that the prosecutor did not ask G.C. “ ‘any questions at
all’ ” during voir dire and asked C.M. only a single question about whether gang
members would attend baseball games, and their responses did not raise any “red flags.”
We are not persuaded that the prosecutor’s limited questioning necessarily indicates a
discriminatory motive in exercising peremptory challenges against these prospective
jurors. A peremptory challenge may be based on nothing more than a hunch or suspicion.
(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165, abrogated on other grounds by People v.
Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn 5.) Thus, while limited or desultory questioning
may be a relevant consideration in assessing a prima facie case, that alone is insufficient
to establish purposeful discrimination in the absence of other supporting evidence.
Parra further observes that all parties in this case were Hispanic and, based on that
fact, speculates that the prosecutor excused G.C. and C.M. because “gays and lesbians
would be less inclined to convict a Hispanic defendant.” Parra explains that since both
groups have historically been subject to discrimination, “there is a greater tendency for
19.
the prosecution to exclude members of [such groups].” This assertion is unsupported by
any evidence in the record and rests on a tenuous and unsubstantiated assumption about
both the prospective jurors’ sexual orientation, and their views toward defendants of a
certain ethnic background. While only an inference of discriminatory intent is required at
the first step of Batson/Wheeler, that inference must be grounded in the totality of
relevant circumstances, not conjecture.
Parra invites further speculation as to whether the trial court considered sexual
orientation as a cognizable group entitled to the same protections as race or ethnicity,
based solely on the court’s unexplained finding that no prima facie case had been
established. But the court’s absence of an express discussion about sexual orientation
does not establish legal error. Trial courts are not required to make detailed findings at
the first step of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, so long as the record supports the conclusion
that no inference of discriminatory intent was raised. (See People v. Scott, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 384.) Here, Parra offers no affirmative evidence suggesting the court failed
to apply the proper legal framework, and his argument rests entirely on speculation about
what the court may have considered, or failed to consider, in reaching its conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Parra’s Batson/Wheeler claim was
properly denied at the first stage. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to
support an inference that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent in exercising
peremptory challenges against G.C. and C.M. based on their sexual orientation.
II. Instructional Error and Assembly Bill 333
Parra was tried in 2021, and the jury was instructed using the CALCRIM
instructions in effect at that time, including CALCRIM Nos. 1400 (active participation in
criminal street gang), 1401 (felony or misdemeanor committed for benefit of criminal
street gang), and 1402 (gang-related firearm enhancement). Effective January 1, 2022,
Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22, adding new substantive elements and
procedural requirements for proving gang enhancements and the substantive offense of
active gang participation. (People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477.) Those
20.
changes apply retroactively to all convictions that had not yet reached finality at the time
Assembly Bill 333 was enacted. (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207
(Tran); People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 394.)
Parra contends that because the jury was instructed under the pre-Assembly
Bill 333 version of the law, all gang-related enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)),
including the gang-related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)), must be
stricken, and his conviction on count 7 for the substantive gang offense (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)) must be reversed. The Attorney General agrees that Assembly Bill 333 applies
retroactively to Parra’s case but argues it is unnecessary to strike the gang enhancements
or reverse the gang conviction because any instructional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
We conclude the instructional error here, which arose as a byproduct of
intervening legislation, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we
reverse the gang enhancements, the gang-related firearm enhancements, and the
substantive gang offense, all of which may be retried at the prosecutor’s election. (See
People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 610.)
A. Background: Evidence Establishing the Existence of the Gang
To prove the existence of DSSM as a criminal street gang, the prosecutor relied on
the testimony of Dias, who had investigated crimes committed by DSSM members,
including Parra, Bautista, and Lopez, and who had received extensive training on local
gangs, including the Norteños. The prosecutor also relied upon the testimony of Lopez,
who was familiar with the innerworkings of the DSSM gang, the defendants, and many of
the subjects of the predicate offenses.
Dias testified that DSSM is one of at least 20 subsets of the Norteños, who are
controlled by the NF prison gang. Drawing on his investigative experience, Dias opined
that DSSM had approximately 100 members as of 2018. He further explained that
DSSM members use common signs and symbols, including the letter “D” for DSSM, the
21.
numbers “4” and “14” referencing “N,” the 14th letter of the alphabet, and the Detroit
Tigers baseball logo.
Dias opined that the primary activities of DSSM Norteño include weapons
violations, including the possession of weapons by prohibited persons, vehicle theft,
robberies, burglaries, and selling narcotics. According to Dias, individuals may become
members of the NF by committing crimes for the gang, paying dues to the organization,
and otherwise engaging in conduct that generates revenue for the gang. Such crimes
range from narcotics sales and burglaries to more serious offenses, including home
invasion robberies.
To prove a pattern of criminal gang activity under section 186.22, the prosecutor
introduced certified court records of predicate offenses committed by DSSM members.
These included:
• In 2015, Carlos Bautista committed two separate vehicle thefts (§ 10851).
• On October 15, 2016, Parra committed felony evasion from a peace officer (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29820).
• On October 8, 2016, Jorge Gonzales, Jr., a DSSM member, possessed a controlled
substance while armed with a firearm (§ 11370.1, subd. (a)) and carried a loaded
firearm in public as an active gang member (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3)).
• On July 9, 2017, Jorge Gonzales, Jr., unlawfully possessed a weapon and
ammunition (§§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1)).
• On September 14, 2017, Parra committed felony evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2,
subd. (a)).
• On February 28, 2018, Anthony Daniel Gonzalez distributed an assault weapon
(§ 30600, subd. (a)), possessed an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a)) and
admitted a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Dias, who personally
investigated the case, opined that Gonzales was an active Norteño gang member.
• In 2018, Yobani Valencia Yepez and Alberto Bautista committed a home invasion
robbery (§ 211) with gang and firearm use enhancements (§§ 186.22,
22.
subd. (b)(1)(A), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and false imprisonment (§ 236) with a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Lopez testified that he knew both Yepez
and Alberto and identified them as DSSM gang members.
• On June 20, 2018, Luis Angel Casarez and George Arthur Muñoz II committed
first degree burglary (§ 459) and multiple counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)), each with gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Dias
testified that Casarez is a documented DSSM gang member. Lopez, who testified
that he knew both Casarez and Muñoz personally and had participated in crimes
with them, identified Casarez as an active DSSM gang member. He stated that
Muñoz was not a DSSM member but was affiliated with the “north side.”
Lopez testified that he joined DSSM at age 14 or 15 after growing up around the
gang in south Modesto. He corroborated Dias’s testimony that DSSM is a Norteño subset
with over 100 members.
According to Lopez, DSSM’s primary criminal activities include burglaries, home
invasions, robberies, and shooting rival gang members, the commission of which were
regarded as “putting in work” for the gang. He described DSSM’s hierarchical structure,
in which lower-ranking “street soldiers” could advance by putting in work for the gang or
time spent in custody.
Lopez detailed the gang’s signs and symbols, including tattoos (such as the
Old English “D,” the number 14, and one dot/four dot patterns), colors (red), and clothing
brands (True Religion), all of which must be earned. He testified that DSSM claimed
territory in the South Modesto/Crows Landing area.
According to Lopez, Norteño gang members were expected to pay a 10 percent
“tax” to the gang, with the proceeds used to support incarcerated members. With respect
to members of the Stanislaus County area Norteño subsets, however, the obligation to pay
taxes varied. Lopez explained that DSSM was one of several Stanislaus County Norteño
subsets, which also included the Deep South Side Locs, the Deep South Side Norteños,
the Deep South Side Youngsters, and the Deep Nite Owl Locs. Lopez further testified
23.
that Parra told him he owed tax money to the gang, and that Bautista had money placed
on his books by a DSSM Norteño.
Lopez testified that firearms were treated as shared gang property and were
safeguarded by members who were not on probation to avoid law enforcement detection.
He further stated that all DSSM members had access to and could use these guns.
Finally, Lopez explained that DSSM coordinated through social media, believing
that their communications could be deleted. The gang also maintained internal rules,
including prohibitions on drive-by shootings, which were regularly enforced.
B. Assembly Bill 333
“ ‘Assembly Bill 333 made the following changes to the law on gang
enhancements: First, it narrowed the definition of a “criminal street gang” to require that
any gang be an “ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Second, whereas section 186.22, former
subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members “individually or collectively engage
in” a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a “criminal street gang,” Assembly
Bill 333 requires that any such pattern have been “collectively engage[d] in” by members
of the gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Third, Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed
the definition of a “pattern of criminal activity” by requiring that (1) the last offense used
to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the
currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were
committed by two or more gang “members,” as opposed to just “persons”; (3) the
offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a
pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense. (§ 186.22,
subd. (e)(1), (2).) Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to
have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any “common benefit” be “more
than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)’ ” (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 395–396;
see also Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.)
24.
“Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but
are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual
rival gang, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or
informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
C. Harmless Error Standard for Omitted Elements in Jury Instructions
The parties agree that the jury was instructed under the pre-Assembly Bill 333
version of section 186.22 and that, as a result, the instructions omitted elements now
required under the amended statute. The relevant question here is whether those
omissions were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
When jury instructions omit elements that apply retroactively, a defendant is
entitled to remand for further proceedings unless the error is harmless. (See People v.
Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 763.) The parties agree that prejudice resulting from such
an instructional omission is reviewed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,
24 (Chapman). (See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 4; Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 1207 [when a substantive change alters the elements of an offense and the jury is not
instructed accordingly, the omission implicates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
and reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict would
have been the same absent the error].)
“In this assessment, we ‘conduct a thorough examination of the record. If, at the
end of that examination, [we] cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error—for example, where the defendant
contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary
finding—[we] should not find the error harmless.’ [Citation.] Conversely, where we
conclude ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the
same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.’ ”
(People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 449.)
25.
“ ‘In assessing prejudice in this context, the question is not whether there is
evidence in the record that would support a jury finding of the missing element. Instead,
we ask whether we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that “the jury verdict would
have been the same” had the jury been instructed on the missing element.’ [Citation.]
‘Our task, then, is to determine “whether the record contains evidence that could
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” ’ ” (People v.
Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 449; People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 261 [the
instructional error is harmless only if the reviewing court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury would have found in the defendant’s favor on
the omitted element, given the verdict and the state of the evidence].)
D. Analysis
A “criminal street gang” under newly amended section 186.22, subdivision (f), is
defined as “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons, whether
formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more
of the criminal acts enumerated in subdivision (e), having a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol, and whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged
in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” Given this definition, the question is whether we
can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence presented at trial was such that
no reasonable jury would have failed to find each of these elements satisfied.
1. Whether DSSM Was an Ongoing, Organized Association or Group of Three
or More Persons with a Common Name, Sign, or Symbol
As amended by Assembly Bill 333, section 186.22 now requires proof that a
criminal street gang is “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more
persons, … having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol[.]” (§ 186.22,
subd. (f).) Previously, the statute required only proof of an “ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons,” without expressly requiring that the
group be organized. (former § 186.22, subd. (f).)
26.
Considering the jury’s findings and the state of the evidence, we are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury would have found in Parra’s favor on
the issue of whether DSSM was an ongoing, organized association of three or more
persons with a common name, sign, or symbol. Parra does not contend otherwise.
The prosecutor presented testimony from both law enforcement and Lopez, a
former DSSM gang member. Dias, testifying as a gang expert, stated that DSSM was
one of at least 20 Norteño subsets, themselves controlled by the NF. Based on his
training and experience investigating gang crimes, Dias opined that DSSM had
approximately 100 members. He further explained that DSSM members used shared
signs and symbols, including the letter “D,” the numbers “4” and “14,” and tattoos and
clothing styles reflecting their gang affiliation. In his opinion, the gang’s primary
activities included weapons violations, vehicle thefts, robberies, burglaries, and narcotics
sales.
Lopez, in turn, confirmed that DSSM is a subset of the Norteño gang and that it
has more than 100 members who often worked in smaller groups. He described DSSM
as hierarchical, with lower-ranking “street soldiers” advancing through criminal activity
or time in custody. Although he did not opine on whether Parra held a particular rank,
Lopez testified that Parra recruited younger individuals and directed them to commit
crimes.
Lopez also testified that DSSM maintained a distinct identity through its symbols,
tattoos, colors, and clothing. He explained that DSSM claimed territory in south
Modesto, enforced internal rules (including prohibitions on drive-by shootings), expected
its members to “put in work” for the gang, and required them to pay taxes. Members also
shared firearms and communicated through social media.
Taken together, this evidence demonstrated far more than a loose affiliation of
individuals. The combined testimony of Dias and Lopez established that DSSM had a
defined membership, identifiable symbols, a hierarchical structure, organized methods of
communication, and a continuing existence within the larger Norteño network.
27.
Accordingly, although the jury instructions did not reflect the amended statutory
definition, we conclude that the omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the evidence overwhelmingly established that DSSM satisfied this element.
2. Whether DSSM Has Engaged in a Pattern of Criminal Activity
Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the definition of a “pattern of criminal gang
activity” by requiring that: (1) the last offense relied upon occurred within three years of
the commission of the currently charged offense; (2) the offenses were committed by
two or more gang “members,” rather than merely “persons”; (3) the offenses commonly
benefitted a criminal street gang; (4) the offenses establishing the pattern must be
different from the currently charged offense; and (5) the prosecution must prove that the
predicate offenses “commonly benefitted a criminal street gang” in a manner that is more
than reputational. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2); People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735,
743 (Cooper); People v. Hin (2024) 17 Cal.5th 401, 462–463 (Hin).)
Several of the alleged predicates here fail at the threshold because they are no
longer enumerated offenses under section 186.22, subdivision (e), as amended by
Assembly Bill 333. These include Bautista’s 2015 auto thefts, and Parra’s 2016 and 2017
felony evasions. Even if those crimes had once qualified, they cannot serve as predicates
under the current statute. These crimes are no longer considered qualifying predicate
crimes under amended section 186.22.
Moreover, Casarez and Muñoz’s robbery occurred on June 20, 2018, after both the
Olympia Street drive-by shooting (February 19, 2018) and the Avon Street home invasion
(April 11, 2018).9 As Parra correctly observes, “[c]rimes occurring after the charged
offense cannot serve as predicate offenses to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity.”
(People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1458.)
9 Lopez testified that he participated in the offense and that it occurred on June 19,
2018.
28.
We further note that although the record shows Yepez and Alberto were convicted
in 2018 of the home invasion, it does not disclose the date the offense was committed.
(See § 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) This omission creates ambiguity as to whether the predicate
offense may have occurred after the currently charged crimes. Because the People bear
the burden of proving each element of the gang enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt,
including the gang’s existence, we decline to presume that this predicate offense preceded
Parra’s charged crimes.
The following predicate offenses remain: Parra’s 2016 firearm possession
(§ 29800), Jorge Gonzales, Jr.’s, 2016 drug-and firearm-related convictions, Jorge
Gonzales, Jr.’s, 2017 firearm and ammunition offense, and Anthony Gonzales’s 2018
distribution of an assault weapon.10 The difficulty for the prosecution, however, is that
the record contains insufficient evidence demonstrating how almost all of these crimes
benefitted DSSM as an organization rather than merely the individual perpetrators.
“[T]he question of whether an offense is within the gang’s primary activities is
distinct from the question of whether a particular offense has ‘commonly benefited a
criminal street gang.’ (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) A jury determination regarding the gang’s
primary activities merely constitutes a conclusion about the types of activities in which a
gang typically engages, whereas the question about a common benefit asks about how the
specific predicate offense actually benefited the gang. (See People v. E.H. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 467, 473, 478–480 [finding that though the predicate offenses included
crimes that could, in theory, provide a monetary benefit to the gang, the evidence did not
10 Parra argues that Anthony Gonzales’s February 28, 2018 assault weapon
conviction cannot serve as a predicate, both because of its timing and because the
evidence was insufficient to establish his gang membership. We disagree. Contrary to
his claim, the record demonstrates that Gonzales was an active Norteño gang member,
and that the larger Norteño gang was in fact organizationally connected to DSSM. (See
People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 76.) In light of our conclusion that the record
does not contain evidence of two qualifying predicates, we do not recite the evidence
supporting our conclusion.
29.
show that these predicate offenses actually benefited the gang].)” (Cooper, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 743–744.)
Cooper is illustrative. In Cooper, our Supreme Court rejected the notion that
robbery and narcotics sales automatically qualify as predicate offenses which confer a
financial benefit to the putative gang, reasoning that such crimes may just as easily be
committed for the personal gain of individual gang members rather than to benefit the
gang as a whole. (Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 743–744.) The court explained,
“While robbery and the sale of narcotics typically provide a financial benefit to the
offender, the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding
regarding whether the fruits of the offenses were intended to or did benefit the gang as a
whole.” (Id. at p. 743.)
The prosecutor’s evidence in that case also fell short of establishing the
circumstances surrounding the predicate offenses, and because the jury had not been
instructed under the new law (Assembly Bill 333), the appellate court applied the rule
that it must “ ‘determine “whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead
to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” ’ ” (Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 742–743, quoting People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417.)
Similarly, in Hin, the court found inadequate an expert’s generic testimony that
“drug sales and burglary ‘generate[] revenue’ and thereby ‘support the gang,’ ” because
the record contained no evidence that the specific drug sale or burglary offered as a
predicate generated revenue for the gang as an organization. (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pp. 462–463.)
All but one of the predicate offenses in the case at bench suffer from the same
infirmities. Lopez testified that firearms were considered shared property of DSSM
members, safeguarded by those not on probation, and available for use by all members.
Although this testimony provided general background on DSSM’s practices, it did not
establish that the firearms underlying Jorge Gonzales, Jr.’s, or Parra’s convictions were
possessed, distributed, or used for the gang’s benefit. Although there was ample evidence
30.
demonstrating that Parra and Gonzales, Jr., were DSSM gang members, “a jury could
have reasonably concluded that the predicate offenses … were committed for personal
gain alone.”11 (Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 744.)
In contrast, the prosecutor introduced evidence that Anthony Gonzales trafficked
firearms from New Mexico into California and distributed them to Norteño gang
members. Lopez identified Gonzales as a DSSM gang member and testified that
Gonzales supplied firearms from out of state to the gang. This testimony provides clear
evidence of a nonreputational benefit to the gang. Nevertheless, the statutes and
instructions require “a pattern of criminal gang activity.” Evidence of a single predicate
offense is insufficient to establish the existence of the alleged gang under section 186.22.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the gang enhancements (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)) and the gang-related firearm use enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (d) &
(e)(1)), must be reversed, as well as the jury’s verdict on count 7 for the substantive gang
offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The prosecutor may elect to retry these allegations. In light
of our conclusion, Parra’s remaining claims challenging the gang enhancements,
including whether his current offenses were committed for the benefit of the gang, are
moot. We therefore need not and do not address them.
III. The Kill Zone Theory Instruction
Parra contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury on
the kill zone theory. He argues the evidence was insufficient to support giving the
instruction and that the modified version of the instruction was itself flawed. We agree
11 Lopez also described multiple home invasions he participated in, one of which
occurred on New Year’s Eve in 2017. But the prosecutor never made clear that she was
relying upon this crime, or any of the other home invasions committed by Lopez and
other gang member accomplices, in proving the pattern of criminal gang activity.
Moreover, upon this record, we cannot be confident that the jury would have concluded
that these home invasions were committed for the benefit of the gang rather than for
personal benefit.
31.
error occurred in both respects, but conclude the errors were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A. Background
At the conclusion of the final discussion concerning the jury instructions, Parra’s
trial counsel stated he had no objections to the instructions as given, including the
instruction on the kill zone theory.
Below is the optional bracketed kill zone pattern jury instruction for the kill zone
theory of attempted murder liability:
“[A person may intend to kill a primary target and also [a] secondary
target[s] within a zone of fatal harm or ‘kill zone.’ A ‘kill zone’ is an area
in which the defendant used lethal force that was designed and intended to
kill everyone in the area around the primary target.
“In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of <insert name
or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on
concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that the defendant not
only intended to kill <insert name of primary target alleged> but also either
intended to kill <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted
murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, or intended to kill everyone
within the kill zone.
“In determining whether the defendant intended to kill <insert name or
description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on
concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that (1) the only
reasonable conclusion from the defendant’s use of lethal force, is that the
defendant intended to create a kill zone; and (2) <insert name or description
of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent
theory> was located within the kill zone.]” (CALCRIM No. 600.)
The trial court instructed the jury on attempted murder under CALCRIM No. 600,
as modified to include the kill zone theory, as follows, with the portions Parra challenges
shown in italics:
“In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of Omar
Castaneda and Jovina Mendoza, the People must prove that the defendant
not only intended to kill Omar Castaneda but also either intended to kill
Jovina Mendoza, or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.
32.
“In determining whether the defendant intended to kill Omar
Castaneda and Jovina Mendoza, the People must prove that (1) the only
reasonable conclusion from the defendant’s use of lethal force, is that the
defendant intended to create a kill zone [around Omar Castaneda]; and
(2) Omar Castaneda and Jovina Mendoza were located within the kill
zone.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that Parra intended to kill Castaneda
because he was a rival gang member, and that Parra was also guilty of attempting to
murder Mendoza because, when Casarez fired four to six shots from an assault rifle into
the passenger compartment of Castaneda’s pickup truck, the act created a kill zone in
which Mendoza was present. The prosecutor argued that Parra aided and abetted the
attempted murders by directing the group’s search for Castaneda, urging Casarez to shoot
him, positioning the Toyota Camry to enable the shooting, and then driving away to
dispose of the shell casings.
The prosecutor explained that the kill zone theory applied to the attempted murder
of Mendoza. She never suggested that the theory could apply to either the lesser-included
offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, or to the attempted murder of Castaneda,
the intended target of the attack.
Parra’s trial counsel argued that Alberto was driving the Camry, and that Lopez
had either lied or was mistaken about Parra’s involvement. He did not address the kill
zone theory.
Bautista’s trial counsel similarly argued Bautista was merely a passenger who
played no role in the shooting, and likewise did not address the kill zone theory.
Bautista’s counsel further argued there was no evidence Bautista aided and abetted
any crime or sat in the car with an intent to kill. He asserted Bautista’s purpose was
solely to transport a gun to Santana Felix’s residence and that he harbored no homicidal
intent. Counsel briefly addressed attempted voluntary manslaughter, explaining that if
Castaneda flashed gang signs on the day of the incident, it could have provoked a heat of
passion reaction, reducing attempted murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter. But,
he raised this point only as a lesser included offense for the jury to consider, emphasizing
33.
that the prosecutor’s theory of premeditation and deliberation was unsupported and that,
at most, the evidence showed Parra made a snap decision and instructed others to shoot.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated that Parra aided and abetted the attempted
murders by suggesting the group search for Castaneda, providing the weapon used in the
drive-by shooting, driving the car, and directing Casarez to shoot.
B. General Principles of the Kill Zone Theory
“To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the
specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602
(Canizales), quoting People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) “When a single act is
charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must
be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill
cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred
intent doctrine.” (Canizales, at p. 602.)
Our Supreme Court has recognized the concept of “concurrent intent to kill as a
permissible theory for establishing the specific intent requirement of attempted murder.”
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602, italics omitted.) Under the kill zone theory, a
defendant who targets a specific individual by intending to kill everyone in the area
where that individual is located—the so-called “kill zone”—may be convicted of the
attempted murder of secondary victims within that zone. (People v. Bland (2002) 28
Cal.4th 313, 330.)
Recognizing the potential for misapplication, the Canizales court clarified that the
kill zone theory may be applied “only when a jury concludes: (1) the circumstances of
the defendant’s attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of force the
defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended
to create a zone of fatal harm—that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill
everyone present to ensure the primary target’s death—around the primary target and
(2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located
34.
within that zone of harm. Taken together, such evidence will support a finding that the
defendant harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both the primary target and
everyone within the zone of fatal harm.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) “[T]he
kill zone theory does not apply where ‘the defendant merely subjected persons near the
primary target to lethal risk. Rather, in a kill zone case, the defendant has a primary
target and reasons [that] he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in the
area in which the target is located. In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone
instruction should not be given.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Canizales court further emphasized that when “the kill zone theory is used to
support an inference that the defendant concurrently intended to kill a nontargeted victim,
… evidence of a primary target is required.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608.)
“ ‘[W]ithout a primary target, there cannot be concurrent intent because there is no
primary intent to kill as to which the intent to kill others could be concurrent.’ ” (Id. at
p. 609; People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 193 (Mumin) [“Without substantial
evidence showing the defendant acted with intent to kill a primary target, the essential
basis for a concurrent intent analysis is not satisfied”].)
C. Standard of Review
To determine whether the trial court properly instructed on the kill zone theory, we
apply the substantial evidence standard of review. Under this standard, the question is
whether the record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the
defendant intended to kill everyone within the zone of harm as a means of killing the
primary target. (Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 203.) In making this determination, we
view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and ask whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 199.)
In addition, when reviewing challenges to the wording of a jury instruction, we
evaluate the instructions as a whole and ask whether there is a reasonable likelihood the
35.
jury misunderstood or misapplied the challenged language. (People v. Nelson (2016) 1
Cal.5th 513, 544.)
D. Analysis
We conclude the trial court erred in two respects: first, by giving the kill zone
instruction in the absence of sufficient evidence, and second, by modifying CALCRIM
No. 600 in a way that risked conflating the primary target (Castaneda) with the secondary
victim (Mendoza).
As to sufficiency, the circumstances here did not establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that Casarez or his accomplices either (1) actually knew a second person was in
Castaneda’s truck, or (2) were consciously aware of a high probability that another person
was present when Casarez opened fire. The prosecutor introduced no evidence that
Casarez or his companions saw Mendoza before shooting, heard her voice, or otherwise
had any reason to be aware of her actual presence. Nor did the circumstantial evidence
support an inference that they were consciously aware another occupant was likely in the
truck. The record is silent as to whether the Camry’s occupants could see into the cab,
and eyewitnesses testified extremely loud music was playing from Castaneda’s truck,
making it unlikely anyone inside could be heard. Finally, Mendoza’s testimony that her
position in the truck passenger seat, kneeling and leaning toward the center console,
suggests she may not have been readily visible to occupants in approaching vehicles.
This evidentiary gap bears directly on whether the method of attack supported an
inference of concurrent intent to kill all occupants, as opposed to a singular intent to kill
Castaneda. In the absence of such evidence, we are skeptical that the kill zone instruction
was warranted here. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 [“Evidence that a defendant
who intends to kill a primary target acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of
serious injury or death for those around a primary target does not satisfy the kill zone
theory”]; see also People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1079 [disapproving use
of the kill zone theory where one of multiple shots discharged hit an unseen victim in a
shed where the target victim hid, explaining, “it is not possible to intend to kill someone
36.
in the vicinity of a target if the attacker has no knowledge that the person is present”];
cf. People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 564 [holding that the defendants
demonstrated a deliberate intent to take human life, beyond the targeted person, by firing
high-powered, wall-piercing firearms into inhabited dwellings]; see also People v. Adams
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1023 [concluding that a defendant may be convicted of
attempted murder under a kill zone theory even if unaware of the secondary victim’s
presence, provided the defendant recognized or accepted that anyone within the zone
could or would die as a natural and probable consequence of his act].)
Separately, we conclude that the modified instruction compounded the error by
inserting Castaneda’s name, both the primary target and intended victim, into the
paragraphs describing how to apply the kill zone theory. This wording blurred the
distinction between the primary target and the secondary victim and risked suggesting
that the jury could use the kill zone theory to establish intent to kill Castaneda himself.
Nevertheless, we are persuaded that both instructional errors were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 9, 13 [applying
Chapman where alternative-theory error has occurred].) As to Castaneda, the prosecutor
consistently argued that he was the intended target, a rival gang member whom Parra
sought to kill, and explained that Parra aided and abetted the shooting by locating
Castaneda’s truck, supplying the firearm, and directing Casarez to open fire. The
prosecutor never suggested that Castaneda’s mere presence within a “kill zone” could
establish the requisite intent to kill necessary to support a conviction for attempted
premeditated murder. Given the prosecutor’s emphasis on Parra’s intent to kill
Castaneda, the absence of any argument inviting reliance on a kill zone theory as to the
attempted murder of Castaneda, and the ample trial evidence supporting this conclusion,
there is no reasonable possibility the jury convicted on an invalid theory. Accordingly,
we conclude that the instructional error identified was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
37.
With respect to Mendoza, the jury acquitted Parra of attempted murder and instead
found him guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, an offense that by definition
requires a direct intent to kill under a mitigating circumstance and to which the kill zone
theory does not apply.12 By returning that verdict, the jury necessarily found that Parra
personally harbored an intent to kill Mendoza while acting in the heat of passion, thereby
rejecting any theory of concurrent intent authorized by the kill zone instruction.
Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor invited the jury to apply the kill
zone theory to the voluntary manslaughter charge, and the instruction itself was expressly
linked to the attempted murder count. Given the structure of the instructions and the
distinct mental state requirements of the two offenses, there is no reasonable likelihood
the jury relied on the kill zone instruction in convicting Parra of attempted voluntary
manslaughter. Accordingly, although the trial court erred in both giving and modifying
the kill zone instruction, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that neither error
contributed to the verdicts on count 1 and 2. (See Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Parra’s Conviction for the Attempted
Voluntary Manslaughter of Mendoza
Parra argues there was insufficient evidence to support instructing the jury on
attempted voluntary manslaughter, asserting that “[t]here was no evidence that Mendoza
did anything that would provoke heat of passion .…” He further contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for that offense because there was no
12 Attempted voluntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant specifically
intended to kill the named victim, although the intent is mitigated by heat of passion or
imperfect self-defense. (See People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583.) The kill
zone theory, by contrast, is a method of proving concurrent intent to kill multiple victims
to ensure the death of the primary target. (See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 596–
597.) The two concepts are incompatible. A person who acts without reflection in
response to adequate provocation does not act with malice. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56
Cal.4th 935, 942 (Beltran).) In addition, the mitigating circumstances that reduce an
intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter must be tied to the particular
victim the defendant intended to kill. (See People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 105.)
38.
proof that he or his accomplices “acted under the actual influence of a strong passion or
emotion.” We agree with Parra and conclude that his conviction on count 2 for attempted
voluntary manslaughter must be reversed.
A. Applicable Law: Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter
Attempted voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of attempted
murder, distinguished only by the absence of malice. (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 942; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705.) Malice may be negated by either
heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, but in both circumstances the offense still
requires proof of the intent to kill. (See Beltran, at p. 942; see also People v. Montes
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1546–1552 [heat of passion negates malice aforethought
but does not negate the intent to kill].) Stated plainly, attempted voluntary manslaughter
reduces attempted murder without altering the requirement of intent to kill; the only
difference lies in the presence of a mitigating circumstance.
The record, including the jury’s verdict, confirms that Parra was convicted of
attempted voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory. Neither party argued
that Parra or his accomplices acted in imperfect self-defense.
When liability is premised on aiding and abetting under this theory, the prosecutor
must prove the aider and abettor personally intended to kill the victim and either acted, or
aided another in acting, while under the influence of a legally sufficient provocation.
(See People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 661–662; see also People v. Martinez
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 892, 902 [“Just as the aider and abettor of attempted voluntary
manslaughter must have had an independent intent to kill, he must also have reacted in a
heat of passion that would have mitigated his intent to kill”].)
“The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of
passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably believed by the
defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47,
59 (Lee); accord, People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 233.)
39.
B. Substantial Evidence/Standard of Review
The standard for assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is highly
deferential. We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence; that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507;
see also People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849 [we “resolve all inferences
and intendments in favor of the judgment,” and “all conflicting evidence will be resolved
in favor of the decision”].)
In conducting our review, we must presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
(People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 441.) We also accept all logical inferences the trial
court could have drawn from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th
371, 411.)
The question is not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whether substantial evidence supports the trier of fact’s finding. (See People v.
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139.) As such, a party challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence bears a heavy burden. The judgment must be upheld unless it appears that,
under no hypothesis whatsoever, is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.
(People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508; People v. Sanchez (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 325, 329.)
C. Analysis
The jury convicted Parra, as an aider and abettor, of the attempted voluntary
manslaughter of Mendoza, necessarily finding that he shared the direct intent to kill her
under a legally recognized mitigating circumstance. (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 942;
People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461.) The record, however, contains no evidence
that anyone in Parra’s vehicle saw Mendoza in Castaneda’s truck or was otherwise aware
40.
of her presence before the shooting. Without such evidence, the jury could not
reasonably infer that Parra, or Casarez, the principal he aided and abetted, intended to kill
Mendoza.
Nor does the record establish legally sufficient provocation by Mendoza.
Castaneda allegedly flashed gang signs or displayed a firearm the day before or just prior
to the shooting, but Mendoza engaged in no provocative conduct, and there is no
evidence that Parra or his companions reasonably believed she had.13 Because
provocation is victim specific (see Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59), Parra’s liability as an
aider and abettor on a heat of passion theory required proof that he personally intended to
kill Mendoza and formed the intent while under a heat of passion circumstance
attributable to Mendoza. (People v. Martinez, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.)
Provocation cannot, as the Attorney General suggests, have “flowed through
Castaneda[.]”
The record contains no such proof. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict finding Parra guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter on
count 2.
The Attorney General maintains that because the jury convicted Parra of the
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Castaneda, it is “indisputable”
that [Parra] was guilty of the attempted murder of Mendoza under a kill zone theory. But
a conviction as to the primary target does not itself establish the concurrent intent that the
kill zone doctrine requires, specifically, an intent to kill everyone within the zone of fatal
harm as the means of ensuring the target’s death. (See People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th
at pp. 330–331; Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 204–205.) Here, the record does not
supply evidence of such an intent.
13 There is also scant evidence that Parra or his companions acted under the
influence of a strong passion induced by provocation. (See People v. Moye (2009) 47
Cal.4th 537, 550 [subjective component of heat of passion requires evidence that the
defendant acted under the actual influence of a strong passion induced by provocation].)
41.
Nor does the jury’s verdict finding Parra guilty of a lesser verdict as to Mendoza
salvage the conviction. Attempted voluntary manslaughter required proof that Parra
intended to kill Mendoza and formed that intent under a heat of passion circumstance
attributable to her; provocation is victim-specific. (See Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59.)
As discussed, the record contains no such showing. Thus, even assuming, as the Attorney
General suggests, that the jury’s verdict on count 2 reflected an act of lenity, that
assumption does not cure the evidentiary gap in this record.14
The question then becomes the appropriate remedy. Although the trial evidence
supports a conviction of assault with a firearm, it is not a lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter. The assault with a firearm offense includes elements,
including the use of a firearm and the present ability to apply force, that are not required
for attempted voluntary manslaughter, whereas the attempted voluntary manslaughter
offense requires a specific intent to kill that assault does not. We therefore cannot modify
the verdict on count 2 by reducing the conviction to assault with a firearm. (See § 1181,
subd. 6.)
Notwithstanding, there is ample evidence to support a conviction of assault with a
firearm. The proper course is therefore to reverse the conviction for attempted voluntary
manslaughter on count 2 and remand the matter for further proceedings at the
prosecutor’s election. (See § 1262.)
V. Failure to Instruct the Jury on CALCRIM No. 334 on Counts 8 Through 11
Lopez, who took part in both the February 19, 2018 Olympia Street shooting of
Castaneda and Mendoza and the April 11, 2018 Avon Street home invasion, testified at
trial. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 335 (accomplice testimony
as a matter of law) for the attempted murders (counts 1 & 2), shooting at an occupied
14 Parra contends his conviction on count 2 for attempted voluntary manslaughter is
incorrectly reflected in the abstract of judgment and that his sentence on this count is
unauthorized. Because we conclude the conviction must be reversed and the matter
remanded for a full resentencing hearing, this claim is moot.
42.
motor vehicle (count 3), robberies (counts 4 & 5), and gang participation charges
(count 7), but not for the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition charges
(counts 8–11). This instruction informed the jury to view with caution any testimony that
tended to incriminate Parra and to require supporting evidence that independently
connected Parra to those offenses before relying on Lopez’s testimony to convict.
According to Parra, Lopez’s testimony established that Lopez was also an
accomplice to the firearm and ammunition offenses. During the Olympia Street shooting,
Lopez handed the AR rifle to Casarez after Parra ordered the shooting, which, in Parra’s
view, made Lopez an aider and abettor to Parra’s constructive or joint possession of the
gun and ammunition (counts 8 & 9). Likewise, during the Avon Street home invasion,
Lopez testified that he accompanied Parra and others to retrieve the rifle from a car trunk
after they planned the crime. Parra argues this testimony made Lopez an accomplice to
the unlawful possession offenses arising from that event (counts 10 & 11). He therefore
contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony
as to counts 8 through 11.
The Attorney General responds that Lopez’s actions did not constitute aiding and
abetting the possession crimes. According to the Attorney General, handing a firearm to
another person at the direction of the possessor or accompanying a possessor when he
retrieves a weapon does not amount to aiding and abetting unlawful possession.
Moreover, accomplice liability for possession required proof that Lopez specifically
intended to assist Parra’s unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition, which in turn
depended on Lopez knowing facts that made Parra’s possession unlawful, specifically
that Parra was a felon prohibited from possessing such items. Parra acknowledges that
direct evidence of such knowledge does not appear in the record. Because Lopez could
not have been an accomplice to counts 8 through 11 without that knowledge, the Attorney
General submits that the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 334 as to those counts.
We conclude that Parra’s claim is meritless.
43.
A. Background
For the Olympia Street shooting (counts 8 & 9), the prosecutor argued that Parra
constructively possessed the assault rifle and ammunition because he knowingly entered
the car with the weapon, knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms based on his
prior felony conviction, and exercised control over the rifle by ordering Casarez to shoot
Castaneda.
For the Avon Street home invasion (counts 10 & 11), the prosecutor argued that
Parra was involved in planning the crime, drove his accomplices to a location where
Norteño gang firearms were stored, personally retrieved the AR rifle, and armed his
codefendants before sending them into the residence. Although he remained in the car,
the prosecutor contended that Parra directed the robbery, shared in the proceeds, and
therefore possessed both the firearm and the ammunition in it.
B. Applicable Law
Section 1111, which underlies CALCRIM No. 334, bars a conviction based solely
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Corroborating evidence must do
more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt, but it may be slight and need not be strong or
independently persuasive. (People v. Trujillo (1948) 32 Cal.2d 105, 110–111.)
An “accomplice” is one who could be prosecuted for the identical offense charged
against the defendant, either as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. (§ 31;
People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 564.) California law places the burden on the
defendant to prove a witness’s accomplice status, because that issue is collateral to guilt
and not an element of the charged offense. (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953,
963–968.)
C. Standard of Review
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18
Cal.4th 558, 569.) In a criminal case, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary
to the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953.)
44.
The correctness of jury instructions is determined by considering the charge as a whole,
not by viewing individual instructions in isolation. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47
Cal.4th 145, 192.)
D. Analysis
We conclude the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on
accomplice testimony with respect to the unlawful possession counts (counts 8–11). To
be deemed an accomplice under section 1111, a witness must be liable to prosecution for
the identical offense as the defendant, either as a perpetrator or as an aider and abettor.
(§ 1111.) Parra argues that Lopez’s conduct, handing Casarez the firearm during the
Olympia Street shooting and accompanying Parra to obtain the rifle used in the
Avon Street home invasion, made him an accomplice to the possession crimes.
Whether a witness is an accomplice is offense specific and turns on whether the
witness was “liable to prosecution for the identical offense” as a principal or as an aider
and abettor. (§ 1111; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1155 (Johnsen).) To aid
and abet, the witness must know the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and intend to
facilitate that crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.)
Because the possession offenses are status based, Lopez would qualify as an
accomplice only if the evidence showed that he knew Parra was legally barred from
possessing firearms or ammunition and intended to assist him in doing so. Absent proof
that Lopez knew of Parra’s prohibited status, his brief handling of or mere proximity to a
firearm could amount to, at most, assistance in ordinary possession, which is not
inherently unlawful for a nonprohibited person and would establish, if anything, Lopez’s
independent liability for the same section 29800 and 30305 offenses.
On this record, there is insufficient evidence showing that Lopez knew Parra was a
prohibited possessor. Parra suggests we may infer as much from the longstanding
relationship between the two. But a close relationship, even one that includes shared
criminal activity, does not establish knowledge of a status element. Nothing shows
Lopez was told Parra had suffered a felony conviction, observed any court proceedings,
45.
saw paperwork reflecting a firearms prohibition, or otherwise had reason to know that
Parra was legally barred from possessing firearms or ammunition.
At most, the evidence shows that Lopez socialized with Parra, discussed guns, and
helped retrieve or handle a weapon during the charged incidents. Those facts do not
supply a reasonable inference that Lopez knew the circumstance that made Parra’s
possession unlawful, as opposed to ordinary possession. Because the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that Lopez was an accomplice to the
possession counts, we conclude that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on
accomplice testimony as to counts 8 through 11. (Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1155.)
Even assuming the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 334 as to counts 8 through 11, we conclude it is not reasonably probable that the
omission affected the verdict. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The jury
was expressly instructed under CALCRIM No. 335 to treat Lopez as an accomplice
whose testimony implicating Parra should be viewed with caution and required
corroboration for the more serious charges, including the attempted murders, robberies,
and gang offenses. It is unlikely the jury would have compartmentalized its assessment
of Lopez’s credibility by applying the instruction to some counts but not others,
particularly since the same witness testified to all of the charged events.
Further, independent evidence, including surveillance footage and GPS data
showing Parra’s vehicle near the crime scenes, corroborated portions of Lopez’s account
and tended to connect Parra to possession of the weapon and ammunition. Considering
this corroboration, the jury’s verdicts on the more serious offenses, and its awareness that
Lopez was both a convicted felon and a participant in many of the charged crimes, which
provided ample reason to view his testimony with caution, it is not reasonably probable
that inclusion of the accomplice instruction on counts 8 through 11 would have affected
the outcome.
46.
VI. Prosecutorial Error in Closing Argument
Parra contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during her comments in
closing argument by telling the jury 23 times that a guilty verdict was the “only
reasonable verdict.” He argues this language improperly lessened the prosecution’s
burden of proof, similar to the error identified in People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659
(Centeno) where our Supreme Court held it was improper for the prosecutor to argue that
guilt was the only reasonable view of the evidence. (Id. at p. 672.) Parra further
maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Following our
independent review of the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, we find Parra’s
claim meritless.
A. Background
In her initial comments in closing argument, the prosecutor explained the People’s
burden of proof, stating: “Reasonable doubt, that is the People’s burden. That is my
burden to prove this case to you. And reasonable doubt is one that leaves you with an
abiding conviction that the charge is true. And it need not eliminate all possible doubt.”
She then reviewed the elements of each offense and enhancement, and in doing so
frequently told the jurors that “the only reasonable verdict” for each count was guilty or
that “the only reasonable verdict” on an enhancement was true. Before making this point
for each individual count at the conclusion of her argument, she again reminded the
jurors: “It is the People’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and therefore, it is
the People’s burden to be as thorough as possible for you, members of the jurors.”
Trial counsel for Parra and trial counsel for Bautista emphasized the reasonable
doubt standard in detail during their closing arguments, repeatedly reminding jurors that
guilt had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor again reminded the jury: “The People have the sole
burden of proof to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The only burden is on the
People,” before discussing the standard once more. She concluded by stating, with
47.
respect to the charged crimes and enhancements, that “[t]he only reasonable verdict that
the facts and evidence actually support is a verdict of guilty and the enhancements true.”
The trial court further instructed with CALCRIM No. 103 on the presumption of
innocence and CALCRIM No. 220, which defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt using
the “abiding conviction” formulation and explained that the jury must acquit unless the
People met that burden.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review, “a defendant
must object and request that the jury be admonished concerning the misconduct.”
(People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 464; Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1164,
quoting People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [“It is well settled that making
a timely and specific objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished (if jury is
not waived), is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
for appeal”].)
Parra failed to object at trial to the portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument
he now claims constitute prejudicial misconduct. Although a timely objection and
request for admonition may be excused where either would have been futile or an
admonition would not have cured the harm (see Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1164),
the record does not support either exception here. Parra does not contend otherwise. We
therefore conclude that Parra’s claim is forfeited.
Parra alternatively contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to object. (See Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674, quoting People v. Lopez
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 [“ ‘A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel’s inaction violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ ”].) We therefore
consider whether counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient performance under
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (Strickland)).
48.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant is required
to make a two-part showing. (See People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, overruled
on other grounds by People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 559 [the defendant has the
burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel].) First, they must establish that
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms[.]” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519–520.)
Second, they must show that trial counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. (Id. at
p. 520.)
Prejudice must be affirmatively demonstrated. The record must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’ ” (Harrington v.
Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105, quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 371.)
“It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
the proceeding.’ ” (Harrington, at p. 104.) Rather, “[t]he likelihood of a different result
must be substantial, not just conceivable.” (Id. at p. 112.)
C. Applicable Law: Prosecutorial Misconduct
The standard for establishing prosecutorial error is well established. (See People
v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275.) A prosecutor violates the federal
Constitution when their conduct reflects a pattern of serious and egregious behavior that
renders the trial fundamentally unfair and infringes upon the defendant’s right to due
process. (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 854.) To rise to the
level of a federal violation, “the misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result
in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1158, 1202, quoting United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108.) However, even if
the conduct does not violate constitutional standards, a prosecutor’s remarks may still
49.
contravene state law if they involve “deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the
court or jury.” (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1031; accord, Daveggio and
Michaud, at p. 854.)
When challenging a prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the defendant must
demonstrate that, “ ‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and the instructions,’
[citation], there was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.]’ ” (Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) “If the challenged comments, viewed in context, ‘would
have been taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, [then] they obviously
cannot be deemed objectionable.’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 130,
quoting People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 793.) In conducting this analysis, courts
“ ‘ “do not lightly infer” ’ ” that the jury adopted the most damaging interpretation of the
prosecutor’s comments. (Centeno, at p. 667.)
D. Analysis
Our Supreme Court has made clear that “it is error for the prosecutor to suggest
that a ‘reasonable’ account of the evidence satisfies the prosecutor’s burden of proof.”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672, italics omitted.) The prosecutor here made no such
comments. She repeatedly emphasized that the People bore the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court correctly instructed the jury on that
standard. In this context, nothing in the challenged remarks could reasonably be
understood as inviting conviction based only on a “reasonable” view of the evidence.
Notwithstanding, considering the parties’ repeated explanations of the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, the trial court’s correct description of that burden, and the
court’s instructions directing the jury to apply it, we conclude there is no reasonable
probability of a different outcome had trial counsel objected to or sought an admonition
regarding the prosecutor’s challenged comments. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 694.) The jurors were repeatedly admonished that the prosecutor bore the sole burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and we presume they followed the court’s
50.
instructions. As our Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘[w]e presume that jurors treat the
court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments
as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.’ ” (People v. Cortez, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 131, quoting People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, fn. 8.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s cited comments did not prejudice Parra. Parra has demonstrated neither
error, nor prejudice assuming error.
VII. Ruling Limiting Recross-examination of Lopez
Lopez initially told Dias that the Morris Market incident, where Castaneda flashed
gang signs and a gun, occurred immediately before the shooting. At trial, however,
Lopez testified that he could not recall when that incident occurred. Trial counsel
attempted to impeach him with his prior statement, but the court sustained objections,
ruling it had to come through Dias. Both sides questioned Lopez about the inconsistency,
and Dias later testified to the statement.
Parra contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his state and
federal confrontation rights by limiting his impeachment of Lopez. Upon this record, we
are persuaded that any presumed error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Background
On direct examination, Lopez stated that on February 19, 2018, he, Parra, Bautista,
and Casarez met at a residence on Glenn Avenue and then left in a car to deliver a “mini
AR” assault rifle. He said they drove west on Glenn Avenue, north on Seattle Street,
west on Butte Avenue, and south on Olympia Street, where they made a U-turn and then
shot at Castaneda. He made no mention of Castaneda taunting them at Morris Market.
On cross-examination, Parra’s trial counsel emphasized that Lopez faced 25 years
in prison for his role in the charged crimes and other cases, but had secured probation in
exchange for testifying against Parra and others.
When asked if he told officers that the Morris Market incident, where Castaneda
taunted Parra and the others while flashing a gun, occurred immediately before the
51.
shooting, Lopez initially claimed not to remember. After reviewing the transcript,
however, he admitted making that statement. Trial counsel pressed him on the
inconsistency, suggesting the Morris Market incident may have taken place a day or more
before the shooting, and Lopez conceded he was unsure whether it happened the day of
the shooting or earlier.
On redirect examination, Lopez said he believed the Morris Market incident
occurred on a prior day.
Trial counsel confronted Lopez about other inconsistencies between his trial
testimony, prior statements, and preliminary hearing testimony. Lopez claimed that
Castaneda had disrespected the group “multiple times” at Morris Market and elsewhere,
but he could not recall if the incident in question happened on the day of the shooting.
Lopez subsequently claimed that Castaneda had been disrespecting the group by flashing
gang signs and laughing at them for years.
When the prosecutor returned to the Morris Market incident, Lopez reiterated that
Castaneda had disrespected Parra’s group five or six times and that the Morris Market
incident occurred on a different day than the Olympia Street shooting.
Parra’s counsel again challenged Lopez with his October 2018 statement to
detectives suggesting the Morris Market incident occurred immediately before the
shooting. After reviewing the transcript, Lopez admitted he had previously told
detectives that Castaneda brandished a gun at Morris Market on the day of the shooting,
that Parra’s group followed Castaneda, and that Casarez opened fire after Castaneda
pulled over. On further questioning, however, Lopez equivocated, ultimately admitting
he was “confused” about whether the Morris Market incident was separate from the
shooting.
The prosecutor later had Lopez confirm that, based on the Richie’s Market
surveillance video, the route driven on the day of the shooting differed from the route he
originally described after the Morris Market incident. Dias testified that Lopez first told
him in October 2018 that the shooting occurred just after Castaneda had flashed a pistol
52.
and made gang signs at Morris Market, but Dias also confirmed that Lopez gave a
different account at the preliminary hearing.
In closing, trial counsel attacked Lopez’s credibility, arguing that his testimony
was “at least very confused” and inconsistent with his prior statements and with
surveillance video that partially depicted Parra’s driving route. Counsel argued Lopez
conflated multiple encounters with Castaneda at Morris Market and elsewhere, and
admitted he was “confused.” According to counsel, the identity of the shooters therefore
rested on a witness “who really doesn’t know what happened[.]” The prosecutor, in
rebuttal, conceded Lopez had difficulty separating the Morris Market incident from the
shooting.
B. Applicable Law
Under California law, impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement is
governed by Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235. (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th
1183, 1219.) The process is straightforward. When a witness gives testimony that
conflicts with an earlier statement, the opposing party may confront the witness with the
prior statement and must first provide an opportunity to explain or deny it. (§ 770,
subd. (a).) If the witness admits making the statement, the impeachment is complete. If
the witness denies the statement or claims not to recall it, the prior statement may then be
proved by extrinsic evidence.
Once the foundational requirements of section 770 are met, the prior inconsistent
statement is admissible both to impeach the witness and for the truth of the matter
asserted. (Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2025) § 2:42, p.139; Evid. Code, § 1235.)
C. Analysis
Under Evidence Code section 770, a witness must first be confronted with a prior
statement and given an opportunity to admit, deny, or explain it. If the witness denies or
claims not to recall the statement, its contents may then be proved by extrinsic evidence
through the testimony of someone who personally heard or recorded the prior statement.
(Evid. Code, §§ 770, 1235.) Counsel’s questions, even when quoting from a document,
53.
are not evidence and cannot establish that the statement was made. (People v. Kiney
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807, 814–815.)
Although Evidence Code section 770 does not prohibit quoting a prior statement
verbatim when confronting a witness, doing so would have added little here, since
counsel still had to establish through competent evidence that the prior statement was in
fact made, particularly in light of Lopez’s limited recollection regarding the timing of the
taunting incident. The trial court’s direction that counsel “go through the detective first”
accurately reflected this procedure.
Once Lopez either denied or claimed not to recall making certain statements to
police, those statements could be introduced only through a witness with personal
knowledge, such as Dias, who conducted the interview. Because the transcript had not
been authenticated, trial counsel could not properly read from it in front of the jury to
prove that the prior statement was made. (Evid. Code, §§ 770, 1401.) The trial court did
not prohibit impeachment; it simply required compliance with the statutory process that
distinguishes between confronting a witness and proving the prior statement through
admissible evidence.
Even assuming the trial court erred in limiting the form of impeachment, however,
we conclude that any error was harmless under either the state or federal standard. The
jury heard that Lopez initially told police the Morris Market incident occurred
immediately before the Olympia Street shooting. At trial, Lopez acknowledged making
that statement after his recollection was refreshed, and Dias later confirmed the same
point in his testimony. Trial counsel also relied on these inconsistencies in closing
argument to challenge Lopez’s credibility. We conclude that on this record, any
limitation on the form of impeachment could not have affected the verdict. (See
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
VIII. The Trial Court’s Exclusion of the Defense Expert’s Testimony
Parra contends the trial court committed reversible error by excluding his defense
expert as a discovery sanction. The Attorney General responds that because the expert
54.
was not disclosed until the 17th day of trial, the court acted within its discretion in
precluding the testimony. Given trial counsel’s untimely disclosure and the court’s broad
authority to manage discovery, we conclude Parra has not established that the court’s
ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. We further conclude that any presumed error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Background
On June 4, 2021, the jurors were sworn in.
On June 7, 2021, during his opening statement, trial counsel told jurors they would
see from the Richie’s Market surveillance video that Alberto, not Parra, was driving the
car used in the Olympia Street shooting. He promised the jury the video showed
Alberto’s face and stature, not Parra’s.
On July 12, 2021, trial counsel informed the court he intended to call Brent
Turvey, a criminalist, to testify as a forensic photographic analyst. Turvey’s proposed
testimony was that size and measurement comparisons between Parra, Alberto, and the
car excluded Parra as the driver. Counsel admitted he hired Turvey after trial began and
did not disclose him earlier because Turvey had not yet formed an opinion. Counsel also
sought to introduce work by defense investigator Rich Paloma, who had not been
previously disclosed or identified in any reports.15
The prosecutor objected under section 1054, citing repeated late discovery by trial
counsel. She represented that she had only learned of Turvey’s analysis on the Friday
before the instant hearing.
The prosecutor further explained she had been provided only 10 PowerPoint
slides, with no foundation, reports, or methodology disclosed. The slides themselves
contained speculative language such as “it appears” and “it could,” and the measurements
appeared to be taken from photographs rather than the actual vehicle, which remained in
15 Parra does not challenge the exclusion of his proposed defense investigator, who
would have introduced a photograph showing the presence of an outdoor surveillance
camera at the Denny’s restaurant, offered to establish that such a camera existed.
55.
police custody. She also emphasized that trial counsel had long known Alberto owned
the car Parra had been driving and that Lopez’s 10-hour interview with police on
January 31, 2020, contained extensive discussion of whether he was the driver.
Trial counsel responded that he had requested access to the car but, when denied,
used another 1998 Camry for measurements. Although he initially claimed the issue
arose only during trial, he also acknowledged knowing “a long time ago” that Alberto
owned the car, and said he realized the similarity only after viewing Alberto’s photograph
online during trial.
The trial court concluded the disclosure was untimely, found that the People would
have no fair opportunity to rebut, and denied counsel’s request to call Turvey or Paloma.
Later, the prosecutor set forth in detail the defense’s repeated and ongoing discovery
violations.
B. Applicable Law
Under section 1054.3, subdivision (a), the defense must disclose to the prosecution
the names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, that it intends to call as
witnesses at trial and their written or oral statements. (People v. Riggs (2008) 44
Cal.4th 248, 305–306.) The phrase “intends to call” means persons the party reasonably
anticipates it is likely to call at trial. (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356,
375–376 & fn. 11.) A witness need not be disclosed by the defense until the decision to
call that witness is final. (Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal. App. 4th 1163,
1170.) The disclosure must be made 30 days before trial or, if counsel becomes aware
of a witness after that time, immediately. (§ 1054.7.)
Section 1054.5, subdivision (b), provides in part that “Upon a showing that a party
has not complied with Section … 1054.3 and upon a showing that the moving party
complied with the informal discovery procedure provided in this subdivision, a court
may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter, including, but
not limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the
56.
testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or
any other lawful order.”
While excluding a witness’s testimony is a sanction of last resort (see § 1054.5,
subd. (c)), a party’s willful failure to comply with discovery obligations in order to gain
a tactical advantage may justify exclusion. (People v. Jackson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
1197, 1203.) Courts have also recognized that, in some circumstances, sanctions short
of exclusion “would perpetuate ‘prejudice to the State and … harm to the adversary
process.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 413.)
Some courts have held however that excluding a witness’s testimony is improper
absent a showing of significant prejudice to the opposing party and willful misconduct by
the party offering the evidence. (People v. Jordan (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 349, 358;
People v. Gonzales (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1744, 1758.)
“ ‘[A] trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, “consider a wide range of
sanctions” in response to [a] violation of a discovery order.’ ” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23
Cal.4th 225, 299.) “ ‘We generally review a trial court’s ruling on matters regarding
discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.’ ” (People v. Lamb (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 575, 581.)
C. Analysis
Trial counsel represented that he hired Turvey after trial began, did not disclose his
presence until weeks later, and provided the prosecutor only 10 PowerPoint slides
without reports, methodology, or foundational data. Simultaneously, counsel also
attempted to introduce a second previously undisclosed investigator, Paloma.
Although he claimed the issue of Parra’s role as driver arose only during trial, the
record shows trial counsel had long known that Alberto owned the vehicle and had access
to discovery materials in which Lopez discussed Alberto’s possible involvement in the
drive-by shooting. Indeed, during his comments in opening statements, trial counsel told
the jury that surveillance video would show Alberto rather than Parra driving on the day
of the drive-by shooting incident.
57.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion
by finding trial counsel’s late disclosure untimely and prejudicial, as the prosecutor had
no meaningful opportunity to rebut or investigate Turvey’s proposed testimony.
We recognize however that the trial court failed to make an explicit finding that
counsel’s nondisclosure was willful. Some case authority indicates that such a finding is
a necessary prerequisite to excluding a proffered witness’s testimony. (See People v.
Gonzales, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1758.) Although exclusion of Turvey’s testimony
appears justified under the circumstances, we will presume error out of an abundance of
caution. We find the presumed error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.
Turvey would have testified that, after comparing photographs of Parra and
Alberto and their respective heights, and after estimating the interior dimensions of the
suspect vehicle using a similar make and model, the driver depicted in the Richie’s
Market surveillance video was Alberto, not Parra. Although this testimony supported the
defense theory, its underlying components were based on the same surveillance video and
readily observable features of the two individuals, which the jury was equally capable of
assessing. We further observe that Lopez offered detailed testimony identifying Parra as
the driver. His testimony was subject to cross-examination, and the jury was tasked with
assessing his credibility and the weight of his statements. Considering the video evidence
and Lopez’s testimony, any presumed error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
IX. The Firearm Use Enhancement Attached to Counts 4 and 5
Parra contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that the firearm use
enhancements imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), attached to counts 4 and
5 must be stricken. These counts represent the two counts of first degree robbery in
connection with the Avon Street home invasion.
58.
We agree with the parties. The evidence established that Parra did not enter the
Avon Street residence during the April 11, 2018 home invasion. Instead, he remained
outside while his three coparticipants went inside and carried out the crimes.
As CALCRIM No. 3146 explains: “Someone personally uses a firearm if he or
she intentionally does any of the following: [¶] 1. Displays the weapon in a menacing
manner; [¶] 2. Hits someone with the weapon; [¶] OR [¶] 3. Fires the weapon.” Parra
accomplished none of these acts. The evidence showed only that he armed his
companions and waited in the getaway vehicle.
And, because section 12022.53, subdivision (b), requires proof that the defendant
personally used a firearm, the enhancement cannot be sustained based on the conduct of
other principals. (People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058.) Accordingly,
the enhancements attached to counts 4 and 5 must be stricken.
X. The Trial Court’s Failure to Give a Unanimity Instruction on Count 12
Parra argues the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to give a unanimity
instruction on count 12, his conviction for the unlawful possession of ammunition. He
claims the jurors could have disagreed on which specific act supported guilt because
there were three separate potential acts of possession arising from ammunition in his
residence, his car, and in the adjacent vacant lot.
The Attorney General submits that no unanimity instruction was required because
(1) section 30305 criminalizes simultaneous possession of ammunition as a single
offense, regardless of type or location; (2) the evidence here showed one continuous
course of conduct arising from the search of Parra’s residence and surrounding property
on a single date; and (3) the prosecutor elected to rely on all the ammunition found in
arguing the charge. The Attorney General further contends that even if a unanimity
instruction should have been given, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the jurors necessarily agreed he possessed all of the ammunition if he possessed
any.
59.
We agree with the Attorney General that although a unanimity instruction was
required, the trial court’s failure to give such an instruction was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A. Background
On January 3, 2019, law enforcement conducted aerial surveillance of the
residence at 1309 Inyo Avenue because, despite an active warrant for his arrest, Parra had
not yet been apprehended. A bedroom inside the residence contained paperwork and
other belongings associated with Parra, and a Range Rover registered to him was parked
outside. Sheriff’s deputies believed Parra resided at the residence.
While surveilling the residence, sheriff’s deputies observed DSSM gang members
Yepez and Arreola transferring rifles to a transient person on a vacant lot at 1313 Inyo
Avenue, where the rifles were wrapped in a blue tarp and buried. Both properties were
later searched pursuant to warrants.
In the backyard of 1309 Inyo Avenue and on the adjacent lot, deputies found a
large cache of firearms and ammunition, including AR-15 style assault rifles
(one short-barreled), at least three handguns, loaded magazines, boxes of
.223/5.56-caliber ammunition, and spent casings. Several of the recovered firearms
matched weapons depicted in photos from Parra’s Instagram account, including images
taken inside his residence.
At 1309 Inyo Avenue, Parra’s green Range Rover and a black Infiniti sedan
believed to be his were parked outside. Inside the black Infiniti, deputies found a secret
compartment containing handgun magazines, at least one loaded, along with a phone, a
plastic baggie with ammunition, and cash.
The prosecutor relied on all ammunition recovered from the Infiniti and the vacant
lot to support count 12. In closing, she characterized the cache of guns and ammunition
as DSSM’s inventory tied to Parra’s residence and vehicles, stating that on January 3,
2019, the sting unit “came upon, essentially, most of the [DSSM] Norteños’s gun
60.
inventory and ammo inventory at Mario Parra’s house [with] ammo littered everywhere,
in the backyard, home and Parra’s car.”
The prosecutor highlighted evidence tying Parra to the Inyo Avenue residence,
noting that clothing and accessories seen in his social media photos, including a
black-and-gray checkered belt, distinctive shoes, and a “Cookies” sweatshirt, were found
inside the bedroom associated with him. She emphasized that Parra’s vehicles, a
Range Rover and an Infiniti, were also located at the residence. Referring to Lopez’s
testimony, the prosecutor explained that Parra’s Infiniti contained “a secret compartment
behind the center console,” where detectives discovered “a second hidden phone,
magazines, money and ammo.” The prosecutor also referenced a short-barreled assault
rifle linked to counts 8 through 11 and pointed out that it contained ammunition.16 She
concluded, “So in regards to Count 12, all of the elements have been met.”
In response, defense counsel briefly challenged Lopez’s credibility, noting that
Lopez was the sole witness linking Parra to the Infiniti’s secret compartment, but did not
address the ammunition recovered elsewhere. Counsel also emphasized that, according
to Lopez’s own testimony, 1309 Inyo was “a headquarters of [DSSM],” frequented by
many individuals.
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 2591 on unlawful possession of
ammunition, but the trial court did not provide a unanimity instruction. Although there
were off-the-record discussions about the jury instructions, on the record, trial counsel
raised no objection to the instructions given and made no request for a unanimity
instruction on count 12.
B. Applicable Law
Criminal defendants have the right to juror unanimity on issues of fact in criminal
trials. (People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 142; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th
16 Counts 8 and 9 charged Parra with the unlawful possession of a firearm and
ammunition during the Olympia Street drive-by shooting, and counts 10 and 11 charged
him with the same crimes for the Avon Street home invasion.
61.
1124, 1132 (Russo).) In other words, “ ‘the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is
guilty of a specific crime.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877; Russo, at
p. 1132.) When the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime under a single count,
either the prosecution must elect the act relied upon or the court must instruct the jury to
agree on the same criminal act. (Covarrubias, at p. 878; Russo, at p. 1132.)
The unanimity instruction exists to prevent jurors from convicting a defendant
based on different instances of conduct, thereby ensuring all 12 jurors are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the same act constituted the offense. (People v.
Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 569 (Hernandez); Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 1132.) It also guards against the risk that jurors may “ ‘ “amalgamat[e] evidence of
multiple offenses, no one of which has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in order
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant must have done something
sufficient to convict .…” ’ ” (Hernandez, at p. 569; Russo, at p. 1132.)
A unanimity instruction is required when the record shows evidence of more than
one crime that could support conviction under a single count. (People v. Grimes (2016) 1
Cal.5th 698, 727; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 281.) But if the evidence
shows only a single discrete crime, no instruction is necessary. (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th
at p. 1132.) The trial court must ask whether there is a genuine risk the jury may split
over two discrete crimes, in which case the instruction is required, or whether the
evidence merely presents different ways of committing a single crime, in which case it is
not. (People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 878; Russo, at p. 1135.)
Determining whether a particular instruction was required presents a
predominantly legal mixed question of law and fact. (Hernandez, supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at p. 568.) We therefore review claims of instructional error de novo.
(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
C. Analysis
In possession cases, a unanimity instruction is required when the evidence shows
multiple, distinct acts of possession separated by time, place, or possessory
62.
circumstances. (See People v. Crawford (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 591, 598–599
(Crawford); People v. King (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 493, 501–502.)
Here, the prosecutor elected to rely on all of the ammunition recovered on
January 3, 2019, from the Inyo Avenue residence, the secret compartment inside the
Infiniti parked in the driveway, and the adjacent lot, describing count 12 as based on
“ammo littered everywhere, in the backyard, home and Parra’s car.”17 Although the
prosecutor described count 12 as a single course of conduct encompassing all
ammunition recovered during the search, each potential site of possession was supported
by distinct factual predicates.
To find Parra guilty based on the ammunition in the Infiniti, jurors had to credit
Lopez’s testimony linking Parra to that vehicle. To find him guilty based on the
ammunition in the backyard, jurors instead had to conclude he exercised constructive
possession through his dominion over the premises, even though three other individuals
were observed handling the guns and ammunition there. Given these distinct evidentiary
foundations, there remained a rational basis upon which jurors could disagree as to which
act of possession constituted the offense.
Crawford, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 591 is instructive. There, the court held that a
unanimity instruction was required where the defendant was charged with a single count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm, but the evidence showed four guns located in
separate areas of his residence. One gun was found at the foot of the defendant’s bed,
another in the bedroom closet, and two more in an upstairs bedroom occupied by another
person. The defendant and his girlfriend each denied knowledge of some of the guns, and
the girlfriend claimed ownership of one. (Id. at pp. 594–595.) The prosecutor suggested
17 Thompson inferred that ammunition was inside the 1309 Inyo residence because it
was observed being removed from the residence into the backyard. Despite that
inference, we could not locate evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that any
ammunition was recovered from inside the residence during the deputies’ search.
63.
that the two guns in the defendant’s bedroom supported the charged offense during his
case-in-chief. (Id. at p. 595.)
The appellate court found that while possession was not fragmented in time, it was
“fragmented as to space,” because the firearms were found in different parts of the
residence and the “evidence showed unique facts surrounding the possessory aspect of
each weapon.” (Crawford, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 598–599.) Because jurors could
have believed the defendant possessed one gun but not another, the lack of a unanimity
instruction created the risk that not all jurors agreed on the same act of possession. (Id. at
pp. 596, 599.)
A similar concern exists in this case, where the ammunition was discovered at the
same time, but in separate locations under distinct factual circumstances. This created a
risk that the jurors did not unanimously agree on which act constituted possession. We
therefore conclude the trial court should have given a unanimity instruction on count 12.
Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the error in failing to give such an instruction was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
In Crawford, the prosecutor presented no unifying theory of possession:
four firearms were found in separate rooms, linked to different occupants, and supported
by distinct evidentiary circumstances. The defendant offered separate defenses as to each
weapon, claiming ignorance of some, conceding third-party ownership of another, and
denying access to others, creating a genuine risk that different jurors relied on different
guns. (Crawford, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 596, 598–599.)
By contrast, the prosecutor here expressly referred to the ammunition recovered
from the Infiniti, and the adjacent lot as part of one cache “littered everywhere, in the
backyard, home and Parra’s car,” and advanced a single theory that Parra possessed all of
it. The defense, rather than offering distinct explanations, denied Parra’s possession of
any ammunition and attacked Lopez’s credibility to undermine the Infiniti link while
portraying the residence as a shared gang space. The jury’s guilty verdict necessarily
reflects its rejection of that global denial.
64.
The record further establishes that Parra resided at the Inyo Avenue residence.
Deputies found a bedroom containing paperwork and personal belongings associated with
him, and both his Range Rover and Infiniti were parked outside. Investigating deputies
testified that they believed Parra lived there, and social media photos taken inside the
residence depicted firearms later recovered during the search. These facts strongly
support that Parra exercised dominion and control over the premises and its contents,
including the ammunition recovered that day.
Moreover, one of the loaded firearms recovered that day, the short-barreled assault
rifle tied to counts 8 and 9, was the same weapon used in the drive-by shooting Parra
directed, directly tying the recovered cache to his ongoing criminal conduct. These facts,
together with the prosecutor’s single overarching theory, the defense’s consistent posture,
and overlapping evidence of control, distinguish this case from Crawford and support the
conclusion that any presumed instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 576–577 [applying Chapman to the trial court’s failure to give a unanimity instruction
sua sponte]; People v. Thompson (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 843, 853 [“[w]here the record
indicates the jury resolved the basic credibility dispute against the defendant and
therefore would have convicted him of any of the various offenses shown by the
evidence, the failure to give the unanimity instruction is harmless”].)
XI. The Sentence Imposed on Count 1 Was Unauthorized
The Attorney General contends, and the record confirms, that the trial court
imposed an unauthorized sentence on count 1 by imposing a determinate seven-year term
for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. By statute, that offense
carries an indeterminate life term with the possibility of parole. Because the jury also
found true the gang enhancement alleged with this count, Parra was subject to a
minimum parole eligibility of 15 years. (§§ 664, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(5).) The
trial court did not strike the premeditation finding under section 1385. Accordingly, the
65.
Attorney General asserts that the sentence on count 1 was unauthorized and must be
corrected on remand.
Parra initially argues, based on his claim that the sentence on count 2 was
unauthorized, that the trial court intended to strike the jury’s premeditation finding under
section 1385. We find insufficient evidence in the record to support that assertion.
Rather, it appears the court erroneously failed to record the proper sentence for count 1 in
the abstract of judgment and minute order. As Parra ultimately concedes, the issue is
technically moot because a full resentencing hearing is required on remand. We address
the issue only to avoid a potential repetition of the error at resentencing.
A. Background
The jury found Parra guilty of attempted murder on count 1, and found true the
premeditation allegation. Although the mandatory prison term was seven years to life,
the trial court imposed a determinate term of seven years at sentencing. The abstract of
judgment and minute order are consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement of
judgment, imposing a “[midterm] of seven years .…”
B. Applicable Law
“It is well established in California by a long line of decisional authority … that a
trial court’s failure either (1) to pronounce sentence on a statutory sentence-enhancement
allegation based upon a finding by the trier of fact or an admission by the defendant that
the allegation is true, or (2) to exercise its discretion—to the extent imposition of the
enhancement is discretionary—to either strike the enhancement allegation or impose the
enhancement, results in an unauthorized sentence.” (People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 422, 432.)
Whether a sentence is unauthorized “presents a pure question of law” we examine
de novo. (People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467.)
C. Analysis
The trial court did have statutory authority under section 1385 to strike the jury’s
finding of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation on count 1. Section 664,
66.
subdivision (a) distinguishes between attempted murder that is willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, which is punishable by an indeterminate life term, and all other attempted
murder, which is punishable by a determinate term of five, seven, or nine years. Courts
have long recognized that the premeditation allegation functions as a penalty provision,
and therefore a trial court has discretion under section 1385 to strike it “in furtherance of
justice.” (People v. Marsh (1984) 36 Cal.3d 134, 144.)
That discretion, however, is strictly conditioned on compliance with
section 1385’s procedural safeguards. The trial court must state its reasons for any
dismissal orally on the record and enter those reasons in the minutes. (People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531–532; People v. Bonnetta (2009) 46 Cal.4th
143, 151–152.) The purpose of this requirement is to ensure judicial accountability and
to protect against arbitrary or improper dismissals. (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937,
944.) If the court fails to comply with this requirement, the sentence is unauthorized.
Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court did not exercise its section 1385
discretion to strike the premeditation finding. To the contrary, the court expressly stated
at sentencing that it would not “exercise any [section] 1385 striking.” Nor did the court
provide a statement of reasons on the record or in the minutes, as section 1385 requires.
Absent such an express and valid dismissal, the premeditation finding remained intact,
and the court was required to impose the indeterminate life sentence prescribed by
section 664, subdivision (a). The court’s imposition of a determinate seven-year term,
representing the midterm for nonpremeditated attempted murder, was therefore
unauthorized.
On remand, the trial court must impose a lawful sentence on count 1, either by
properly exercising its section 1385 discretion to strike the premeditation finding in
accordance with statutory requirements, or by imposing the correct indeterminate life
term with the applicable enhancements.
67.
DISPOSITION
Parra’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
The jury’s findings on the section 186.22, subdivision (b), gang enhancements; the
section 186.22, subdivision (a), substantive gang offense; and the gang-related firearm
use enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), are vacated in
light of Assembly Bill 333. The prosecutor may elect to retry these allegations within
60 days of the filing of the remittitur in the trial court. (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2).)
Parra’s conviction on count 2 for attempted voluntary manslaughter is reversed,
and the firearm use enhancements imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (b),
attached to counts 4 and 5 are stricken.
Following resentencing, the trial court shall prepare and forward to the appropriate
authorities an amended abstract of judgment reflecting all modifications, along with an
updated custody credit calculation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HARRELL, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
LEVY, J.
68.
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