CourtListener 10781440•People v. Limon CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/29/26 P. v. Limon CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B342397
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA072152)
v.
ARNO SACRAMENTO LIMON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Vacated and
remanded.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
In 2006, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Arno
Sacramento Limon of one count each of first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and premeditated and deliberate
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and the trial court
sentenced him to 117 years to life in prison. In 2024, the court
resentenced him under section 1172.75, reducing his aggregate
sentence to 80 years to life. Limon contends the superior court
abused its discretion in imposing the new sentence. He argues
the court failed to sufficiently consider his post-conviction good
conduct when it denied his motion under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike one of his prior strikes
for purposes of sentencing. In addition, he argues the court erred
by refusing to reexamine the jury’s finding that he committed his
offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22) in
light of subsequent legislation restricting the application of gang
enhancements.
We disagree with Limon’s first claim but agree with his
second, and accordingly we vacate the court’s new sentencing
order. Before the court addresses the gang finding, however, it
must verify that Limon’s name appeared on a list provided by the
Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and that it
thus has jurisdiction to resentence him.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from a 2005 encounter between Limon and
two strangers outside a drug store in Pomona. Limon asked the
two men where they were from, and they responded that they
were OAG (Original Asian Gang). The two men entered the
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
store, and Limon, who was a member of the rival 12th Street
gang, remained outside and spoke with an associate on a bicycle.
When the two OAG members exited the store, the man on the
bicycle shot them, killing one and wounding the other. A full
account of the facts of the case can be found in our opinion
affirming Limon’s convictions on direct appeal (People v. Limon
(Aug. 22, 2007, B193220) [nonpub. opn.]).2
In addition to convicting Limon of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and premeditated and deliberate
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), the jury found
that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing death and great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and
that the offenses were gang related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). On
count 1, the court sentenced Limon to a base term of 25 years to
life, doubled because Limon had suffered a prior strike offense
(see §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), plus an
additional 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, plus five
more years under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for a prior
serious felony conviction, plus one additional year under section
667.5, subdivision (b) for a prior prison term. On count 2, the
court imposed a base term of 15 years to life rather than the
otherwise-applicable term of seven years to life because Limon
committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
(See §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a).) The
court doubled that term because of Limon’s prior strike
2 We recently issued a second opinion in Limon’s case
addressing his petition for post-conviction relief under section
1172.6. (People v. Limon (July 16, 2025, B337656) [nonpub.
opn.].) The issues in the current appeal have nothing to do with
those in Limon’s section 1172.6 appeal.
3
conviction, and added six years of enhancements under sections
667 and 667.5, just as in count 1. This resulted in an aggregate
sentence of 117 years to life in prison—81 years to life on count 1,
and a consecutive term of 36 years to life on count 2.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1), which eliminated the
one-year enhancement for prior prison terms under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) except in the case of defendants whose prior
prison term was imposed for a sexually violent offense. Two
years later, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, which
declared all existing enhancements imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) invalid except when the enhancement was
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense, and
created a mechanism for eliminating the invalid enhancements
from sentences of defendants in custody. (Sen. Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.)
In April 2024, Limon filed a motion requesting that the
superior court strike the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements and resentence him under section 1172.75. After
a hearing, the court recalled Limon’s sentence and struck the two
invalid enhancements. The court also stayed the weapon
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and elected
not to impose the five-year enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) for Limon’s prior serious felony conviction. The
court reimposed the base term of 25 years to life for murder and
15 years to life for deliberate and premeditated attempted
murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Both of those
terms were doubled because of Limon’s prior strike conviction,
yielding a new aggregate sentence of 80 years to life.
4
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Must Verify its Jurisdiction by
Determining Whether the CDCR Identified Limon
for Resentencing
Before we evaluate the merits of Limon’s arguments, we
first address the superior court’s jurisdiction to vacate his
original sentence and resentence him.
“ ‘[A] trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a
criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has
commenced. [Citations.] Where the trial court relinquishes
custody of a defendant, it also loses jurisdiction over that
defendant.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 636.)
The Legislature may restore jurisdiction to the trial court by
enacting a statute allowing defendants with final convictions to
petition for resentencing, and indeed, has done so several times.
(Id. at p. 637, citing §§ 1170.126, 1170.18, former § 1170.95,
subsequently recodified as § 1172.6.)
The Legislature did not create a right for defendants to
petition for resentencing in section 1172.75. Instead, it required
the secretary of the CDCR and the county correctional
administrator of each county to initiate the resentencing process
by “identify[ing] those persons in their custody currently serving
a term for a judgment that includes an [invalid] enhancement . . .
and . . . provid[ing] the name of each person, along with the
person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket
number, to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.”
(Id., subd. (b).) The deadline to provide such a list was March 1,
2022, for certain defendants potentially eligible for immediate
release, and July 1, 2022, for all other inmates. (Id., subds. (b)(1)
& (2).) Absent action by the CDCR, the trial court lacks
5
jurisdiction to entertain a defendant’s motion for resentencing.
(People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447-448; People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 381; see also People v. Newell
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268; but see People v. Cota (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 1118, 1129-1131 [superior court has jurisdiction to
resentence a defendant if the CDCR includes the defendant in a
list of eligible inmates but fails to forward the list to the superior
court], review granted Oct. 1, 2025, S292637.)
In Limon’s motion for resentencing, his attorney stated
that she “believe[d] the [s]ecretary of the [CDCR] . . . and the
county correctional administrator identified [Limon] as a person
in their custody serving a sentence that includes a[ now-invalid]
enhancement,” but she included no evidence of such an
identification. In his opening brief in this appeal, Limon
acknowledged that “[i]t is unclear from the existing appellate
record whether the [CDCR] had identified [him] as being subject
to this resentencing process and then referred him to the trial
court for resentencing.” In their appellate brief, the People state
that they do “not challenge the superior court’s jurisdiction or
[the Court of Appeal]’s jurisdiction because respondent’s counsel
has independently verified with the CDCR that [Limon] was on
one of the 2022 lists of possibly qualifying inmates that the
CDCR provided to the Los Angeles County Superior Courts in
2022.” Once again, however, the People have provided no
documentation of Limon’s presence on any such list.
Thus, the record before us does not establish that the
superior court had jurisdiction to resentence Limon under section
1172.75. Any action taken without fundamental jurisdiction is
“void, not simply voidable.” (People v. Boyd (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 56, 71.) Prior to taking any further action on
6
remand, therefore, the court must first determine whether the
CDCR in fact placed Limon’s name on a list of defendants
potentially eligible for resentencing.3
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Consider
Limon’s Post-conviction Conduct
At the resentencing hearing, Limon made a Romero motion
(People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497)
requesting that the court disregard his prior strike conviction for
purposes of sentencing. He now contends the court abused its
discretion when it denied the motion because it “limited its
analysis to factors existent at the time of original sentencing . . .
3 The record indicates that Limon’s prior convictions were
for robbery (§ 211) and false imprisonment (§ 236), neither of
which is a sexually violent offense. (See § 1172.75, subd. (a);
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b).) Thus, so far as we can see,
Limon’s section 667.5 sentence enhancements are “legally
invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The question of how the trial
court should proceed upon remand if it turns out that the CDCR
failed to put Limon’s name on a list of inmates potentially eligible
for resentencing under section 1172.75 is not before us.
Nevertheless, to avoid confusion, nothing in this opinion implies
that Limon would be definitively barred from relief in that event.
As the court explained in a similar circumstance in People v.
King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 629, “[t]he unavailability of a motion
procedure does not deprive wrongfully incarcerated defendants of
a remedy. A defendant who is serving a longer sentence than the
law allows may challenge the sentence in a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.” (Id. at p. 640.) Alternatively, section 1172.1
provides jurisdiction to resentence a defendant upon
recommendation by certain governmental authorities or,
following an ameliorative change in the relevant sentencing laws,
on the court’s own motion. (See King, supra, at p. 641.)
7
without any meaningful consideration of [his] post-conviction
actions and performance during the intervening 20 years of his
incarceration.”
Limon is correct that the full resentencing rule applies to
proceedings under section 1172.75. (People v. Superior Court
(Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 877.) Under this rule, “the
resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the
sentence” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893) and may
“revisit all prior sentencing decisions” (People v. Valenzuela
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425). In particular, the court may
consider any “changed circumstances” since the original
sentencing hearing. (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668,
681.)
We see no indication, however, that the court failed to
follow this law in resentencing Limon. At the outset of the
hearing, the court stated that Limon “is entitled to a full re-
sentencing” and that it “has read the motion and heard the
arguments.” The court also stated that it had “weighed in” its
sentencing decision the evidence Limon submitted regarding his
conduct in the years following his conviction. The court found the
evidence of Limon’s rehabilitation unconvincing because he
participated in “minimal programming” while in prison, and did
so only after he became eligible for resentencing: “I’m concerned
in regards to how much or how little he did prior to that.”
Limon focuses on another statement the court made during
the hearing. In explaining why it was denying the Romero
motion, the court said, “I understand that [the strike] is old now,
but I don’t think that the fact that he had been in prison this
entire time should affect the old—the analysis in looking at the
age of a strike. And as I indicated, he was [o]n parole for that at
8
the time he was involved in what ended up being a murder[ and]
an attempted murder in a gang situation.”
The court was speaking extemporaneously, and its
language may have been imprecise, but its point was clear
enough. The court acknowledged that Limon’s prior strike
offense was remote in time, but it concluded this did not assist
Limon because he committed his current offenses while on parole,
and then spent the following 18 years leading up to the
resentencing hearing in prison. The remoteness of a prior strike
is “a factor in mitigation” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
1134, 1141), but only where the defendant lives a crime-free life
after committing it. (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
809, 813.) In the court’s view, Limon still merited a second-strike
sentence because he had not shown he was able to live outside
prison without committing further offenses. We see no error in
the court’s analysis.
C. The Trial Court Erred by Refusing to Reconsider the
Gang Enhancement
Limon contends the superior court erred by refusing to
reconsider the jury’s finding that he committed his crimes for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) when
resentencing him. The People concede that Limon is correct, and
we concur.
As noted above, Limon’s original sentence was based in
part on the jury’s finding that he committed the offenses for the
benefit of a criminal street gang. Without that finding, his
sentence for premeditated and deliberate attempted murder
would have been life with the possibility of parole after having
served seven years. (See §§ 664, subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a)(1).)
Because of the gang finding, however, his sentence for attempted
9
murder required that he serve at least 15 years prior to any
parole. (See § 186.22, subd. (b)(5).)4
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699) (Assembly Bill 333),
which, effective January 1, 2022, restricted the circumstances in
which gang enhancements under section 186.22 apply. (People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.) In resentencing proceedings
under section 1172.75, “[t]he court shall . . . apply any . . .
changes in law that reduce sentences” (id., subd. (d)(2)), and
Limon argued that in light of the amendments to section 186.22,
“a retrial on the gang allegation is necessary.” The superior court
disagreed, concluding “[t]he gang enhancement has been found to
be true” and that a retrial was not warranted.
Two months after the resentencing hearing, the Supreme
Court held in People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 that
Assembly Bill 333’s substantive amendments to section 186.22
apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions are not final.
(Lopez, supra, at pp. 392-393.) Even if a defendant’s conviction
became final years ago, if his sentence is vacated as a result of
subsequent legislation, it “bec[omes] nonfinal” for purposes of
resentencing. (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 162;
accord, Lopez, supra, at p. 398.) Thus, assuming the court had
jurisdiction to vacate Limon’s sentence (see Discussion, part A,
4 Vacating the gang finding would not make Limon
immediately eligible for parole. The court doubled this 15-year
minimum on the attempted murder charge to 30 years because
Limon had suffered a prior strike conviction (see §§ 667, subd.
(e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and further ordered this sentence to
run consecutive to the 50-year minimum sentence for murder.
10
ante), he is entitled to benefit from the recent amendments to
section 186.22 at resentencing.
Limon argues we must remand the case for potential retrial
of the gang finding. (See People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
467, 480 [“The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—
where newly required elements were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is
to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the
affected charges”].) We agree with the People, however, that
prior to vacating the jury’s finding that Limon committed his
crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, the superior court
must determine whether the lack of jury instructions on the
current law regarding gang findings prejudiced him. As we
explained in another case, “[b]y requiring proof for a gang
enhancement that the benefit to the gang was more than
reputational, Assembly Bill . . . 333 essentially adds a new
element to the enhancement. When jury instructions are
deficient for omitting an element of an offense, they implicate the
defendant’s federal constitutional rights, and we review for
harmless error under the strict standard of Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705].”
(People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 668.)
Upon remand, if the People prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless and the superior court so
finds, the court may resentence Limon based on the jury having
found the criminal street gang enhancement true. If the superior
court finds prejudicial error, then that enhancement must be
vacated and the People given the opportunity to retry it.
11
DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order vacating Limon’s sentence and
resentencing him is vacated. On remand, the court shall first
determine whether it has jurisdiction to resentence Limon. If
not, it shall dismiss his petition without prejudice to his
eligibility for relief by other means. If the court determines it
does have jurisdiction, it shall conduct further proceedings as
described above in Discussion, part C.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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