White v. Gerard Cosmetics CA2/5

CourtListener 10780189Calctapp27.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/27/26 White v. Gerard Cosmetics CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SHAUN WHITE, B346758

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 19STCV33840)

GERARD COSMETICS, INC.,
et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Kerry R. Bensinger, Judge. Affirmed.
Shaun White, self-represented litigant, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Law Offices of Perry H. Rausher, Perry H. Rausher, for
Defendants and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shaun White appeals from a judgment entered
following the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award in
favor of defendants Gerard Cosmetics, Inc. and Jennifer Gerard.
We affirm the orders denying the petition to vacate and granting
the petition to confirm it.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Settlement Agreement

On September 23, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendants asserting, among other causes of action, a claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (White v. Gerard
Cosmetics, Inc., et al., Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2019, No.
19STCV33840). Following a mediation, the parties reached a
settlement, as memorialized in a settlement agreement executed
September 20, 2022 (agreement), pursuant to which defendants’
insurer agreed to deposit $1,000,000 in a trust that would
disburse payments to plaintiff and others as required by the
terms of the agreement. Among other terms, the agreement
contained non-contact, non-disparagement, confidentiality, and
non-disclosure provisions. It also specified penalties for
violations of those provisions, including forfeiture of payments
due plaintiff under the agreement from amounts held in the
settlement trust and liquidated damages of $15,000 for each such
violation. The agreement further provided that, if the retired
judge who mediated the dispute was unavailable to adjudicate

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claimed breaches of the agreement, those claims would be
resolved in binding arbitration before alternative dispute
resolution provider Signature Resolution (Signature); the parties
would share the arbitration fees equally at the outset, but the
prevailing party would be entitled to recover from the losing
party all arbitration fees, attorney fees, and costs incurred in the
arbitration; and any awards rendered by the arbitrator would be
“binding, final, and non-appealable.”
On January 24, 2023, the trial court dismissed the action
with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation that the court would
retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement under
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.1

B. Arbitration and Award

Based on plaintiff’s alleged breaches of the agreement,
defendants submitted to Signature a demand for arbitration
against plaintiff. On August 22, 2024, the arbitrator held a case
management conference during which he denied defendants’
request for entry of plaintiff’s default due to his late payment of
arbitration fees but advised that any future failure to timely pay
fees would result in “substantial penalties, including but not
limited to default.”
Following the conference, Signature notified the parties
that the arbitration hearing would commence on October 8, 2024,
and requested payment of additional arbitration fees by
September 10, 2024. The arbitration hearing was later
rescheduled for November 11, 2024.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

3
When plaintiff failed to pay the additional arbitration fees
by September 10, 2024, “Signature made repeated efforts to
collect the payment. This include[d] telephone calls and at least
five different emails to [plaintiff’s] counsel. [Plaintiff’s] counsel
[did] not respond[ ] to any of those telephone calls or emails. . . .
[Plaintiff’s] counsel . . . also ignored [defendants’] efforts to reach
out and communicate in advance of the request for default.”
Accordingly, on October 23, 2024, the arbitrator issued an order
finding plaintiff in default and setting a “default prove-up” on
November 11, 2024, the date previously scheduled for the
arbitration hearing.
On October 29, 2024, plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to the
arbitrator requesting reconsideration of the default in which
plaintiff “acknowledge[d] that the latest invoice provided by
Signature . . . had not been paid but he simply [did] not [have]
the necessary funds. He was unaware of the ramifications of not
timely paying the invoice.” That same day, defendants sent a
letter in opposition to the request. On November 1, 2024, the
arbitrator issued a further ruling, denying plaintiff’s request to
reconsider the default, but providing that, “if [plaintiff] [paid] his
share of the fees by remitting payment of the outstanding bill by
the close of business [that day], he [would] . . . preserve his right
to be present on Zoom during the default prove-up, to cross-
examine any witnesses who testify at the hearing, and to submit
briefing of his own on the issues. Regardless of whether
[plaintiff] submit[ted] payment, he [would] not, however, be
permitted to testify or present any affirmative evidence at the
hearing.”
Prior to the November 11, 2024, hearing, defendants
submitted “a default prove-up package in lieu of live testimony.”

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After the deadline for submission of it had passed, plaintiff
submitted a brief which the arbitrator considered over
defendants’ objections. Plaintiff argued, among other things, that
the agreement’s confidentiality provision violated section 1001
which prohibits “a provision within a settlement agreement that
prevents or restricts the disclosure of factual information related
to” claims for sexual assault, sexual harassment, workplace and
other harassment, and discrimination.” (§ 1001, subd. (a)(1)–(4).)
Following the default prove-up hearing, the arbitrator
issued an award finding that defendants had established
multiple violations of the agreement, independent of any
violations of the confidentiality provision, including multiple
violations of the no contact provision. Accordingly, the arbitrator
issued the following award: (1) the amount of $280,938.43
remaining in trust and due to be disbursed to plaintiff under the
agreement was deemed forfeited and the trustee was ordered
instead to pay that amount forthwith to the domestic violence
program of the child and family center in Santa Clarita; (2) based
on at least three separate violations of the settlement agreement
established by defendants, plaintiff was ordered to pay them
$15,000 per violation, for a total of $45,000 in liquidated
damages; and (3) plaintiff was ordered to pay defendants’
arbitration costs in the amount of $15,000 and attorney fees in
the amount of $30,400.80.
On November 21, 2024, plaintiff filed an objection to the
award. On November 22, 2024, defendants filed a response. The
arbitrator “declined to rule on the [o]bjection,” and instead found
that the award was “binding, final and [nonappealable].”

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C. Petitions to Confirm and Vacate

On January 29, 2025, plaintiff filed a petition to vacate the
arbitration award, asserting two grounds in support—the award
was “obtained by corruption, fraud, or other unfair means” and
“the misconduct of [the] neutral arbitrator substantially
prejudiced [plaintiff’s] rights.” In support of the petition, plaintiff
attached a copy of the agreement and the award but did not
submit any additional evidence.2
On February 3, 2025, defendants filed a petition to confirm
the award, supported by their counsel’s declaration and exhibits
detailing the procedural history of the arbitration proceeding. On
March 6, 2025, they also filed objections and an opposition to
plaintiff’s “petition to vacate,” including additional exhibits
providing further details about the arbitration proceedings.
On March 20, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the
“[m]otion to [v]acate or [a]lter [the a]rbitration [a]ward” and
petition to confirm the award. Plaintiff did not appear at the
hearing. Following the hearing, the court issued a minute order
ruling on plaintiff’s motion and defendants’ petition. The court
rejected plaintiff’s assertion that the award was procured by
fraud explaining, plaintiff “contends [defendants] used unverified
evidence, tampered with witnesses, and used retaliatory tactics,
such as recruiting [plaintiff’s] ex-girlfriend to file a frivolous
restraining order and fabricate nondisclosure breaches, to
procure the [a]rbitration [a]ward. These are serious charges.

2 The case register reflects that on the same date, plaintiff
filed a “Motion to Vacate or Alter Arbitration Award.” Plaintiff,
however, did not designate that motion as part of the record on
appeal.

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However, [plaintiff] does not support any of these charges with
admissible evidence. Indeed, as the [defendants] point out in
their [o]bjection [and o]pposition, none of [plaintiff’s] exhibits are
authenticated. (See Pet. to Vacate [sic], Exs. 1–33.)[3] In short,
the information and allegations lack foundation.”
On plaintiff’s claim of arbitrator misconduct, the trial court
reasoned, “[Plaintiff] next argues the [a]rbitrator did not honor
his promise to allow [plaintiff’s] attorney to cross-examine
witnesses at the default prove-up hearing and issued the [award]
without the promised procedural safeguards. [Plaintiff] further
argues the [a]rbitrator’s late arrival to the hearing reflects a lack
of impartiality and due process. [¶] [Plaintiff’s] arguments fall
short. Although it is undisputed the [a]rbitrator arrived late to
the hearing, and more, [plaintiff’s] counsel did not cross-examine
any witnesses, [plaintiff] fails to show whether [defendants]
called any witnesses in support of the default prove-up in the
first place. Indeed, as [plaintiff] admits, no hearing was held.
The arbitrator proceeded by way of a default. While [plaintiff]
may have been permitted ‘to cross-examine any witnesses who
testify at the hearing, and to submit briefing of his own on the
issues,’ . . . no hearing was held, no witnesses testified. [¶]
Further, it is undisputed the [a]rbitrator conferred with counsel
on November 11, 2024[,] and that [plaintiff] submitted a late brief
which the [a]rbitrator nonetheless considered in issuing the
[award]. . . . [Plaintiff’s] participation in the arbitration was
consistent with the [a]rbitrator’s order. . . . [He] does not show

3 Although the ruling refers to 33 exhibits in support of the
petition to vacate, plaintiff’s January 29, 2025, petition, which is
part of our record on appeal, included only the agreement and
award.

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the [a]rbitrator acted improperly or violated his due process
rights.”
Finally, on the petition to confirm, the trial court ruled that
“[t]he procedural requirements of . . . section 1285.4 have been
satisfied. In moving to confirm the [award], [defendants]
included a copy of the agreement to arbitrate . . . and copy of the
[award] issued by [the a]rbitrator . . . . Further, the court has
considered [plaintiff’s] challenges to the [award] which are set
forth in [p]laintiff’s [p]etition to [v]acate [sic].”

D. Motion for Reconsideration

On April 1, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration
under section 1008, subdivision (a) “on the grounds that newly
authenticated evidence was not properly considered in the prior
ruling.” Plaintiff argued the trial court failed to consider key
evidence due to authentication issues and that the attached
“newly authenticated” evidence would show that (1) “[t]he
arbitration provider was misled by [defendants], who concealed
key evidence;” (2) plaintiff “was financially disadvantaged and
forced into default;” and (3) defendants “presented misleading
evidence at a default arbitration hearing without [plaintiff]
present.” His declaration identified 14 exhibits attached to an
exhibit list.
On April 21, 2025, plaintiff filed a supplemental
declaration asserting facts that he claimed would show “the
arbitration award was procured through fraud, perjury, use of
dismissed evidence, and the suppression of [his] rights as a
harassment survivor.” The declaration identified eight additional

8
exhibits attached to a supplemental exhibit list without providing
other information authenticating them.
On April 24, 2025, defendants filed objections and an
opposition to the reconsideration motion. On April 29, 2025, they
filed objections to plaintiff’s supplemental declaration.
On May 1, 2025, plaintiff filed responses to defendants’
objections to his evidence.
At the May 8, 2025, hearing on the reconsideration motion,
plaintiff again failed to appear. The court took the matter under
submission.
On May 14, 2025, the trial court issued a minute order
denying the motion. The court based its ruling on the following
grounds: “First and foremost, contrary to [plaintiff’s]
representations, he has not provided properly authenticated
evidence. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1400, 1401.) [Plaintiff’s] motion
appears nearly identical to his [p]etition to [v]acate [sic]. [¶]
Second, [plaintiff] does not provide any discussion or explanation
elucidating what should be considered new or different facts,
circumstances, or law that require reconsideration of the court’s
March 20, 2025 order. (. . . § 1008, subd. (a).) [¶] Third, even if
[plaintiff] had properly authenticated the evidence (which he did
not), [plaintiff] does not explain why he could not have submitted
such evidence in support of his [p]etition to [v]acate [sic]. [¶]
Fourth, [plaintiff] is mistaken that the court denied the [p]etition
to [v]acate [sic] and granted the [p]etition to [c]onfirm solely on
[plaintiff’s] failure to provide admissible evidence. Not so. The
court noted [plaintiff’s] admission that his default was entered in
the arbitration proceedings for multiple failures to pay timely his
arbitration fees, that the [a]rbitrator considered [plaintiff’s] late-
filled [sic] brief and nonetheless found in favor of

9
[defendants]. . . . Based on these facts, the court found [plaintiff]
failed to show the [award] was procured by arbitrator
misconduct. [Plaintiff] does not address this portion of the court’s
order. Reconsideration is not warranted.”

E. Judgment

On May 14, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment
forfeiting the $280,938.43 in funds remaining in the settlement
trust and ordering them paid to the domestic violence program,
awarding defendants $45,000 in liquidated damages, and
awarding them $15,000 in arbitration costs and $30,400.80 in
attorney fees and additional costs, for a total monetary award of
$90,400.80.
On May 23, 2025, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be
correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) An appellant must
affirmatively establish error by an adequate record. (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) In the absence of a proper
record on appeal, the appealable judgment or order is presumed
correct and must be affirmed. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1281, 1295–1296.)

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“Generally, courts cannot review arbitration awards for
errors of fact or law, even when those errors appear on the face of
the award or cause substantial injustice to the parties.
([Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 6, 28
(Moncharsh)].)” (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th
909, 916, (Richey).) “An award may be vacated only for fraud,
corruption, misconduct, an undisclosed conflict, or similar
‘circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself,
or with the fairness of the arbitration process.’ (Moncharsh,
[supra, 3 Cal.4th] at p. 12; see § 1286.2, subd. (a).)” (Heimlich v.
Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 367 (Heimlich).)
“The exceptions to the limits on review of awards protect
against error that is so egregious as to constitute misconduct or
so profound as to render the process unfair. . . . ‘“The statutory
provisions for [review of an arbitration award] are manifestly for
the sole purpose of preventing the misuse of the proceeding,
where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error, or mistake has
been carried into the award to the substantial prejudice of a
party to the proceeding.”’ [Citation.]” (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 368, fn. omitted.)
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
request to vacate an award de novo, giving deference to the
award.4 (See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9

4 Defendants contend that, in the agreement’s arbitration
provision, plaintiff waived his right to appeal from the judgment
entered on the arbitration award. We disagree.
The provision here stated that the arbitration award would
be “binding, final, and non-appealable.” But there is no language
explicitly providing that plaintiff waived his rights to appeal from
the judgment entered on the award on the limited statutory
grounds for vacating the award. Absent such express language,

11
Cal.4th 362, 375–376, fn. 9; O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 1044, 1055–1056.) If there are disputed issues of
fact before the trial court, the appellate court accepts the trial
court’s resolution of disputes if supported by substantial
evidence. (See Malek v. Blue Cross of California (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 44, 55–56.) The appellate court also presumes the
trial court found every fact and drew the permissible inferences
to support the trial court’s determination. (Fininen v. Barlow
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 185, 189–190.)

courts do not find waiver. “California courts enforce contractual
provisions waiving a party’s right to appeal a judgment on an
arbitration award. [Citations.] But they do so only if this intent
is ‘clear and explicit.’ [Citations.] [¶] Reasonably read, the cited
language of the parties’ arbitration agreement does not show [the
appellant] waived his right to appeal on the limited judicial
review grounds provided in the arbitration statutes. ‘[G]enerally,
a contract provision stating that arbitration is “non-appealable”
signifies that the parties to the contract may not appeal the
merits of the arbitration; not that the parties agree to waive a
right to appeal the . . . judgment confirming or vacating the
arbitration decision.’ [Citation.] This principle applies here.
Although the parties unambiguously gave up their rights to
litigate the matter in a judicial forum, including their judicial
appellate rights, they did not explicitly waive their rights to the
limited judicial review provided under the arbitration statutes,
which encompass the right to appeal a final judgment on these
matters. (See § 1294.)” (Emerald Aero, LLC v. Kaplan (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 1125, 1144–1145.)

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B. Ruling on Petition to Vacate

1. Challenges to Merits of Award

Plaintiff raises several arguments concerning the
enforceability of the contract provisions on which defendants
predicated their claims, including challenges based on
unconscionability, illegality, public policy, and freedom of
expression.
We reject plaintiff’s merits-based arguments for at least
two reasons. First, and as defendants note, there is no record of
plaintiff having raised these arguments in the trial court. “‘“As a
general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal . . . . This rule is based on
fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the
opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.”
[Citation.]’” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) By failing to raise his arguments in the
trial court, plaintiff has forfeited them on appeal. (Ibid.)
Second, even if plaintiff had not forfeited his arguments on
appeal, we would reject them because as explained, “[a] court’s
power to correct or vacate an erroneous arbitration award is
closely circumscribed.” (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 367.)
“‘[B]y voluntarily submitting to arbitration, the parties have
agreed to bear the risk [of uncorrectable legal or factual error] in
return for a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive resolution to their
dispute.” (Moncharsh, [supra, 3 Cal.4th] at p. 11.)” (Ibid.) On an
appeal from a ruling denying a petition to vacate an arbitration
award, “[w]e cannot review the merits of the controversy, the
validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning, or the sufficiency of the

13
evidence supporting an arbitrator’s award.” (Luster v. Collins
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344.)
Unless the arbitration provision contains an express and
unambiguous limitation on the arbitrator’s powers, “an arbitrator
has the authority to find the facts, interpret the contract, and
award any relief rationally related to his or her factual findings
and contractual interpretation.” (Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd.
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1182.) “‘Inherent in that power is the
possibility the arbitrator may err in deciding some aspect of the
case. Arbitrators do not ordinarily exceed their contractually
created powers simply by reaching an erroneous conclusion on a
contested issue of law or fact, and arbitral awards may not
ordinarily be vacated because of such error, for “‘[t]he arbitrator’s
resolution of these issues is what the parties bargained for in the
arbitration agreement.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1360–
1361.) We therefore reject plaintiff’s challenges to the merits of
the arbitration award.

2. Fraud and Misconduct

Plaintiff also contends that the arbitration award was
procured by fraud and that the arbitrator engaged in prejudicial
misconduct. According to plaintiff, “[b]y submitting transcripts
from a dismissed [domestic violence restraining order] case—
while concealing the dismissal—[defendants] misled the
arbitrator. That constitutes fraud by concealment.” Plaintiff also
contends that the arbitrator “committed serious misconduct. He
kept [plaintiff] in default despite payment of required fees,
barred him from testifying or presenting evidence, [and]

14
considered [defendants’] private submissions that were never
disclosed to [plaintiff] . . . .”
The record on appeal does not support plaintiff’s factual
contentions. Specifically, the record on appeal does not include
the exhibits that plaintiff purportedly submitted in connection
with his motion to vacate the arbitration award. Thus, there is
no evidentiary support for plaintiff’s assertion that defendants
misled the arbitrator by submitting transcripts from a dismissed
case; that the arbitrator “kept [plaintiff] in default despite
payment of required fees;” or that the arbitrator “considered
[defendants’] private submissions that were never disclosed to
[plaintiff] . . . .” Given the record on appeal, we presume the
court’s order was correct. (Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at
pp. 1295–1296.)
Although the record on appeal demonstrates that the
arbitrator ruled plaintiff could not testify or present evidence at
the hearing given his failure to pay the arbitration fees, plaintiff
does not articulate how plaintiff’s rights were substantially
prejudiced by the arbitrator’s ruling. (See § 1286.2, subd. (a)(5);
Hall v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 427, 439.) He
therefore cannot demonstrate the trial court erred in denying his
petition to vacate the award.5

5 Other than his arguments in support of his motion to
vacate, plaintiff did not separately oppose the petition to confirm
in the trial court, and he makes no separate assertion of error on
appeal. We therefore affirm the order confirming the award for
the same reasons we affirm the order denying the petition to
vacate.

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C. Ruling on Reconsideration Motion

Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motion to reconsider its ruling on the petition to vacate.
According to plaintiff, “[t]he trial court denied [plaintiff’s m]otion
to [v]acate and [m]otion for [r]econsideration on the ground that
‘100% of [plaintiff’s] evidence is unauthentic.’ . . . [¶] That
ruling is refuted by the appellate record now before this [c]ourt.
Every category of evidence is either: [¶] An official court
judgment or agency determination; [¶] A certified exhibit
attached to the [s]upersedes [s]tay filing already in this [c]ourt’s
docket; or [¶] A submission from [defendants’] own counsel. [¶]
Together, the [j]udicial [n]otice records[6] and [s]upersedes [s]tay
exhibits conclusively establish authenticity and eliminate the
evidentiary barrier relied upon by the trial court.” (Boldface
omitted.)
“Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for
reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances,
or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a
satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at
an earlier time. [Citation.] A trial court’s ruling on a motion for
reconsideration is reviewed under the abuse of discretion

6 In his opening brief, plaintiff requests that we take judicial
notice of three documents. We deny the request for failure to
comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a) which
requires, among other things, a separate motion attaching copies
of the documents subject to the request. Further, we deny
plaintiff’s December 23, 2025, motion to augment the record with
a copy of defendants’ August 21, 2024, arbitration brief as there
is no indication that document was submitted to the trial court.

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standard. [Citation.]” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.)
We find no abuse of discretion. First, plaintiff did not
present an explanation in the trial court as to why he did not
earlier produce the purportedly new evidence. Moreover, and
contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, much of the evidence submitted
by plaintiff lacked authentication. A writing must be
authenticated before it is received in evidence. (Evid. Code,
§ 1401, subd. (a).) “Authentication of a writing means (a) the
introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is
the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or
(b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided
by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.) Although plaintiff submitted two
declarations that referenced documents included in separate
exhibit lists, those declarations did not adequately authentic the
exhibits. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
denial of the reconsideration motion.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The orders denying plaintiff’s petition to vacate the award
and granting defendants’ petition to confirm it are affirmed.
Defendants are awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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