CourtListener 10780080•People v. Sanny CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/27/26 P. v. Sanny CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083398
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD294529)
BRYAN L. SANNY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed.
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson
and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 2023, a jury convicted Bryan L. Sanny of transportation of a
controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379; count 5), assault
with a firearm (Pen. Code,1 §§ 245, subd. (a) & 12022.5, subd. (a); count 2),
possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 3), and misdemeanor resisting arrest
(§ 148; count 4).2 The jury acquitted Sanny of attempted murder and the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (count 1), as well as the
greater offense of resisting arrest under section 69 (count 4). The convictions
stemmed from two separate incidents. Count 5, not at issue on appeal,
occurred in September 2021 when Sanny was pulled over for a traffic
violation and police discovered a large quantity of methamphetamine and a
digital scale in his possession.
The second, more serious incident (charged in counts 1, 2, 3, and 4)
occurred several months later, on May 3, 2022. That night, around
10:00 p.m., Sanny drove to an apartment near Balboa Park to pick up his on-
and-off girlfriend, S.G. When he arrived, M.H., a man in Sanny’s circle of
methamphetamine users, approached Sanny outside his car holding a
machete. Minutes later, S.F., another member of the drug circle, charged at
Sanny with a taser. Sanny and S.F. then engaged in a physical fight, which
ended when Sanny shot S.F. Sanny fled the scene on foot and was
apprehended by police as he was hiding in the brush on a hill in Balboa Park.
Sanny was arrested, jailed, and charged with the attempted murder of S.F.,
along with the other crimes.
Later in May, S.G., facing separate criminal charges, told her counsel
she had information about the attempted murder of S.F. S.G.’s counsel
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury also found true allegations that Sanny personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) with respect to count 2.
2
arranged a meeting with the prosecutor in Sanny’s case. The interview took
place on June 14, 2022, and was audio-recorded. During that conversation,
S.G. told the prosecutor she had spoken with S.F., who was staying at the
apartment where S.G. lived. S.G. stated that S.F. told her that he and M.H.
were planning to rob Sanny the night of the shooting, S.F. had tased Sanny
in the face before the shooting, and S.F. wanted S.G. to tell Sanny’s father he
would testify the shooting was accidental in exchange for $50,000 and a
truck. S.G. also told the prosecutor her conversations with S.F. had been
recorded by security cameras that were installed in the apartment.
Over a year later, on June 28, 2023, the date set for Sanny’s trial to
begin, the prosecutor disclosed to defense counsel for the first time the
existence of her recorded conversation with S.G. After listening to the
recording, Sanny’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the
prosecutor’s failure to disclose the information S.G. provided in the interview.
Defense counsel argued that because the interview contained both
exculpatory information and resulted in the destruction of exculpatory
evidence (the security video), the prosecution had violated Sanny’s right to a
fair trial. The trial court delayed trial and conducted an evidentiary hearing
on Sanny’s motion. Thereafter, the court issued an extensive written order
denying Sanny’s motion without prejudice to a renewed motion at the
conclusion of the trial. The court also stated it would advise the jury of the
prosecution’s failure to disclose the evidence and play all or some of the
recording of the interview at trial at the defense’s request.
The case proceeded to trial, and a portion of the prosecutor’s recorded
interview with S.G. was played for the jury. The court also gave the jury an
instruction that the prosecution had improperly withheld from the defense
the interview recording, and that the video of S.F.’s statements to S.G.
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referenced in the interview had been destroyed by the time the interview was
disclosed to the defense. After the jury rendered its verdict acquitting Sanny
of attempted murder and convicting him of assault with a deadly weapon,
Sanny renewed his motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion, finding
that although the prosecutor had violated her ethical duties by failing to
preserve, in bad faith, evidence that was potentially helpful to the defense,
dismissal was not the appropriate remedy because Sanny had received a fair
trial. Thereafter, the court sentenced Sanny to nine years in prison.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Sanny argues the trial
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the prosecutor’s
misconduct violated his due process rights. Sanny also asserts the trial court
erred by imposing a concurrent term for possession of a controlled substance
while armed with a firearm, count 3, rather than staying the punishment for
this conviction under section 654. The Attorney General responds that the
trial court properly denied Sanny’s motion to dismiss and that the court
properly imposed a separate punishment for count 3.
As we shall explain, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the
prosecutor, Philippa Cunningham, acted in bad faith by failing to preserve
the video evidence disclosed to her by S.G. on June 14, 2022. However, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sanny’s
motion to dismiss because he received a fair trial despite the prosecutor’s
misconduct. We also reject Sanny’s contention the trial court erred by
imposing a concurrent term for count 3. Accordingly, the judgment is
affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 6, 2022, the People filed an initial complaint against Sanny
charging him with the attempted murder of S.F. (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664),
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two counts of assault with a firearm against S.F. and M.H. (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)), possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd.(a)), and possession of a
controlled substance for sale (id., § 11378). Thereafter, on October 20, 2022,
the People filed an amended complaint adding a charge for resisting arrest
after the shooting (§ 69), and a new charge of transporting a controlled
substance for sale arising from Sanny’s traffic stop in 2021 (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379, subd. (a)).
On June 28, 2023, the People filed their final amended information,
charging Sanny with attempted murder of S.F. while personally discharging
a firearm causing great body injury (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1), assault of
S.F. with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2), possession of a firearm while
in possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a); count 3), resisting arrest (§ 69; count 4), and transporting a
controlled substance for sale arising from Sanny’s traffic stop in 2021 (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 5).
A. Motion to Dismiss
The day before trial was set to begin, during discussions on the parties’
in-limine motions, Cunningham—for the first time—disclosed to Sanny’s
defense counsel, Jordan Furrow, and the court that she had a “free-talk”
interview with S.G. in June 2022.3 The following day, Cunningham
explained to the court that S.G.’s attorney and a police officer were present
during the interview, and it was audio recorded. That day, Furrow listened
to the audio recording of the “free-talk” interview, which was about 30
minutes long.
3 An investigator for the prosecution explained at a subsequent
evidentiary hearing that the purpose of the “free-talk” interview was for S.G.
to offer information potentially in exchange for a deal in her prosecution.
5
The court then delayed the start of trial to allow the defense to make a
motion concerning the newly disclosed interview. On July 3, 2023, Furrow
filed a motion to dismiss for a denial of due process. The motion argued
Cunningham’s delayed disclosure of her recorded interview with S.G. violated
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) because the interview
contained exculpatory evidence. Defense counsel also asserted that it was
reasonably probable the outcome of the preliminary hearing would have been
more favorable to Sanny if the interview had been disclosed in a timely
manner. Further, he asserted the nondisclosure hampered the defense’s
investigation and development of trial strategy. Defense counsel also argued
dismissal of the case was the appropriate remedy for the prosecution’s
misconduct.
On the same day, the prosecutor filed “Points and Authorities Re:
Defense’s Anticipated Motion.” Therein, Cunningham asserted dismissal of
the case was not available because section 1054.5, subdivision (c) allowed the
court to dismiss the charges only if it was “required to do so by the
Constitution of the United States” and no constitutional violation had
occurred. The brief also argued the evidence had not been suppressed
because it was disclosed before trial and because statements from an
interview of S.G. conducted by a defense investigator revealed that the
defense had knowledge of the alleged recordings of S.G.’s conversation with
S.F. since September 29, 2022.
When the parties returned to court on July 3, 2023, the court stated its
intention to set an evidentiary hearing if Sanny was willing to waive his
speedy trial rights. The court noted that because of the serious nature of the
charges, and because it appeared there had been a Brady violation and a
failure by the People to retain potentially exculpatory evidence that had since
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been destroyed, the court wanted to provide Cunningham “the opportunity
for further explanation.” Sanny agreed to waive time, and the court provided
the parties with its understanding of the issue and the statements S.G. made
during the interview. The court then posed several questions to be addressed
during the evidentiary hearing, including whether Cunningham informed the
detective in the case about S.G.’s statements, whether the detective also
interviewed S.G., whether the prosecution took any steps to obtain the video
recordings of the conversations S.G. had with S.F. that were referenced
several times in the interview, whether S.G.’s counsel saw the video or ever
had possession of it, and what efforts the prosecution made to secure S.F.’s
testimony for trial.
At the outset of the two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court
admitted the audio recording of Cunningham’s interview with S.G. into
evidence, as well as a “partial transcript” of the recording. The prosecutor
appointed to handle the hearing, not Cunningham, then stated he did not
intend to call any witnesses because the defense had the burden under
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section 1054.1 to establish a constitutional error.4 The court responded that
“the problem is more in the [California v.] Trombetta [(1984) 467 U.S. 479
(Trombetta)] and [Arizona v.] Youngblood [(1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood)]
arena.” The prosecutor argued Trombetta and Youngblood were not violated
because the prosecution was never in possession of the video recording that
S.G. said existed (and tried to show Cunningham) during the interview. The
prosecutor asserted there was “no corresponding duty on law enforcement to
gather physical evidence that might prove useful to the defense.” The
prosecutor also doubted the video’s existence, arguing “the only evidence that
this video ever existed came from [S.G.], the individual with dubious
credibility.”
In addition, the prosecutor explained that a District Attorney
Investigator, Yanci Blackwell, contacted the security system company that
S.G. referenced in the interview, Wyze, and was told that any recording
would have been saved for only 14 days, which had passed. The prosecutor
also stated that Blackwell did not have the identifying information required
by Wyze to obtain the video by warrant. Cunningham stated that during the
4 Section 1054.1 states: “The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the
defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and
information, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the
prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating
agencies: [¶] (a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends
to call as witnesses at trial. [¶] (b) Statements of all defendants. [¶] (c) All
relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the
offenses charged. [¶] (d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material
witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial. [¶]
(e) Any exculpatory evidence. [¶] (f) Relevant written or recorded statements
of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor
intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts
made in conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental
examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the
prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.”
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interview, she believed that she made it clear to S.G.’s counsel that if he had
a copy of the video, she wanted him to provide it to her.
After this initial argument by the prosecution, the court heard
testimony from S.G.’s counsel, Blackwell, and S.G. S.G.’s counsel, Greg
Turner, testified that S.G. never sent him the video of her conversation with
S.F. Rather, she sent Turner an email on May 24, 2022, stating that she had
spoken with S.F. for over an hour, and that the conversation had been
recorded by cameras in her apartment. The email also said that although
they discussed staying out of Sanny’s case, S.G. could not “live with myself if
I didn’t try to help, knowing what I know.” Turner testified that when he
met with S.G., she showed him seconds-long snippets of video on her phone.
Turner told the court that during the interview with Cunningham there was
a back-and-forth discussion that the video could be Brady evidence. He also
stated that after the interview with Cunningham, he was left with the
impression that she was going to pursue the video through her resources, and
that Turner would not be directly participating in any effort to obtain it.
Cunningham conducted the direct examination of Blackwell. He
testified that Cunningham reached out to him on June 15, 2022, the day after
she interviewed S.G., and provided him with a copy of the audio recording of
the interview. Cunningham asked Blackwell to review the recording and to
attempt to obtain the surveillance videos S.G. referenced in the interview.
Within a few days, he sent an email to the legal department at Wyze.
Blackwell received a response that the company did not retain any
information beyond 14 days, but by that time it had been over 14 days since
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the alleged conversation between S.G. and S.F.5 During cross-examination,
Blackwell estimated that around June 28, 2022 he concluded a warrant to
Wyze would not be fruitful and communicated this to Cunningham the same
day.
S.G. testified that she spoke with S.F. in May and S.F. told her that he
and M.H. had attacked Sanny, M.H. held a machete to Sanny’s neck, S.F. had
tased Sanny in the face, and S.F. thought Sanny shot him accidently. She
stated S.F. acted as if the incident were a joke and told her it was funny that
Sanny could spend the rest of his life in prison because of the shooting. She
also said S.F. asked her to go to Sanny’s dad and tell him that for $50,000
and a truck he would help Sanny with his case. S.G. said that during this
conversation she emailed Turner. S.G. said she asked A.P., the man she was
staying with—who was also her ex-boyfriend and the owner of the security
cameras—if she could download the video of her conversation with S.F. He
agreed and they watched the video. She also said the videos were no longer
accessible because they were erased after six months. S.G. said that during
her interview with Cunningham, Cunningham stopped her from providing
any details about the conversation with S.F. S.G. then gave Cunningham
5 Blackwell provided some specific information about Wyze’s service,
explaining Wyze does not collect the video that its customers record with
their equipment. Rather, the cameras relay an encrypted signal to the
customers’ cell phones or other devices. The company does “save a still
photograph once every five minutes, or a 12-second video once every five
minutes depending on what plan is purchased” and that information is
retained for 14 days. Blackwell also testified that each “camera is equipped
with an SD card slot that can be loaded by the user ... and depending on the
amount of activity on that camera, that card will then hold up to” its capacity
and then the user can download directly from the card. Thus, only the user
could retain video from the Wyze cameras.
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information about the Wyze video that she assumed Cunningham would use
to subpoena the company.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court orally
pronounced its order denying the motion to dismiss without prejudice.6 The
court’s extensive order set forth a detailed factual and procedural background
of the case and the evidence it received at the hearing, including the
recording and transcript of Cunningham’s interview with S.G. Because of its
importance, the court also explained the contents of the interview in detail.
The court stated that at the start of the recording, S.G. said she “had a
conversation with [S.F.] and he told [her] everything, told [her] literally
everything” about the night of the shooting. Cunningham then responded by
asking S.G. to “take [her] a couple steps back” so Cunningham could
determine “if there’s anything exculpatory for [Sanny] in this case in terms of
what [S.F.] has said.”
S.G. then explained that after S.F. was released from the hospital, he
and his girlfriend came to stay at the apartment where S.G. was living with
A.P. S.G. stated that the next morning, S.F. “just started talking to [her]
about” the shooting and that S.F. asked her to help him extort Sanny’s father
for $50,000 and a truck in exchange for S.F.’s help to avoid a criminal
conviction S.G. then told Cunningham she refused this request.
Cunningham specifically asked S.G. if the conversation was “recorded in any
way,” and S.G. responded that the apartment had security cameras, through
Wyze, which she could access on her phone.
Cunningham then cautioned S.G. that if she provided information
about Sanny’s case, Cunningham was required to give that information to
Sanny. S.G. responded that she understood and that she could not live with
6 The court filed a written version of the order on July 21, 2023.
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herself if she did not come forward with S.F.’s admissions. After
Cunningham again cautioned S.G. about giving contradictory statements,
S.G. said she was confident that she remembered the conversation with S.F.,
and that it was “burned into [her] memory.” S.G. again tried to show
Cunningham the video on her phone, but Cunningham refused, telling S.G. to
consult with her lawyer and that they could set up a later meeting about the
video with an investigator.
S.G. then told Cunningham that she had another conversation with
S.F. that morning about the shooting, which would also have been recorded
by the security cameras in her apartment. Cunningham responded by
stating that she wanted to talk about S.G.’s conversations with S.F. at a later
time. Cunningham then continued, “ ‘And that way you can just go look into
whether the recording still exists. You can listen to him, you can talk to Mr.
Turner about what that means.’ ” Turner then asked Cunningham if S.G.
was able to obtain videos of the conversations, if she wanted Turner to
transmit the videos. Cunningham did not provide an answer, stating instead
that Turner’s “ethical duties are slightly different than mine.” Cunningham
stated explicitly that “it does sound like it’s gonna end up being Brady
evidence that I’m going to need to get and turn over” and that if it still
existed she would have the opportunity to get it from Wyze without Turner’s
involvement. Cunningham also stated that if Turner did obtain the video,
they could discuss how to transfer the evidence.
The court also noted that Cunningham declined to testify at the
evidentiary hearing and that “[n]o evidence was introduced regarding any
effort by the District Attorney’s office or the San Diego Police Department to
retrieve the video directly from S.G.” or to “take [S.G.]’s statement about
what [S.F.] had told her.”
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After setting forth this background, the court addressed two separate
issues, (1) “Cunningham’s failure to disclose [S.G.]’s statements” to Sanny’s
counsel, and (2) the “prosecution team’s failure to secure and preserve the
video [S.G.] referred to in her June 2022 interview.” With respect to the first
issue, the court found the prosecution was in possession of exculpatory
information, specifically S.G.’s statements that S.F. and M.H. had attacked
Sanny before the shooting and that S.F. wanted to extort Sanny and his
family in exchange for either favorable testimony or not testifying. Further,
Cunningham explicitly recognized the statements as exculpatory during the
interview. The trial court found that Cunningham’s failure to turn over
S.G.’s statements “was a violation of Penal Code section 1054.1 and Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8.”
The court explained, “the prosecution team’s response to a witness who
was eager to provide exculpatory information was to metaphorically put its
fingers in its ears, and pretend the conversation never took place. This
decision is deeply disappointing, violative of Penal Code 1054.1, and
unethical.” The court, however, concluded that because the procedural
posture of the case was pre-trial, and the defense was in possession of the
statements and they were available for trial, there was not a violation of
Brady. The court also ruled that because section 1054.1 was violated it
would “advise the jury of [the] failure or refusal to disclose evidence” and it
would “consider playing all or some of [S.G.]’s recorded statement[s] to the
jury if so requested by the defense.”
With respect to the second issue, the court found that the surveillance
videos discussed by S.G. were potentially useful to the defense and that the
prosecution had acted in bad faith as defined by Youngblood and its progeny.
However, noting that trial courts have a “large measure of discretion in
13
determining the appropriate sanction for failure to preserve material
evidence,” the court found dismissal was not warranted at that juncture
because whether Sanny could “receive a fair trial in the absence of the video
[was] unknown.” Instead, the court denied the motion without prejudice to a
renewed motion after the close of evidence. The court explained that it was
“unknown whether and how [S.G. and S.F. would] testify,” and, as “observed
by the court, all the potential civilian witnesses in this case have credibility
problems.” The court repeated its ruling that it would “allow the defense to
submit a modification of CALCRIM No. 306 [Untimely Disclosure of
Evidence] for consideration and [would] consider playing all or some of
[S.G.]’s interview if requested by defense.”
B. Prosecution Case
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the case proceeded to trial.
The prosecution’s evidence showed that shortly before 10:00 p.m. on May 3,
2022, M.H. and his girlfriend were parked on 7th Avenue, next to Balboa
Park, in San Diego. M.H. testified he was high on methamphetamine and
went to that location to pick up S.F., a close friend at the time, and S.F.’s
girlfriend from A.P.’s apartment.7 A.P. was selling drugs and M.H. planned
to give S.F. and his girlfriend a ride in exchange for some of the meth
purchased from A.P.
After about 15 minutes of waiting, a car M.H. did not recognize drove
towards M.H.’s truck. The car then drove past M.H.’s vehicle and parked
closely behind him. The car made M.H. nervous, so he called S.F. for help.
M.H. then grabbed a machete he kept between his seats and got out of his
truck. M.H. testified he then approached the car saying something like, “who
the fuck are you?” M.H. also said he raised the machete to shoulder level
7 M.H. testified that at the time of trial he had been sober for over a year.
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with his left hand. The driver of the car, Sanny, got out, told M.H. to get
back because he was “strapped,” and lifted his shirt to show M.H. the handle
of a gun. At that point, M.H. realized it was Sanny and lowered the machete.
Sanny then lowered his shirt. M.H. and Sanny knew each other as fellow
methamphetamine users.
Sanny was at the location to pick up S.G. from A.P.’s apartment.
According to M.H., Sanny asked him why he was there, who was with him,
and whether he was there to see S.G. M.H. said that Sanny seemed angry
and agitated. M.H. was surprised to see Sanny, and thought he might have
been drunk because he was acting out of character. M.H. told Sanny he was
there with his girlfriend, but he did not mention that S.F. was at the
apartment with S.G. M.H. then told Sanny he was waiting to meet S.F.8
M.H. testified Sanny then became more upset, saying “fuck [S.F.].
Where is he at? That’s who I’m trying to talk to.” Sanny also said S.F. owed
him money. Moments later, S.F. came down from the apartment and made a
“clacking” sound with a stun gun in his hand. M.H. testified that when
Sanny saw S.F., Sanny ran towards him. M.H. testified both men were
threatening each other, but S.F. told Sanny he was not there with S.G. and
would get Sanny his money. Sanny threatened S.F. that he would “blast”
him. Sanny and S.F. then engaged in a physical fight; S.F. punched Sanny
with one hand and used the other to hit Sanny with the stun gun. Sanny
punched with his left, while he tried to hold the gun in his waistband with his
right.
M.H. paced near the fight and saw S.F. start to get the better of Sanny.
Sanny then pointed his gun towards S.F.’s leg in what M.H. described as an
attempt to scare S.F. In response, S.F. lunged with the stun gun and M.H.,
8 M.H. denied that he and S.F. had planned to rob Sanny that night.
15
who was behind Sanny and still holding the machete, heard one gunshot.
M.H. could not tell if the gun was discharged accidentally, and did not hear a
second gunshot. S.F. fell to the ground screaming he was shot. Sanny then
ran past M.H. to the driver’s side of his car, reached into it, then ran towards
Balboa Park.
M.H. put his machete back into his truck, called 911, and tried to apply
pressure to S.F.’s wound while they waited for the police and paramedics to
arrive. S.F. was transported to the hospital. At the hospital, doctors
performed emergency surgery on S.F. for a bullet track that ran from his
lower left flank to his right buttock, which caused bleeding from the femoral
vein between the pelvis and abdomen. S.F. had a second wound to his upper
right chest that the treating surgeon described as a “superficial,” “in-and-out”
gunshot wound.
After police arrived, they interviewed M.H. and discovered he was
wanted for a felony warrant. M.H. was arrested at the scene and while he
was in custody he wrote down Sanny’s name as the shooter. He did not want
to say Sanny’s name out loud because “it’s not what we do.” Following a
pursuit by a police helicopter, a K9 unit, and a search team, Sanny was
captured by police in thick brush on a steep hill in Balboa Park. After Sanny
failed to respond to repeated police commands to come out of the brush for
approximately 30 minutes, police unleashed a K9 on Sanny. Officers then
descended on Sanny who surrendered, but only after initially resisting the
arrest. Sanny also resisted being handcuffed when he was taken to the
hospital to treat his K9 bite wounds.
After arresting Sanny, officers located a backpack Sanny had discarded
in Balboa Park and discovered four bags of a crystalline substance that was
later determined to be over 100 grams of methamphetamine. Officers
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searched extensively for the gun Sanny used, but it was never found. Police
did recover a nine-millimeter bullet fragment and a live round consistent
with that slug on 7th Avenue near where the shooting occurred. Officers also
found a stun gun in the patio of a nearby home. Sanny also had gunshot
residue on his hands after he was taken into custody.
At the hospital, S.F. was placed into a medically induced coma for two
days. After he regained consciousness, on May 9, 2022, the lead detective on
the case attempted to talk with S.F. at the hospital. S.F., however, was
uncooperative and refused to speak to the detective. The detective testified
that S.F. said, “I will not speak to police officers” and told the detective to get
out of his room.
The prosecution called S.G. to the stand in its case in chief. S.G.
testified she believed S.F. owed Sanny money for drugs that Sanny had
provided to him. While S.F. was in the hospital, S.G. left San Diego to attend
her stepfather’s funeral in Temecula. When she returned to A.P.’s
apartment, S.F. and his girlfriend were staying in a spare bedroom there.
During this time, S.F. spoke to both S.G. and A.P. about the shooting. S.G.
said she was using methamphetamine at that time, but was not impaired
because she had a high tolerance as a habitual user. S.G. testified that S.F.
told them that M.H. had put a machete to Sanny’s neck and pulled him out of
his car, and that S.F. had “tased” Sanny in the face with the thought that
they could rob him. According to S.G., S.F. and M.H. thought it was funny
how Sanny screamed when he was tased. S.F. also told S.G. and A.P. that
Sanny was scared and shaking as he pulled out a gun, which made S.F. and
M.H. laugh. S.F. said Sanny was so rattled that he dropped the gun, at
which point the “clip” fell out. S.F. told them that Sanny tried to get the clip
and run away but S.F. “bum-rushed” Sanny and they got into a fistfight. S.F.
17
also said he expected M.H. to back him up by going for the gun but M.H. did
not, and while S.F. and Sanny were on the ground, the gun went off
accidently, hitting S.F.
S.G. also testified that during a subsequent conversation with S.F.
while he was still staying in A.P.’s apartment, S.F. told her that he and M.H.
were planning on “jacking” Sanny. S.G. also said that on two separate
occasions, S.F. asked her if she would approach Sanny’s father and tell him
that S.F. wanted $50,000 and Sanny’s truck to testify in a way that would
help Sanny. S.G. refused the requests.
After S.G. testified, a portion of her interview with the prosecutor was
played for the jury. In the excerpted recording, S.G. said she had a
conversation with S.F. where he told her everything that happened the night
of the shooting, that S.F. liked to brag about the incident and thought it was
funny, and that she had another conversation with S.F. the morning of the
interview. The excerpt also included S.G.’s statement that S.F. wanted her to
extort Sanny’s father for $50,000 and a truck and, in exchange, S.F. would
“dip” and not testify. S.G. said that S.F.’s statement was recorded because
there was a “really good surveillance system” throughout her residence.
The prosecution also called S.F. to the stand. He admitted multiple
felony convictions, including grand theft in 2005, 2008 and 2017, and was
openly hostile to the proceedings during his testimony. S.F. told the jury he
could not recall any details of the shooting and claimed he did not know S.G.
S.F. also denied owing Sanny money for drugs.
In addition, the prosecution played a recording of Cunningham
interviewing S.F. on July 17, 2023. During that interview, Cunningham
asked S.F. if he told S.G. to tell Sanny’s father, “Hey, you give me $50,000. I
won’t testify.” S.F. responded, “Yeah well of course. Who wouldn’t try to
18
fuckin’ juice their family.” S.F. also told Cunningham S.G. was lying when
she said that S.F. told her that he and M.H. were trying to rob Sanny and
that M.H. attacked Sanny with a machete. S.F. said S.G. was also lying
when she told Cunningham S.F. said the magazine dropped out of the gun
when Sanny was pointing it at S.F. In addition, he said he did not tell S.G.
the gun went off accidently.
Cunningham also called the defense investigator to the stand. The
investigator testified that he attempted to talk to S.F. but could not locate
him. The investigator also told the jury that he met S.G. for the first time
around September 29, 2022, the date of a report he drafted about their
meeting. As at trial, S.G. told the defense investigator that S.F. said the gun
accidentally fired and that its magazine had fallen out during the altercation
that led to the shooting. She also told the investigator about S.F.’s request
for her to help him extort Sanny’s father for $50,000 and a truck, and she
said she did not think S.F. would uphold his end if such a bargain were made.
However, the investigator testified S.G. never said M.H. put a machete to
Sanny’s neck or that M.H. pulled Sanny from his car—only that M.H. had
threatened Sanny with the knife. The investigator also stated that S.G. told
him that S.F. and another man had robbed S.G. and A.P. in A.P.’s apartment
in the summer of 2023.
During cross-examination, the investigator testified that although S.G.
had a methamphetamine addiction, he did not believe she was under the
influence of drugs when she took the stand in this case, or during his
conversations with her. He explained that she seemed to have a hard time
communicating and often spoke quickly, adding to the challenge of
understanding what she was trying to convey. The investigator, however,
testified that she was consistent throughout their interactions about what
19
S.F. had told her about the night of the shooting, specifically that S.F.
admitted attacking Sanny first, S.F. and M.H. started the altercation that led
to the shooting, the men intended to rob Sanny, and S.F. wanted to extort
Sanny and his family for the promise of favorable testimony in this case.
C. Defense Case
Sanny took the stand in his own defense. He told the jury that he
struggled with methamphetamine addiction and had been convicted of
several prior felonies. Sanny also explained that S.G. was his off-and-on
girlfriend for the last seven years, and that S.G. had been romantically
involved with A.P. when she and Sanny were not together. Sanny testified
that on the day of the shooting, he had used methamphetamine throughout
the day and sold drugs at his home in Bonita. In the morning, after not
speaking with S.G. for a week or two, they met in the parking lot of a grocery
store near the apartment she shared with A.P. and agreed they would get
back together as a couple. They made a plan that S.G. would go home to
A.P.’s apartment, and Sanny would come back later that day to take her to
his home.
Sanny went back to his house and continued to use methamphetamine
and work on projects on his property. He testified he and S.G. texted
throughout the rest of the day, but he was “lagging” to pick her up. Finally,
around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., Sanny placed his gun in his waistband, grabbed
his backpack containing meth, put on sandals, and left in his car to go pick
up S.G. Sanny explained he wanted the gun because A.P.’s apartment and
neighborhood were dangerous, and Sanny had been robbed in the same area
when he was a teenager.
When Sanny arrived at the apartment, he pulled onto 6th Avenue, a
small dead-end street, came around a corner, and saw a truck heading
20
toward him. Sanny recognized M.H. and saw him sitting in the front seat
smoking methamphetamine. Sanny thought M.H. also recognized him and
pulled his car behind M.H.’s truck, then parked a few feet behind.
Sanny called S.G., but she did not answer. M.H. then walked toward
the driver’s side of Sanny’s car holding a machete. Sanny testified that M.H.
“jumped out in a fight stance with a weapon, sweating, and crazy-eyed.”
Sanny testified he was surprised because although they had been in a prior
dispute about M.H.’s girlfriend, he thought the issue was resolved. Sanny
quickly got out of his car, yelled at M.H. to back up, and lifted his shirt to
show him the handle of his gun. Sanny started backing up, then heard
“clack, clack, clack, clack” and saw a blue spark coming from the nearby
alley. Sanny saw S.F. heading towards him with the stun gun clacking.
Sanny testified that he would not have gone to the apartment if he had
known S.F. would be there because of his reputation for “robbing people,
stealing” and being “really hard to deal with.”
Sanny and S.F. then engaged in a physical fight. Sanny said that S.F.
began “tasing” him in the shoulder, neck, and chin. Sanny was using his
right hand to hold the gun in his waistband in place and only fighting back
with his left hand. While Sanny and S.F. fought, M.H. stood behind Sanny
with the machete raised. Sanny said he thought the men were going to kill
him, and he jumped on the sidewalk, pulled his gun out to deter them, and
stumbled because of his sandals. Sanny testified that as he stumbled he
must have hit the eject clip button on his gun, causing the clip to fall on the
sidewalk.
Sanny said he turned around to pick up the clip, keeping his eyes on
S.F. and M.H. Sanny saw M.H. pacing and Sanny thought he was looking for
a way to get behind Sanny. Sanny thought S.F. was coming towards him to
21
attack. Sanny testified that as he grabbed the clip with his left hand, and
began standing up, he heard the gun in his right hand fire. Sanny could not
remember if the clip was back in the gun or still in his hand. Sanny said he
did not mean to point the gun at S.F. and the gun fired during the physical
struggle. Sanny said he knew he pulled the trigger, but it was unintentional,
and he was not trying to kill S.F. After the gun fired, S.F. fell onto the
sidewalk.
Sanny said he ran because he knew he was “not looking good right here
if the cops show up” since he had an unregistered gun and drugs, and he
thought he might get shot and killed by the police. Sanny said he ran to his
car to drive away, but he could not find his car key, so he threw everything in
his backpack, including the gun and clip, and ran as fast as he could into
Balboa Park.
Sanny heard a helicopter and assumed it was looking for him. He flung
his backpack, which contained methamphetamine, onto the ground. Then
Sanny ran into the bushes in the park, hid the gun in a crevice, crawled
under a bush, and fell asleep from exhaustion. He testified he did not hear
the police telling him to come out and he was awakened by the police dog
biting him.
In addition to Sanny, the defense presented the testimony of Sanny’s
friend, T.S. Sanny met T.S. in prison, and T.S. was part of the same circle of
drug users and knew S.F., S.G., and M.H. T.S. testified that in October 2022,
he ran into S.F. in his neighborhood and gave S.F. a ride to Ocean Beach.
T.S. told the jury that on the ride, S.F. told him about the shooting. T.S. said
S.F. told him that he intended to rob Sanny when he tased him in the face.
T.S. also stated that S.F. told him that the clip came out of Sanny’s gun and
when he tried to put the clip back in, the gun fired accidentally. T.S. also
22
testified that when they arrived in Ocean Beach, T.S. got out of his car to
speak with someone else while S.F. stayed in his car. When T.S. returned,
S.F. was gone, along with some of T.S.’s belongings.
D. Verdict, Renewed Motion, and Sentencing
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Sanny (1) not guilty of
attempted murder and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter on count 1, (2) guilty of the lesser included offense of resisting
arrest under section 148 on count 4, and (3) guilty as charged on counts 2, 3,
and 5. As to count 2, the jury also found true allegations that Sanny
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Thereafter, Sanny admitted, and the
court found true, the out-on-bail allegations charged on counts 2, 3, and 5.
Before sentencing, Sanny renewed his motion to dismiss. Sanny
asserted he did not receive a fair trial because the court’s ruling denying his
initial motion allowed the prosecution to strategically call S.G. to its case in
chief, damaging her credibility. Further, the portion of S.G.’s interview with
Cunningham that was played for the jury contained statements that were
damaging to Sanny’s case. Sanny also argued the trial became improperly
focused on S.G. and the statements she made to Cunningham and the
defense investigator, many of which were unrelated to the charged crimes.
Sanny also asserted that he might not have needed to take the stand to
explain that he acted only in self-defense if the recording of S.F. had been
obtained.
In support of the motion, Sanny also submitted the declaration of the
defense investigator, who spoke with the jury’s foreperson after trial. The
foreperson told the investigator that the jury did not find S.G. credible, and
“that the only information they believed from [her] recorded interview was
23
the assertion that Mr. Sanny was allegedly not ‘supposed to be there’ and was
‘creeping.’ ”
In opposition to the motion, the prosecution asserted the evidence was
not important because the jurors did not find S.F. credible and would not
have taken the statements he made to S.G. as true. Further, the jury
concluded that even if S.F. attacked him, Sanny used excessive force by firing
the weapon. The prosecution also asserted that the remedy provided by the
trial court had been sufficient to protect Sanny’s rights, and that the jury’s
verdict and the defense investigator’s interview of the foreperson showed that
he received a fair trial. Specifically, that interview established that the jury
found Sanny and S.F. were engaged in a mutual fist fight, and that Sanny
intentionally used excessive force by pulling the trigger of his gun to end the
fight.
After argument, the trial court denied the motion. The court again
found that the prosecution had engaged in misconduct, but concluded that
despite the misconduct Sanny had received a fair trial, and the remedy
fashioned to cure the prosecution’s wrongdoing was sufficient. The court
explained that its decision was based on several facts presented at trial,
specifically that M.H. testified that he and S.F. had attacked Sanny before
the shooting; S.F. admitted in a recorded statement played for the jury that
he attempted to extort Sanny’s family; and the medical evidence at trial
showed S.F. was shot twice and Sanny admitted on the stand that he had
pulled the trigger. The court concluded that “even if the video had been
retained, and even if it contained all of the information that it might have
that was favorable to the defense, that evidence would not have added
significantly to the jury’s understanding of the events of the shooting.”
24
The court also noted the jury had deliberated for close to five days,
asked multiple thoughtful questions during the deliberation, and listened to
“the readback of the testimony of both [M.H.] and Mr. Sanny, at one point
sending a note asking whether the use of ... reasonable force ... was a
subjective or objective standard and ultimately acquitting Mr. Sanny of three
counts, including Count 1, and the LIO of Count 1, both of which required as
elements the intent to kill.” The court found the jury was not “flippant about
the law” or “dismissive of the defense’s theory of the case.”9
The same day, the court sentenced Sanny to a total term of nine years
in state prison. The court imposed eight years on count 2, consisting of the
low term of two years for the substantive offense, the low term of three years
for the firearm use enhancement, and three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement. The court imposed a one-year term on count 5, to run
consecutively to count 2, and the middle term of three years on count 3 and
364 days in jail on 4, to run concurrently to count 2. Finally, the court struck
the out-on-bail enhancements.
Sanny timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
I
Motion to Dismiss
Sanny asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him because the prosecutor’s
failure to preserve material, exculpatory evidence deprived him of his rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sanny argues
that dismissal of the assault conviction was the only viable remedy for
9 The court added that the prosecution’s opposition made clear that “the
People still fail to appreciate and take responsibility for their mistakes in this
case.”
25
Cunningham’s misconduct of failing to disclose or pursue the exculpatory
evidence S.G. attempted to provide during her interview on June 14, 2022.
The Attorney General responds that insufficient evidence supported the
trial court’s finding that Cunningham destroyed potentially useful evidence
in bad faith. Further, the Attorney General argues the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Sanny’s motion to dismiss because he received
a fair trial.
A
Legal Standards
“The prosecution’s duty to disclose and retain evidence stems from the
due process clause of the United States Constitution, as explained and
interpreted by the three leading United States Supreme Court decisions on
this subject—Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83; Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, and
Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood ). [¶] Brady is the
leading case on the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. ‘[T]he
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’
(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.) Such evidence must be disclosed if it is
material, that is, if there is a reasonable probability the evidence might have
altered the outcome of the trial.” (People v. Alvarez (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
761, 771 (Alvarez).)
“The duty to retain, rather than simply disclose, potentially exculpatory
evidence is somewhat different. Trombetta concerned a driving under the
influence case involving two drivers. The Trombetta court found that
although breath samples taken from the defendant had not been preserved,
the test results were nonetheless admissible. The court rejected the
26
defendant’s argument that the state had a duty to retain the samples for a
number of reasons. The police officers were acting in good faith and
according to normal procedure, the chance the samples would have been
exculpatory were slim, and the defendants had other means to prove their
innocence. (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 488–490.) ‘Whatever duty the
Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be
limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the
suspect’s defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality,
[citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means.’ (Id. at pp. 488–489, fn. omitted.)” (Alvarez,
supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 771–772.)
“Youngblood, the most recent of the three cases, explains the
requirements for demonstrating a due process violation based on the failure
to retain evidence under somewhat different circumstances. Youngblood was
a sexual assault case in which the state had failed to properly preserve fluid
samples from the victim’s clothing and body. Unlike the situation in
Trombetta, where the evidence was destroyed after all relevant testing was
complete, in Youngblood, only limited testing was initially performed to
determine whether sexual contact had indeed occurred. (Youngblood, supra,
488 U.S. at p. 53.) By the time more rigorous testing was attempted, it was
no longer possible, because the victim’s clothing had been improperly
refrigerated. (Id. at p. 54.) The defendant’s principal argument was
mistaken identity, and he argued that if the victim’s clothing had been
properly preserved, the physical evidence might have exonerated him. (Ibid.)
27
The defendant was found guilty, and ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction.” (Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)
Youngblood held: “ ‘The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the
State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material
exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process Clause requires a
different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve
evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have
been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant.’ (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 57.) As explained in
Trombetta, the court noted the problematic nature of determining the
materiality of permanently lost evidence. The court also declined to impose
on the police an absolute duty to retain and preserve anything that might
possibly have some significance. (Id. at p. 58.)” (Alvarez, supra, 229
Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)
Youngblood further held “that requiring a defendant to show bad faith
on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to
preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases
where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which
the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a
basis for exonerating the defendant.” (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58.)
“We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on
the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.” (Ibid.) Youngblood concluded that
the conduct of the police in that case could, at worst, be characterized as
negligent, not bad faith. (Ibid.)
28
“Thus, there is a distinction between Trombetta’s ‘exculpatory value
that was apparent’ criteria and the standard set forth in Youngblood for
‘potentially useful’ evidence. If the higher standard of apparent exculpatory
value is met, the motion is granted in the defendant’s favor. But if the best
that can be said of the evidence is that it was ‘potentially useful,’ the
defendant must also establish bad faith on the part of the police or
prosecution.” (Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.)
“A trial court’s ruling on a Trombetta [or Youngblood] motion is upheld
on appeal if a reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the
ruling.” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837 (Montes).) “ ‘In
assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ in support of the court’s decision.
[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal
of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.)
“With respect to the proper remedy, courts have a large measure of
discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for failure to preserve
material evidence. (People v. Memro [(1995)] 11 Cal.4th [786,] 831.) A
dismissal on due process grounds may be improper if a less drastic
alternative is available that still protects the defendant’s right to due process.
(See [United States] v. Kearns (9th Cir.1993) 5 F.3d 1251, 1254.) Many cases
have acknowledged the ability of courts to administer ameliorative jury
instructions. (See Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 60 (conc. opn. of Stevens,
J.); People v. Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 837.)” (Alvarez, supra, 229
29
Cal.App.4th at pp. 778–779.) However, if an instruction would pale in
comparison to the potential value of the destroyed evidence, dismissal is
warranted. (Ibid., citing [United States] v. Cooper (9th Cir. 1993) 983 F.2d
928, 932 [proposed jury instruction would pale in comparison to destruction
of lab equipment, which deprived defendants of the ability to establish their
innocence because experts could not determine by viewing photographs
whether or not the lab was constructed for methamphetamine production];
and U.S. v. Bohl (10th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 904, 914 [bad faith destruction of
evidence required dismissal because the effect of destruction and dearth of
adequate secondary evidence violated the defendants’ due process rights].)
B
Analysis
1. Bad Faith
No party challenges the trial court’s determination that the withheld
evidence was potentially useful to Sanny—and therefore material under
Youngblood. Thus, we need not reach this facet of the court’s ruling. The
Attorney General does argue, however, that there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Cunningham acted in bad faith when
she failed to disclose the information to Sanny or pursue the video S.G. tried
to show her during the interview. This argument is without merit.
As the trial court thoroughly explained in its order denying the motion
to dismiss without prejudice, during the interview, S.G. informed
Cunningham that a video of her conversations with S.F. existed and that she
had access to the video at that moment. Cunningham immediately
recognized the evidence was potentially exculpatory, stating to S.G.’s counsel
that the video “sounded like Brady material and that she needed to ‘get it
and turn it over.’ ” S.G. twice told Cunningham she had the video on her
30
phone, and attempted to show it to Cunningham, but Cunningham refused to
let S.G. show her the video. Despite wanting to provide the video to the
prosecutor, Cunningham did not let S.G. turn it over. Further, no one from
the prosecutor’s team or law enforcement took the phone into evidence, nor
did Cunningham inform the detective on the case of the evidence.
Additionally, no one contacted S.G. after the interview to obtain the videos or
get further information about them.
As the Attorney General states in his brief, “the presence or absence of
bad faith necessarily turns on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. ([People v.] Frye [(1998)]
18 Cal.4th [894,] 943; Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 838.) And bad faith is
shown if the police by their own conduct indicate that the evidence could form
a basis for exonerating the defendant and then fail to take any steps to
preserve it. (Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.)” Here, at the time of
the interview, Cunningham both recognized the evidence’s exculpatory value
and had exclusive knowledge of its existence, yet she did not inform the
defense. This evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding that
Cunningham’s failure to take any action to secure the videos from S.G. was
more than negligent, and that Cunningham acted in bad faith.10
10 The parties both point to Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 761, to
support their positions on the issue of bad faith. In that case, one of the
defendants, who was charged with robbery, asked police at the scene to
obtain video from a security camera in the vicinity operated by the police,
which the defendant said would show his innocence. (Id. at p. 764.) The
officer told the defendant at the scene that obtaining video footage from the
camera was part of his job, but the officer failed to follow up at all, asserting
it was not his responsibility. (Ibid.) The video was no longer available by the
time the case was assigned to an investigating detective, and the defendant
successfully moved to dismiss the case based on Youngblood. (Ibid.)
31
The Attorney General asserts that insufficient evidence supported the
court’s finding that Cunningham acted in bad faith because she asked the
District Attorney Investigator, Blackwell, to find out if the video could be
obtained from Wyze, then checked with him to see if he had made any
progress. However, this evidence does not negate the evidence relied on by
the trial court to find bad faith, particularly the fact that Cunningham made
no effort to obtain the video from S.G. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th
680, 703 [“ ‘if the circumstances reasonably justify the ... findings, the
judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding’ ”].)
2. Proper Remedy
Sanny asserts the only appropriate remedy for the prosecutor’s
misconduct was dismissal of the assault charge. We disagree. As in
Youngblood, “[t]his is not a case where evidence initially gathered was
destroyed. The issue here is the asserted failure of the police [or the
prosecutor] to collect relevant exculpatory evidence.” (Montes, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 837.) Although the California Supreme Court has “suggested
On appeal, the Attorney General argued that bad faith had not been
established, and that at most the officer was negligent. (Alvarez, supra, 229
Cal.App.4th at p. 777.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument,
concluding sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding of bad faith.
(Ibid.) In particular, in addition to the defendant asking for the video on the
night of the robbery, the defense had asked the prosecution to provide any
video the police obtained from the area just a few days after the robbery.
However, neither the prosecution nor the police ever took any steps to obtain
the video. Importantly, when the defendant asked the police officer to get the
video, the officer explicitly recognized it “could form a basis for exonerating
the defendant.” (Id. at p. 777.) Likewise here, Cunningham also explicitly
recognized the exculpatory nature of the evidence S.G. disclosed and yet took
no steps to obtain the evidence from her. As discussed, Cunningham’s
actions in this case support the trial court’s finding of bad faith.
32
that cases may arise in which the failure to collect evidence could justify
sanctions against the prosecution at trial,” we agree with the Attorney
General that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied
Sanny’s renewed motion to dismiss because, in light of the evidence adduced
at trial, the remedies provided by the court adequately protected his right to
a fair trial. (Ibid.)
As stated, courts have a large measure of discretion to determine the
appropriate sanction for failure to preserve material evidence. (People v.
Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 831; Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at
p. 778.) A dismissal may be improper if a less drastic alternative, such as an
ameliorative jury instruction, can protect the defendant’s right to due
process. (Alvarez, at pp. 778–779.) Here, the court’s decision to instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 306 informed the jury Cunningham had “withheld
from defense counsel an audio-recorded interview with witness [S.G.]
conducted on June 14, 2022. The interview contained evidence favorable to
Mr. Sanny’s defense and referenced a video recording of statements made by
[S.F.] to [S.G.] The audio-recorded interview was not provided to defense
counsel until June 29, 2023, the day originally set for trial. By the time
defense counsel learned of the video recording, the video recording had been
permanently destroyed.” The instruction also told the jury it could consider
this information in its deliberations.
The trial court also allowed the defense to play portions of the
interview that corroborated the jury instruction, and in which S.G. explained
that the video would have shown S.F. telling her everything about the night
of the shooting, that S.F. thought the shooting was funny, that he and M.H.
had attacked S.F., and S.F. telling her that he wanted S.G. to extort $50,000
and Sanny’s truck from Sanny’s father in exchange for helping him with his
33
case. In addition, S.G.’s trial testimony further clarified what she meant
when she said Sanny told her everything that happened the night of the
shooting. S.G. testified that during multiple video-recorded conversations
with S.F., he told her that he and M.H. attacked and attempted to rob Sanny
and that the gun fired accidently when he and Sanny were fighting.
Thus, as the trial court explained in its ruling denying the renewed
motion to dismiss, the jury was informed that the destroyed video evidence
would show S.F. telling S.G. that: (1) he, in order not to testify, wanted S.G.
to ask Sanny’s father for $50,000; (2) Sanny fired the gun accidentally; and
(3) he and M.H. attacked Sanny intending to rob him. Those three assertions
were relevant to the case because defense counsel argued Sanny was not
guilty of count 2 since he was acting in self-defense. Conversely, the
prosecutor argued Sanny was the initial aggressor, engaged in mutual
combat, and, even if he was attacked first, used excessive force in firing the
first gunshot or, at the very least, in firing the second gunshot, which
required insertion of the magazine.
With respect to S.F.’s statement that he wanted to extort Sanny and his
family, as the trial court stated in its ruling, S.F. admitted during his
interview with the prosecution, which was played for the jury, that he told
S.G. he would not testify if he received $50,000. Because S.F.’s own
admission to that statement was evidence that would have been cumulative
to any evidence showing him on video making that statement to S.G., the
failure to preserve that video evidence did not prevent Sanny from receiving a
fair trial.
With respect to the second fact at issue, that S.F. thought the gun was
accidently fired, S.G. testified S.F. told her that he and M.H. had attacked
Sanny, M.H. held a machete to Sanny’s neck, S.F. tased Sanny in the face,
34
and S.F. believed Sanny shot him accidentally. Additionally, the defense
investigator testified that S.G. told him that S.F. had told her that the gun
was fired accidentally. T.S. also testified that S.F. told him the same story.
Thus, as the trial court concluded, despite the credibility problems S.G.
suffered, the defense investigator’s and T.S.’s testimony corroborated S.G.’s
testimony, reducing any harm caused by Cunningham’s failure to preserve
the video evidence.
Regarding the third fact, that M.H. and S.F. attacked Sanny, the harm
caused by the failure of Cunningham to preserve the video was minimized by
S.G.’s testimony that S.F. told her he planned to rob Sanny, which was also
corroborated by the defense investigator’s testimony. Further, M.H. himself
testified that he called S.F. to help him defend himself against Sanny, then
M.H. got out of his vehicle while holding a machete in a threatening manner
at shoulder level, and that he continued to stand behind Sanny and hold the
machete while he fought S.F. As the trial court stated in its ruling, the
physical evidence found at the crime scene—the machete and the taser—also
corroborated this version of events. Thus, the missing evidence, i.e.,
statements S.F. might have made on video indicating that S.G. and M.H.
attacked Sanny, would have been cumulative to the trial evidence. We
cannot say that the court’s well-reasoned determination that these factors
showed Sanny received a fair trial despite Cunningham’s misconduct was an
abuse of its discretion.
In addition, as the trial court explained in its ruling, the jury’s long
deliberations, multiple thoughtful questions and requested read-backs of key
testimony, and the ultimate acquittal of Sanny on count 1 for attempted
murder and its lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter,
shows the jury gave serious consideration to Sanny’s self-defense claim and
35
accepted it for purposes of the most serious charge. The fact that the jury’s
foreperson after trial indicated that they spent “ ‘very little time discussing
the alleged video that was mentioned at the end of trial’ ” and “ ‘were
confused about the mention of the missing evidence,’ ” does not show the
court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. Rather, it is notable that the jury
did consider the prosecution’s actions, evidenced by the fact that it was
discussed. Again, the jury’s questions and relatively long deliberation and
acquittals show it gave serious consideration to Sanny’s defense.
In sum, we hold the trial court properly and thoughtfully exercised its
discretion when it denied Sanny’s renewed motion to dismiss count 2
because, in light of the evidence adduced at trial, the remedies provided
Sanny a fair trial.
II
Section 654
Sanny also asserts that the punishment imposed for count 3, possession
of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm, was barred by
section 654 because the offenses were committed during the same course of
conduct incident to a single objective. On count 2, the principal count of
assault with a firearm, the trial court imposed the low term of two years, plus
the terms for two enhancements, for a total term of eight years. On count 3,
the court imposed the middle term of three years, to run concurrently to the
term on count 2 and expressly found that the term on count 3 was not barred
under section 654.
Section 654, subdivision (a), precludes multiple punishment when the
defendant commits different acts that violate different statutes, but the acts
comprise an indivisible course of conduct committed with a single intent and
objective. (People v. Latten (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 574, 577.) Whether a
36
course of criminal conduct is divisible depends on the intent and objective of
the defendant. (People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 229.) If the
defendant committed all the offenses with one objective, he or she can only be
punished for one of them. (Ibid.) On the other hand, if a defendant
committed multiple offenses with multiple objectives, then he or she may be
punished for each offense. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
If the defendant commits two crimes, and punishment for one of the
crimes is precluded under section 654, the statute requires the sentence for
one conviction to be imposed, and the sentence for the other conviction to be
imposed and then stayed. (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594.)
Section 654 applies to concurrent and consecutive sentences. (Ibid.) A trial
court’s section 654 ruling is a factual question that this court reviews for
substantial evidence. (People v. Phung (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 741, 760–761.)
Here, the objective of possessing the gun as to count 3 was self-
protection in the sale of methamphetamine. During his testimony, Sanny
told the jury “I purchased the gun just for safety.” He explained that in the
drug world in which he operated, “a lot of gang-related people you see in that
circle are just robbing and stealing, and they will do anything to get whatever
you have.” As related to count 3, Sanny’s possession of the gun for self-
protection was coupled with his knowing possession “of methamphetamine to
use or sell.” (See People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1005 [“Drug dealers
are known to keep guns to protect not only themselves, but also their drugs
and drug proceeds; ready access to a gun is often crucial to a drug dealer’s
commercial success.”].) By contrast, the evidence showed the objective in
possessing the gun as to count 2 was the use of the weapon to shoot S.F.
Because there was substantial evidence that count 3 was committed with a
37
different intent and objective than count 2, the trial court properly found that
the concurrent sentence on count 3 was not barred under section 654.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
KELETY, J.
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