CourtListener 10780046•People v. Williams CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/27/26 P. v. Williams CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Colusa)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101215
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR618862)
v.
JOHN WILLIAMS III,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant John Williams III guilty of two counts of second degree
robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years, which
included an upper term sentence on one of the robbery convictions. On defendant’s
original appeal, another panel of this court agreed with defendant that the trial court
improperly imposed the upper term based on the increasing seriousness of his prior
convictions without relying on a certified record of conviction. We remanded for a full
resentencing. At resentencing, relying on a certified copy of defendant’s rap sheet from
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the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), the trial court
determined that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous and of increasing
seriousness and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years, including an upper
term sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by imposing an
upper term sentence in the absence of a personal jury trial waiver on the aggravating
circumstance that his prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness.
The People agree. Given the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v.
Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley), we agree with the parties and will remand for a full
resentencing. Given this conclusion, we need not address defendant’s additional claims
of error.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying defendant’s convictions are not relevant to this appeal, but a
detailed summary can be found at People v. Williams (Sept. 25, 2023, C095180) [nonpub.
opn.] (Williams).1
In 2021, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second degree robbery
(Pen. Code, § 211)2 and, as to each count, found true a personal use of a firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 16
years in prison, which included an upper term sentence on one of the robbery convictions.
(Williams, supra, C095180.) The court selected the upper term because “defendant ha[d]
a significant and increasingly serious criminal record, including seven prior felony
convictions, one of which was for robbery.” (Ibid.) On direct appeal from the judgment,
defendant asserted, among other things, that following passage of Senate Bill No. 567
1 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior opinion in Williams, supra,
C095180. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) the trial court could not impose the upper term on his robbery
conviction based on his increasingly serious criminal record, because it did not rely on
certified records of conviction in making this finding. (Williams, supra, C095180.)
Another panel of this court agreed, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded for full
resentencing. (Ibid.)
At resentencing, a certified copy of defendant’s CLETS rap sheet was admitted
into evidence to establish that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous and of
increasing seriousness. The CLETS rap sheet reflected that between 1999 and 2020
defendant had seven felony convictions: (1) a 1999 conviction for grand theft (§ 487),
resulting in 36 months’ probation; (2) a 2002 conviction for attempt to receive stolen
property (§ 496, subd. (d)), resulting in 24 months’ probation; (3) 2003 and 2009
convictions for selling counterfeit drugs (Health & Saf. Code, § 11355), each resulting in
a three-year probationary term; (4) a 2015 conviction for carrying a concealed weapon
(§ 25400), resulting in a 16-month prison term; and (5) 2020 convictions for making
criminal threats (§ 422) and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1), each resulting in a 16-month
prison term.
Defendant asked the court to impose the middle term. He filed a statement in
mitigation, relating to issues of childhood trauma, mental illness, and drug use.
Defendant also argued that some of his felony convictions are now “misdemeanor-type
offenses.”
The trial court found the mitigating circumstances defendant submitted were
highly attenuated, did not appear to have a direct bearing on the commission of the crime,
and were insufficient to overcome his serious prior record of convictions. The trial court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years, including the upper term of five
years on one of the robbery convictions. The court imposed the aggravated term due to
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defendant’s “significant and increasingly serious criminal record, including seven prior
felony convictions. One of which was for robbery.” 3
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by imposing the upper term
on one of his robbery convictions based on an aggravating circumstance found true
absent a jury trial waiver. The People agree.
A. Jury Trial Right
Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), “the trial court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify
imposition of an upper term sentence, and ‘the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt’ at
a jury or court trial.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1078.) This jury trial right “is
constitutionally required for all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied
upon to justify an upper term sentence.” (Ibid.)
As was the common practice at the time of resentencing, the trial court relied on
defendant’s certified record of conviction to make findings on aggravating facts in
imposing an upper term sentence. After defendant’s resentencing, the California
Supreme Court issued its decision in Wiley. Relying on Erlinger v. United States (2024)
602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), Wiley concluded that “a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all
aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that
expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily
provided midterm.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086, fn. omitted, italics added; see
3 We note, although the trial court indicated at both the original sentencing and the
resentencing that one of defendant’s prior felony convictions was for robbery, the CLETS
rap sheet does not show a prior conviction for robbery. The rap sheet shows arrests for
robbery and dismissals of robbery charges in 2008 and 2020, for insufficient evidence
and in furtherance of justice, respectively.
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id. at p. 1076.) Wiley explained that section 1170, subdivision (b), must be interpreted to
comport with federal constitutional requirements as clarified by Erlinger. (Wiley, supra,
at p. 1085.)
Consistent with Erlinger and Wiley, a sentencing judge may only use the
information in the record of conviction for the “ ‘ “limited function” of determining the
fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense.’ ” (Wiley, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 1081, quoting Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 839.) A determination that
defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness requires “a comparison and
evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination
as to their relative seriousness. As a result, it involves something more than a narrow
factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to
prove them.” (Wiley, supra, at pp. 1082-1083.) Thus, defendant was entitled to a jury
determination on this aggravating factor.
B. Waiver
Defendant must personally waive the right to a jury trial in open court. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 16.) The waiver must be explicit “ ‘and will not be implied from a
defendant’s conduct.’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.) Therefore, “a
‘[d]efendant’s failure to object also would not preclude his asserting on appeal that he
was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial.’ ” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th
36, 46.) Defendant was not advised of his right to a jury trial on the aggravating facts,
nor did he explicitly waive his right to jury trial on those aggravating facts. The trial
court erred in imposing an upper term sentence in the absence of such a waiver.
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C. Prejudice
“When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify
imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman[4]
standard of review.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) Under Chapman, “ ‘a
sentence imposed under . . . section 1170[, subdivision ](b) must be reversed and
remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury,
applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon
which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified.’ ” (Ibid.) “Lack of a jury
trial is not harmless under Chapman if ‘the record contains evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.” (Ibid.)
The parties agree the record does not support the conclusion that no rational jury
could have failed to find that defendant’s criminal record was “significant and
increasingly serious.” Applying the Chapman standard, we agree.
Defendant’s certified CLETS rap sheet shows that between 1999 and 2020
defendant had seven felony convictions. As in Wiley, none of these offenses is “strikingly
more serious than the others, either by reference to the nature of the offense or the
punishment.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1089.) Most of defendant’s convictions
were theft or drug offenses. Contrary to the trial court’s assertion, there was no prior
conviction for robbery. Each offense was alternatively punishable as a felony or a
misdemeanor. (§§ 489, 496, subd. (d), 25400, 422, 136.1, subd. (b), Health & Saf.,
§ 11355.) And, each offense exposed defendant to a sentencing range of 16 months, two
or three years (§§ 18, 1170, subd. (h)(1)). While the criminal threats and dissuading a
witness convictions are classified as serious felonies, that designation is “simply one
factor the jury could have considered” in evaluating whether defendant’s crimes were of
4 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).
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increasing seriousness. (Wiley, supra, at p. 1090.) “Its relevance as a factor underscores
that the determination is a comparative and qualitative one. These realities make it
‘ “ ‘difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been
submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did
the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“[W]hile the evidence may have been sufficient to support a finding of increasing
seriousness, that is not the proper inquiry . . . under Chapman. [Citation.] Instead, we
must ask ‘whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.’ ”
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.) We conclude a rational fact finder could have come
to the opposite conclusion. The failure to afford defendant a jury trial on whether his
prior convictions were of “increasing seriousness” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2))
was prejudicial. Accordingly, we must vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the
matter for a full resentencing.
Given this conclusion, we need not address defendant’s additional claim that the
abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of
judgment relative to defendant’s updated custody credits. The parties and the trial court
will have the opportunity to address this issue at the time of resentencing.
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III. DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing.
(Perrachi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1254-1255.)
/S/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
/S/
FEINBERG, J.
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