Skytte v. Skytte CA4/3

CourtListener 10779532Calctapp26.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/26/26 Skytte v. Skytte CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

BIRTHE B. SKYTTE, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, G064930

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-
00902820)
CHRISTIAN SKYTTE, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Layne H. Melzer, Judge. Affirmed. Motion to dismiss.
Denied.
Christian Skytte and Catherine J. Skytte, in pro. per. for
Defendants and Appellants.
Law Office of David E. Libman and David Ethan Libman; Jeff
Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis, Kyla Dayton, and Tim Cotter for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Recently, a different panel of this court considered an appeal filed
by the same parties, affirming dismissal of a probate dispute. (Skytte v.
Skytte (G061364, Feb. 27, 2024) [nonpub. opn.] (Skytte).) On remand, the trial
court ordered Christian Skytte and his wife, Catherine J. Skytte, to pay
attorney fees to Birthe Skytte, Michael Skytte, Stephen Skytte, and Thomas
Skytte.1 Christian argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Birthe’s motion because it was untimely, Birthe was barred from filing a
motion for an award of fees and costs, and the award was excessive. We
conclude each contention lacks merit and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case began as a probate dispute between family members.
(See Skytte, supra, G061364.) In 2018, Christian and Birthe settled their
dispute and dismissed their competing claims. Under the terms of their
settlement agreement, the parties agreed the prevailing party would pay
attorney fees and costs arising from enforcement of the agreement.
In 2021, Christian moved to vacate the dismissal of his claims.
(Skytte, supra, G061364.) The trial court denied the motion, and Christian
appealed (Ibid.) A different panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s ruling
and remanded the matter to the trial court to award costs. (Ibid.) Birthe

1 To avoid confusion and for ease of reference, we refer to the

parties by their first names. Christian and Catherine will be collectively
referred to as “Christian” in the singular. The four other family members will
be referred to collectively, and in the singular, as “Birthe.” We mean no
disrespect.
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subsequently filed a request for attorney fees as the prevailing party with the
trial court. Christian opposed the request, making the same arguments he
now repeats in this appeal.
The trial court awarded Birthe $63,958.75 in attorney fees.
Although the court did not agree with Christian’s argument that the fees
requested were unreasonable or excessive, it reduced the award by $2,460. It
explained some of the time entries “appeared to be administrative in nature”
and were “not appropriate tasks for attorneys.” The court also rejected
Christian’s argument that Birthe was barred from filing the motion because
Christian failed to support his contention with an analysis of either the facts
or the law.
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION TO DISMISS
As a preliminary matter, we address Birthe’s motion to dismiss
the appeal. In her motion, Birthe contends Christian waived his right to
appeal the fees and cost award because Christian voluntarily satisfied the
judgment.2
While “a waiver will be implied where there is voluntary
compliance with a judgment, as when the judgment debtor satisfies the
judgment by making payment to the prevailing party under its terms,” such a
waiver “occurs only where the compliance was ‘. . . by way of compromise or
with an agreement not to take or prosecute an appeal.’” (Lee v. Brown (1976)

2 Christian maintains he felt compelled to satisfy the judgment to

expunge Birthe’s judgment lien on real property, needed for a real estate
transaction unrelated to this case. Birthe did not present evidence to the
contrary.
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18 Cal.3d. 110, 115.) Otherwise, “‘payment of a judgment must be regarded
as compulsory, and therefore, as not releasing errors, nor depriving the payor
of his right to appeal.’” (Reitano v. Yankwich (1951) 38 Cal.2d 1, 4.)
While Birthe argues Christian’s satisfaction of the judgment was
voluntary, Birthe does not offer any arguments or evidence that Christian’s
payment of the judgment was part of a compromise or agreement to waive his
right to appeal. Because Birthe failed to meet her burden of proof on this
essential element, we deny Birthe’s motion to dismiss. (Coldwell Banker &
Co. v. Department of Insurance (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 381, 401.)
II.
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Birthe’s motion for attorney fees and costs. Christian
contends the court abused its discretion because (1) Birthe’s motion was
untimely, (2) Birthe was barred from filing a motion for an award of fees and
costs, (3) the award of claims and fees was excessive. We address each
contention in turn, concluding each lacks merit.
A. Timeliness
Christian contends Birthe’s motion for fees and costs was
untimely because Birthe filed the motion after the deadline set forth in
California Rules of Court, rule 8.278.3
We apply a de novo review standard in considering whether the
trial court properly interpreted the California Rules of Court. (In re M.C.
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 804–805.) Under rule 8.278, a costs
memorandum must be filed and served within 40 days after issuance of the

3 All further references to the rules will be to the California Rules

of Court.
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remittitur. (Rule 8.278(c)(1); see In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 1, 7–9.) Under rule 3.1702 (d), a trial court may extend the time
to file a motion for attorney fees for good cause. Rule 3.1702(d) is to be
liberally construed. (Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 304, 326.)
Here, Birthe filed her memorandum on June 7, 2024. The trial
court rejected the filing because her attorney’s address did not match court
records. After remedying her clerical issue, Birthe resubmitted her
memorandum on June 13, 2024, three days after the 40-day deadline set out
in rule 8.278. The record shows the court was aware of the late filing but
nonetheless considered Birthe’s motion and Christian’s response pursuant to
rule 3.1702 (d).
On appeal, Christian neither addresses the trial court’s authority
to extend the time for filing, nor does he argue the court abused its discretion
in exercising its authority. He has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error. We
have no reason to conclude the court abused its discretion in extending the
time for filing by three days. (Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304 [court has broad discretion to allow relief from late
filing where there is no showing of prejudice to opposing party].)
B. Birthe was not barred from filing a motion for an award of fees
While not entirely clear, Christian seems to argue the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to determine Birthe’s entitlement to attorney fees and
costs because Birthe did not seek an order from the trial court or the
appellate court permitting her to do so. He made a similar argument in the
trial court. Christian failed to support his contention below and in his
appellate briefing with any analysis of either the facts or the law. “‘Appellate
briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken.
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“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it
with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.”’ [Citation.] ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for
them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to
authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’” (Cahill v. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) The claim is thus
waived.
Even if we considered the substance of Christian’s claims, we
would conclude there is no basis for reversal. “When a contract includes an
attorney fee provision, [Civil Code,] section 1717 grants attorney fees to the
prevailing party.” (City of Los Angeles Dept. of Airports v. U.S. Specialty Ins.
Co. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1043.) Civil Code, section 1717, subdivision
(a) states: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing
party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the
contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall
be entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.”
Here, paragraph eight of the promissory note between the parties
indicates the prevailing party shall recover all reasonable court costs and
attorney fees in any action to enforce the note. We find nothing in Civil Code
section 1717, nor does Christian point us to any authority, indicating Birthe
was required to seek an order from the trial court or the appellate court
allowing her to file a memorandum for fees and costs after she prevailed on
appeal.
Christian also appears to mistakenly believe Birthe was barred
from being awarded attorney fees because, under Civil Code section 1717, she
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was required to request fees in her memorandum of costs on appeal. From
our review of the record, it appears Birthe concurrently filed a memorandum
of costs with her motion for fees and costs. In any event, once again,
Christian cites no authority to support his contention. This argument is
similarly waived. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it
but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived”].)
C. Excessiveness
Finally, Christian contends the attorney fees the trial court
awarded to Birthe were excessive and unreasonable. We find no support for
this contention in the briefing or on this record.
Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) provides that where
attorney fees are authorized by contract, “the prevailing party . . . shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees,” which “shall be fixed by the court.”
“The trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable
fee, and the award of such fees is governed by equitable principles.” (EnPalm,
LCC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 (EnPalm).) In fixing a
reasonable fee, the court first computes “the lodestar figure—a calculation
based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s
hourly rate.” (Ibid.) Second, the court may adjust the lodestar to ensure that
the fee awarded is reasonable in view of various factors, including “the nature
and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill
required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or
failure, . . . ‘necessity for and the nature of the litigation,’” as well as other
circumstances of the case. (Ibid.)

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“We will reverse a fee award only if there has been a manifest
abuse of discretion.” (EnPalm, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) Christian
bears the burden of affirmatively establishing the trial court abused its
discretion. (Ritter & Ritter, Inc. Pension & Profit Plan v. The Churchill
Condominium Assn. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 103, 128.) On matters as to
which the record is silent, we indulge all intendments and presumptions to
support the trial court’s order. (Ibid.)
Here, Christian did not cite any evidence presented to the trial
court to support his contention that the fee award was excessive or
unreasonable. Additionally, Christian failed to specify why the hours Birthe’s
attorneys worked were unreasonable. Instead, without citation to any legal
authority, he argues the motion was “unreasonable in its amount,
unsupported by the facts alleged and the law relied upon, and defective in
that it fails to state the amount of fees and costs, and specifically as against
whom they are sought on the first page of the pleading.” Such conclusory
arguments are inadequate. “‘In challenging attorney fees as excessive
because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the
challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient
argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed
are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific
challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.’” (Lunada
Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) For the reasons stated
above, Christian has forfeited his excessiveness argument.
Even if we were to find that Christian did not forfeit his
argument, the record does not support the conclusion the trial court awarded
Birthe excessive attorney fees. Birthe supported her request for attorney fees
with declarations from the attorneys who handled the underlying case and
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prior appeal. Although the record does not include the reporter’s transcript,
the court’s minute order reflects the court found Birthe’s attorneys’ rates
were “all reasonable.”
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The motion to dismiss is denied. In the
interests of justice, each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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