CourtListener 10778888•Kim v. Koo CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/23/26 Kim v. Koo CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DEAN KIM,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064063
v. (Superior Ct. Case No. 30-
2021-01178855)
JACOB KOO,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila O. Recio, Judge. Affirmed.
Grignon Law Firm, Margaret M. Grignon, Anne M. Grignon, and
Vakili & Leus, Sa’id Vakili, David N. Schultz, and Stephen P. Hoffman, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, Steven S. Fleischman, Gaspard Rappoport, and
Kahana & Feld and Sharon Oh-Kubisch, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jacob Koo appeals from a judgment in favor of Dean Kim
following a bench trial. The trial court found that notwithstanding a written
agreement stating that Koo would pay $500,000 to Kim for Kim’s interest in
a limited liability corporation, Koo actually had agreed to pay $850,000. Koo
contends the court’s ruling violated the parol evidence rule, which generally
bars extrinsic evidence from varying the terms of an integrated written
agreement. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude substantial
evidence supported the court’s finding there was no integrated written
agreement. Thus, the parol evidence rule did not apply, and accordingly, we
affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
COMPLAINT AND ANSWER
On January 14, 2021, Kim filed a complaint against Koo, seeking
enforcement of a $350,000 promissory note. The complaint alleged Kim and
Koo created Damon Capital, LLC (Damon Capital) to operate a high-end bed
and mattress store. Subsequently, Kim agreed to sell his 50 percent interest
in Damon Capital to Koo. The complaint alleged the purchase price was
$850,000. However, Kim could only obtain a $500,000 loan from Wells Fargo
Bank. To facilitate the loan, on or about August 31, 2015, the parties
executed a Transfer Agreement, a $500,000 promissory note, and a $350,000
promissory note. The Transfer Agreement and the $500,000 note were dated
August 31, 2015, and the $350,000 note was dated September 1, 2015. The
complaint further alleged that after the Transfer Agreement and the
$500,000 note were submitted to Wells Fargo, the bank expressed concerns.
The Transfer Agreement and the $500,000 note were revised to address Wells
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Fargo’s concerns, but the $350,000 note was left unchanged. However, Koo
never made any payments on the note.
On April 1, 2021, Koo filed an answer generally denying the
allegations and raising numerous affirmative defenses. On June 22, 2022, he
amended his answer to add additional affirmative defenses.
II.
STIPULATED FACTS
Before trial on the complaint, the parties filed a joint stipulation
setting forth disputed and undisputed facts. They stipulated that Kim and
Koo each initially invested $350,000 into Damon Capital and owned a 50
percent interest in the company. In March 2015, Koo sought to obtain a loan
from Wells Fargo to fund his purchase of Kim’s membership interest in
Damon Capital. On September 2, 2015, Koo signed four documents: (1) a
$350,000 note in favor of Kim, (2) a $500,000 note in favor of Kim dated
August 31, 2015, (3) the Operating Agreement of Damon Capital, and (4) a
Membership Interest Transfer Agreement dated August 31, 2015 (“August
Transfer Agreement”). The parties disputed whether the $350,000 note
related to Koo’s purchase of Kim’s membership interest.
On September 18, 2015, the parties executed a Termination
Agreement, which did not reference the $350,000 note. Kim asserted the
Termination Agreement was drafted to cancel, revoke, terminate or otherwise
render unenforceable the August Transfer Agreement and the $500,000 note.
Koo asserted the Termination Agreement affected the August Transfer
Agreement, the $500,000 note, and the $350,000 note. On September 23,
2015, the parties executed a revised Membership Interest Transfer
Agreement (the “September Transfer Agreement”), which complied with
Wells Fargo Bank’s requested changes.
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The August Transfer Agreement and September Transfer
Agreements were admitted into evidence at trial. The agreements both
provide the purchase price for Kim’s membership interest in Damon Capital
was $500,000, and referenced the $500,000 note. Their preambles state: “This
Agreement supersedes any and all agreements and understandings which
predate this Agreement.” Additionally, paragraph 10 of both agreements
state:
“Entire Agreement. This Agreement supersedes any and all other
agreements, either oral or in writing, between the Parties to this Agreement
with respect to the subject matter hereof and contains all the covenants and
agreements between said Parties with respect thereto, and each Party to this
Agreement acknowledges that no representations, inducements, promises, or
agreements, orally or otherwise, have been made by any Party, or anyone
acting on behalf of any Party which are not embodied herein, and that any
other agreement, statement, or promise concerning the subject matter set
forth in this Agreement shall be of no force or effect except in a subsequent
modification in writing signed by the Party to be charged.”
The notes were also admitted into evidence. The $500,000 note
states that Koo agreed to pay the note in exchange for Kim’s 50 percent
membership interest in Damon Capital. The $350,000 note states it was for
“VALUE RECEIVED,” with no further reference.
III.
TRIAL TESTIMONY
At trial, Kim testified that in January 2015, he asked Koo to buy
him out or purchase his 50 percent membership interest in Damon Capital.
At that time, Kim had lost trust in Koo, and wanted to exit their professional
business relationship to salvage their friendship. Koo offered $850,000.
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Although Kim believed his interest was worth between 1.25 to 4 million
dollars, he accepted the price to end their professional relationship. Koo,
however, lacked the funds to pay. In February or March 2015, he informed
Kim he could only qualify for a $500,000 loan from Wells Fargo, and Kim
agreed to lend Koo the remaining amount ($350,000) via a carryback note.
After Wells Fargo required additional covenants to approve Koo’s loan, Kim
signed the September Transfer Agreement to facilitate the loan approval.
Kim was never told by Koo or anyone else that the integration clause in the
agreement extinguished the $350,000 note until five years later when Koo
reneged on paying the note.
Yong Duk (John) Chung testified he was asked to draft the
various agreements and notes. He understood the purchase price would be
$850,000. However, he was asked to draft a promissory note for $500,000 and
another note for $350,000, which led to him learning that Koo would only
qualify for a $500,000 loan. Chung was informed that the “main agreement[ ]
should only have $500,000 for [Koo] to be able to get a loan. So [$]350[,000]
should not be incorporated into the main agreement.” He testified that
notwithstanding the integration clause, the parties intended the $350,000
note to be part of the purchase price. Chung also prepared the September
Transfer Agreement. He did not believe this agreement canceled the
$350,000 note. It had an integration clause because that was part of the
template he used to draft agreements.
Koo testified the purchase price of Kim’s interest was $500,000.
He came up with this figure based on a representation from Wells Fargo that
he was likely to qualify for a $500,000 loan. Koo testified the $350,000
amount represented the value of gifts from Kim that he wanted to return.
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VI.
TRIAL COURT RULINGS AND JUDGMENT
Following the close of evidence and the parties’ arguments, the
trial court issued its tentative decision in a written statement. The court
found the parties entered into an agreement to purchase Kim’s interest in
Damon Capital for $850,000, which included the $350,000 note.
Koo objected to the tentative decision on numerous grounds. As
relevant to this appeal, he asserted the trial court failed to address whether
the September Transfer Agreement was a “completely integrated contract.”
He argued the tentative decision conclusorily found the parties had agreed to
a $850,000 purchase price, which, he contended, “is belied by, and flatly
contrary to, the express language of the September Transfer Agreement.”
On February 26, 2024, the trial court issued the judgment after
bench trial and final statement of decision. The court stated: “Based on the
evidence presented, including credibility determinations, the court finds that
the parties entered into an agreement, wherein [Koo] agreed to buy out
[Kim’s] interest in Damon Capital, LLC for total sale price of $850,000, which
included a $350,000 promissory note. . . . To be clear, the court finds the
$350,000 promissory note to have been part of the consideration for the
buyout agreement and to be enforceable.” “The court further notes that it did
not find [Koo’s] testimony credible when testifying that the buyout agreement
with [Kim] was for only $500,000. Although the documents presented to
Wells Fargo suggested that the deal was for only $500,000, those documents
appear to have been drafted and presented to Wells Fargo for the purpose of
securing the loan, and not for the purpose of limiting the true and actual
buyout agreement between the parties to $500,000. Importantly, [Koo] would
not have qualified for the $500,000 loan if Wells Fargo was informed of the
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$350,000 promissory note. And even with the crafty presentation to Wells
Fargo, [Koo] qualified for only $500,000. The documents were an attempt to
mislead Wells Fargo about the true terms of the agreement between the
parties.” The court entered judgment in favor of Kim, and awarded damages.
Koo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
“The parol evidence rule is codified in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1856 and Civil Code section 1625. It provides that when parties enter
an integrated written agreement, extrinsic evidence may not be relied upon to
alter or add to the terms of the writing.” (Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v.
Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1174, fn.
omitted, italics added.) In contrast, “parol evidence is admissible to explain,
supplement, or even contradict the terms of an unintegrated agreement.”
(Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 340, italics added.)
Civil Code section 1625 provides that “[t]he execution of a
contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not,
supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which
preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.” Here, the
September Transfer Agreement would supersede the $350,000 promissory
note if it was an integrated agreement because the September Transfer
Agreement specifically states it concerns the purchase of Kim’s interest
whereas the $350,000 note does not explain its subject matter.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, subdivision (a) provides:
“Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement with respect to the terms included therein may not be
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contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement.”1 Section 1856, subdivision (b) provides: “The terms set forth in a
writing described in subdivision (a) may be explained or supplemented by
evidence of consistent additional terms unless the writing is intended also as
a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.”
As a panel of this court explained: “Section 1856 creates two
levels of contract integration or finality: (1) the parties intended the writing
to be the final expression of their agreement; and (2) the parties intended the
writing to be the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of their
agreement.” (Kanno v. Marwit Capital Partners II, L.P. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
987, 999, fn. omitted (Kanno).) “If a writing falls within level 1 (the writing is
a final expression) then a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement is
admissible if it does not contradict the writing, and evidence of consistent
additional terms may be used to explain or supplement the writing.” (Id. at
pp. 999-1000.) “If a writing falls within level 2 (complete and exclusive
statement) then evidence of consistent additional terms may not be used to
explain or supplement the writing.” (Id. at p. 1000.)
Section 1856, subdivision (d) provides that “[t]he court shall
determine whether the writing is intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to the terms included therein and
whether the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of the agreement.” “In considering whether a writing is integrated,
the court must consider the writing itself, including whether the written
agreement appears to be complete on its face; whether the agreement
1
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure, unless stated otherwise.
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contains an integration clause; whether the alleged parol understanding on
the subject matter at issue might naturally be made as a separate agreement;
and the circumstances at the time of the writing.” (Founding Members of the
Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 944, 953–954 (Founding Members).) “Under California law, the
presence of an integration clause in the contract is not conclusive but is a
factor which ‘may help resolve’ that issue.” (Kanno, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1001, quoting Masterson v. Sine (1968) 68 Cal.2d 222, 225,)
“Whether a contract is integrated is a question of law when the
evidence of integration is not in dispute.” (Founding Members, supra, 109
Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) “If the issue of integration requires a resolution of a
conflict in the evidence or of credibility, then the trial court’s determination is
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.” (Kanno, supra, 18
Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
II.
ANALYSIS
Here, the trial court concluded the September Transfer
Agreement is an unintegrated agreement, notwithstanding the fact that it
had an integration clause. It determined based on the “evidence presented”
and “credibility determinations” that the document was “presented to Wells
Fargo for the purpose of securing the loan, and not for the purpose of limiting
the true and actual buyout agreement between the parties to $500,000.” It
found that “the parties entered into an agreement, wherein [Koo] agreed to
buy out [Kim’s] interest in Damon Capital, LLC for a total sale price of
$850,000, which included a $350,000 promissory note.”
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The trial court’s finding on integration required resolution of
conflicting evidence and credibility determinations because Kim and Koo
presented differing versions about the agreement to buyout Kim’s
membership interest. The court credited Kim’s version, which explained why
the $350,000 promissory note was not included in the purchase price set forth
in the transfer agreement. As the court found, the note was separated from
the other agreements to secure the loan from Wells Fargo because Koo
“would not have qualified for the $500,000 loan if Wells Fargo was informed
of the $350,000 promissory note.” Kim’s trial testimony, along with Chung’s
corroborating testimony, thus constituted substantial evidence to support the
court’s finding that the September Transfer Agreement is not an integrated
agreement. (See Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 962, 969 [“The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to
constitute substantial evidence”].) Because there was no integrated
agreement, the parol evidence rule did not apply. The trial court could
consider the $350,000 promissory note and conclude it was part of the buyout
agreement and enforceable.2
Koo argues the trial court did not make any findings regarding
integration and the parol evidence rule in the tentative decision or the final
2
In his reply brief, Koo argues there is no conflicting evidence
because the only conflicting evidence is “parol evidence” that contradicts the
express terms of the September Transfer Agreement. But the testimony of
Kim and Chung can properly be considered in determining “whether the
alleged parol understanding on the subject matter at issue might naturally
be made as a separate agreement; and the circumstances at the time of the
writing.” (Founding Members, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) Their
testimony concerned the parties’ “actions” in drafting the various
agreements. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
391 [“It is only when there are conflicting inferences about the actions of the
parties, i.e., what happened, that a question of fact is presented”].)
10
statement of decision. We disagree. Although the terms “integration” and
“parol evidence” do not appear in the statements of decision, the court
expressly stated the documents presented to Wells Fargo did not reflect the
“true and actual buyout agreement.” Thus, the September Transfer
Agreement is not a “final expression of their agreement with respect” to the
buyout of Kim’s membership interest or “a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement.” (§ 1856, subds. (a) & (b).) Accordingly, the
September Transfer Agreement is not an integrated agreement and the parol
evidence rule does not apply to bar consideration of the $350,000 promissory
note.
Koo’s remaining arguments concern whether the September
Transfer Agreement is a completely integrated agreement, i.e., a level 2
integrated agreement as defined in Kanno, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 987, and
whether any exception to the parol evidence rule applied. Given our
affirmance of the trial court’s finding that the September Transfer Agreement
is not an integrated document, whether partially or completely integrated,
these arguments are irrelevant. However, we will address one issue raised in
the reply brief regarding consideration of collateral agreements in the context
of integration.
In IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 640 (IIG
Wireless), a panel of this court stated: “Generally, the parol evidence rule
states that evidence of an oral agreement inconsistent with a written contract
is inadmissible even where the contract is not integrated. This rule is based
on sound logic and policy; when a contract is reduced to writing, it is
presumed to contain all of the material terms, and it cannot reasonably be
presumed that the parties would intend two contradictory terms to be part of
the same agreement. (Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers International [(1987)
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190 Cal.App.3d 263, 271 (Gerdlund)].)” Koo relies on the first sentence in the
quote above to argue the $350,000 promissory note cannot be considered even
if the September Transfer Agreement is not integrated. However, that
language contradicts well-settled law that the parol evidence rule applies
only when an agreement is integrated. (See. e.g., Founding Members, supra,
109 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [“If the agreement is partially integrated, the parol
evidence rule applies to the integrated part”]; 11 Williston on Contracts (4th
ed. 2024) § 33:14 [“application of the parol evidence rule depends on the
existence of a valid integrated contract”].) In any event, the conflict may be
resolved by construing the term “integrated” to mean complete integration.
As the Kanno court noted, “Case law sometimes uses the term ‘integration’ to
mean a complete integration, i.e., the second level of integration. Justice
Traynor did so in Masterson v. Sine, supra, 68 Cal.2d at page 225.” (Kanno,
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1000.) The use of “integration” to mean complete
integration in IIG Wireless, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 630 is confirmed when we
examine the cited Gerdlund case.
In Gerdlund, the appellate court stated: “Our Supreme Court
held in Masterson v. Sine, supra, 68 Cal.2d 222, that [an integration] clause,
while it certainly helps to resolve the issue, does not of itself establish an
integration; the collateral agreement itself must be examined in order to
determine whether the parties intended it to be a part of their bargain.
Masterson, however, does not go so far as to permit proof of a collateral
agreement which contradicts an express provision of the written agreement.
The reason for this clear: it cannot reasonably be presumed that the parties
intended to integrate two directly contradictory terms in the same
agreement. Under Masterson then, parol evidence can be admitted only “‘to
prove the existence of a separate oral agreement as to any matter on which
12
the document is silent and which is not inconsistent with its terms. . . .’””
(Gerdlund, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 270–271.)
Thus, the reference to “integrated” refers to complete integration.
When determining whether a separate oral agreement should be integrated
into a partially integrated written agreement, a term in the collateral
agreement cannot be integrated if it is inconsistent with or contradicts a term
in the written agreement. The reason is that “it cannot reasonably be
presumed that the parties intended to integrate two directly contradictory
terms in the same agreement.” (Gerdlund, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 263, at p.
271.) However, this principle of contract integration does not apply to
unintegrated agreements.
The same language from Gerdlund quoted above suggests that
collateral agreements with inconsistent or contradictory terms cannot be
used to determine whether an agreement is integrated. For example, the
Kanno court stated: “On the issue of contract integration, ‘“the court must
consider not only whether the written instrument contains an integration
clause, but also examine the collateral agreement itself to determine whether
it was intended to be a part of the bargain. [Citations.] However, in
determining the issue of integration, the collateral agreement will be
examined only insofar as it does not directly contradict an express term of the
written agreement; ‘it cannot reasonably be presumed that the parties
intended to integrate two directly contradictory terms in the same
agreement.’”’” (Kanno, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) However, when
integration is viewed as complete integration, any confusion is resolved.
Collateral agreements may be considered along with the parties’ testimony
about why the agreements were drafted and executed when determining
whether a written agreement is a “final expression” of the parties’ agreement,
13
but they cannot be used to contradict the terms of a written agreement the
parties actually intended to be a final expression of their agreement. (§ 1856,
subd. (a).)
In sum, the trial court may not consider extrinsic evidence to
contradict the terms of an integrated agreement. However, the court may
consider extrinsic evidence to contradict the terms of an unintegrated
agreement. (See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 340 [“parol
evidence is admissible to explain, supplement, or even contradict the terms of
an unintegrated agreement”].) In this case, the court found the September
Transfer Agreement was not integrated. That finding was supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, the parol evidence rule did not apply, and the
court could consider and enforce the $350,000 promissory note.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
BANCROFT, J. *
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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