People v. Ruiz CA2/4

CourtListener 10778168Calctapp22.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/22/26 P. v. Ruiz CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B341200

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA492757)
v.

CESAR STEVEN RUIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Larry Paul Fidler, Judge. Affirmed as modified, sentence vacated and
remanded with directions.
J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Nancy Lii
Ladner, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Cesar Steven Ruiz went into a house and shot his friend.
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, first degree residential
burglary, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court imposed
consecutive sentences for each conviction. On appeal, the Attorney General
concedes that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the
murder and burglary convictions under Penal Code section 654.1 In addition,
both parties agree that defendant was entitled to an additional day of
presentence custody credits. We also agree on these points and remand for
resentencing.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In December 2020, four individuals (Fernando Tafolla, Eduardo
Mendoza, Gilbert Moreno, and Jose)2 were living together in a home and
trafficking narcotics. Defendant’s role in the narcotics operation was as a
backup, “some kind of security,” and to make sure the drugs arrived at their
destination. Defendant wanted to move into an empty bedroom in the house.
On December 13, 2020, defendant and Mendoza argued about missing
money from a methamphetamine transaction. However, on December 24,
2020, the men apologized and tried to resolve their differences.
Around 12:30 a.m. on December 25, 2020, defendant drove his car to
the back of the house. Defendant held a gun behind his back as he
approached the house. When he entered the house, defendant had the gun by
his side. The gun was a nine-millimeter Taurus. It was a gun that

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2 Jose’s last name is unknown.
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previously belonged to Mendoza, but was later acquired by defendant. Five
seconds after defendant went into the house, Moreno heard between five and
ten rapid gunshots. The shots sounded like they were from the Taurus.
When defendant ran out of the house, he said in Spanish to Moreno, “esto es
pa mi jefito,” which means “it’s for my boss.”
After the shooting, Mendoza was sitting on his bed, bleeding and
asking for help. He later died from eight gunshot wounds. There were nine-
millimeter spent casings in his bedroom. Defendant’s phone records showed
that he was in the area at the time of the murder and that he sent
threatening messages soon after.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 12, 2023, a jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and first degree residential burglary (§ 459;
count 2). As to counts 1 and 2, the jury also found true defendant personally
used a handgun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 3).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus 12 years in
state prison, consisting of: 25 years to life for count 1, plus 10 years for the
personal use enhancement; a consecutive term of 16 months for count 2; and
a consecutive term of 8 months for count 3. Defendant was given 1,324 days
of presentence custody credit.
Defendant timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I. Section 654
Defendant contends, and the Attorney General agrees, consecutive
sentences on both the murder and burglary counts violates section 654’s
prohibition against multiple punishments for a single act. We too agree.

A. Relevant Background
At trial, the jury was instructed that, to prove defendant was guilty of
burglary as charged in count 2, the People were required to prove defendant
entered a building and “[w]hen he entered a building, he intended to commit
murder.” And, during closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the
burglary was predicated on the murder. He contended that the burglary
“refers to entering a building with the intent to commit a crime inside, a
felony inside, the felony here being the murder of [Mendoza].” The prosecutor
then stated that “the question here is when [defendant] entered [the house]
right before killing [Mendoza], did he go in with the intent to [kill]. If you
find that he did, [defendant is] guilty on the burglary.” The prosecutor
concluded, “[I]f you believe [defendant is] guilty of the murder, then almost
by definition he’s guilty of the burglary as well.”
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that the facts
underlying the burglary demonstrated that defendant went into the house
with the intent to commit murder. However, the prosecutor then argued
defendant should be punished separately because it was “an utter violation of
the sanctity of one’s residence,” and that Mendoza was not in a position to
defend himself. The court noted that the crime was “extremely violent” and it
deserved the “absolute maximum sentence.” The court then imposed
consecutive terms for each crime.

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B. Analysis
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that: “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.” This statute “bars
the imposition of multiple sentences for a single act or omission, even though
the act or omission may violate more than one provision of the Penal Code.”
(People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1413.) “Section 654 has long
been interpreted to preclude multiple punishments not only for a single act
that violates more than one statute, but for an indivisible course of conduct.
[Citation.] . . . [Citation.] ‘[I]f all of the offenses were merely incident to, or
were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may
be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only
once.’” (People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1042–1043.) “On appeal,
we review factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence
test, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People.
[Citation.] We review de novo the legal question of whether section 654
applies.” (People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 794.)
“Burglary consists of entry into a house . . . with the intent to commit a
felony. [Citation.] Thus, ordinarily, if the defendant commits both burglary
and the underlying intended felony, Penal Code section 654 will permit
punishment for one or the other but not for both.” (People v. Centers (1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98; see also People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116,
130 [“When a defendant is convicted of burglary and the intended felony
underlying the burglary, section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes”].)

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Here, the record reflects that the intent and objective of both the
burglary and the murder were the same, and this was the prosecution’s
theory of the case at trial. Accordingly, in light of the evidence introduced at
trial, the jury instruction on burglary, and the prosecutor’s argument,
substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s order to sentence
defendant consecutively on these counts. Rather, one of the sentences on
counts 1 or 2 should be stayed pursuant to section 654. And, because section
654 provides the court with discretion with regard to which sentence will be
stayed, remand is necessary for the court to exercise its discretion in
modifying defendant’s sentence. In doing so, we express no opinion about
how the trial court should exercise its discretion.

II. Custody Credits
We agree with the parties that defendant is entitled to presentence
custody credits for 1,325 days he spent in custody between his arrest and
sentencing.
Section 2900.5 provides that a defendant is entitled to have the time he
spends in custody before he is sentenced credited toward his term of
imprisonment. Such credit is distinct from credits an inmate may receive for
good conduct or participation in certain rehabilitation or work programs
while in custody. (See §§ 2933.05, 4019.) Section 2933.2, subdivision (a)
precludes a person convicted of murder from accruing worktime and conduct
credit between arrest and conviction but does not preclude such a person
from receiving custody credits accrued during this time. (People v. Taylor
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647.)
The trial court awarded defendant 1,324 custody credits. Defendant
was entitled to one additional day of presentence custody credit because the

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court failed to include the day of his arrest. (People v. Valdes (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 953, 955 [the day of arrest “counts as a custody credit day”].) On
February 18, 2021, defendant was arrested. On October 4, 2024, he was
sentenced to state prison. There are 1,325 days between the two dates,
including the first and last date. Therefore, on remand, the trial court is
directed to modify the judgment to reflect an award of 1,325 days of
presentence custody credit.

DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions for
the trial court to resentence defendant applying section 654 and to further
exercise its sentencing discretion under current law. (See People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) The trial court is also directed to modify the
judgment to reflect an award of 1,325 days of presentence custody credit. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

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