Conservatorship of C.S. CA4/1

CourtListener 10778071Calctapp22.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/22/26 Conservatorship of C.S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Conservatorship of the Person of C.S.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY PUBLIC
GUARDIAN,
D087144
Petitioner and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. PRRI2402455)
C.S.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with instructions.
Suzanne M. Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Objector and Appellant.
Stacy Keffer, Office of the County Counsel; Smith Law Offices,
Douglas C. Smith and Julian V. Lee, for Petitioner and Respondent.
After determining C.S.’s mental health rendered her “gravely disabled”
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under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (the LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 5000 et seq.), the trial court imposed a one-year conservatorship over her
and further ordered, consistent with the parties’ stipulation, that the least
restrictive level of placement was a closed, locked facility. C.S. contends that
her due process rights were violated because she did not consent to the least
restrictive placement or the imposed disabilities of the conservatorship
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judgment. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment
determining placement and imposing disabilities and remand for the court to
verify C.S.’s consent to the terms of the conservatorship judgment on the
record or, alternatively, to hold a hearing on these matters.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.S. is an elderly woman with a history of schizophrenia and other
mental health disorders. Over the last several years, C.S. has been admitted
to over 20 hospitals for matters related to her mental health, demonstrated
an inability to voluntarily take prescribed medications in an outpatient
setting, and failed to maintain consistent shelter when not at a hospital or
treatment program.
In September 2024, the Riverside County Public Guardian (the County)
petitioned for it to be appointed C.S.’s permanent conservator. The County
asserted that C.S., as a result of her mental health disorder, could not
provide for her basic needs and was unwilling to accept treatment.

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All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
2
C.S. does not challenge the jury’s finding of “grave disability.”

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Consequently, because C.S. was allegedly “gravely disabled,” the County
asserted that a permanent conservatorship was necessitated under the
LPS Act.
C.S. received notice of the hearing for an LPS conservatorship and
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sought a jury trial. Ultimately, after trial testimony from the County’s
expert and C.S., the jury returned a verdict finding that C.S. was “presently
gravely disabled due to a mental disorder.”
After the jury was discharged and a “brief recess,” the trial court
recalled the matter. The court noted that C.S. was “not present” and asked
defense counsel: “Counsel waive[s] [C.S.’s] appearance?” Defense counsel
responded affirmatively. The trial court then granted the petition for
appointment of a permanent conservatorship, finding pursuant to the jury
verdict that C.S. was “gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.”
While C.S. was still absent from the court room, the trial court
immediately asked defense counsel for “any recommendations.” Defense
counsel responded, “I would offer the following findings to the Court; that
[C.S.] is able to express a desire to vote, placement [in a closed, locked
facility] is appropriate and least restrictive, and [C.S.] would reserve on the
issue of psychotropic medications.” When the County did not object, the trial
court indicated—while C.S. remained absent—that it would sign the order
“right now” and directed defense counsel to inform C.S. of her right to appeal.
A short pause in the proceedings occurred. When the trial court came
back on the record, it noted that C.S. was “now present.” The trial court

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Pending the outcome of the petition for permanent conservatorship,
C.S. was placed under a temporary conservatorship. At the time of the
hearing on the permanent conservatorship, C.S. was housed in a closed,
locked facility.
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informed C.S. of her right to an appeal, directing her to her attorney for
further discussion of her appeal rights. The proceeding concluded without
any further comment from, or inquiry directed to, C.S.
The trial court thereafter entered a judgment for a one-year
conservatorship. The judgment, consistent with the stipulation, determined
that C.S.’s present confinement, in a closed locked facility, was the “least
restrictive and most suitable facility”; imposed disabilities, including that
C.S. did not have the right to refuse medical treatment related to the grave
disability but retained the right to vote; and granted powers to the
conservator.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, C.S. asserts that the trial court erred by failing to obtain
her consent during the “placement and disabilities” hearing. According to
C.S., by accepting defense counsel’s recommended placement and disabilities
without a formal hearing and without obtaining her consent to the findings of
the stipulation, the trial court acted contrary to this court’s decision in
Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 612
(Christopher A.) and violated her due process rights. We agree.
Whether the trial court afforded C.S. due process by imposing
placement and disabilities consistent with the attorneys’ stipulation and
without C.S.’s consent raises a question of law. We review such questions de
novo. (See Conservatorship of Tian L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1029.)
“The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention, evaluation, and
treatment of persons who, as a result of mental disorder, are . . . gravely
disabled.” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142 (John L.).)
The LPS Act authorizes a trial court to appoint a conservator for a person
who is found to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et seq.) so that he or she may

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obtain “treatment, supervision, and placement,” (§ 5350.1). Once an LPS
conservatorship is in place, it automatically terminates after one year, but
reappointment of the conservator may be sought by petition. (§ 5361.)
Because of the significant liberty interests at stake in an LPS
conservatorship, multiple procedural safeguards exist at all stages of the
adjudication. (See John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 151–52.) Relevant here
is the placement, disabilities, and conservator powers determination, which is
made separately from, and after, the determination that a person is gravely
disabled. (See Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1578
(Walker.) [“A conservatee does not forfeit any legal right nor suffer legal
disability by reason of the LPS commitment alone. (§ 5005.)”];
Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) At this stage, the
conservatee likewise has a right to due process before any disability or
placement may be imposed. (Ibid.; see K.G. v. Meredith (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 164, 182 (K.G.) [recognizing conservatee has a right to due
process before disabilities may be imposed].)
Specifically, the conservatee has a right to a separate hearing or jury
trial, wherein the trial court “determine[s] the duties and powers of the
conservator, the disabilities imposed on the conservatee, and the level of
placement appropriate for the conservatee.” (Christopher A., supra, 139
Cal.App.4th at p. 612; see also §§ 5357 & 5358.) If the judgment is by
stipulation, due process requires the proposed conservatee’s consent to the
terms, either by personal, in-person consent at the hearing or by the
conservatee’s counsel who has verified to the court on the record that the
conservatee actually consents to the terms of the stipulation. (K.G., supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.) The party seeking the conservatorship bears the
burden of showing that the proposed least restrictive placement and

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disabilities are necessary to accomplish the purpose of the LPS
conservatorship. (Christopher A., at p. 612, fn. 5.)
In this matter, it is evident from the record that C.S. was not afforded
due process at the placement and disabilities stage of the proceedings. At no
point during this portion of the proceedings did the trial court verify C.S.’s
express consent to the terms of the stipulated judgment, either by C.S.
herself or by verification of her consent through defense counsel. Instead, in
C.S.’s absence, the trial court simply accepted the stipulated placement and
imposition of disabilities that only the attorneys had agreed upon. In doing
so, the court effectively allowed defense counsel to waive C.S.’s right to a
hearing on the issue of disabilities, placement, and conservator powers. Even
when C.S. returned to the courtroom, the court did not take the opportunity
to inform her of the consequences of the stipulated judgment, nor to obtain
her consent.
On appeal, both parties discuss this court’s decision in Christopher A.
to support their respective positions. In that matter, as here, the trial court
accepted a stipulated judgment on the issues of placement, disabilities, and
conservator powers without obtaining the conservatee’s consent.
(Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 613.) A panel of our court
reversed, despite evidence on the record to support the judgment, because
failure to obtain such consent violated the conservatee’s due process rights.
(Ibid.) While factual dissimilarities certainly exist between the present case
and Christopher A., this matter and Christopher A. are the same in all
material factual regards: mainly, that the conservatorship judgment was
entered on the basis of a stipulated agreement of only counsel. The factual
differences the County highlights—that C.S. left the courtroom and made no
attempt to discuss the stipulated judgment, unlike the conservatee in

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Christopher A. who remained in the courtroom and sought to question the
court—do not dictate a different outcome.
The County further asserts that because C.S. testified during the grave
disability portion of the hearing, she had the “equivalent of a formal hearing”
on the matter of placement and disabilities, such that any deprivation of due
process was cured. Putting aside that the County cites no authority for this
proposition, the County ignores that the grave disabilities portion of the
proceedings is tailored to a determination of whether a proposed conservatee
is unable to provide for his or her basic needs because of a mental disorder.
The fact that a proposed conservatee is gravely disabled does “not by itself
satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities.”
(Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1578.) While it is possible C.S. would
have had nothing to add to what she had already testified to, we cannot know
because she was never given the opportunity. Consequently, C.S.’s prior
testimony does not render harmless the lack of a hearing or consent with
respect to the least restrictive placement and disabilities determination.
We likewise reject the County’s claim that C.S. waived her due process
rights because she voluntarily chose to leave the courtroom. That C.S. briefly
left the proceedings does not amount to an intentional relinquishment of a
known right. (See Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 371
[waiver is the “ ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right’ ”].)
In sum, the determination of least restrictive placement, imposition of
disabilities, and designation of conservator powers implicates a conservatee’s
personal liberty interest. (See Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 611–612; K.G., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.) Consequently, when a
stipulated judgment is entered in these respects, due process requires the

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conservatee’s consent to, and consultation on, the agreed upon terms.
(Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 613.) Because that consent was
not obtained in this case and C.S. was not otherwise provided a hearing,
entry of the judgment with respect to least restrictive placement and
disabilities violated due process.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment determining least restrictive placement
and imposing disabilities is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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