People v. Lopez CA4/1

CourtListener 10776925Calctapp20.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/20/26 P. v. Lopez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084046

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS297472)

OSVALDO APOLO LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Garry G. Haehnle, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley, Marvin E. Mizell, and Michael D. Butera, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Osvaldo Apolo Lopez appeals the second denial of his motion for
discovery under the Racial Justice Act and seeks a new trial judge to oversee
the matter on remand. (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (d).) We previously
remanded the matter for reconsideration of the motion under the “plausible
justification standard” for good cause explained in Young v. Superior
Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138. (People v. Lopez (Nov. 28, 2023, D080443)
[nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court again denied Lopez’s RJA
discovery motion. The People concede discovery should have been granted,
but disagree reassignment is warranted.
We conclude Lopez satisfied the low bar for RJA discovery, and thus we
reverse the denial order and remand for the trial judge to determine the
appropriate scope of discovery. We also direct the matter to be reassigned to
a different trial judge on remand, in the interests of justice, based on
comments made after the motion ruling.
I.
For context, we repeat the facts underlying Lopez’s conviction and some
of the procedural history from our earlier unpublished opinion. (People v.
Lopez, D080443.)
A.
The state charged Lopez with the murder of Ricardo Sales. Sales had
an ongoing affair with Lopez’s wife. When he learned of the affair, Lopez
called Sales to tell him not to contact his wife anymore. Lopez testified that
Sales identified himself as a gang member, threatened Lopez and his family,
and demanded to meet.
During that meeting, Lopez shot Sales dead. Witnesses saw Lopez
shoot Sales and then stand over the fallen body and continue shooting.
At trial, Lopez offered testimony explaining how his gang-related
trauma made him more likely to believe his life was in danger and more
“emotionally reactive” to perceived threats. After Sales punched him in the
back of the head, making him fall, Lopez thought Sales was going to kill him.

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In response, Lopez pulled out a gun and “started shooting.” He felt
“disoriented” and “hazy,” with “tunnel vision.” Unsure if he had shot Sales,
Lopez “kept squeezing [the trigger] until it looked like he wasn’t going to get
back up.”
The jury found Lopez guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser
included offense of murder. (Pen. Code, § 192(a).) The jury also found true
that Lopez used a firearm during the offense. (§ 12022.5(a).)
The trial court sentenced Lopez to the middle term of six years for
voluntary manslaughter and the low term of three years for the firearm
enhancement, for a total of nine years in prison.
B.
Before sentencing, Lopez moved (1) to dismiss the firearm
enhancement under the RJA and (2) for RJA discovery. Lopez relied on
statistical data from a study examining death penalty charging in San Diego
County; a comparison of his case with a homicide case involving a White
shooter; and evidence of what Lopez’s counsel viewed as implicit bias in the
prosecutor’s sentencing briefing because it invoked “a very real and insidious
stereotype that Latinx men are prone to jealousy” as confirmed by a list of

scholarly articles.1 He argued imposing the firearm enhancement “would
amount to a violation of the” RJA and asserted good cause for RJA discovery
to obtain copies of all charging documents in homicide cases filed by the San
Diego District Attorney’s office between January 1, 2017, and February 24,
2022, the date of the motion.

1 We grant Lopez’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the prior
record of appeal in case No. D080443, including these documents submitted
in support of his RJA discovery motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452(d), 459(a).)
3
The trial court denied both motions. On the discovery motion, the trial
court stated, “If this Court cannot find a prima facie showing [of a
substantive RJA violation], I don’t know how [it] can find a showing of good
cause that the discovery in this case should be released.”
C.
Afterwards, Young clarified that good cause for RJA discovery is a
“minimal” plausible justification standard less onerous than the prima facie
showing of an RJA violation under section 745(c) that “should not be difficult
to meet.” (Young, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159, 161.)
In denying Lopez’s RJA discovery motion, the trial court acted without
Young’s guidance and appeared to equate the different standards under
section 745(c) and (d), so we reversed and remanded for the trial court to
reconsider the motion as guided by Young. (People v. Lopez, D080443.)
D.
On remand, Lopez filed a supplemental pleading in support of his
request for RJA discovery of “the charging documents from all homicide cases
from January 2017 through the present date.” He argued good cause for this
discovery based on his original submission as well as a list of 35 homicide
cases assigned to the Office of the Primary Public Defender between 2017
and 2020, which he offered as “a small statistical sampling of what he hopes
to develop.”
The trial court again denied Lopez’s motion for RJA discovery because
it did not find good cause “even under the lower standard.”
II.
A.
We asked the parties to address whether the court’s denial of Lopez’s
RJA discovery motion is an appealable order in light of In re

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Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071-1072 and People v.
Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292. The parties agree it is, as do we.
Montgomery and Serrano each involved a postjudgment RJA discovery motion
that was consequently not appealable. (Montgomery, at p. 1066; Serrano, at
p. 283.) Here, in contrast, Lopez first sought RJA discovery and relief during
sentencing proceedings before judgment was entered. The matter of that
same RJA discovery motion returns to us following our remand for the trial
court to reconsider it. We thus view it as a continuation of Lopez’s original
and appealable motion made presentencing.
B.
Lopez contends, and the People concede, the trial court erred in
denying Lopez’s motion for RJA discovery. We accept the People’s concession.
Good cause for RJA discovery requires only a “plausible factual
foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial Justice Act
‘could or might have occurred.’” (Young, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) Here, the
People admit “the statistical and academic materials presented,” as described
above, “satisfy [Young’s] minimally stringent requirements for discovery,
entitling [Lopez] to further evidentiary development of his RJA claim.” In
addition to the statistical and academic materials, which include scholarly
articles about racial stereotypes of “Latinx men,” Lopez pointed to at least
nine instances in a sentencing brief where “the district attorney assert[ed]
and implie[d] . . . Lopez was motivated by jealously over an affair.” Together,
Lopez argued this evidence “demonstrates a very real possibility of implicit
bias on the part of the District Attorney’s Office.” “At this stage, [the
defendant] need not make a strong case but only a plausible one.” (Young,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) In accepting the People’s concession, we conclude
this suffices to establish good cause for RJA discovery.

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Although Lopez contends the scope of his discovery request was
appropriate, the trial court did not reach that issue. (See McDaniel v.
Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 248-249, fn. 9.) “[H]ow much of
this requested data may be ordered disclosed, when, and in what form, is for
the trial court to consider, in an exercise of its discretion, weighing probative
value against burden.” (Young, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 169.) We accordingly
remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion to decide the appropriate
scope of disclosure by weighing the factors Young sourced from City of
Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134:
• whether the material requested is adequately described;
• the material’s relative availability to the responding entity and the
defendant;
• the request’s timeliness;
• the risk of causing unreasonable delay or imposing an undue burden on
the responding entity; and
• the risk of violating third-party confidentiality, privacy rights, or
protected governmental interests.
(Young, at p. 168.)
C.
Finally, invoking Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1(c), Lopez asks
us to assign this matter to a different trial judge on remand. We direct the
presiding judge of the superior court to do so.
At a party’s request, we must consider if the interests of justice favor
directing further proceedings to be heard before a different trial judge. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 170.1(c).) Such power is to be used “sparingly.” (People v.
LaBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1079.) We may reassign the trial
judge in the interests of justice “when necessary to dispel the appearance of

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bias, for example, when the record shows the trial judge became embroiled or
personally invested in the outcome of the proceedings” (ibid.)—in other
words, “where a reasonable person might doubt whether the trial judge was
impartial” (Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 303).
“Mere judicial error” is normally not enough. (LaBlanc, at p. 1079.)
The basis for Lopez’s reassignment request comes from a conversation
between the trial judge and defense counsel after the court had ruled on
Lopez’s RJA discovery motion. Following the ruling, defense counsel made a
record of what she believed established good cause. Defense counsel finished
making her record, after which the trial judge expressed that he had “never
been more disappointed in a counsel that I had a lot of respect for” based on
the trial judge’s belief that defense counsel called the prosecutor a racist.
Defense counsel denied calling the prosecutor a racist. But the trial judge
insisted, “Yes, you did. At the original sentencing hearing, you called him a
racist.” (Italics added.) Defense counsel clarified that she “never said that
[the prosecutor] was being explicitly racist. This is about implicit bias.”
Even so, the trial judge continued to accuse defense counsel of calling the
prosecutor a racist at sentencing and told her, “you’re not respecting the rules
of professional conduct when you call a fellow attorney a racist.” (Contra
conc. & dis. opn. at p. 10.) When defense counsel explained she was “doing
[her] job” under the RJA by calling out implicit bias, the trial judge
referenced “[h]ow many courses” he had “been to on implicit bias.” When
defense counsel expressed that “part of the problem with RJA litigation” was
“probably . . . the hostility of the Bench,” the trial judge responded, “Oh, no,
no, no, no. You’re not going there because” he had granted RJA discovery
motions “on a number of occasions.” Then the trial judge returned to his

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belief that defense counsel “call[ed] another attorney a racist based on
something that clearly could have risen out of jealousy.”
We have reviewed the entire sentencing transcript and confirmed
defense counsel never accused the prosecutor of explicit racism at the
sentencing hearing; instead, at the hearing she grounded her arguments in
implicit bias.
Lopez contends the trial judge’s “displeasure with trial counsel
escalated to what can only be described as hostile, with the court seemingly
taking on the role of advocate in tandem with the prosecutor.” The People
argue “it was not irrational for the court to interpret [Lopez’s] arguments
against the prosecutor as encompassing claims of both implicit and explicit
racial bias.” In any event, the People categorize “misinterpreting counsel’s
argument” as “not evidence of partiality” but rather the court expressing a
view on a legal or factual issue presented in the proceeding, which they say is
“specifically excluded as a basis” for reassignment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.2(b). Yet section 170.2(b) expressly permits such
conduct to serve as a ground for reassignment as provided in section 170.1(c).
On this record, we conclude the interests of justice counsel in favor of
reassigning further proceedings to be heard before a different trial judge. A
reasonable person might view the trial judge as having become embroiled in
the proceeding. Our decision does not constitute a determination the trial
judge in this case exhibited actual bias. (See LaBlanc, 238 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1079.)
III.
We reverse the order denying Lopez’s motion for discovery under Penal
Code section 745(d) and remand with directions that the presiding judge of
the superior court reassign the matter to a new trial judge. On remand, the

8
new trial judge is directed to exercise its discretion to determine the
appropriate scope of discovery by weighing the factors identified in Young v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 168, citing City of Alhambra v.
Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134.

CASTILLO, J.

I CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

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Kelety, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I too accept the People’s concession that the trial court erred in denying
Lopez’s motion for discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) and join the
majority in concluding that the matter must be remanded so that the trial
court may consider the appropriate scope of discovery. The Legislature has
made its position quite clear: “The Legislature . . . intends that individuals
must be afforded access to a broad range of relevant discovery to develop and
support their potential RJA claims.” (Assembly Bill No. 1071 (Stats. 2025,
ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b), italics added.)
However, in my view, the comments made by the trial judge after
ruling on Lopez’s RJA discovery motion did not reflect bias or partiality in
connection with the motion, and therefore the matter should not be
reassigned on remand.
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 subdivision (c) provides that upon
appeal, we consider “whether in the interests of justice [we] should direct
that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge
whose judgment or order” is under review. Cases have interpreted the
phrase “interests of justice” as asking us to consider whether a reasonable
person might doubt whether the judge was impartial in ruling on the matter
before it, or where the orders appealed from reflect “bias or whimsy.”
(Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 303.)
Here, nothing in the record indicated that the judge’s order was
whimsical in any sense. Further, as discussed post, there is no reason to
doubt the judge’s impartiality in assessing Lopez’s RJA claim in future
proceedings. The judge noted his awareness of the implicit bias issue,
pointed out that he had granted RJA discovery motions in the past, and
highlighted his experiences as a judicial officer in the community. He flatly
rejected any suggestion that he was hostile to the RJA.
Instead, the comments of the court, after ruling on the motion, focused
on the conduct of counsel as it played out in the posttrial pleadings and
proceedings before him.
It bears noting that the jury’s verdict was not well received in all
quarters. For his part, Lopez no doubt had hoped for complete acquittal. On
the other hand, as the probation report noted, the victim’s family was “very
upset” that Lopez had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, rather than
first or second degree murder. The court referenced the emotion of the case
in the original sentencing hearing, admonishing the respective families to
maintain the peace between them, and commending them for remaining calm
at the end of the hearing.
An understanding of the court’s comments to defense counsel, as
referenced in the majority opinion, requires a review of the posttrial
proceedings. This review demonstrates that the emotion in the case was not
limited to the families of the defendant and the victim and shows why the
judge raised his concerns with defense counsel. It appears that the
proceedings before the court were growing increasingly heated between the
parties and that the court assigned at least some of the responsibility for that
“heat” to the statements of defense counsel, both in the pleadings and at the
posttrial hearings.
On February 4, 2022, Lopez filed a lengthy sentencing memorandum
and statement in mitigation, which included arguments in mitigation
discussing Lopez’s history of trauma and included family photos and letters
of support. Also included were two letters from trial jurors that referred to
Lopez’s prior trauma, as well as a letter from a third juror stating that

2
“[Lopez’s] wife’s drug addiction, affair, and involvement with an active gang
member . . . led to Mr. Lopez’s downfall.”
On February 7, 2022, Lopez filed a supplemental sentencing
memorandum addressing the probation report, which had recommended a
ten year sentence, again arguing that Lopez’s history of trauma was a
contributing factor in the offense under Penal Code section 1170 subdivision
(b)(6), and requesting a probationary sentence or a lower term sentence.
On February 9, 2022, Lopez filed a second supplemental sentencing
memorandum, raising proportionality as an issue and discussing the facts of
a recent prosecution, People v. Russell, in which a White deputy sheriff shot
and killed a fleeing suspect. Lopez argued that the RJA required the court to
give strong weight to the fact that the district attorney had allowed Russell to
plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter but had not made the same offer to
Lopez.
On the same date, February 9, the People filed a brief sentencing
memorandum, arguing that a sentence to prison was appropriate. The
memorandum did not reference jealousy or mention the affair between
Lopez’s wife and the victim.
Then, on February 18, 2022, the People filed a supplemental sentencing
memorandum and statement in mitigation. This memorandum noted that
the day before the shooting, Lopez learned that his wife was involved in an
extramarital affair with the victim, ordered the victim to end the affair,
agreed to meet the victim the next day, and armed himself with the firearm.
It argued for the middle term and argued against probation. It noted that
Lopez had made the choice to “arm himself with a deadly weapon and
confront the man who was having an affair with [his] wife.” It further noted
that “[e]ven though [he] was certainly under the influence of emotion based

3
on finding out his wife was having an extramarital affair and using
methamphetamine with [the victim]” he acted “with a sense of calm planning
and sophistication throughout the homicide and after.” It further noted that
Lopez “was overwhelmed with severe emotions that kept him awake all night
and unable to perform his job the next day,” and that his “emotions likely
began to boil over” when he met with the victim. It disputed that Lopez had
made a sufficient showing under the RJA. It closed with a recommendation
for a ten-year prison term. The People’s supplemental memorandum never
used the words “jealous” or “jealousy.”
On February 22, 2022, Lopez filed his response to the People’s
supplemental sentencing memorandum. It argued that the memorandum
was a “vindictive” response to Lopez’s February 9 filing because it reflected a
change in the People’s position from their earlier filing—which recommended
prison but did not state a specific recommended term—to the more recent 10-
year prison term recommendation in the memorandum. Lopez alleged this
change was a vindictive response to Lopez’s February 9 filing referencing the
RJA and proportionality. Lopez’s response disputed the District Attorney’s
characterization of the evidence at trial:
“[T]he district attorney’s supplemental sentencing brief
never once respectfully acknowledges that Mr. Lopez has a
fear of gang violence or has a documented history of severe
trauma. Instead, the district attorney asserts and implies
in its sentencing brief on at least nine separate occasions
that Mr. Lopez was motivated by jealousy over an affair.1
“Defense counsel is therefore concerned that the district
attorney’s office is promulgating, perhaps even

1 As noted above, although the People’s supplemental sentencing
memorandum referred to the affair and the emotions that Lopez likely
experienced upon learning of it, the brief never used the words “jealous” or
“jealousy.”
4
unconsciously, a racist stereotype about Latinx or Chicano
men. [¶ . . . ¶]
“And in this case, where all the trial evidence demonstrated
that Mr. Lopez was motivated by fear and not jealousy, the
court should be disturbed by the district attorney’s
continued assertions that this is a case about a man who
was jealous of his wife’s paramour . . . .”
Lopez urged the court to dismiss the firearm enhancement via the RJA.
On the same day, February 22, Lopez filed a motion for discovery under
the RJA seeking copies of all charging documents in homicide cases filed by
the District Attorney’s office between January 1, 2017 and February 24, 2022,
to determine whether the District Attorney sought to impose more serious
sentences for non-White individuals than for similarly situated White
individuals.
On February 28, 2022, the People filed a third pleading entitled Reply
to Vindictive Prosecution & Racial Justice Act Violation Allegations. The
People contended that “[t]here is not a scintilla of evidence that the District
Attorney’s Office or the assigned deputy district attorney demonstrated any
race-based bias, implicit or otherwise.” The People noted concerns “about the
escalating nature of the rhetoric in this case . . . .” It rejected the narrative
that its sentencing recommendation was vindictive and argued that Lopez
had not established good cause for discovery under the RJA. It contended
that allegations of racism against the office were “both perplexing and deeply
offensive.” It stated,
“[T]o suggest that somehow it is racist to say that a
husband would be moved to anger when another man had
an affair with his wife, is simply preposterous. It requires
little common sense to understand that this is a universal
and completely understandable sentiment that transcends
race . . . [and] to accuse the deputy of racism (with no basis)

5
in a sentencing proceeding is not an honest pursuit of the
[RJA].”
The People cited to People v. Jackson (1971)18 Cal.App.3d 504, 509 (“a trial
judge must alertly supervise proceedings in his court, curbing when
necessary over-zealous advocates”).
At the sentencing hearing on March 2, 2022, a hearing that the court
characterized as “emotional,” defense counsel recounted the chronology of the
sentencing pleadings and asserted that the chronology established a prima
facie case of vindictive prosecution. When the District Attorney’s ethics
coordinator addressed the court, characterizing the RJA issues as a
“sideshow,” the court rebuked his “language”. The coordinator continued on
to state that the “racial accusations” were “deeply offensive to our office.”
In addressing the applicability of the RJA to the case, the judge noted
that he had been in the criminal justice system for over 30 years, including
over 16 years as a prosecutor, 2 years as a commissioner, 5 years as a
dependency judge, 5 years as a readiness judge, and 5 years as a criminal
trial judge. He stated that he had taken implicit bias classes and was keenly
aware of issues of implicit bias before the court. He relied on this extensive
experience as well as on “everything that has been filed in this case” in
denying the defense request to find that the RJA applied to the case and that
discovery should be ordered.
After ruling on the RJA motion, the court turned to sentencing. The
court heard from the victim’s family and friends, including those who
referenced the issue of marital infidelity. (“Why did you choose to kill my son
over an affair your wife had?”; “You shot my son over a female”; and, “If that
was [the jurors’] wife, they would have been angry as well.”) The court
sentenced Lopez to nine years custody. The court did not comment on the
conduct of either counsel at this hearing.

6
The tension on the issues apparently did not abate in the two years
that elapsed between the sentencing and the hearing on remand.
On April 8, 2024, after remand, Lopez filed a pleading based upon
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138 and Penal Code section
745 subdivision (d), again asking the court to grant the requested discovery.
The pleading discussed intervening case law, and contended bias could be
seen in available statistics, in disparate treatment of people of color, and “in
the coded language used in the district attorney’s pleading at sentencing.” It
asserted that “the district attorney filed a statement in aggravation which
suggested on nine separate occasions that he committed manslaughter
because of jealousy over an affair—despite the jury’s finding that he acted in
imperfect self-defense when his life was threatened and despite the fact that
there was no evidence at trial that he was motivated by sexual jealousy.”
The People responded on April 15, 2024, arguing that the court no
longer had jurisdiction to consider the matter, because Lopez was no longer
in prison and that because he had served his time, there was no relief that
the court could give him under the RJA. The People noted that, “No one—not
this court—not even Cher can ‘turn back time.’ ”
Lopez’s reply was filed on April 19, 2024, stating that Mr. Lopez was
still on parole and the court retained jurisdiction. In its conclusion, Lopez
contended that the Legislature did not “want prosecutors to flippantly make
jokes about popular music in their pleadings on the subject [of racism in the

criminal justice system].”2

2 Cher’s song did not reference race or jealousy or marital infidelity, but
was instead a song of regret to a former lover about hurtful words that could
not be taken back.
7
At the hearing on remand, the District Attorney’s ethics coordinator
appeared to argue that the Public Defender’s Office was not bringing the
motion to assist Lopez, who was no longer in custody, but instead to use the
discovery for its future clients. The court cut off the People’s argument,
stating that “we’re not going to get into this back-and-forth match.” The
court rejected the People’s jurisdiction argument and, despite reservations,
also agreed to consider new information submitted by defense counsel on the
issue. The court then concluded that it could not find good cause to grant the
discovery motion, even under the more lenient Young standard.
Defense counsel asked to make a record, and the court pointed out that
her statements referenced the information that was already in the record
before the court. However, he allowed her to proceed. She summarized the
information she had provided, and stated, “We had the fact that a district
attorney wrote in a sentencing brief nine times calling Mr. Lopez ‘jealous’
even though that was not the evidence.” Defense counsel further stated, “I
am concerned about sort of the flippant nature of the district attorney’s
response to this.”
It was at this point in the proceedings that the majority’s citation to the
colloquy between the court and defense counsel occurred.
First, I disagree with majority’s statement that “defense counsel never
accused the prosecutor of explicit racism.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8). As the
chronology (ante) makes clear, the defense attorney stated (1) that “the
district attorney asserts and implies in its sentencing brief on at least nine
separate occasions that Mr. Lopez was motivated by jealousy over an affair”;
(2) that the prosecution used “coded language” in its pleadings; and (3) that
defense counsel was “concerned that the district attorney’s office is
promulgating, perhaps even unconsciously, a racist stereotype about Latinx

8
or Chicano men.” These statements can only be read to assert explicit bias,
with slight concessions (“and implies” and “perhaps even unconsciously”) that
the alleged bias may have been implicit.
From the record, it appears that it was defense counsel who injected
the allegedly racially-biased concept of jealousy into the proceedings. The
People’s supplemental sentencing memorandum never referenced “jealousy,”
but instead pointed out the undisputed facts at trial that Lopez had learned
of his wife’s affair and drug use and was “emotional.” The defense’s
characterization of this memorandum morphed over time from an allegation
that the prosecution “assert[ed] and implie[d]” jealousy as a motivation for
the killing to defense counsel’s flat-out assertion at a hearing that, “[w]e had
the fact that a district attorney wrote in a sentencing brief nine times calling
Mr. Lopez ‘jealous’ even though that was not the evidence.” It was at this
juncture, after the court had ruled, that the court expressed its
disappointment with defense counsel’s stance toward the prosecution.
Further, the California Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3D(2), make
clear that “[w]henever a judge . . . concludes that a lawyer has committed
misconduct or has violated any provision in the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the judge shall take appropriate corrective action . . . .” Among
other things, the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to make an intentional or reckless
misrepresentation. (Rule 8.4(c).) Here, although not referencing a particular
section of these rules, the judge stated that defense counsel had not
“respect[ed] the rules of professional conduct.” It appears that the corrective
action taken by the court was to express the court’s dismay and concern after
the ruling on the motion and immediately prior to the conclusion of the
hearing.

9
As noted in Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 123, “A
court has authority to control courtroom conduct of an attorney that is in
flagrant disregard of elementary standards of proper conduct and to temper
his speech in order ‘to insure that courts of law accomplish that for which
they were created—dispensing justice in a reasonable, efficient and fair
manner,’ ”quoting In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 253–254, footnotes 21,
22. On a cold transcript, we cannot discern the tone and demeanor of defense
counsel (or of the prosecutor, for that matter, who may have played a part in
the “escalating rhetoric”); but it is clear that the judge was concerned about
the effect of defense counsel’s statements on the matter before the court.
Whether a different judge would have had a different concern and
addressed the concern differently is not the issue before us. Instead, we are
concerned with whether in the future proceedings in this case, this judge will
impartially consider the merits of future proceedings under the RJA. I
believe that a reasonable person would conclude that he will. For that
reason, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion directing
reassignment to a different judge.

KELETY, J.

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