CourtListener 10774045•People v. Willis CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/13/26 P. v. Willis CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171740
v.
JONATHON JERMAINE WILLIS, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 24SM009419A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathon Willis appeals from his conviction for attempted residential
burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 460 subd. (a)).1 Willis’s appointed counsel filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), summarizing
the facts and procedural history and asking this court to independently
review the record to identify any issues warranting review. Willis was
advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he did not do so. We
affirm but remand for the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2024, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed a
complaint charging Willis with first degree residential burglary. (§ 460,
subd. (a)). The burglary was alleged to have occurred on May 24, 2024. The
complaint further alleged that the burglary was committed when another
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence, thus giving
notice that a conviction would constitute a violent felony conviction (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)). The complaint also included two misdemeanor drug paraphernalia
charges (Health & Safety Code, § 11364) and one misdemeanor count of
possessing burglary tools (§ 466). These offenses were alleged to have
occurred on June 3 and June 19, 2024.
A preliminary hearing was held on July 5, 2024. A City of San Mateo
police officer testified that on May 24, 2024, he responded to a report from
S.L. who owned a home on Norfolk Street in San Mateo. She related that she
was at work when she looked at her home surveillance camera and saw a car
pull into the driveway. A man got out and walked around her house into the
backyard. She could see the man opened the door to a “shed that was
attached to the house, looked through the shed, and then walked back
towards the front of the house,” looked around, and then left.
The officer also spoke to S.L.’s son, J.L. J.L. resided at the location and
was home throughout the time of the events captured by the surveillance
camera and observed by his mother. He did not see or hear anything.
The officer also testified to viewing the surveillance camera footage
himself. The officer stated that it showed a white sedan pull into the
driveway. A man got out and walked into the backyard. The man pulled
open the door to the “shed that was attached to the house, look[ed] inside,
closed the shed door, and walked around the other side of the building . . . .”
The man looked at the door and windows at the front of the house and then
got in the car and left. Still photographs extracted from the surveillance
video showing the backyard and shed and a man looking inside the shed were
received in evidence.
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The officer was able to identify the type of vehicle seen in the video and
its license plate. Using the license plate, he learned that the vehicle was
registered to Willis. Comparing a state issued photograph of Willis with the
photo of the man seen in the surveillance video, the officer opined that the
two individuals were “very similar” in appearance. Based on this, the officer
then made an in-court identification of Willis as the man seen in the
surveillance video. The officer also spoke to Willis’s probation officer who
confirmed that it was Willis in the surveillance video and that Willis drove a
vehicle of the same make and model as that seen in the video.
The officer testified that he subsequently learned that on June 3, 2024,
another City of San Mateo police officer had stopped Willis driving the same
car seen on the surveillance video. During that stop, a methamphetamine
pipe was found in the vehicle. The officer further testified that on June 19,
2024, yet another City of San Mateo police officer stopped Willis driving the
same car. During that investigation, the officer located a methamphetamine
pipe and burglary tools in Willis’s car.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Willis’s counsel argued
that the “shed” was not an inhabited part of the building and therefore the
conduct did not qualify as a first-degree residential burglary. He also argued
that there was no entry because the door to the shed opened outward and the
defendant was only seen opening the door and looking inside, and therefore,
at most, the conduct qualified as an attempted burglary. The prosecutor
argued that the shed was attached to the house and shared the same roof and
therefore it was “functionally interconnected” with and immediately
contiguous to the house, and therefore it qualified as an inhabited part of the
dwelling under People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101. Willis was
held to answer on all charges in the complaint.
3
Willis was arraigned on the information on July 18, 2024. The
information included the same charges as originally alleged in the complaint.
However, it included an enhancement to the burglary charge, alleging Willis
had been convicted previously of three separate serious felonies in 2014 and
2016, specifically for residential burglary. Other enhancements were also
added, alleging that each of those prior convictions was a serious felony
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), and alleging that Willis was
presumptively ineligible for probation pursuant to section 1203,
subdivision (e)(4). Willis entered not guilty pleas and denied all special
allegations.
Willis then moved pursuant to section 995, subdivision (a)(2)(B) to set
aside the felony residential burglary charge. He argued that the evidence at
the preliminary hearing did not support a finding that the shed was part of
the residence because there was “no door or other opening from the shed into
the house” nor did it support a finding that Willis entered the shed, therefore,
Willis was committed without probable cause.
As to the first point, the prosecution argued that the evidence need only
show the structure was “ ‘ “functionally interconnected with and immediately
physically contiguous to other portions of the house” ’ ” pursuant to People v.
Jackson (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 918, 925. The prosecution further argued
that the absence of an interior door did not automatically relegate the offense
to a second degree burglary pursuant to People v. Rodriguez, supra, 77
Cal.App.4th at page 1111.
As to the second point, the prosecution argued that the evidence need
only show the intruder penetrated the space beyond a door or a window
whether open or closed, because a reasonable person would understand that
permission would be needed to do so, citing People v. McEntire (2016) 247
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Cal.App.4th 484, 493. The prosecution claimed the evidence met this
standard.
At the hearing on the motion, the court agreed with the prosecution on
the first point but not the second. The court stated that the evidence showed
defendant Willis had pulled open the door to the shed, looked inside and
walked away. The court noted his body did not move into the shed. The
court found sufficient evidence in the record to modify the charge to an
attempted residential burglary “based on the conduct described at the
preliminary hearing” because “[w]hile the door was opened; it was not a
completed burglary.” Accordingly, it granted the motion to set aside the
order.
On October 14, 2024, an amended information was filed, charging
Willis with attempted residential burglary of an inhabited and occupied
dwelling (§§ 664, 460, subd. (a)). All prior felony convictions and
misdemeanors offenses previously charged were included in the amended
information.
On the same date, Willis entered a plea of no contest to the attempted
residential burglary charge in which he admitted that the offense constituted
a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and one prior
conviction for a serious or violent felony from 2014 pursuant to
section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). He executed a waiver of rights form to
this effect and answered the court’s questions during the plea colloquy.
The court accepted Willis’s plea and admissions, finding each to have
been entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Willis waived a
probation report, and the court pronounced sentence in accordance with the
agreement between the parties. Specifically, it imposed a prison sentence of
two years (the low-term of one year for the attempted residential burglary
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doubled for the prior strike conviction) plus eight months for a probation
violation in another case. The balance of the complaint was dismissed
pursuant to the negotiations. The court also awarded Willis 118 actual days
of custody credit and 118 days credit pursuant to section 4019 for a total of
236 days credit on the instant case and nine days credit on the probation
violation. As part of his sentence, the court also ordered a DNA sample, a
$300 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4 and an identical fine under
§1202.45 that was suspended pending successful completion of post sentence
supervision. The court waived the criminal conviction fee and the court
operations fee.
The day after sentencing, an abstract of judgment was issued that
included the court operations fee and the criminal conviction fee, which the
trial court had waived. But it otherwise accurately reflected the sentence
imposed.
The same day, Willis’s counsel filed a notice of appeal and requested a
certificate of probable cause pursuant to section 1237.5, subdivision (b). The
grounds for the request were the “denial of the [section] 995 motion in this
case and the denial of a motion to dismiss at the preliminary hearing.”
The superior court denied the request for a certificate of probable
cause, concluding that the grounds were not cognizable on appeal. It
explained that the section 995 motion was brought on sufficiency of evidence
grounds, an appeal of which was waived by his entry of plea. The court
further stated that, to the extent a motion to dismiss was advanced at the
preliminary hearing on the same grounds, it too was waived by entry of plea.
II. DISCUSSION
Following Wende’s guidelines, we have reviewed counsel’s brief and the
entire appellate record. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.) Our review of
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the record confirms the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Willis’s request for a certificate of probable cause. After prevailing on his
section 995 motion to set aside the felony residential burglary charge, Willis
entered a plea of no contest to the amended charge of attempted residential
burglary thereby waiving his rights to challenge the validity of that
conviction on appeal. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1)(A).)
Because the trial court denied Willis’s request for a certificate of
probable cause, his appeal is limited to “postplea claims, including sentencing
issues, that do not challenge the validity of the plea.” (People v. Cuevas
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379.) Here, Willis entered into a negotiated
disposition with the People, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived
his constitutional and statutory rights and the court imposed sentence in
accordance with the plea agreement. Our review of the record does not reveal
any cognizable post plea claims. Consequently, we affirm the conviction.
(Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
However, the abstract of judgment erroneously included the court
operations fee and the criminal conviction fee that the trial court waived.
The abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect that those fees were
waived by the court.
III. DISPOSITION
We remand to the trial court for it to amend the abstract of judgment
by removing the criminal conviction assessment and the court operations fee
and to forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
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_________________________
Moorman, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Streeter, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Goldman, J.
A171740W/People v. Willis
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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