CourtListener 10774030•In re J.O. CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/13/26 In re J.O. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re J.O., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174106
v.
(San Francisco City & County
T.O.,
Super. Ct. No. JD23-3272)
Defendant and Appellant.
T.O.1 (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights over now two-year-old J.O. pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.2 Mother contends the court erred in
declining to apply the parental benefit exception to termination under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.
Mother is sometimes referred to as T.B. We refer to her as mother or
1
T.O. consistent with the parties’ references. Father is deceased and is not a
party to this appeal.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
1
BACKGROUND
Proceedings Leading to Reunification Services
In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency)
received a referral that mother may have “relapsed on methamphetamines
while she was alone in the community with [one-month-old J.O.] The baby
fell out of his stroller, but mom did not seek medical attention for him. In
addition, during earlier inciden[ts], mom was seen holding the baby in an
unsafe manner. It was reported that she held him on her hip without
supporting his head, she held him with one hand over her own head, and she
held him in a way that put him a headlock.” A month later, mother tested
positive for amphetamines, although she denied taking any substances. The
referral also noted mother had an older child, then 20-year-old D.J., over
whom maternal grandmother had obtained legal guardianship.
In September, the Agency filed a section 300 petition alleging a failure
to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)). The petition specifically alleged mother has
substance abuse and mental health issues, requiring assessment and
treatment and that mother has “cognitive and physical limitations” that
impact her ability to independently parent J.O. (Capitalization omitted.) At
that time, J.O. was not detained but a safety plan was put in place, whereby
mother had to be “supervised at all times” by family members when she was
with J.O. Additionally, mother was to complete random drug testing.
The Agency filed a supplemental petition, adding allegations that
mother had failed to follow through with her safety plan by leaving her
previous placement, disappearing “for hours and not disclos[ing] where she
was going,” and missing a drug testing appointment.
In its detention report, the Agency recommended J.O. be detained and
that mother complete a psychological evaluation “to assess parenting capacity
2
and cognitive abilities.” Mother had missed her random drug tests, and
maternal aunt “expressed concerns” regarding mother’s behavior. For
example, she would leave maternal grandmother’s home in the morning,
remain away from home all day until “late in the evening,” and not call to
check on J.O. The safety plan required mother “to do the lion’s share of
taking care of [J.O.], and [maternal grandmother] now believes the mother is
taking advantage of the family support,” as the family was often left to care
for or purchase milk for him. Maternal grandmother had also called the
police and wanted mother out of her home, after mother was “angry,
slamming doors[,] and calling family members derogatory names.” Another
safety plan was prepared whereby J.O. would stay with maternal
grandmother and mother would, among other things, continue calling and
drug testing daily; visit and care for J.O. daily for two hours; and enroll in a
residential treatment program where she could have J.O. with her. Mother
had previously been in a program but “self-discharged . . . because of their
strict rules,” and her spot was no longer available. The Agency was
attempting to secure mother another bed at her previous facility.
Based on the supplemental petition, the court removed J.O. from
mother’s care and set the matter for a jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency recommended the
allegations in the petition be sustained, J.O. be declared a dependent child of
the court, and that reunification services be offered.
Mother had a good support system from maternal grandmother and
maternal aunts. The family believed mother “may never be able to parent
[J.O.] independently, but also express[ed] their commitment to keep mom and
[J.O.] in the family permanently.” “[M]other has health concerns that appear
to interfere with her ability to process time,” and she often lost track of time
3
and could not retain information. Additionally, mother had “suffered a head
injury and multiple strokes,” which resulted in her having “occasional
difficulty using her right arm[]/hand.” She was on psychotropic medication
for depression and medication for nerve damage. Finally, mother had a 20-
year substance abuse history. Although she was currently “testing negative
for all substances,” she had been referred to family treatment court for
additional support but missed her initial intake appointment. The Agency
recommended mother complete a psychological evaluation to assess her
cognitive abilities and parenting capacity. J.O. was doing well in his
placement with maternal grandmother.
The court sustained the amended allegations,3 found there was
substantial danger in returning J.O. to mother’s care, declared him a
dependent child, continued his placement with maternal grandmother, and
ordered reunification services and supervised visitation for mother.
Proceedings Leading to Termination of Services
In its six-month status review report, the Agency recommended an
additional six months of services. Mother had completed 14 out of 15 visits,
and the visits were “reported to be going very well,” although on two visits
J.O. was returned to maternal grandmother’s care “with wet diapers” and
“starving” as he was sent back “without having been fed the amount of food
sent” with him on the visit. Mother completed her psychological evaluation
but had not completed her substance use assessment. Mother had been “very
3 The petition was amended to allege mother had a substance abuse
issue that requires assessment and treatment as evidenced by her positive
test for methamphetamines in August 2023 and that when mother was
interviewed, the social worker reported mother’s speech was slurred and she
appeared under the influence (count B-1) and that mother has cognitive and
physical limitations that impact her ability to independently parent (count B-
3). The remaining allegations were stricken.
4
inconsistent with her [r]andom drug testing,” and she had tested positive for
amphetamines, methamphetamines, and ethyl glucuronide on one occasion.
Though mother had made some “positive progress” with her case plan, the
Agency remained concerned mother “may still be using illicit substances as
she has not engaged at all in any Substance Abuse Treatment,” and she had
only tested once during the reporting period and that test was positive.
The court found mother’s progress in alleviating the causes
necessitating placement had been “[a]dequate” and continued reunification
services. The court continued J.O. in his current placement, continued
visitation as previously ordered, and set the matter for a 12-month review
hearing.
In its 12-month status review report, the Agency recommended
termination of services and that the court set a selection and implementation
hearing pursuant to section 366.26, with adoption as the permanent plan.
Mother had made 29 out of 32 scheduled visits. She had also been
having extra weekend visitation with J.O. under maternal aunt’s supervision.
However, during the reporting period, mother’s relationship with maternal
aunt had deteriorated and those visits had been stopped as mother was no
longer “on speaking terms with her sister.” Maternal grandmother had
offered extra visitation instead, but mother had not followed through with
her.
Mother had only tested six out of 45 times during the reporting period.
One test was negative for all substances, four were positive for
amphetamines and methamphetamines, and one was negative “but it was
noted that the test had been diluted.” When confronted with the positive
tests, mother became upset, assured the social worker she was not using, and
did “not understand why the tests [were] positive.” When the social worker
5
offered mother the option to take a “hair follicle test,” mother refused.
Mother had completed her substance use assessment, and she was provided a
list of several outpatient treatment programs but had not enrolled in any of
them.
Mother had failed to follow up with her “medical needs,” missing her
most recent appointment with “her navigator with Team Lily at General
Hospital.” Mother had been attending therapy through the Trauma Recovery
Center, but she reported her therapist left and she stopped therapy. The
social worker submitted a new referral for mother. J.O., then one years old,
was doing well in his placement.
In an addendum report, the Agency’s recommendations remained the
same. The Agency noted the concerns about mother’s substance abuse and
mental health continued, and most recently “domestic violence has once
again began [sic] to impact [mother], as she became involved in a
relationship, which led to her arrest due to a domestic dispute.” Additionally,
mother was found in possession of drug paraphernalia, “adding to the concern
[mother] may not be sober.”
The court terminated services and set the matter for a section 366.26
hearing. The court ordered weekly supervised visitation but allowed mother
and maternal aunt to arrange additional visitation on condition that
maternal aunt be present during the visits.
Proceedings Leading to Termination of Rights
In its section 366.26 report, the Agency recommended termination of
mother’s parental rights, that J.O. remain with maternal grandmother, and
that he be ordered placed for adoption. J.O., then 20 months old, had been
with maternal grandmother since he was two months old, and he continued
to “thriv[e] in the home.” The Agency noted mother had been consistent with
6
her visitation, “for the most part,” as there had been some missed visits when
mother had not shown up or the Agency was unable to confirm visitation with
mother. Visitation had “been very positive between [J.O.] and his mother.”
Mother and J.O. “have a very positive” and “strong” relationship, and
J.O. “is all smiles as soon as he sees his mother nearing the visit.” Mother
was “very loving and interactive” with J.O. during visitation, and J.O. “enjoys
the time that he spends with his mother.” Mother did “well in the supervised
setting in addressing [J.O’s] needs of feeding and diapering.”
The Agency noted J.O. was likely to be adopted. He was described as a
“always smiling and interacting with people around him” and as having an
overall “positive disposition.” Maternal grandmother could provide a “safe
and permanent home,” which was in his best interest. J.O. would have
“permanency with his family and be a part of his extended family,” including
his five-year-old cousin who also lived with him. Maternal grandmother, who
had previously obtained legal guardianship of J.O.’s sister, believed the
permanent plan of adoption would provide J.O. with “the most permanent
and stable outcome both physically and emotionally.”
In an addendum report, the Agency continued to recommend
termination of rights and adoption by maternal grandmother. J.O., now two
years old, continued to thrive in his placement. Mother had been consistent
with her visitation, and J.O. “smiles and runs up to” mother when she visits,
greeting her “with a hug and a kiss.” The family reported J.O. enjoyed
visiting and playing with mother. However, when he “becomes hungry, tired
or becomes upset he seeks out comfort from other family members.”
Maternal grandmother continued to provide J.O. with “a safe, stable and
loving home” and made sure he “received recommended medical treatment,
vaccinations and dental treatment.”
7
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court heard from counsel.4
Mother’s counsel requested the court find the parental benefit
exception applicable. Counsel argued mother had consistently visited J.O.,
and those visits “are emotionally rich and developmentally appropriate,” and
that he “smiles and runs up to [mother] . . . and greets her with a hug and a
kiss.” Counsel noted the section 366.26 report stated J.O. has “a strong
relationship with his mother,” that mother and J.O. “have a very positive
relationship and that [he] is all smiles as soon as sees his mother nearing the
visit.” J.O. enjoyed spending time with mother, and mother “performs well in
the supervised setting, addressing his needs for feeding and diapering and
keeping the visit both fun and safe.” Finally, counsel argued “[g]iven the
depth of this bond,” J.O. “is attached to his mother,” termination would be
detrimental to J.O. His and mother’s relationship, “if severed, would not be
easily replaced or forgotten.” Counsel noted adoption “in this case induces an
added layer of emotional complexity,” and J.O. will “grow up knowing that
his grandmother adopted him away from his biological mother despite
Mother remaining present, consistent, and committed to him. This reality
may foster confusion, internal conflict, and even resentment in [J.O.] when he
is older.” Counsel asserted the “psychological impact of feeling as though his
grandmother took him away from his mother, however, unintentionally,
cannot be ignored.” Thus, counsel requested legal guardianship instead of
termination.
4 Mother was not present. Her counsel explained she had a criminal
case, and counsel requested her appearance be waived. The court had
previously called the case on June 18 and July 2, 2025, and mother was not
present. At the July 2 hearing, the court continued the case until July 7 but
noted if mother was not present at the next hearing date the court intended
to proceed in her absence.
8
The Agency asked the court to terminate parental rights. The Agency
conceded mother “has made visits,” and that “the confined visits go well.”
However, counsel maintained the “visits are not parent-child visits but more
like a friendly relationship in which the child enjoys the visits with the
biological mother.” Counsel asserted the beneficial relationship here is “more
to the parent than the child,” and that J.O. was “receiving all of the parental
needs in the care of the caretaker.” Whether J.O. would have resentment
toward maternal grandmother was speculation. The Agency believed the
current home is appropriate, it would be J.O.’s “forever home,” and “it will
meet all of his needs.”
The Agency did not believe severing the relationship would have “an
impact that would prevent this Court to not go forward with the adoption.”
Finally, the Agency felt legal guardianship would be better for mother, not
J.O. However, with the termination of services, the focus shifts to the minor’s
best interests, and adoption as “the most permanent plan that can be given
and the most secure plan,” would be in J.O.’s best interest.
J.O.’s counsel joined with the Agency. Counsel further noted mother’s
progress had been minimal in terms of drug treatment and testing and
mental health treatment and follow up. Counsel was also concerned about
mother’s “new arrest for domestic violence.” The “new arrest is a new
romantic relationship, but this is a recurring pattern with her, and [J.O.] is
two, but he is an active two, and he requires a lot of supervision, and he is
living in a home with his adoptive cousin.”5 J.O. and his cousin had been
“lifelong partners in [maternal grandmother’s] home, and if there is any
separation, the anxiety would be from this foster sister, who is his sister
5 Maternal grandmother had also recently adopted a child from one of
J.O.’s maternal aunts.
9
actually, and from his grandmother.” Although J.O. enjoyed visits with
mother, counsel pointed out when J.O. needed comfort he turned to maternal
grandmother.
The court concluded the exception had not been established. The court
found mother had established the first prong, regular visitation and contact.
However, mother had not established the second prong, the existence of a
relationship the continuation of which would benefit J.O. The court first
went through the Caden C.6 factors: “the child’s age, the time spent out of
parental custody, a positive or negative affect of any interaction between the
parent and the child, the child’s particular needs, and how does the child look
to, feel about, and interact with the parent.” The court then stated, “[t]he
positive attachment between parent and child has been described as
nurturing, one that provides the child with a sense of security and stability,
an emotional attachment that is one where the child views the parent as
more than a mere friend or playmate. [¶] And here I acknowledged that the
visits between [mother] and the child have gone well. They are positive. It is
clear that she loves the child and that she is attentive and loving towards
him, and I agree with the assessment in the .26 report, . . . that the
relationship is a strong one, but I am concluding that [mother] has not
established that prong. [¶] The petition was filed . . . when the baby was two
months old. The child has been out of [mother’s] care since then. The visits
have been supervised. [¶] The information in the addendum report, which I
find credible and which I rely on, suggests that the relationship between
[mother] and the child is more like that of a friend or playmate.” Although
J.O. “enjoys” seeing mother, when he sought comfort or when he was upset,
6 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631, 636 (Caden C.).
10
he sought out other family members, including maternal grandmother but
not mother.
In any event, continued the court, even had she established the second
prong, mother had not established the third, that termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to J.O. The court did not find mother’s counsel’s
hypothetical assertion that adoption would cause “the possibility of confusion
and resentment” supported by the evidence. The court also declined to credit
counsel’s assertion that J.O. “would view the maternal grandmother as
taking him away from his mother.” The court stated, “No one has done that.
The reality is that [mother] has failed to reunify with the child.”
The court concluded the Agency established adoption was in J.O.’s best
interest, and J.O. had lived with maternal grandmother “nearly his entire
life” and was “thriving in her care.” He had a “strong connection” with
maternal grandmother’s home and was “surrounded by family.” Although
counsel urged legal guardianship, the court stated “the legislature has
decreed that adoption is the preferred plan in part because it affords the child
the most permanency, security, and stability. Guardianship . . . is not
irrevocable and falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended
by the legislature.”
The court found by clear and convincing evidence J.O. was likely to be
adopted and terminated mother’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
The parental benefit exception to the termination of parental rights
applies where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact
with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent must prove, by a preponderance of
evidence, three things: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
11
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that
(3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636, italics omitted.) We review the
first two elements for substantial evidence, and the third for abuse of
discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–640.)
“ ‘The first element [of the exception]—regular visitation and contact—
is straightforward. The question is just whether “parents visit consistently,”
taking into account “the extent permitted by court orders.” ’ ” (In re
Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 (Katherine J.).)
“The second element, in which the court must determine whether the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship with [his or] her parent,
is more complicated. ‘[T]he relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors,
such as “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” [Citation.]’ (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) ‘[C]ourts often consider how children feel about,
interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.’ (Ibid.) Caden C. instructs
us that ‘it is not necessary—even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise
“quantitative measurement of the specific amount of ‘comfort, nourishment or
physical care’ [the parent] provided during [his or] her weekly visits.”
[Citation.]’ (Ibid.) Expert opinions or bonding studies provided by
psychologists who have observed and/or reviewed the parent-child
relationship are often ‘an important source of information about the
psychological importance of the relationship for the child.’ (Id. at pp. 632–
633, fn. omitted.) Ultimately, the court’s role is to decide whether the child
has a ‘ “significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent.]” ’ (Id.
at p. 633.)” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 316–317.)
12
“The third and final element asks the court to ascertain whether
severing parental ties—and thus ‘terminating [the] parental’ relationship—
would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
‘What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.’ (Ibid.)
Because any harm caused by loss of this relationship may be significantly
mitigated by the child’s adoption into a stable, loving home, the court must
then perform a delicate balancing act. The ‘subtle, case-specific inquiry [that]
the statute asks courts to perform [is]: does the benefit of placement in a new,
adoptive home outweigh “the harm [the child] would experience from the loss
of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]” ’ (Ibid.)
‘When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the
security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination
would be “detrimental to the child due to” a child’s beneficial relationship
with a parent.’ (Id. at pp. 633–634.)” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 317, italics & fn. omitted.)
There is no dispute the trial court concluded mother carried her burden
as to the first element.
As to the second element—whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship with the parent—mother contends the juvenile
court failed to recognize the strength and significance of her bond with J.O.
She likens her case to In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218 (B.D.).
In B.D., the juvenile court did not have the benefit of Caden C., when it
concluded although the parents consistently visited the children, who were
approximately eight and five years old at the time of the section 366.26
hearing, the parents “did not fulfill a parental role.” (B.D., supra,
13
66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1224.) Upon review, the appellate court stated the
record “suggests that the parents presented evidence to support a finding
that they had a beneficial relationship,” noting the minors were always
happy to see the parents, greeting them with hugs, the visits ended with
hugs and kisses, and the minors expressed sadness at the end of visits
because they did not understand why they could not live with the parents.
(Id. at p. 1229 & fn. 4.) In remanding the case, the appellate court provided
further guidance to the juvenile court noting, “A ‘significant attachment from
child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for
physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation.’ [Citation.] A
positive attachment between parent and child is necessarily one that is not
detrimental to the child but is nurturing and provides the child with a sense
of security and stability. Finally, an emotional attachment is one where the
child views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate and who’s
interactions with the parent were not ambivalent, detached, or indifferent.
(Id. at p. 1230.) To address whether there was such an attachment, the court
should take “into consideration the child’s age, the portion of the child’s life
spent in parental custody, the positive or negative impact of interaction with
the parent, and the child’s particular needs.” (Id. at p. 1230, fn. 5.)
The instant case is distinguishable. To begin with, the minors in B.D.
were much older than J.O. and expressed sadness at the end of visitation.
There was no such expression of sadness observed here. Additionally, the
court here was guided by and well aware of Caden C., and the court
thoroughly evaluated the relationship between J.O. and mother.
Mother contends the “positive” nature of her visits led both the Agency
and the court “to describe [her] relationship with [J.O.] as strong.” While
true, both counsel for the Agency and J.O., as well as the court, went on to
14
describe that relationship as one of mere friendship. Specifically, the court
observed that although visitation went well, J.O. sought comfort, solace, and
fulfillment of his needs with maternal grandmother—not mother—and that
visitation with mother was more akin to a relationship with a playmate than
that of a significant, emotional, and substantial attachment. In short,
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding.
Having concluded the juvenile court did not err in finding mother did
not meet her burden of establishing the second prong, we need not evaluate
the court’s conclusion as to the third.
Nevertheless, even assuming there was such a relationship, mother has
not demonstrated loss of the relationship would be detrimental to J.O. “to an
extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.)
Mother contends the court abused its discretion in relying on J.O.’s
bond with maternal grandmother, rather than “the detriment of severing his
relationship with his mother” and the “specific harm [J.O.] would suffer from
losing the significant and positive attachment.” However, the juvenile court
considered what J.O.’s “life would be like without [mother] in it,” and found
terminating mother’s relationship with J.O. would not be detrimental. There
was no evidence presented at the hearing or in any of the reports, that J.O.
would suffer detriment with the termination of parental rights. At the
hearing, counsel merely speculated adoption “may foster confusion, internal
conflict, and even resentment in [J.O.] when he is older.” Counsel’s
speculation is not evidence, and the court did not credit it.
By the time of the termination hearing, J.O. was two years old, with
the proceedings having begun when he was two months old. It is true
mother’s visitation with J.O. was generally positive. But the evidence simply
15
did not show a significant relationship, the loss of which would outweigh the
benefits of the permanence and stability of adoption in light of J.O.’s age,
time away from parental care, and the detriment that would arise form a
disruption of his current care. (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803,
820 [“There is no question that there are some benefits in continued visits
with loving parents to which a child has some substantial attachment. Yet to
justify withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘ “sense of belonging a new
family would confer” ’ [citation], the parents must prove more than ‘ “some
benefit.” ’ ”]; In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 [“[f]riendly or
affectionate visits are not enough” to overcome preference for adoption].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
16
_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A174106, In re J.O.
17
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