People v. Sams CA5

CourtListener 10771242Calctapp08.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/8/26 P. v. Sams CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089009
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F14906439)
v.

VANCE EUGENE SAMS, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly
Gaab, Judge.
Charles M. Bonneau, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, and
Brook A. Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
In August 2024, defendant Vance Eugene Sams, Jr., filed a Penal Code1
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. In October 2024, defendant filed a form entitled
“Request for Recall of Sentence Pursuant to AB 600[2] and § 1172.1.” The court held a
hearing on November 20, 2024, during which the public defender conceded defendant
could not make a prima facie showing under section 1172.6, and the court denied relief
under that section. Defendant then orally sought to proceed under section 1172.1, and the
trial court held the oral request was not properly before the court, and it would not
exercise its discretion to resentence. In January 2025, the trial court also issued a written
order denying defendant’s request for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1.
On appeal, defendant argues the matter must be remanded because he presented an
alternate written petition for relief under 1172.1 during the November 2024 hearing, and
the court acted on the oral motion without realizing there was a written motion with
supporting documents on file. In support of his request for relief under section 1172.1, he
contends the court had authority to revise his sentence on the firearm enhancement and to
revise the sentence in light of the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1)
(RJA). The People assert the court’s order denying his section 1172.1 request for relief is
not appealable. Alternatively, they argue the court did not err in denying the request.
We conclude the order appealed from is not an appealable order and, accordingly,
dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, defendant was charged with murder (count 1, § 187, subd. (a)). It was
further alleged that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2 Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) effective January 1, 2024 (Stats.
2023, ch. 446, § 2) (Assembly Bill 600).

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proximately caused great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and in the
commission and attempted commission of the offense, defendant personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder
and found true the allegation that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, which proximately caused great bodily injury or death to (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)).3 The court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for the murder conviction,
plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
firearm enhancement.
Following defendant’s first appeal, our court affirmed the judgment but remanded
for the trial court to make corrections to the abstract of judgment and to consider whether
to exercise its newly afforded discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement
under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2). (People v.
Sams (June 26, 2019, F074751) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court declined to
strike the firearm enhancement and defendant again appealed. (See People v. Sams (June
3, 2021, F080738) [nonpub. opn.].) Our court initially affirmed the judgment, but the
California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our
opinion and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688.
(People v. Sams, supra, F080738.) Thereafter, we remanded the matter for the trial court
to exercise its discretion consistent with Tirado and pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivision (h). (Sams, F080738.)
In November 2022, after the matter was transferred back to the trial court, the trial
court exercised its discretion to modify the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement to a violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The court then

3 During jury deliberations, the People made a formal request to strike the first-
degree allegation, which the court granted.

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resentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life on count 1 (§ 187, subd. (a)), plus 10
years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) firearm enhancement.
In August 2024, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). He checked boxes indicating a complaint,
information or indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine; at trial and he was convicted of first or second degree murder pursuant to the
felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. He also checked a
box requesting that the court appoint him counsel during the resentence process and
another box indicating he “was not a major participant in the felony or … did not act
with reckless indifference to human life during the course of the crime or felony.” He
also checked a box stating he was convicted of second degree murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or under the second degree felony-murder doctrine
and could not now be convicted of murder because of changes to section 188, effective
January 1, 2019. Defendant included a supplemental handwritten brief with his petition.
The People filed an opposition to defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for relief, asserting
“the record shows [d]efendant’s post SB 1437[4] murder conviction had nothing to do
with the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the felony[-]murder rule, or any
theory under which malice is imputed.” Relying on the jury instructions attached to the
opposition, they asserted “the jury instructions show that neither the theory of natural and
probable consequences nor the theory of felony murder was provided to the jury as a
theory on which to convict the [d]efendant. … As such, there was no theory of murder
provided for jury consideration that would impute malice on the defendant.” Rather,
“[t]he jury … necessarily found that [d]efendant acted with malice aforethought.”
Additionally, because the jury found true the allegation “defendant personally and

4 Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).

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intentionally fired a gun causing the death of Raymond [F.],” it “necessarily found that
defendant was the actual killer in this case.” The accompanying jury instructions
reflected the jury was instructed on murder with malice aforethought, not on felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Then, on October 18, 2024, defendant filed a form entitled “Request for Recall of
Sentence and Resentencing Pursuant to Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code
Section 1172.1.” Under a section titled “Statement of Eligibility,” he asserted he was
“eligible for consideration of a new sentence under [Assembly Bill] 600 and …
[section] 1172.1 because the following law(s) applied at the time of [his] sentencing has
changed.” Defendant then marked the boxes referring to sections 1385 (amended in 2022
by Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)), 667, subd. (a)(1) (amended in 2019 by Sen.
Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), and sections 1170 and 1170.1 (amended in 2022
by Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)). He also checked a box requesting the
court appoint him counsel. He attached to his request a letter from a correctional
lieutenant at San Quentin State Prison in support of his suitability for parole hearing. He
also attached certificates evidencing his completion of various programs, including a
program at the Institute of Technology for Culinary Arts, before he was incarcerated,
certificates evidencing his completion of and attendance in various programs while
incarcerated, and laudatory chronos he received while in prison.
The court held a hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for relief on
November 20, 2024, during which defense counsel explained she had independently
reviewed the jury instructions, the verdict forms and her office’s file and in her “review
of all the material,” she was “not able to determine any way he would make a prima facie
case.” The court denied with prejudice defendant’s request for recall and resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6, concluding defendant did not make a prima facie showing for
relief that would support an evidentiary hearing. Rather, defendant was ineligible for
resentencing “as a matter of law.”

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At that same hearing, defendant addressed the court, stating:

“I originally filed the petition for resentencing brief number 1172.6.
I now humbly ask the Court to allow me to submit the 1172.1 petition,
which was created for a contrary person as myself, who has taken
rehabilitation very seriously from the time I arrived in prison on November
28, 2016, until the present day. I didn’t wait until the law changed in my
favor to start my rehabilitation, to start rehabilitating myself. I hit the
ground running without ever really knowing if I would ever get the chance
to go home. I did not wait until the law changed in my favor. I hit the
ground running. I have been rehabilitating myself every day since
November 28th, 2016.”

“I … really have worked on rehabilitation to better myself today.
I’m a Christian, a man of God, a man of faith, I have got a wife, I’ve got a
grandkid, I got kids, … I’m a pastor, I got a support system, I have a
family. I have a career. I’m a pastry chef, I’m a chef. I would not be able
to take the risk, but an asset to my community. If given a second chance, I
would exceed the Court’s expectation.”
The court responded, “Okay. [Defendant], if I’m understanding you, you are
making an oral request for resentencing under [Assembly Bill] 600, that is codified [in]
Penal Code Section 1172.1.” Defendant confirmed, “Yes.” The following exchange then
took place during which the court denied defendant’s oral request:

“[THE COURT]: That is the section that allows the Court to recall and
sentence and resentence. The sentencing laws have changed.

“Let me start by saying that request is not before this Court today.
You were here on a different issue, which was resentencing under 1172.6.
You’re … going to need to make that request in writing if you are making
an additional request. [¶] Is there anything further from the People on this?

“[PROSECUTOR]: Your honor, the defense has shown us the
documentation. We would oppose any [Assembly Bill] 600 relief at this
time. Though while we oppose that, we do commend [defendant] for,
frankly, paying off victim restitution. We don’t think it’s appropriate at this
time. We think his release is better suited for a parole board.

“[THE COURT]: [Defendant], to the extent that you are making an
oral request for recall of your sentence, I am denying that request.
Considering all of the changes to the law, defendant’s record, facts of the

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case, the Court doesn’t find resentencing in the interest of justice, and I
wouldn’t exercise my discretion based on his oral request.

“But I will say, [defendant], I appreciate that you have taken positive
steps in your life, and based on what you are telling me today, you
appearing to doing [sic] well, and you have acquired skills to be a pastry
chef and you are moving on with your life. These are all arguments that
you can make before the parole board to show that you are rehabilitated
when you are eligible to do so. [¶] Okay?

“[THE DEFENDANT]: Okay.”
Thereafter, in a written order dated January 29, 2025, the court denied defendant’s
written request for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1. The order stated:
“Defendant filed a request for recall of sentence and resentencing pursuant to Assembly
Bill … 600 and … section 1172.1. [¶] However, … section 1172.1, subdivision (c)
clearly states that ‘[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the
court under this section.’ Therefore [d]efendant’s request for recall of sentence and
resentencing is denied.”
DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, defendant argues the matter must be remanded because the court
acted on his oral motion for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1 without
realizing there was a written motion with supporting documents on file. He contends the
court had authority to revise his sentence on the firearm enhancement and to revise the
sentence in light of the RJA. The People assert the court’s order is not appealable.
Alternatively, they contend the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.
I. Applicable Law
Where, as here, execution of sentence has commenced and the judgment is final,
the trial court is generally “deprived of jurisdiction to resentence” a criminal defendant.
(People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, citing Dix v. Superior Court (1991)
53 Cal.3d 442, 455; accord, People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326.) To
obtain resentencing on a final judgment, a defendant generally must file a petition for

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writ of habeas corpus (see People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339) or proceed
by way of a special statutory procedure (e.g., §§ 1170.18, 1170.91, 1172.1, 1172.2,
1172.6, 1172.7, 1172.75). (People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1118.)
Section 1172.1 (former § 1170, subd. (d)) provides an exception to the general rule
that a trial court loses jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun by authorizing a
recall and resentencing procedure that may be invoked when, for example, the secretary
of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommends resentencing.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082.) Assembly
Bill 600 amended section 1172.1 to allow a court to now resentence a defendant “on its
own motion” when “applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as
amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.) Accordingly, effective January 1, 2024,
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides the court may, “on its own motion, … at any
time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently
changed by new statutory authority or case law, … recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided
the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (Italics added.)
Notably, section 1172.1, subdivision (c) expressly states, “A defendant is not
entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section.” (Ibid.)
Additionally, “If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court
is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)
II. Analysis
Defendant argues, “[s]ince the trial court had the jurisdiction to consider
[defendant’s] written section 1172.1 request, and did in fact purport to act on the oral
motion without realizing that there was a written motion with supporting documents on

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file, the trial court erred in summarily denying the section 1172.1 request, without
considering the availability of a lesser sentence or the application of the RJA.” He argues
remand is necessary in this instance. The People contend the court’s order is not
appealable. And, even it if was, the order should be affirmed.5 We agree with the People
that the order appealed from is not appealable and, accordingly, the appeal must be
dismissed.
“ ‘ “It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is
not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.” [Citations.]’ ” (Teal v. Superior
Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Section 1172.1 does not address whether a trial
court’s denial of a defendant’s request for recall and resentencing under the statute is
appealable. However, section 1237, subdivision (b) “provides that a defendant may
appeal from ‘any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the
party.’ ” (Teal, at p. 598.)

5 Though defendant did not raise it in his opening brief, the People further note
“[n]ewly enacted section 1171 does not alter the analysis.” In his reply brief, defendant
asserts section 1171 supports his contention.
Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 2483 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
enacted section 1171, which sets forth various procedures under subdivision (c) that
apply to all postconviction proceedings to modify a sentence or conviction under
ameliorative statutes, including section 1172.1. (§ 1171, subds. (a), (c); Assem. Bill
No. 2483; Stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2.) Section 1171 provides that, upon receiving “a
request to begin a postconviction proceeding that is authorized in law,” the court shall
consider appointment of counsel for the defendant. (§ 1171, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)
It also requires a court to “state on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny
the initial request to begin a postconviction proceeding” and provide notice of that
decision. (Id., subd. (c)(4).) And “[a]fter ruling on a request, the court shall advise the
defendant of their right to appeal and the necessary steps and time for taking an appeal.”
(Id., subd. (c)(5).) Notably, section 1171 expressly states that the procedures set forth in
subdivision (c) do not apply where “there is a conflict with a more specific rule
established in statute, in which case the more specific statute shall apply.” (Id.,
subd. (c).)

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Here, we cannot conclude the court’s order on defendant’s oral request for relief
pursuant to section 1172.1 is appealable. Section 1172.1, subdivision (c) expressly
provides that the trial court may choose not to respond to a defendant’s invitation for the
court to initiate recall and resentencing proceedings on its own motion pursuant to section
1172.1, subdivision (a) as amended by Assembly Bill 600. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) By
stating a court may decline to respond to a defendant’s request for relief under the statute,
the language of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) establishes there is no affirmative
obligation on a trial court to consider a defendant’s request for relief or initiate recall and
resentencing proceedings in response thereto. And, if a court has no duty to respond to—
let alone grant—a defendant’s request for relief, it follows that a defendant has no right to
the initiation of recall and resentencing proceedings. Thus, where, as here, the court
denies such relief, such an order cannot be said to affect the defendant’s substantial rights
as would be required for such a postjudgment order to be appealable. (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
That is, the statutory language of section 1172.1 provides a basis as to why a defendant
should be precluded from raising the court’s alleged erroneous failure to initiate recall
and resentencing proceedings on appeal. (Cf. People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1167; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376.)
Defendant’s contention that the court failed to acknowledge his written request for
recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1 when it denied his oral motion
pursuant to the same section does not transform the court’s order on his oral motion into
an appealable order. Rather, because defendant had no right to relief (i.e., the defendant
has no right to the court’s initiation of recall and resentencing proceedings on its own
motion pursuant to § 1172.1), the order denying such relief cannot be said to affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. (See People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040,
1049 [“a defendant who requests recall and resentencing under section 1172.1 … does
not have a substantial right at stake, and the trial court’s decision on that request is not
appealable”].) And “ ‘appealability depends upon the nature of the decision made, not

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the court’s justification for its ruling.’ ” (People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
687, 698; see also People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 985.) Furthermore, it
bears worth noting that the court issued a separate order in January 2025 acknowledging
and denying defendant’s written request for relief pursuant to section 1172.1.
Accordingly, we conclude the order appealed from is not appealable, the appeal
must be dismissed.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

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