CourtListener 10770585•People v. Powell CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/7/26 P. v. Powell CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052911
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR008305)
v.
KEVIN JAMES POWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Kevin James Powell attacked two brothers, Lucrecio and Israel
Salvador Cabrera, at a motel.1 Lucrecio was able to escape after Powell swung an axe at
him, but Israel died from injuries sustained when Powell attacked him with the axe and a
knife. A jury convicted Powell of first degree murder for Israel’s death, and willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder for the attack on Lucrecio.
Powell contends that his attempted murder conviction must be reversed because
substantial evidence does not demonstrate he intended to kill Lucrecio. We disagree and
will affirm.
1
For ease of reference and intending no disrespect, we will refer to the brothers by
their first names.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The prosecution charged Powell by amended information with murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a))2 and attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a)). The amended information alleged three enhancements on each count,
including that Powell personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (an axe) in
committing the offenses. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The case was tried to a jury.
The prosecution presented the following evidence: Lucrecio and Israel were
staying in a motel in King City. Powell was staying in the same motel. On the evening
of the charged offenses, Powell parked his car in the motel parking lot and then was
captured on video walking around the motel, looking in room windows, and approaching
residents who had their doors open. As Powell was doing so, Lucrecio and Israel arrived
at the motel and remained outside their room talking and looking at their phones, with
Lucrecio standing and Israel eventually sitting on the pavement. Powell then got into his
car and drove away before returning soon thereafter, ultimately backing into a parking
space directly in front of where Lucrecio and Israel were located.
Powell then got out of his car, retrieved an axe from the back seat, and attacked
Lucrecio and Israel. He swung the axe once at Lucrecio using two hands, striking
Lucrecio in the shoulder. Lucrecio ran away as Powell swung at him a second time,
missing Lucrecio. Powell then immediately struck Israel with the axe several times.
Israel attempted to flee and defend himself, finally dislodging the axe from Powell.
Powell then pulled out a kitchen knife and stabbed Israel repeatedly. Israel then was able
to retreat. Powell retrieved his axe and other belongings and returned to his car, driving
away.
The prosecution introduced videos of Powell’s actions at the motel that evening,
including the attack on the brothers. Lucrecio testified that Powell did not say anything,
2
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
that he and Israel had never seen Powell before, and that he did not see the attack coming
before it happened. Lucrecio testified that he sustained a blow to the shoulder resulting
in swelling that lasted “a day or a week.” A pathologist testified that Israel died from
“extensive hemorrhaging or bleeding out due to stab wound of the neck.” A contributing
cause of Israel’s death was a “chop wound and . . . other sharp force injury.” The
pathologist stated that a “chop wound” is caused by “a heavy object or tool like an axe.”
Law enforcement officers testified about items found in Powell’s residence and car,
including the axe. An investigator stated the axe was 33 inches long, with a four-pound
head and a blade four inches wide. The investigator characterized the axe as a “wood
splitting axe,” stating it was “[n]ot particularly sharp and it was rusty.”
Powell testified in his own defense. He stated that he had been using
methamphetamine for several years, which caused him to be paranoid and experience
delusions about his loved ones being hurt. On the evening of the charged offenses, he
had been using methamphetamine and he believed his mother was calling to him, so he
tried to look for her at the motel. He testified that he attacked Lucrecio and Israel
because in his state he believed they were holding and sexually assaulting his mother.
On cross-examination, Powell said he had the axe and knife for protection. He
denied intending to kill Lucrecio and Israel when he attacked them with the axe, stating
that he intended to “hurt them.” However, the prosecutor then asked Powell if he
attacked Israel with the axe and knife “because you meant to kill him,” and Powell
replied affirmatively. Later, the prosecutor asked Powell: “At what moment exactly that
day did you decide that you were going to try and kill these guys?” Powell replied:
“I did not decide that day. It was planned [sic].” The prosecutor then asked: “The
circumstances leading up to you attacking the victims with the axe and trying to kill
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them, that was all coincidental and that you didn’t decide to attack them until the moment
that you stepped out of your car?” Powell replied: “Until I heard my mother’s voice.”
A defense expert in methamphetamine induced psychiatric disorders opined that
Powell experienced “a psychotic disorder that was induced by methamphetamine use or
methamphetamine dependence.” Powell’s girlfriend and stepfather testified as to
Powell’s methamphetamine use and delusions. Powell’s mother similarly testified as to
Powell’s methamphetamine use and paranoia. She also testified that after the charged
offenses, Powell came to the house and told her, “ ‘I just killed somebody.’ ” Powell
explained to his mother that he took this action because he thought she was being
sexually assaulted in a room.
The trial court instructed the jury that to convict Powell on the attempted murder
count, the prosecution must prove Powell “took at least one direct but ineffective step
toward killing another person” and Powell “intended to kill that person.” The prosecutor
argued that Powell intended to kill Lucrecio, citing Powell’s testimony that he intended to
kill Israel and stating that Powell could be found guilty of attempted murder even though
Lucrecio was not seriously injured. Powell’s counsel conceded in his closing argument
that Powell was guilty of second degree murder and attempted murder. However,
counsel argued that due to Powell’s delusions from methamphetamine use, Powell did
not commit first degree murder and did not act with deliberation and premeditation on the
attempted murder count.
The jury convicted Powell of first degree murder and of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premediated murder. The jury found true the allegation that Powell
personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of both offenses. The trial court then
4
found true allegations that Powell suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
The trial court sentenced Powell to 12 years in prison plus 50 years to life, plus a
consecutive life term. This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Powell does not challenge his first degree murder conviction or the jury’s finding
that he used a deadly weapon in committing both charged offenses. He does not dispute
that he swung the axe at Lucrecio and hit Lucrecio in the shoulder, or that this act
constituted a direct but ineffectual step toward killing Lucrecio. His sole contention is
that attempted murder requires proof of intent to kill, and insufficient evidence supports
the jury’s finding that he intended to kill Lucrecio. The Attorney General responds that
intent to kill may be inferred from the circumstances leading up to and during the attack.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Powell intended to
kill Lucrecio.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a
limited one.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738 (Smith).) “The proper test for
determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the
entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (1990)
51 Cal.3d 294, 314 (Jones).) “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and
the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. [Citation.]” (People v. Ugalino (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1064.)
“Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value,
nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
5
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination
depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must
accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s
credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]” (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.)
B. Analysis
Under the deferential substantial evidence standard, presuming in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence,
substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Powell intended to kill Lucrecio.
The manner of Powell’s attack supports the jury’s finding that Powell intended to
kill Lucrecio. Evidence as to the manner of an attack may support a finding of intent to
kill. (See People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658-659.) Powell swung at
Lucrecio twice with a large axe. The video depicts Powell swinging suddenly and
forcefully with a sidearm or overhand motion. The first blow was to Lucrecio’s upper
body, and the second swing as Lucrecio began to flee appears to have just missed
Lucrecio’s upper body as well. While the axe was described at trial as “[n]ot particularly
sharp” and “rusty,” photographs of the axe introduced into evidence support the jury’s
finding that the axe was nonetheless a deadly weapon. In addition, the axe caused a chop
wound that the pathologist determined was a contributor to Israel’s cause of death. The
prosecutor correctly noted in her closing argument that the video shows Powell directing
his swings at “Lucrecio’s center mass.” The jury could reasonably conclude that Powell
intended to kill Lucrecio by swinging a large wood splitting axe at Lucrecio’s upper body
in a violent attack.
Powell argues the axe “is not a deadly weapon per se,” asserting the mere
possession of the axe in his car could not support a finding he intended to kill Lucrecio
with it. However, both cases on which he relies recognize that an object may be a
“deadly weapon” if used as such. (See People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 185
[affirming conviction for assault with a deadly weapon where defendant assaulted victim
6
with a knife because “[w]hile a knife is not an inherently dangerous or deadly instrument
as a matter of law, it may assume such characteristics, depending on the manner in which
it was used, and there arises a mixed question of law and fact which the jury must
determine under proper instructions from the trial court”]; In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th
528, 535-536 [concluding juvenile court’s finding that minor used a butter knife as a
deadly weapon was not supported by substantial evidence, but recognizing “[a]lthough it
is inappropriate to consider how the object could have been used as opposed to how it
was actually used, it is appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what harm
could have resulted from the way the object was actually used”].) Here, the violent
manner in which Powell actually used the axe, and his strikes at Lucrecio’s upper body
with full force, support a finding of intent to kill. According due deference to the trier of
fact and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, the jury’s finding
that Powell swung the axe with intent to kill Lucrecio is reasonable.
That Powell failed to warn Lucrecio of the impending attack further supports the
jury’s finding of intent to kill. Lucrecio was unarmed and caught unaware. He testified
that he had never met Powell before and that Powell and the two brothers exchanged no
words. Lucrecio testified that he did not see the attack occur before he was struck, and
the video evidence supports this testimony. The jury could reasonably conclude that
Powell intended to kill by twice swinging an axe at Lucrecio when Lucrecio could not
defend himself. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701-702 [defendant
repeatedly attempting to stab “unarmed and trapped victim” and succeeding in stabbing
victim in the arm and leg “alone is substantial evidence of defendant’s intent to kill”];
People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 561 [“In plunging the knife so deeply into . . . a
vital area of the body of an apparently unsuspecting and defenseless victim, defendant
could have had no other intent than to kill”]; People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
1539, 1552 [intent to kill established by evidence of “unprovoked attack that rendered the
unarmed victim prone and defenseless” as defendant repeatedly stabbed the victim with a
7
shank].) That Powell then focused on Israel when Lucrecio succeeded in moving out of
the range of the axe does not negate the significance of the unprovoked attack on the
equally defenseless Lucrecio as evidence of Powell’s intent to kill him.
Finally, Powell’s motive supports the finding that he intended to kill Lucrecio.
“[W]here motive is shown, such evidence will usually be probative of proof of intent to
kill.” (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742.) Powell testified that he believed his mother
was being held and sexually assaulted in the room both Lucrecio and Israel occupied.
Powell attacked Lucrecio first and then immediately turned his attack to Israel as
Lucrecio fled, killing Israel. After denying that he intended to kill the brothers with the
axe, Powell then admitted on cross-examination that he intended to kill Israel when he
attacked Israel with the axe and knife. Powell had the same motive to attack both
Lucrecio and Israel: his delusion that the brothers were holding and abusing his mother
in their room. The jury could reasonably infer that Powell intended to kill Lucrecio
because Powell attacked the two brothers together, and Powell had the same motive in his
attacks on both brothers.
Powell argues that his intent to kill Israel cannot be transferred to Lucrecio to
prove attempted murder. We agree. “To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant
must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. The defendant’s mental state
must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim.” (People v. Bland (2002)
28 Cal.4th 313, 328 (Bland).) However, in examining the intent to kill element
independently as to each alleged victim, on the facts we describe above, the jury could
reasonably conclude that Powell’s admitted intent to kill Israel supported the inference
that Powell also separately and independently intended to kill Lucrecio.
The California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th
411 is instructive here. In Sanchez, the defendant was convicted of the first degree
murder of a police officer and the attempted murder of a second victim, among other
offenses. (Id. at pp. 419-420.) Sanchez shot the officer to death during a robbery when
8
the officer responded to a silent alarm, stating, “ ‘You’re going to die.’ ” (Id. at pp. 420,
428.) Sanchez then aimed his gun at a second victim and fired, but the gun was empty.
(Id. at p. 428.) Sanchez argued that substantial evidence did not demonstrate his intent to
kill the attempted murder victim. (Id. at p. 457.) The California Supreme Court rejected
this argument, in part concluding that Sanchez shot and killed the officer “[o]nly seconds
before he pointed the gun” at the second victim, and that Sanchez could have had the
same motive to shoot both victims—they were in Sanchez’s way. (Ibid.)
Similarly here, Powell’s attacks against both brothers were nearly simultaneous,
and arose from the same paranoid ideation. Powell swung his axe at Lucrecio before
turning his attack to Israel. Lucrecio, who was standing, succeeded in escaping and thus
survived. Israel, who was sitting and thus had a more difficult time fleeing, was not so
fortunate. Powell admitted his intent to kill Israel, and his motive for attacking both
brothers was the same.
As Powell recognizes, “[d]irect evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the
intent to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of the defendant and the
circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.]” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 602.) “One who intentionally attempts to kill another does not often declare his state
of mind either before, at, or after the moment he shoots. Absent such direct evidence, the
intent obviously must be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the
putative killer’s actions and words. Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent to
kill is, of course, a question for the trier of fact. While reasonable minds may differ on
the resolution of that issue, our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.]” (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946.) Here, a rational
9
trier of fact could have concluded that Powell intended to kill both Lucrecio and Israel,
based all the circumstances of the attempt.
Powell primarily relies on People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675 (Ratliff) to assert
that the prosecution did not demonstrate he intended to kill Lucrecio. Ratliff shot a gas
station attendant to death and wounded the deceased victim’s associate in the shooting.
(Id. at pp. 683-684.) The trial court failed to instruct the jury that a specific intent to kill
was required to convict Ratliff of attempted murder. (Id. at p. 695.) The California
Supreme Court concluded the error was not harmless, rejecting the notion that the jury
necessarily concluded Ratliff had the intent to kill the surviving victim where he shot the
surviving victim immediately after demanding money from and shooting the deceased
victim. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court stated: “Although it seems clear that defendant had
the intent to shoot and thus disable his victims, there was no further evidence of a specific
intent to kill necessary to sustain an attempted murder conviction.” (Ibid.) Powell
argues: “If the precise use of a uniquely deadly weapon (such as the firearm used in
Ratliff) is not sufficient to dispel prejudice from an instructional error, an imprecise attack
with a rusty old ax, inflicting a single blow to an extremity that under ordinary
circumstances would not result in death, and which in this case resulted only in swelling
of soft tissue, cannot be substantial enough to prove the defendant guilty of committing
attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt.”
But Ratliff held that the defendant’s act of shooting at two victims did not render
the instructional error harmless because the defendant’s act did not necessarily
demonstrate he had the intent to kill the surviving victim. Our standard of review here is
limited and deferential: we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record before us. As Powell
10
recognizes, Ratliff’s analysis was “employed in a different context,” a difference that
renders Ratliff inapposite.
Powell brutally attacked both brothers with a large axe. Lucrecio was hit in the
shoulder and a second swing narrowly missed Lucrecio as he scrambled to escape.
Lucrecio had no warning or opportunity to defend himself. As the jury concluded and as
Powell admitted on cross-examination, Powell intended to kill Israel, and the same
motive Powell possessed for Israel applied equally to Lucrecio as they were similarly
associated with the room where he believed his mother was held. Under our deferential
standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supports Powell’s attempted
murder conviction.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
11
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052911 People v. Powell
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