People v. Busby CA3

CourtListener 10767619Calctapp31.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/31/25 P. v. Busby CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE,
C102127
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24FE00474)
v.

PHILLIP ROBERT BUSBY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Phillip Robert Busby pleaded no contest to robbery of a local
supermarket. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1 The
People concede that the court erred in finding Busby ineligible for diversion. The
concession is well taken. We conditionally reverse the judgment, vacate the trial court’s
order denying diversion, and remand the matter for a new hearing on Busby’s motion.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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BACKGROUND
In October 2023, Busby and a companion entered a supermarket. Busby took
various items, placed them in a bag, and left the store without paying. The store’s loss
prevention officer confronted Busby, and a struggle ensued. Busby eventually grabbed
the bag from the officer and fled the scene.
The People charged Busby with second degree robbery. (§ 211.) They further
alleged that he had a prior strike based on a 2018 conviction for first degree burglary.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
In July 2024, Busby filed a motion for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36. His motion attached a report from a Licensed Clinical Social Worker
(LCSW) stating that he had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and that he “was
likely experiencing ongoing symptoms of anxiety” during the alleged crime.
The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that Busby had failed to present
sufficient evidence of his diagnosis. The People also maintained that clear and
convincing evidence showed that Busby’s mental health disorder was not a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense. The prosecution attached copies of
Busby’s criminal record as well as police reports from the current and prior offenses.
During an August 2024 hearing on the motion, the trial court asked Busby to focus
his argument on the nexus between his mental disorders and the alleged crime. Busby
argued that symptoms of depression “include impaired decision making, difficulty
thinking, feelings of hopelessness, and decreased emotional regulation.” He noted the
LCSW’s opinion that he was likely experiencing ongoing symptoms of anxiety during the
alleged crime. Busby also told responding law enforcement officers that he was in
difficult economic circumstances because of his mental health, leading him to take items
from the store.
The prosecution argued that the police reports and Busby’s criminal history, which
included three prior thefts, supplied clear and convincing evidence that his anxiety and

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depression were not significant motivating factors in the offense. The prosecution noted
that, in talking to responding officers, Busby initially denied any criminal activity but
eventually admitted that he had committed petty theft. And nothing in the police reports
from his prior convictions indicated that Busby experienced symptoms of anxiety or
depression during those crimes. Instead, the prosecution argued, Busby was “motivated
by his criminally entrenched lifestyle.”
The trial court denied Busby’s motion. The court was “fine with the report
provided by the clinician,” and it “accept[ed] those reports . . . at kind of face value as to
what they put forward.” But the court was “not convinced whatsoever that it was anxiety
or depression that was causal whatsoever in terms of his actions in this matter. I think
this is a young man who has profound economic pressures that are placed on him in
trying to provide. And I’m not here to cast any sort of moral judgment on that; it’s
unfortunate to be sure. And here, this was frankly just good old-fashioned thieving,
which he’s done previously. And he got away with it. He actually got out of the store
with the duffel bag – right – and drove away. [¶] And whether or not ultimately the
People can prove a robbery and the like if the case proceeds to trial, you know, that’s for
a different day and a different [c]ourt. But this is – basically it’s a theft matter and a
commercial burglary. And he went in there for a distinct purpose of stealing, not because
he – I think he can have anxiety in doing it. That doesn’t then negate what he did.”
Based on these findings, the court ruled that Busby was not eligible for mental health
diversion.
The following month, Busby pleaded no contest to the robbery charge and
admitted the prior strike.2 He stipulated to a four-year prison sentence (the low term of
two years, doubled due to the prior strike). The trial court sentenced him accordingly.

2 Busby also pleaded no contest to misdemeanor driving under the influence in a case not
at issue in this appeal.

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Busby timely appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause. The matter
was fully briefed in this court in October 2025.
DISCUSSION
Section 1001.36 authorizes a trial court to grant mental health diversion to
defendants who satisfy the eligibility and suitability requirements set forth in the statute.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “eligible” for diversion if he or she has been
diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder and that disorder “was a significant factor in
the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) “If the
defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal
factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. A
court may consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to,
police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the
defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent
with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2).) A defendant is “suitable” for diversion if the defendant’s symptoms would
respond to mental health treatment, the defendant consents to diversion and waives the
right to a speedy trial, the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion, and the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety
if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
We review a trial court’s denial of mental health diversion for abuse of discretion.
(Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401.) A “ ‘court abuses its
discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact

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has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) In “making this assessment the appellate court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Id. at p. 996.)
The parties in this case agree that there is no substantial evidence supporting the
trial court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Busby’s mental health
disorder lacked the requisite causal connection to the charged offense. We agree as well.
Under the statute, a trial court must presume that a defendant’s diagnosed mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the crime, “unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing
factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
The prosecution bears the burden of presenting such clear and convincing evidence.
(Lacour v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) “[T]he absence of
evidence proving that [a defendant’s] mental disorder was a factor in the commission of
the offenses is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that [a defendant’s] mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the
offenses.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court accepted the LCSW’s report, which diagnosed Busby with
anxiety and depression and which opined that he “was likely experiencing ongoing
symptoms of anxiety” during the alleged offense. The court was nevertheless “not
convinced whatsoever” that anxiety or depression was “causal whatsoever in terms of his
actions in this matter.” This reasoning suggests that the court erroneously shifted the
burden to Busby to prove that his mental health disorder contributed to the offense. (See

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Lacour v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) The court further found
that Busby was facing “profound economic pressures” that led him to engage in “good
old-fashioned thieving,” as he had before. But the facts that Busby was experiencing
economic hardship and had engaged in prior theft offenses are not substantial evidence
supporting a finding that it is highly probable that Busby’s mental health disorders were
not a motivating factor in the robbery.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, the order denying Busby’s motion for
mental health diversion is vacated, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to
reconsider Busby’s diversion motion consistent with this opinion. If the trial court again
denies the motion, the judgment shall be reinstated.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
ROBIE, J.

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