CourtListener 10767440•People v. Pressley CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/31/25 P. v. Pressley CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084686
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE424322)
GREGORY SCOTT PRESSLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Annie Fraser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A deputy sheriff conducted a traffic stop from which the driver fled.
The deputy found a loaded revolver under the driver’s seat of the suspect’s
van. Portions of the events were captured on video. At trial the deputy, and
a detective later assigned to the case, both identified defendant Gregory
Pressley as the fleeing driver. The jury found Pressley guilty of possession of
a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of
ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court
placed Pressley on probation for two years. Pressley raises two issues on
appeal.
First, Pressley contends the trial court erred by allowing the deputy
and detective to identify him because they lacked personal knowledge of his
appearance. We find no error as to the deputy (who saw the suspect fleeing
firsthand) and conclude any assumed error as to the detective (who saw the
suspect only on video and in photos) was harmless.
Second, Pressley argues the prosecutor erred by commenting during
voir dire on the prospect that Pressley would not testify at trial. (See Griffin
v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 (Griffin).) We agree the prosecutor
committed Griffin error but conclude it was harmless.
Finding no cumulative error from the assumed evidentiary error and
the Griffin error, we affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Around 9:55 a.m. on April 13, 2023, San Diego County Deputy Sheriff
John Balos was patrolling traffic on his marked motorcycle when he saw a
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
white van run a stop sign.2 The deputy activated his emergency lights and
siren. The van, after initially failing to yield, eventually stopped in an
AM/PM gas station parking lot. Deputy Balos approached the van and saw
in the “shattered” passenger’s side mirror that the driver appeared to be
Black and possibly male. As the deputy moved to the driver’s side to contact
the driver, a Black male exited the driver’s seat and began walking away.
Deputy Balos announced loudly, “Stop, sheriff’s department,” but the suspect
ran away.
As the suspect ran away, he looked back over his left shoulder. From
about 30 feet away, Deputy Balos saw “a portion of the left side of [the
suspect’s] face and a portion of . . . the left front side of his face.” Concerned
someone else was in the van, the deputy stayed by it and radioed for backup
to pursue the fleeing suspect. Deputy Balos described the suspect over the
radio as a Black male, about 30 years old, six feet tall, and weighing about
130 pounds with a thin build. At trial, the deputy added that the suspect had
shoulder-length dreadlocks and was wearing a black baseball cap.
Deputy Balos saw security cameras mounted near the roof of the
AM/PM and obtained video footage of the incident from them. The footage
was shown to the jury. It shows a tall, thin Black male with a baseball cap
exit the van and begin walking away (with no discernable limp) before
eventually running.
After determining the van’s registration expired in 2020, Deputy Balos
conducted an inventory search before having the van towed. After finding
2 Before Deputy Balos testified, the trial court read the following
stipulation to the jury regarding the deputy’s credibility: “On October 13th,
2016, Deputy John Balos was disciplined for unbecoming conduct and neglect
of duty for partaking in activities not required in the performance of the [sic]
duty.”
3
nothing notable during a preliminary search, the deputy eventually found a
body armor vest behind the driver’s seat and a revolver loaded with three
rounds concealed under the driver’s seat. It appears from body-worn camera
footage of the preliminary search that Deputy Balos was not wearing gloves
during the search; photos of the revolver show him wearing a leather
motorcycle glove while holding the gun. The deputy determined the revolver
was functional and submitted it for forensic analysis.
Deputy Balos provided information about the van’s registration to the
dispatcher, who advised that there was a “pending master file” identifying
Gregory Pressley as attempting to register it.3 The most recent DMV records
showed it was registered to Russell T. at a specific address on Lamar Street.
Records showed that Pressley also lived at that same address. Pressley and
Russell were the only males associated with that address in the three-year
period preceding trial.
To determine whether it was Pressley or Russell who fled from Deputy
Balos, investigators reviewed DMV records and body-worn camera footage
pertaining to each male.
Pressley’s driver’s license from July 2022 listed his height as 6 feet
6 inches tall, his weight as 185 pounds, and showed his hair was shoulder-
length dreadlocks tied back to one side. The trial court took judicial notice
that Pressley was 6 feet 7 inches tall when wearing inch-and-a-half tall
shoes.
Deputy Sheriff Raymond Guzman testified about an encounter with
Pressley on August 16, 2022, that was captured on body-worn camera
3 This information was not admitted for its truth because the prosecutor
did not obtain certified DMV records. The evidence was therefore admitted
only to explain Deputy Balos’s subsequent conduct and investigation.
4
footage. The prosecutor played the footage (without audio) for the jury. The
recording showed that Deputy Guzman responded to Lamar Street and met
Pressley near a white van. Pressley told the deputy he had slept in the back
of his van the night before. The deputy described Pressley’s height as 6 feet 3
or 4 inches tall (and definitely no taller than 6 feet 8 inches), his weight as
about 170 pounds with a thin build, and his hair as tied-back braids or
dreadlocks.
Deputy Sheriff Jian Laxina testified about an encounter with Pressley
on November 11, 2022, that was captured on body-worn camera footage,
which the prosecutor also played for the jury without audio. Deputy Laxina
told jurors he responded to the Lamar Street address, saw a white van
parked across the street, and was directed to the residence’s garage where he
found Pressley sleeping. Deputy Laxina testified Pressley’s hair was braided
and in a ponytail.
Deputy Sheriff Kerry Hughes testified about an encounter with
Pressley on May 20, 2023, that was captured on body-worn camera and
played for the jury without audio. In that instance, Deputy Balos and
Deputy Hughes responded to a report by Pressley that his Mercedes had been
vandalized. Deputy Hughes interviewed Pressley. Pressley stated he got the
Mercedes about a month earlier (that is, about a week after the van was
towed from the crime scene). Deputy Hughes testified Pressley was about
6 feet 4 inches tall, with “a dreaded hairstyle.” Deputy Balos testified that
“the person who reported [the vandalism] looked familiar,” but the deputy did
not question Pressley then about the van incident.
Turning our attention to the other resident, Russell T., DMV records
showed that he was 6 feet 1 inch tall, weighed 222 pounds, and wore his hair
in a “fohawk” — “kind of like a mohawk and a short tapered haircut along the
5
side.” Photos of Russell posted to his social media accounts in March 2022
showed “an extremely short hairstyle.” Body-worn camera footage from an
August 29, 2023, encounter with Russell showed that he walked with “a
distinct limp,” had a medium build with a “somewhat protruding” stomach,
and had “short . . . Afro-style hair.” This footage was played for the jury.
Deputy Balos testified about his role in the investigation. After the
deputy wrote his report in April 2023, the case was assigned to a detective.
The detective “bounced things off” Deputy Balos and they “went back and
forth as far as trying to figure out how to identify” the suspect from the
incident. In July 2023, Deputy Balos was assigned to “kind of take [the
investigation] back over.” In doing so, he looked at three or four incidents in
which Pressley was connected to the van and compared images from the
AM/PM security footage with images of Pressley and Russell. “Based on the
totality of the circumstances,” Deputy Balos testified he “had reason to
believe” that Pressley was the person “who . . . fled the scene” in April 2023.
Sheriff’s detective Andrew Paulino also testified about his involvement
in this case. The detective testified he became involved in the case about one
month before trial. He had never met Pressley, seen the van, nor been to the
Lamar Street location. Detective Paulino read Deputy Balos’s report;
watched the AM/PM surveillance footage “multiple times”; watched some of
the body-worn camera footage discussed above as well as footage of another
encounter with Pressley on August 30, 2022, which was played for the jury;
watched body-worn camera footage of an encounter with Russell; looked at
DMV records and social media images of Russell; and reviewed registration
records for the van. “Based on the photos, all prior contacts, the build of . . .
Russell, and the way the subject moves away from the scene” in the “AM/PM
surveillance” footage, Detective Paulino concluded “the subject was not . . .
6
Russell.” Instead, “based on all prior contacts” and “documented photos,”
Detective Paulino “believed the subject who ran from Deputy Balos at the
time was Mr. Pressley.”
A crime lab technician analyzed the revolver for latent fingerprints and
found none. A DNA analyst determined the gun contained a mixture of DNA
from two contributors, one a 96-percent contributor and the other a 4-percent
contributor. The analyst also examined a reference DNA sample obtained
from Pressley’s inner cheek.4 The analyst determined that Pressley best fit
the 96-percent contributor, with a 400 quintillion likelihood ratio.
The only evidence Pressley presented at trial was the trial court’s
judicial notice of his height. He otherwise relied on an identity defense and
held the prosecution to its burden of proof.
The parties stipulated that Pressley suffered a prior felony conviction.
B. Procedural Background
The prosecution charged Pressley with felony counts of possession of a
firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of ammunition by a
prohibited person (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and one misdemeanor count of
resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
4 The defense insinuated that the reference DNA sample from Pressley
was contaminated. Deputy Balos obtained the reference sample from
Pressley at an earlier hearing by swabbing Pressley’s inner cheek. At trial,
the deputy acknowledged he did not wash his hands or put on gloves before
beginning to obtain the sample. After defense counsel reminded Deputy
Balos to put on gloves, he put on only one glove because there was only one
glove in the DNA kit. The DNA analyst refuted the defense’s contamination
theory. The analyst confirmed there was only one contributor to the
reference sample. And she clarified that if someone touched the tip of a swab
that had collected a reference sample from an inner cheek, she “would never
expect to be able to detect any” DNA from “a brief contact” by the toucher
because inner cheeks “have a lot of DNA in them.”
7
The jury found Pressley guilty of the firearm and ammunition
possession charges and not guilty of resisting arrest.
The trial court placed Pressley on probation for two years on the
firearm charge and gave him credit for time served on the ammunition
charge.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Lay Opinion Regarding Identity
Pressley contends the trial court erred by allowing Deputy Balos to
testify he determined it was Pressley “who . . . fled the scene” and by
permitting Detective Paulino to testify he believed it was Pressley “who . . . is
depicted in th[e] surveillance video.” We find no error as to Deputy Balos and
conclude any assumed error as to Detective Paulino was harmless.
1. Background
Pressley moved in limine to preclude Detective Paulino from testifying
that he determined Pressley was the driver of the van. Pressley argued that
because Detective Paulino was not present during the incident, his
conclusions about the significance of the evidence would “dilute[]” the jury’s
“decision-making power.” Instead, Pressley reasoned, the court should “let
the jury look at the same evidence that Detective Paulino looked at” and
“reach their own conclusions” — “If the evidence was good enough for
Detective Paulino’s eyes, it should be good enough for the jury’s eyes.” The
motion did not address Deputy Balos.
The trial court denied the motion, explaining that the detective’s
“elimination or . . . inclusion of someone based upon hairstyle, manner of
walking, . . . clothing, and color of the skin” is “relevant evidence.”
8
At trial, Deputy Balos testified as follows about his conclusion
regarding the identity of the suspect who fled from him:
Q. And based on reviewing all of those photos [of
Pressley and Russell] and the surveillance and your
follow-up investigation, were you able to determine
who it was that fled the scene that day?
A. So, yes. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, I had reason to believe it was Gregory
Pressley.
Pressley did not object.
The prosecutor also questioned Detective Paulino about his conclusions
regarding the identity of the suspect in the AM/PM surveillance video. In one
instance, the prosecutor asked, “Who do you believe is depicted in this
surveillance video?” Detective Paulino responded, “Based on the build and
the facial hair . . . I believe it would be Mr. Pressley.” The prosecutor then
questioned Detective Paulino as follows about his conclusions regarding
whether the suspect was Pressley or Russell:
Q. Based on this investigation, did you rule out that
[Russell] could have been the person who fled the
scene that day?
A. Based on the photos, all prior contacts, the build
of [Russell], and the way the subject moves away from
the scene that you’re looking at with the AM/PM
surveillance, I believed the subject was not [Russell].
Q. And did you believe that it was the defendant?
A. Based on all prior contacts, documented photos,
I believed the subject who ran from Deputy Balos at
the time was Mr. Pressley.
9
2. Relevant Legal Principles
“A lay witness may offer opinion testimony if it is rationally based on
the witness’s perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.) ‘[T]he identity of a person is a proper subject
of nonexpert opinion.’ ” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 601 (Leon).)
“Court of Appeal decisions have long upheld admission of testimony
identifying defendants in surveillance footage or photographs.” (Ibid.) We
review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 600.)
“Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence
is subject to the traditional [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818] test: The
reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would
have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)
3. Analysis
We address Pressley’s claims as to Deputy Balos and Detective Paulino
separately because they are materially distinguishable — Deputy Balos had
personal knowledge of Pressley’s appearance apart from the surveillance
footage whereas Detective Paulino did not.
10
The trial court acted within its discretion in allowing Deputy Balos to
testify that Pressley was the person who ran away from him.5 The deputy
testified he saw Pressley during the traffic stop and got a partial look at
Pressley’s face. Deputy Balos also testified that Pressley looked familiar
when the deputy saw him about a month later when responding to Pressley’s
vandalism report. It is sufficient that Deputy Balos became “familiar with
[Pressley]’s appearance around the time of the crimes” — it is immaterial that
the deputy “did not have contact with him before the crimes.” (Leon, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 601, italics added.) Although Deputy Balos’s
contemporaneous description of Pressley’s height and weight may not have
been accurate, “[q]uestions about the extent of [a witness]’s familiarity with
[the] defendant’s appearance [go] to the weight, not the admissibility, of his
testimony.” (Ibid.; see People v. Gonzales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 467, 472 [where a
police officer’s testimony identifying the suspect at the crime scene was based
on “clothing and specified characteristics of the man” but not “facial
characteristics,” any “[l]ack of positiveness as to the man’s identity went to
the weight and not to the competency of the evidence”].) “Moreover, because
the surveillance video was played for the jury, jurors could make up their
own minds about whether” Deputy Balos accurately identified Pressley.
5 The Attorney General argues Pressley forfeited his challenge as to
Deputy Balos because Pressley objected in the trial court only as to Detective
Paulino. We will exercise our discretion to consider this issue on the merits.
(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is
generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been
preserved for review by a party.”].) For the same reasons, we reject Pressley’s
argument in reply that the Attorney General’s failure to address the merits
as to Deputy Balos concedes the issue. As the appellant, it is Pressley’s
burden to demonstrate error. (See People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th
367, 409.)
11
(Leon, at p. 601.) Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in
allowing Deputy Balos to identify Pressley as the suspect who ran from him.
Detective Paulino presents a different situation because his familiarity
with Pressley came entirely from the materials reviewed in the investigation.
Courts of Appeal have reached different conclusions about the admissibility
of lay opinions regarding identity in this situation. Some cases hold that a
witness must have some degree of personal knowledge of a suspect before the
witness may purport to identify that individual in a photograph. (See, e.g.,
People v. Perry (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 608, 613 [witnesses’ identification
testimony was admissible where it was based on their “prior contacts with
[the] defendant” and “their awareness of his physical characteristics on the
day of the” crime and was helpful to the jury because the defendant had
“altered his appearance” before trial]; People v. Mixon (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d
118, 128 [observing that “Perry . . . requires two predicates for the
admissibility of lay opinion testimony as to the identity of persons depicted in
surveillance photographs: (1) that the witness testify from personal
knowledge of the defendant’s appearance at or before the time the photo was
taken; and (2) that the testimony aid the trier of fact in determining the
crucial identity issue” either because the defendant’s appearance has changed
or because the photo did not clearly depict the defendant].)
On the other hand, recent cases have allowed witnesses without
personal knowledge of a suspect to identify that party in a video where the
witness otherwise had a sound foundation regarding the person’s identity
and could assist the jury in some way beyond merely identifying the suspect.
(See, e.g., People v. Larkins (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067, 1068
(Larkins) [finding no error in admitting a non-police witness’s identification
testimony where his foundation was based on viewing two photos that
12
undisputedly depicted the defendant; the identification was based on the
witness viewing 20 or 30 videos of the suspect, which, unlike the still photos
in Perry and Mixon, allowed the witness to “observe such distinguishing
characteristics as [the] defendant’s posture, gait and body movements”; and
“jurors were able to test the [witness’s] opinion . . . because they saw still
photos taken from some of the videos and they could test his ability to
correctly identify [the] defendant in . . . three videos they were shown”];
People v. Son (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 689, 697 [finding no error in the
admission of a detective’s testimony narrating events depicted in surveillance
footage because she “testified she watched the video at least 50 times and
that subsequent viewings revealed details she had not picked up on at first,”
which was “helpful” to the jury by “speed[ing] up the process of teasing out
obscure details in the video”]; People v. Phillips (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
643, 685 [holding that even if details observed in a video could have been
brought to the jury’s attention without a police officer’s lay opinion regarding
what the details depicted, the opinion was helpful where “the significance of
the [details] to the investigation would not have been evident” and the
opinion “provided connections between . . . items of evidence”].)
We need not determine where along this admissibility continuum
Detective Paulino’s testimony falls because we conclude that even if he lacked
an adequate foundation to identify Pressley in the AM/PM surveillance
footage, any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless.
First, DNA evidence convincingly tied Pressley to the revolver
recovered in the van. Although Pressley argued that Deputy Balos
contaminated the reference sample, the DNA analyst refuted that theory by
confirming that the reference sample contained only a single DNA profile
that certainly would have come from swabbing Pressley’s cheek and not from
13
the deputy’s ungloved hand briefly touching the collection swab. The fact the
jury convicted Pressley on the firearm and ammunition charges and not on
the resisting arrest charge suggests the jury found the DNA evidence
compelling because the evidence related to the former charges but not the
latter. Additionally, despite the Attorney General citing the strength of the
DNA evidence as a basis for finding any error harmless, Pressley did not
contest the claim in his reply brief.
Second, Deputy Balos testified that the person he saw — firsthand —
fleeing from him was Pressley. We have concluded that this evidence was
properly admitted.
Third, the “jurors were able to test [Detective Paulino]’s opinion”
because they saw Pressley’s DMV photo, the body-worn camera footage
documenting four prior encounters with Pressley, and the AM/PM
surveillance footage. (Larkins, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068; see Leon,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601 [“because the surveillance video was played for
the jury, jurors could make up their own minds about whether the person
shown was defendant”].) Indeed, this is partly the relief Pressley requested
in his motion in limine: “Let the jury look at the same evidence that
Detective Paulino looked at . . . and . . . reach their own conclusions.”
The jury also saw photos and video of Russell, which constitute
substantial evidence because the thrust of Pressley’s identity defense was
that Russell — the registered owner of the van who shared an address with
Pressley — was the perpetrator, not Pressley. Thus, the prosecution
primarily needed to distinguish Pressley from Russell, not Pressley from
every other possible suspect. We have seen the photographic and video
evidence and are satisfied that the differences between Pressley and Russell
in height (about five inches), weight (37 pounds), build (thin versus medium),
14
gait (Russell walks with a limp and Pressley does not), and hairstyle
(Pressley has shoulder-length braids or dreadlocks whereas Russell has short
hair) satisfactorily confirm that the AM/PM surveillance video shows
Pressley and not Russell.
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the evaluation of
lay witness opinion testimony (see CALCRIM No. 333) and factors to consider
in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony (see CALCRIM No. 315).
We presume the jury followed these instructions. (See People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 83.)
Pressley maintains the error was prejudicial because Detective
Paulino’s conclusion that Pressley is the person depicted in the AM/PM
surveillance footage, implied the detective “had extra-judicial evidence that
[he] relied upon — which the jury did not receive as evidence.” Specifically,
Pressley argues the detective “testified, after stating he relied on body-worn
camera videos from August 30, 2022, and August 16, 2023 . . . , that there
were a couple of other incidents that he reviewed.” Pressley reasons that
“this reference to evidence not presented or described to the jury . . . would
lead to a reasonable inference that as a detective, he is privy to evidence not
submitted to the jury, so the jury should defer to his opinion.” (See, e.g.,
People v. Rouston (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 997, 1012 (Rouston) [“Given [the
prosecution witness]’s status as a gang expert, the designated investigator
who testified repeatedly throughout the trial, and a detective, ‘the jury had
every reason to look to [him] as a far better judge than they could be’
regarding the reliability of other witnesses’ testimony, and what inferences to
draw from the prosecution’s other evidence.”].) We are not persuaded.
In addition to the two body-worn camera videos that Detective Paulino
specifically cited, the trial court admitted as evidence two other body-worn
15
camera videos depicting Pressley (November 22, 2022, and May 20, 2023).
The jury would most likely have concluded that these were the other
incidents Detective Paulino was referring to. Additionally, although we are
mindful of the weight a jury may place on the testimony of an extensively
involved detective (see Rouston, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012), that risk
was mitigated here because Detective Paulino testified to the limited nature
of his involvement in the case.
Accordingly, we conclude that any assumed error in admitting
Detective Paulino’s testimony that Pressley is the person depicted in the
AM/PM surveillance footage was harmless and did not deprive Pressley of a
fair trial.
B. Griffin Error Occurred but Was Harmless
Pressley contends the prosecutor committed Griffin error during voir
dire when she followed up on defense counsel’s questioning of prospective
jurors about Pressley’s likely decision not to testify at trial. We agree Griffin
error occurred but conclude it was harmless.
1. Background
During voir dire, defense counsel explained that “the right to remain
silent . . . doesn’t just start with police contact,” but “goes all the way through
trial.” After advising that it was “pretty likely” that Pressley would not
testify at trial, defense counsel asked whether any jurors were “going to think
[he] has got something to hide simply because he doesn’t testify” or thought
they would “need[] to hear both sides of the story.” Three prospective jurors
stated they would want to hear Pressley testify. Counsel concluded her
questioning of the jurors by emphasizing, “He’s innocent right now and he’s
innocent even if he doesn’t say a peep.”
16
The prosecutor then questioned the jurors about a variety of topics
before addressing two of the jurors that defense counsel questioned about
Pressley not testifying. The prosecutor asked, “I know that you guys said you
would like to hear from the defense, but . . . would you understand if someone
accused of a crime fearing cross-examination by myself . . . doesn’t want to
take the stand?” Defense counsel objected, citing Griffin. The trial court
sustained the objection. The prosecutor resumed, “At the end of the trial, can
you hold me to my burden that the evidence that I bring proves the case
beyond a reasonable doubt without any statement from the defense?” The
two jurors agreed they would hold the prosecutor to her burden.
During a sidebar conference a few minutes later, defense counsel asked
for a new jury panel based on the sustained objection. The court denied the
request but invited the prosecutor to make a record for her question. The
prosecutor explained that her “question was very similar to [defense
counsel’s] line of questioning” and was “trying to reinforce the point that the
burden is always on [the prosecutor] and that [the defendant] doesn’t need to
testify.” Defense counsel responded that the prosecutor’s reference to
Pressley “fearing cross-examination was the big issue” because it implied “he
must have done something wrong.” The trial court reiterated its denial of the
defense request for a new jury panel, reasoning the prosecutor’s question was
not “prejudicial to the point where a new panel needs to be called up.”
Later, outside the jury’s presence, the trial court clarified at the
prosecutor’s request that while the court had found the prosecutor’s question
was “improper,” it was not Griffin error.
2. Relevant Legal Principles
“ ‘Under the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution, a prosecutor
is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on an accused’s
17
invocation of the constitutional right to silence.’ ” (People v. Tafoya (2007)
42 Cal.4th 147, 184; see Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615 [“We . . . hold that
the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt.” (Fn. omitted.)].)
Griffin error is subject to the harmless error test set forth in Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, which requires reversal unless we conclude
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Thompson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1118 & fn. 14 (Thompson).) “ ‘ “ ‘[I]ndirect, brief and
mild references to a defendant’s failure to testify, without any suggestion that
an inference of guilt be drawn therefrom, are uniformly held to constitute
harmless error.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1118.)
3. Analysis
We conclude the prosecutor’s question constituted Griffin error. The
question expressly referenced a defendant’s decision not to testify. And the
reference to “fearing cross-examination” can reasonably be construed as
implying the defendant may have something to hide. Indeed, although the
Attorney General does not expressly concede error, he “agrees that the
prosecutor’s voir dire question was perhaps imprudent because it could be
interpreted — inadvertently — as communicating to the jury that it could
consider [Pressley’s] silence as evidence of his guilt.” This is precisely the
inference Griffin prohibits. (See Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615; see People
v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 454 [finding the prosecutor’s comment — “ ‘if
he were to . . . take the stand and say he was sorry, which you didn’t see’ ” —
constituted Griffin error because “it clearly refers to [the] defendant’s failure
to take the stand”].) Accordingly, we conclude the prosecutor’s question was
error under Griffin.
18
Having found error, we nonetheless find it harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. We find People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173 (Fierro)
instructive. In Fierro, defense counsel “emphasiz[ed]” during voir dire that
the “defendant’s silence could not be used against him, . . . observ[ing] that
there might be plausible reasons why [the] defendant, although innocent,
would choose not to take the witness stand.” (Id. at p. 208.) “Later, the
prosecutor also stated that [the] defendant had a right to remain silent and
explained, ‘you can’t hold that against the defendant. You can’t consider
that.’ Recalling defense counsel’s remark as to why an innocent person might
not testify, the prosecutor further observed that ‘there might be reasons why
a guilty man doesn’t want to take the stand also and testify.’ However, he
then repeated his admonishment not to ‘even think about this . . . . It would
be totally inappropriate for you to think about . . . this and try to guess about
why somebody does [not testify].’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) The trial court
denied defense counsel’s request for an admonition regarding the defendant’s
right to remain silent, “explaining that it had already admonished each juror
on the burden of proof and [the] defendant’s right not to testify.” (Ibid.)
The Fierro court found no prejudicial error. (Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at
pp. 208–209.) Although the court found “it may have been ill-considered to
state that a guilty person may have reasons not to testify just as an innocent
person might,” the court did “not believe the prosecutor’s statement could
reasonably have been construed as urging the jury to consider defendant’s
silence as evidence of guilt. Indeed, . . . the prosecutor followed this remark
with a further admonition not to consider the matter.” (Ibid.) “Accordingly,”
the Fierro court “discern[ed] no possibility that the statement subjected [the]
defendant to prejudice.” (Id. at p. 209.)
19
Here, too, it was “ill-considered” for the prosecutor to imply Pressley
would likely not testify because he feared cross-examination. But, as in
Fierro, the prosecutor promptly clarified that the jury should not draw an
improper inference from the comment. (Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 208.)
Specifically, immediately after the trial court sustained the defense objection,
the prosecutor admonished jurors to “hold [her] to [her] burden” of proving
her case “beyond a reasonable doubt” even “without any statement from the
defense.” Further, as the prosecutor explained during the sidebar conference,
the question was couched in terms of “understand[ing]” a defendant’s decision
not to testify rather than implying it evidenced guilt.
The trial court’s instructions to the jury further dispel any concerns
about prejudice. Defense counsel did not request a curative instruction after
the court sustained the objection, and the court’s predeliberation charge to
jurors expressly instructed them regarding the presumption of innocence (see
CALCRIM No. 220) and a defendant’s absolute right not to testify (see
CALCRIM No. 355).6 (See Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1118 [finding
Griffin error harmless where “the trial court’s comment [to defense counsel,
“ ‘You are resting without calling your client?’ ”] consisted of just a single
short query,” “did not directly suggest the jury should draw an inference of
guilt from [the] defendant’s decision not to testify,” and “the jury was
instructed that ‘[a] defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not
6 As given, CALCRIM No. 355 states: “A defendant has an absolute
constitutional right not to testify. He or she may rely on the state of the
evidence and argue that the People have failed to prove the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. Do not consider, for any reason at all, the fact that the
defendant did not testify. Do not discuss that fact during your deliberations
or let it influence your decision in any way.”
20
to be compelled to testify’ ” and to “ ‘not draw any inference from the fact a
defendant does not testify’ ”].)
C. No Cumulative Error
Although we have assumed evidentiary error as to Detective Paulino’s
lay opinion testimony and found Griffin error as to the prosecutor’s comment
during voir dire, we have found each error harmless. Pressley maintains the
cumulative effect of these errors warrants reversal. We disagree. “Although
a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not entitled to ‘a perfect
one.’ ” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017.) Based on our review of
the appellate record, we are satisfied that Pressley received a fair trial.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
21
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.