People v. Hietala CA1/5

CourtListener 10766050Calctapp29.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/29/25 P. v. Hietala CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
A171942
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. 24CR04712)
JUSTIN HIETALA,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Justin Hietala appeals a final judgment following his
convictions for two counts of attempted carjacking and one count of
carjacking. The jury found true that he personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon with respect to each count. Hietala contends that these
enhancements should be reversed as to counts two (attempted carjacking)
and three (carjacking) due to prejudicial instructional error. He further
contends that the enhancement should be stricken as to count two because it
was not pled in the information. We agree that the deadly weapon
enhancement attached to the attempted carjacking in count two must be
reversed due to instructional error but otherwise affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
An information charged Hietala with attempted carjacking (Pen. Code,1
§§ 664, 215, subd. (a); counts one and two) and carjacking (id., § 215, subd.
(a); count three). As to counts one and three, but not count two, the
information alleged that Hietala personally used a deadly or dangerous
weapon—a knife (deadly weapon enhancement). (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The day before he rested, the
prosecutor stated in open court that he would be moving to amend the
information to add a deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) as to
count two. The next day, the trial court found that the enhancement was
supported by the evidence and granted the motion over Hietala’s objection.
The jury found Hietala guilty of all counts and found true the deadly weapon
enhancements with respect to all counts.
The trial court sentenced Hietala to an aggregate term of 12 years and
4 months in prison. It imposed an aggravated term of nine years on count
three and consecutive 10-month terms on counts one and two. With respect
to the deadly weapon enhancements, the court imposed a consecutive one-
year term as to count three, and consecutive four-month terms as to counts
one and two. Hietala timely appealed.
B. Facts
On the morning of June 24, 2024, N.R. was sitting in her car at a
McDonald’s parking lot with her 12-year old daughter and five-year old son.
Her driver’s side window was halfway down. As N.R. was about to get out of
the car, she noticed a man approaching through her rearview mirror. The

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise specified.

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man, later identified as Hietala, came up to N.R.’s car and began yelling and
cursing at her. He pulled out a 12-inch serrated knife and stuck it through
the window towards N.R.’s face. N.R. grabbed the knife and struggled with
Hietala, resulting in several lacerations to her hand. Hietala tried to reach
inside the car with his other hand to grab the keys from the ignition. N.R.
eventually pushed Hietala’s arms out of the car and rolled up her window.
She then drove across the street to another parking lot to calm herself and
her daughter down. A few minutes later, Hietala approached again, yelling
and hitting the passenger’s side of N.R.’s car. He tried to open the door and
hit the passenger side window with his knife. N.R. reversed the car and
drove away.
Roughly an hour later, M.F. was sitting in his car in a parking lot about
a quarter mile away from where Hietala had attacked N.R. His driver’s side
window was down. Hietala approached M.F., told him he had an emergency,
and offered M.F. money for a ride across town. M.F. declined. A few minutes
later, Hietala returned, grabbed M.F. by the throat, pressed a knife to his
neck, and demanded that he hand over the car keys. M.F. pleaded for
Hietala to give him a few minutes to get the keys from his pocket. Hietala
repeated his demand, told M.F. to get out of the car, and “said he was going
to cut [M.F.’s] throat and kill [him].” M.F., in fear for his life, stepped out of
the car and gave Hietala the keys. Hietala got in the car and drove off.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Instructional Error
Hietala contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that
it could find the deadly weapon enhancements to be true if the knife was
either “inherently deadly or dangerous or . . . used in such a way that [was]
capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (Italics

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added.) He further contends that the error was prejudicial as to the
enhancements on counts two and three because the jury may have
improperly concluded that the knife was inherently deadly or dangerous.2
The People concede that the court erred but argue that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. We find that the error was prejudicial with
respect to the enhancement attached to the second attempted carjacking of
N.R. (count two) but not with respect to the enhancement attached to the
carjacking of M.F. (count three).
1. Relevant Background
After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant
to CALCRIM No. 3145, that if it found Hietala guilty of any of the charged
crimes, it “must then decide whether, for each crime, the People have proved
the additional allegation that [Hietala] personally used a deadly or dangerous
weapon.” The court defined a deadly or dangerous weapon as “any object,
instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one that is
used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or
great bodily injury.” (Italics added.) It went onto explain that in deciding
whether an object is a deadly weapon, the jury should “consider all the
surrounding circumstances, including when and where the object was
possessed, whether the object was changed from its standard form and any
other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a
dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.”
With respect to the deadly weapon enhancements, the prosecutor
argued during closing that “the evidence shows beyond all doubt” that

2 “Because a knife can be, and usually is, used for innocent purpose, it is

not among the few objects that are inherently deadly weapons.” (People v.
Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 6 (Aledamat).)

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Hietala used a “knife” “in all three transactions.” Defense counsel made no
arguments as to whether the knife constituted a deadly weapon. The
prosecutor reiterated during rebuttal that “the evidence shows one thing
across the board, a weapon was used” and, with respect to count three, that
the force or fear element of carjacking was met when Hietala “had a knife to
[M.F.’s] neck.”
The jury returned its initial verdict forms, which found Hietala guilty
on all counts and found true that he “was armed with a knife.” The
prosecutor asked to approach the bench, and a discussion was held off the
record. The trial court then informed the jury that the verdict forms
contained an error and did not match the language in the jury instructions
with respect to the deadly weapon enhancements. The forms were corrected
and the court instructed the jury to deliberate again. The jury quickly
returned updated verdict forms and found the deadly weapon enhancements
to be true.
2. Law and Standard of Review
As the People concede, the trial court committed error (known as
alternative theory error) by “presenting the jury with two theories by which it
could find [a knife] a deadly weapon: (1) inherently or (2) as used. The first
theory (inherently) is incorrect, but the second theory (as used) is correct.”
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7.) When alternative theory error occurs,
“[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the
entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant
circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Id. at p. 13 [applying Chapman v. Cal. (1967) 386 U.S. 18].)
In Aledamat, the trial court committed alternative-theory error when it
instructed the jury that a box cutter was a deadly weapon if it was either

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inherently deadly or used in a deadly way.3 (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p.
3.) To determine whether that error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, the California Supreme Court applied a test articulated by Justice
Scalia in his concurring opinion in California v. Roy (1996) 519 U.S. 2.
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 14–15.) Under this “nonexclusive” test,
“[t]he reviewing court examines what the jury necessarily did find and asks
whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that
without also finding the missing fact as well.” (Ibid.)
Applying Justice Scalia’s test in Aledamat, our high court found the
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the jury instructions—
which required the jury “to consider all of the circumstances in deciding
whether the object was a deadly weapon, either inherently or as used”—the
court concluded that “it seems unlikely the jury would simply view the box
cutter as inherently deadly without considering the circumstances, including
how [the] defendant used it.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14.)
According to the court, “[t]he arguments of counsel support[ed] this
conclusion.” (Ibid.) For example, “no one ever suggested to the jury that
there were two separate ways it could decide whether the box cutter was a
deadly weapon.” (Ibid.) And defense counsel never argued that “the box
cutter was not a deadly weapon.” (Ibid.)
Indeed, the high court concluded that it would have been “futile” for
defense counsel to do so because the defendant threatened to “ ‘kill’ ” the
victim and because “the jury found [the] defendant assaulted the victim with
the box cutter.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14.) Specifically, the jury
found that: “(1) [the] defendant did an act with a deadly weapon (either

3 Like a knife, a “box cutter is not inherently deadly because it is not

designed for that purpose.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14.)

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inherently or as used) that by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force; (2) [the] defendant was aware of facts that would lead
a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to someone; and (3) [the] defendant
had the present ability to apply force with a deadly weapon to a person.” (Id.
at p. 15.) Thus, even if the jury “applied its common understanding to find
the box cutter deadly because it is sharp and used or cutting,” “ ‘[n]o
reasonable jury that made all of these findings could have failed to find’ that
defendant used the box cutter in a way that is capable of causing or likely to
cause death or great bodily injury.” (Ibid.)
3. Count Two
Like the jury in Aledamat, the jury in this case likely considered “the
circumstances, including how” Hietala used the knife, in determining
whether the knife “was a deadly weapon, either inherently or as used.”
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14.) But unlike the jury in Aledamat, the
jury in this case did not find that Hietala assaulted N.R. with the knife.
Instead, the jury only found that Hietala: (1) “personally used” a knife while
attempting to commit a carjacking; and (2) “took a direct but ineffective step
toward committing [c]arjacking” using “force or fear to take the vehicle or to
prevent [N.R.] from resisting.” (Italics added.) Thus, the question before us
is “whether it would be impossible, on the evidence,” for the jury to make
those findings “without also finding” that Hietala used the knife “in such a
way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily
injury.” (Id. at p. 15.) As for the second attempted carjacking of N.R., we
conclude that it was not.
“The use of an object in a manner ‘likely to produce’ death or great
bodily injury [citation] requires more than a mere possibility that serious

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injury could have resulted from the way the object was used.” (In re B.M.
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 534.) The term “likely,” as used in this context, “refers
to situations in which ‘ “ ‘the probability of serious injury is great.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 533.)
Here, the second attempted carjacking of N.R. occurred a few minutes
after Hietala’s first attempt. During the first attempt, Hietala stuck the
knife into N.R.’s car and cut her hand. But during the second attempt,
Hietala only used the knife to hit the passenger side window of N.R’s car.
There is no evidence that the knife could have contacted N.R. Indeed, the car
windows were closed, the car doors were locked, and N.R. quickly drove off
without a struggle. Based on this evidence, the jury could have found that
Hietala used the knife in an attempt to take N.R.’s car without finding that
his use of the knife was likely to cause any bodily injury.
This conclusion is bolstered by the closing arguments. In closing, the
prosecutor only asserted that a knife was used “in all three transactions” and
did not suggest that the knife was used in a deadly or dangerous way during
the second attempted carjacking. (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216,
1226–1227 [prejudice found where the prosecutor argues legally invalid
theory during closing arguments].)
It is also bolstered by the error in the initial verdict forms. Those forms
allowed the jury to find the enhancements to be true solely because Hietala
was “armed with a knife.” Although the jury ultimately used corrected forms,
which did require a finding that Hietala “personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon,” the use of the erroneous forms, coupled with the
erroneous instruction, the prosecutor’s arguments, and the manner in which
Hietala used the knife during the second attempted carjacking of N.R., could
have led the jury to conclude that the knife qualified as a deadly weapon

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during that attempted carjacking regardless of whether Hietala used it in a
deadly or dangerous manner. Thus, as to the deadly weapon enhancement
attached to count two, we cannot conclude that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Count Three
We reach the opposite conclusion as to the deadly weapon enhancement
attached to the carjacking of M.F. (count three), which Hietala concedes “is a
closer call.” The uncontroverted evidence at trial established that Hietala
pressed a knife firmly against M.F.’s neck while threatening to “cut [his]
throat and kill [him].” The prosecutor, in turn, emphasized during closing
arguments that “putting a knife to someone’s throat and threatening to harm
them is both force and fear.” Hietala’s counsel, who only questioned the
accuracy of M.F.’s testimony due to stress, did not dispute this. Necessarily
believing M.F.’s testimony, the jury found that Hietala: (1) “used force or fear
to take [M.F.’s] vehicle or to prevent [M.F.] from resisting;” and (2)
“personally used” a knife during the carjacking. As in Aledamat, “ ‘[n]o
reasonable jury that made . . . these findings could have failed to find,’ ”
based on the evidence, that Hietala used the knife “in a way that is capable of
causing [and] likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (Aledamat, supra,
8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)
Hietala nonetheless contends that there was prejudice because “[a]
rational jury could have concluded that while [his] use of the knife was
dangerous, M.F.’s response made it unlikely that he would suffer great bodily
injury or death.” In other words, Hietala contends that it was possible for the
jury to find that his use of the knife was not likely to cause injury or death
because M.F. complied with Hietala’s demands. But a weapon is “deadly or
dangerous” based solely on the “way” that the weapon is “used” by a

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defendant—and not based on the actions of the victim. (CALCRIM No. 3415;
see Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 6 [a weapon may be “deadly in the way
defendant used it,” italics added].)
Indeed, whether a weapon is deadly as used “focuses on potentiality”
and not on “an actual injury to [the] victim, or even physical contact.” (In re
D.T. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 693, 698.) Thus, a knife pressed against a
victim’s back is likely to cause serious bodily injury even if the defendant only
intended to “poke the victim in the back.” (Ibid.) This is because “a sudden
distraction or misstep could have resulted in a serious puncture wound.” (Id.
at p. 701.) For this same reason, a pencil, when held against a victim’s neck,
is a deadly weapon even if it “was used only to threaten, and not actually
used to stab.” (People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1472.) Thus, it
strains credulity to imagine that a jury would find that pressing a knife
against a victim’s neck while threatening to kill him was unlikely to cause
death or great bodily injury. (See People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449,
484 [in determining whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
an appellate court need not consider a scenario, “while not impossible, was
highly improbable and supported by only flimsy evidence”].) Accordingly, we
find the instructional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
deadly weapon enhancement attached to count three.
B. Sufficient Notice
Hietala next argues that the deadly weapon enhancement attached to
count two should be stricken because it was not pled in the information.
Although the information was orally amended at trial to add this
enhancement after the prosecution rested, Hietala contends that he did not
receive adequate notice. As a threshold matter, we exercise our discretion to
address Hietala’s claim even though he arguably did not object to the

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amendment based on lack of adequate notice. (People v. Anderson (2020) 9
Cal.5th 946, 962–963 (Anderson).) We, however, reject it.
Section 1170.1, subdivision (e), provides that “[a]ll enhancements shall
be alleged in the accusatory pleading.” Indeed, “a defendant has a cognizable
due process right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement
allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.”
(People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 747.) Nevertheless, an accusatory
pleading may be amended for “any defect or insufficiency, at any stage of the
proceedings.” (§ 1009.) And “not every amendment to a pleading—even one
that increases the defendant’s potential criminal liability—need be made in
writing.” (Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 960.) But regardless of whether
the amendment is written or oral, “the touchstone of determining the
adequacy of an accusatory pleading is whether the defendant had adequate
notice of the charges against him.” (People v. Sandoval (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 111, 134 (Sandoval).)
In Sandoval, the prosecution “orally amended the information to allege
the strike prior in open court, in the presence of [the defendant] and his
attorney.” (Sandoval, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 134.) At that time,
defense counsel “stated that she had no objection to the amendment.” (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant “had reasonable notice of
the prior strike allegation and that any defect in the form of the allegation
did not prejudice [him].” (Ibid.) Hietala attempts to distinguish Sandoval on
the grounds that the trial court in his case only granted the amendment after
the prosecution had rested and over defense counsel’s objection. But Hietala
fails to explain how this deprived him of fair notice. He already knew about
the deadly weapon enhancements attached to the other two counts and still
had an opportunity to present evidence (including recalling N.R.) relating to

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the new enhancement. Rather than do so, he “rest[ed] based on the state of
the evidence.” Given this, we find that Hietala received adequate notice of
the amendment and was not prejudiced.4
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded with respect to the deadly
weapon enhancement attached to count 2 (attempted carjacking). In all
other respects the judgment is affirmed.

CHOU, J.
We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

A171942/ P. v. Hietala

4 Hietala’s reliance on People v. Arias (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1009, is

misplaced. There, the prosecution never moved to amend the information to
add the enhancement. (Id. at pp. 1020–1021.)

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