CourtListener 10765594•Conservatorship of James E. CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/26/25 Conservatorship of James E. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
Conservatorship of the Person and B344431
Estate of JAMES E.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 24NWMH00660)
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
GUARDIAN,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
JAMES E.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Robert S. Harrison and Scott R. Herin,
Judges. Reversed.
Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.
**********
The sole issue presented by this appeal is the validity of a
jury trial waiver on a conservatorship petition under the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000,
et seq.). At the court trial on the petition that followed
James E.’s waiver, the trial court found James to be gravely
disabled within the meaning of the LPS, granted the petition,
and appointed the Los Angeles County Office of the Public
Guardian (Public Guardian) as conservator. On appeal from the
judgment of conservatorship, James contends reversal is required
because the trial court failed to properly advise him of his right to
a jury trial and to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver.
We conclude the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that
James made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a
jury trial. We therefore reverse the order granting the petition
for conservatorship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2024, James was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon (not a firearm) and found incompetent to stand trial.
A referral was made to the Public Guardian for investigation of
whether a conservatorship under the LPS was warranted. James
had several documented “episodes of mental health encounters,”
but no prior criminal record or prior conservatorship proceedings.
At the hearing on December 23, 2024 under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5350, subdivision (d)(1) before Judge
Robert S. Harrison, James was present with appointed counsel.
Counsel advised the court she spoke with James that morning
about the conservatorship proceedings, and James was “very
clear that he does not want a conservatorship, so I would like to
set this for court trial/jury trial setting.”
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The court told James his demand for trial would be
entered. The court then advised James, “you have a right to a
court trial that’s with just a bench officer or a jury trial with
12 people in the courtroom. Do you want to have a jury trial or a
court trial?” James responded, “court trial.” The court accepted
James’s jury trial waiver as “knowing and voluntary” and set
February 3, 2025 as the date for the court trial on the petition.
On February 3, 2025, the court trial on the petition
proceeded before Judge Scott R. Herin. James was present and
represented by appointed counsel. After hearing testimony from
the expert psychiatrist and James, the court found James to be
gravely disabled within the meaning of the LPS, granted the
petition, and appointed the Public Guardian as conservator for
one year.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A proposed conservatee under the LPS has a statutory
right to a jury trial on the petition. By statute, the trial court
was required to personally inform James of his jury trial right.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350, subd. (d)(1); Prob. Code, § 1828,
subd. (a)(6).) At the December 23, 2024 hearing, the trial court
here technically complied with this statutory mandate. However,
the perfunctory advisement and skeletal oral colloquy do not
support a finding James made a knowing and voluntary waiver of
the jury trial right.
In Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, the
Supreme Court explained that LPS proceedings are civil in
nature and that “the laws of civil procedure apply.” (Id. at
p. 147.) John L. concluded any “ ‘analogy between criminal
proceedings and proceedings under the LPS Act is imperfect at
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best and . . . not all of the safeguards required in the former are
appropriate in the latter.’ ” (Id. at p. 151.) Nevertheless, John L.
acknowledged the private interests at stake in an LPS proceeding
are “weighty and deserving of protection.” (Ibid.)
Because of the significant liberty interests involved in civil
commitment proceedings, case law governing criminal
proceedings offers guidance. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of
Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1017–1018 [applying
criminal law standard for assessing jury trial waiver in LPS
proceeding].) James urges us to apply the criminal law standard
for assessing waiver here. We shall do so.
We uphold the validity of a jury waiver by an accused in a
criminal proceeding “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is
voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the
circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991.)
Supreme Court precedent has uniformly rejected requiring that
any specific language or talismanic phrases be used in obtaining
a waiver. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 167.)
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has emphasized “the value of a
robust oral colloquy in evincing a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 169.)
The trial court here was not required to detail all attributes
of a jury trial as compared to a bench trial in order to obtain a
valid waiver. But, the court’s one sentence query was not only
incomplete but confusing. The court asked James only whether
he wanted a court trial with a “bench officer or a jury trial with
12 people in the courtroom.” The court made no effort to clarify
the inapt description of a jury as “12 people in the courtroom.”
Nor did the court identify any essential aspect of a jury trial such
as the jury, as opposed to the judge, being responsible for
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deciding the ultimate question of whether James was gravely
disabled.
In addition, the record indicates James had not been
involved in prior conservatorships or criminal court proceedings,
so we may not presume James had prior knowledge as to what a
jury trial or court trial entails from past personal experiences.
The only other evidence in the record is the brief statement
by James’s counsel that she had spoken with James that
morning, that he had stated his desire to oppose the
conservatorship, and they were making a demand for a trial
setting. We presume the competence of counsel in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 156.)
However, this simple request for a trial setting, unsupported by
any other evidence in the record, is insufficient for us to presume
that counsel and James had the time to fully discuss the
difference between jury trials and court trials to make up for the
dearth of information provided by the court’s advisement.
Moreover, the trial court did not ask whether James spoke to his
counsel about his right to a jury trial.
We could not find any published authority finding a valid
waiver of a jury trial in an LPS proceeding on similar facts.
But, the facts here are similar to People v. Blancett (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1200, which involved a jury waiver in a mentally
disordered offender (MDO) proceeding. There, the defendant’s
appointed counsel requested the matter be set for a court trial.
(Id. at p. 1203.) The court asked the defendant if, as his counsel
had requested, he was “okay with having a judge decide your case
and not a jury” to which the defendant responded “Yes.” (Ibid.)
Blancett reversed, explaining that “[i]n view of the trial court’s
stark colloquy, the lack of evidence that Blancett discussed his
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jury trial right and waiver with counsel, Blancett’s inexperience
with the criminal justice system, and Blancett’s lack of
familiarity with MDO proceedings, we conclude that his waiver
was not knowing and intelligent.” (Id. at pp. 1206–1207.)
The same is true here. The record does not affirmatively
demonstrate James’s waiver of the right to a jury trial on the
petition was knowing and voluntary. We therefore reverse.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the petition for conservatorship is
reversed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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