CourtListener 10763088•People v. Ackerman CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/22/25 P. v. Ackerman CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336242
(Super. Ct. No. BA480314)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
BENJAMIN EITAN
ACKERMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin Eitan Ackerman appeals after a jury convicted
him of three counts of first degree residential burglary (Pen.
Code, § 459)1 with person-present allegations (§ 667.5, subd.
(c)(21)). He contends the trial court erred in: (1) admitting
uncharged and pleaded-to burglaries, as well as evidence of
numerous unspecified other crimes; (2) instructing as it did on
the evidence of uncharged offenses or acts and person-present
allegations; and (3) failing to order or review a presentence
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
probation report before sentencing. He also asserts cumulative
error and a due process violation. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a third amended information, the prosecution charged
appellant and Jason Yaselli with conspiracy to commit money
laundering (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 186.10, subd. (a); one count), first
degree residential burglary with a person other than an
accomplice present (§§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21); three counts),
first degree residential burglary (§ 459; 11 counts), and money
laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a); 28 counts).
Yaselli entered into a cooperation agreement under which
he would receive probation and testify at appellant’s trial.
Appellant entered an open plea to all counts except the three
residential burglaries with person-present allegations (counts 3-
5). He also admitted the white collar enhancement allegation
(§ 186.11, subd. (a)(2)).
The three remaining burglaries proceeded to jury trial. As
to all counts, the jury found appellant guilty and found true the
person-present allegations. The court sentenced him to a total
term of 31 years, 8 months in prison.
Linnea Stalberg Burglary on Ridpath Drive (Count 3)
Linnea Stalberg lived with her family at a home on Ridpath
Drive. Stalberg’s real estate agent, Linda Ferrari, held a broker’s
open house on November 29, 2016. The name “Eitane” or
“Eitone” appeared on the sign-in sheet for that day. Appellant’s
middle name is “Eitan.” That day, appellant texted Yaselli: “I’ve
got Sunday set up for at least 5k . . . .” and “Chanel. Easy out via
yard. Will explain after I’m successful :)”
On Sunday, December 4, 2016, Ferrari held a public open
house. The name “Eiton” appeared on the sign-in sheet for that
day. Ferrari and her colleague would have been inside for the
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entire open house, which went until 4:20 p.m. or 4:30 p.m.
Stalberg testified she and her family returned around 4:30 p.m.
or 4:45 p.m. Stalberg believed Ferrari “was out front.”
Around 7:00 p.m., Stalberg noticed several of her Chanel
purses, worth approximately $20,000, were missing. She later
determined a Louis Vuitton duffel bag and a Givenchy purse
were missing. One of the Chanel purses was recovered from
appellant’s storage unit.
A crime analyst for the sheriff’s department testified
appellant’s phone was in the area of his own residence from 1:52
p.m. to 2:10 p.m. on December 4. From 2:11 p.m. to 3:56 p.m., his
phone did not connect to any cell towers. Between 3:57 p.m. and
4:31 p.m., the phone connected to a tower near Stalberg’s home.
At 4:18 p.m., appellant texted Yaselli: “Call u in 15.” Appellant
had a 12 minute, 20 second phone call with Yaselli beginning at
4:31 p.m. At the end of that call, appellant’s phone was near his
own residence.
Yaselli testified that immediately after the burglary,
appellant called and said he “managed to get out with” purses
and “evaded being seen.”
Shaun Phillips Burglary on Burton Way (Count 4)
Shaun Phillips owned a condominium on Burton Way in
Beverly Hills. His second floor unit was accessible to the public
through an elevator. Phillips’s real estate agent, Chris Jacobs,
held an open house on March 26, 2017, from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00
p.m.
At 3:21 p.m., surveillance video shows appellant walking
up to the front door of the building. He then tries to “jimmy
open” the door with a credit card. At 3:35 p.m., Jacobs lets four
people, including appellant, into the building’s lobby. Jacobs
then brings those people onto the elevator. At 3:45 p.m., three of
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those four people emerge from the elevator into the lobby and
walk toward the exit. At 3:49 p.m., appellant exits the elevator.
The pocket of his hooded sweatshirt was bulging. Appellant then
leaves the building.
Two days later, Phillips realized some property was
missing, including rings and watches. The total value of the
property taken was about $350,000. Law enforcement recovered
one of the rings, one of the watches, and Phillips’s cufflinks at
appellant’s apartment.
In September 2017, appellant texted Yaselli that he saw
Phillips wearing a Cartier watch while appellant was wearing a
watch he stole from Phillips.
Scott Webb Burglary on Rodgerton Drive (Count 5)
In April 2017, Scott Webb listed for sale his home on
Rodgerton Drive. Kate Blackwood, Webb’s real estate agent, held
open houses on Tuesdays and Sundays. Blackwood stayed in the
home for the entirety of these open houses.
Two undated sign-in sheets included the name “Eitan.”
Blackwood recalled that appellant came to the residence on two
days. On both days, he had a backpack. The second day,
Blackwood did not see appellant enter the house. Appellant left
the backpack with Blackwood. “It looked kind of square, like it
had been forced closed, and it was full.”
On Wednesday, May 31, 2017, appellant texted Yaselli he
had “a mark for Sunday” and that “it involves a safe.” On
Sunday, June 4, 2017, appellant texted he obtained a Nikon
camera and a safe containing passports, documents, watch boxes,
$5,000, and two guns. He added: “Agent was upstairs. I put it in
a duffel bag.”
Webb did not realize the safe was missing until June 16,
2017, and he originally believed it was taken that day. Law
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enforcement recovered from appellant’s home several items taken
from Webb’s home.
Other Acts Evidence
The court admitted six pleaded-to and three uncharged
burglaries under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
Each burglary was committed either during or relatively close in
time to an open house. For the three uncharged burglaries,
appellant told Yaselli there was a person present. None of the six
pleaded-to burglaries included person-present allegations.
Evidence admitted to prove the nine burglaries included victim
testimony, text messages, sign-in sheets, and photographs.
DISCUSSION
Other Acts Evidence
Appellant contends “[t]he court erred in admitting evidence
of the six pled-to burglaries on top of the three uncharged
burglaries.” (Bold omitted.) We disagree.
Evidence Code section 1101 “limits the admissibility of so-
called ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’ evidence offered to prove a
person’s conduct on a particular occasion.” (People v. Daveggio
and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822-823.) This rule, however,
does not prohibit admission of crimes or other acts to prove some
other fact, such as intent or common plan. (Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (b).)
“‘The least degree of similarity . . . is required in order to
prove intent.’ [Citation.] For this purpose, ‘the uncharged
misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference
that the defendant “‘probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each
instance.’”’” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 25 (Chhoun).)
“A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove
the existence of a common design or plan.” (People v. Ewoldt
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) “‘To establish the existence of a
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common design or plan, the common features must indicate the
existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous
acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or
unusual’; rather it ‘need only exist to support the inference that
the defendant employed that plan in committing the charged
offense.’” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 712.)
“Even if evidence of the uncharged conduct is sufficiently
similar to the charged crimes to be relevant for a nonpropensity
purpose, the trial court must next determine whether the
evidence’s probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.’” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 26; Evid.
Code, § 352.)
We review admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.) We will not
disturb the trial court’s ruling “‘“‘unless there is a showing that
the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd
manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’”’” (People v.
Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 414.)
Evidence of the nine burglaries was admissible to show
intent. The similarity to the charged offenses certainly supported
the inference that appellant harbored the same intent to commit
theft. The existence of other evidence of intent did not eliminate
the nine burglaries’ probative value. “[I]t is the prosecutor’s
burden to establish every element of the crime, regardless of
whether the defendant offers a defense or not.” (People v. Erskine
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 279, 296-297.) The three uncharged offenses
were particularly relevant because they suggested appellant
intended to commit theft even when another person was present.
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Evidence of the uncharged and pleaded-to burglaries was
also admissible to prove a common plan. The common plan
“standard can be met despite the existence of some factual
differences between or among” the offenses. (Alcala v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1225.) Here, the evidence indicates
appellant committed the charged offenses and the nine burglaries
“pursuant to a common design or plan” to take valuables from
residences with open houses. (People v. Edwards, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 712.) That all the burglaries “were not committed in
exactly the same way”—e.g., only some involved a person
present—did not preclude admission of the nine burglaries on a
common plan theory. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1032; see also Alcala, at p. 1225, fn. omitted [noting Kraft held
the “evidence underlying . . . 16 charged murders ‘generally’
would have been admissible at separate trials” where “‘most’” of
those 16 murders “shared substantial similarities”].)
Regarding Evidence Code section 352, the evidence of the
nine other burglaries was “‘no more inflammatory than the
testimony concerning the charged offenses.’” (People v.
Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 330; see also People v.
Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1380 [court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting “seven separate incidents” of armed
assault].) Moreover, none of the six pleaded-to burglaries
included a person-present allegation, so the jury did not receive
the misleading impression appellant committed burglaries only
with a person present. By contrast, excluding evidence that
another person was present for the three uncharged burglaries
would have created a misleading impression that no one was
present. Given the “substantial probative value with respect to
the issues of intent and a common plan,” the court did not abuse
its discretion. (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1331.)
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Appellant also contends the “trial court erred in admitting
extensive evidence of numerous unspecified other crimes.” (Bold
omitted.) He points, for instance, to text messages apparently
referencing other crimes and photographs of items not obtained
through either the charged offenses or the nine burglaries.
Assuming this contention has not been forfeited, we conclude
admission of such evidence does not rise to the level of a due
process violation rendering appellant’s trial fundamentally
unfair. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) Any error
in admitting this evidence was harmless under state law because
it is not reasonably probable a more favorable outcome would
have been reached absent such error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
Appellant confines his prejudice argument to the person-
present allegations for the three charged burglaries. However,
even as to those allegations, the evidence was overwhelming.
The jury would have reached the same verdicts even if the
“unspecified other crimes” evidence had been excluded. (Bold
omitted.)
Regarding the Stalberg burglary, appellant signed in with
his middle name (or some variation on it), and the realtor
testified she would have been in the home at that time.
Appellant offers a scenario in which he went to the Stalberg
residence before 1:52 p.m. and unlocked doors, then went home,
and then returned at 3:57 p.m. before taking the items. Apart
from the inherent implausibility of this sequence of events, the
evidence does not support it. The cell phone evidence does not
suggest appellant went to the open house in the 1:00 p.m. hour,
and appellant’s middle name (or some variation on it) appears
towards the end of the day’s sign-in sheets, not the beginning.
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Appellant had the requisite intent when he entered the home and
signed in with the realtor present.
Regarding the Phillips burglary, surveillance video showed
the realtor letting appellant into the lobby. As we explain further
below, given appellant’s clear intent to commit theft when he
entered, this circumstance satisfies the person-present allegation.
Finally, the evidence demonstrates realtor Kate Blackwood
was present for the Webb burglary. Blackwood stayed in the
home for the entirety of the open house. She saw appellant with
a backpack that “looked kind of square,” consistent with Webb’s
safe. In a text message, appellant indicated he put the safe in a
duffel bag while the agent was upstairs. Minor inconsistencies in
these accounts and credibility issues pale in comparison to this
powerful evidence.
Claimed Instructional Errors
Appellant contends the jury instructions for the Phillips
burglary erroneously allowed the jury to find the person-present
allegation true even if appellant was present with another person
only in the lobby. The court did not err.
The lobby and Phillips’s unit were both an integrated part
of the condominium building. (See People v. Debouver (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 972, 981 (Debouver) [apartment complex’s secured
underground garage part of “residence” for purposes of person-
present allegation].) The lobby constituted a “residence” for
purposes of the person-present allegation. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)
People v. Singleton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1332, is factually
distinguishable. “There, the defendant burglarized an apartment
while the victim was outside the apartment in an exterior
common area.” (Debouver, at p. 981.)
Appellant argues Debouver reached the wrong result. We
disagree. Even if “residence” and “inhabited dwelling” are not
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identical terms, they can still overlap. Here, the lobby qualifies
as both a residence and an inhabited dwelling.
Appellant challenges the jury instruction regarding the
evidence of uncharged offenses or acts.2 To the extent any error
exists, it was harmless. When factoring in the overwhelming
evidence as outlined above, there is no reasonable probability of a
more favorable outcome absent any error, and any error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d
818; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]
(Chapman).)
Probation Report
Appellant argues the trial court erred by not ordering or
reviewing a presentence probation report prior to sentencing. We
conclude the error was harmless.
A trial court’s failure to order and review a probation report
is subject to harmless error review under Watson. (People v.
Dobbins (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 176, 182.) Here, the court knew
appellant pleaded no contest to most counts, as defense counsel
highlighted this fact. The court heard from appellant and his
2 Modified CALCRIM No. 375 provided, in part, as follows:
“If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged
offenses or acts, you may, but are not required to, consider that
evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether:
A. The defendant acted with the intent to commit the charged
residential burglaries in this case;
B. The defendant knew people were present inside the
residence(s) when he allegedly acted in this case;
C. The defendant had a plan or scheme to commit the offenses
and allegations alleged in this case;
D. The defendant committed the charged burglaries while a
person other than the defendant or an accomplice was
present inside the residence.”
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father, and it also received supporting letters from friends and
family. In explaining the sentence, the court noted
“overwhelming” evidence demonstrated appellant “is a
sophisticated, serial burglar,” appellant’s demeanor at
sentencing, and the aggravating factors. In light of the court’s
thorough assessment, it is not reasonably probable appellant
would have received a more favorable outcome had the court
reviewed a probation report.
Cumulative Error and Due Process
We reject appellant’s cumulative error and due process
arguments. To the extent errors occurred, even when considered
cumulatively, no prejudice exists under either the Watson or
Chapman standards. (Cf. People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539,
627.) Appellant received due process and a fair trial. (Cf. People
v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795.)
We have reviewed the remainder of appellant’s arguments
and conclude he has not shown any grounds for relief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Mark S. Arnold, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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