CourtListener 10761860•People v. Easter CA1/2
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Filed 12/19/25 P. v. Easter CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167502
v.
KEVIN JEROME EASTER, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. 04-00197959-0)
Defendant and Appellant.
On August 7, 2013, Janice Easter was shot five times and killed in the
living room of the home she shared with her husband, defendant Kevin
Easter. In 2015, a jury convicted Easter of her first degree murder, and the
trial court later sentenced him to 65 years, eight months to life in prison. In
2019, we reversed his conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in
failing to reinstate competency proceedings after his trial counsel presented
evidence that he was experiencing new and worsening symptoms of a mental
health condition. (People v. Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 226, 229 (Easter).)
In 2022, Easter was put on trial a second time for Janice’s murder. A
jury again convicted him of first degree murder and possession of a firearm
by a felon, and the trial court sentenced him to 75 years to life in prison.
Easter argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting a computer-aided
dispatch log showing that Pittsburg Police Officer Sibbitt requested a records
check of the murder weapon’s serial number while inside the Easter home on
1
August 4, 2013; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to
evidence regarding the serial number during opening statement; (3) the trial
court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements of the victim as well as
prior incidents of domestic violence between Easter and D.C. under Evidence
Code section 1109; (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing
to object to testimony by Janice’s daughter, Paris Washington, regarding
having seen a firearm in the Easter home; (5) the trial court erred in giving
the jury standard instructions on flight and suppression of evidence as
evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt; (6) the cumulative effect of
the alleged errors requires reversal; and (7) insufficient evidence supports the
jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation in support of Easter’s
conviction for first degree murder. We find these arguments to be without
merit, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The First Trial and Appeal
As we briefly summarized Easter’s first trial and conviction in our 2019
opinion: “On the night of August 7, 2013, Janice Easter, defendant’s wife of
five years, was shot to death in the living room of the home she shared with
defendant. Defendant was arrested shortly after the murder. A March 26,
2014 information charged him with murder with a firearm enhancement and
felon in possession of a firearm, further alleging he had three prior serious
felony convictions and three prior strikes. [¶] . . .
“[I]n May 2014, defense counsel declared a doubt regarding defendant’s
competency to stand trial, and the criminal proceeding was suspended
pending the outcome of a Penal Code section 1368 competency proceeding. In
April 2015, a jury found defendant competent to stand trial, and the homicide
case resumed.
2
“In October 2015, after defense counsel twice unsuccessfully renewed
the issue of defendant’s competency, defendant was tried before a jury, which
found him guilty of first degree murder and found true the personal use of a
firearm allegation. Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant
guilty on the firearm possession charge and found true the prior serious
felony conviction allegations.1 He was sentenced to 65 years eight months to
life in state prison.” (Easter, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.)
On March 13, 2019, we decided defendant’s first direct appeal, agreeing
with his argument that the trial court erred in failing to reinstate
competency proceedings because his counsel had presented substantial
evidence that he was experiencing new and worsened symptoms constituting
a substantial change of circumstances in his mental condition, and reversing
his conviction on that ground. (Easter, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 242–
249.)
The Second Trial
On October 21, 2019, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed
an information again charging Easter with his wife’s murder (Pen. Code2,
§ 187, subd. (a)) (count 1), with an enhancement for intentionally discharging
a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d),
(e)(1)); and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2).
The information further alleged that Easter had four serious or violent prior
1 “Per the prosecutor, because defendant had not waived a jury trial on
the strike allegations and the jury had been discharged, those allegations
were moot.”
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b)–(c)) and two
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Trial began with opening statements on November 7, 2022, and
continued over approximately 12 court days in November and December.
As relevant to the issues on appeal, some of the testimony at Easter’s
second trial was as follows.
In August of 2013, Easter was living with his wife, Janice Easter, on
Army Street in Pittsburg. Easter had recently purchased a Ford F-150
pickup truck from Willy Senn, his neighbor who lived across the street. The
front fender of the truck was painted grey with primer, and the rear portion
was blue.
At approximately 10:24 p.m. on the evening of August 4, Pittsburg
Police Officers Ryan Davis and Mike Sibbitt were dispatched to the Easter
residence in response to a “pocket dial” to 911. When the officers arrived,
Janice was standing in the doorway of the residence pointing and yelling at
Easter, who was in the front yard walking away from the house.
Officer Sibbitt went into the house with Janice and remained inside for
approximately 20 minutes, while Officer Davis waited in the front yard with
Easter.3 While they waited, Officer Davis heard Officer Sibbitt contact
dispatch. And as will be discussed in further detail, the computer-aided
dispatch log of the 911 call indicates that Officer Sibbitt did so in order to
request dispatch run a records check on a firearm with serial number
DW63853.
According to Officer Davis, when Officer Sibbitt returned from inside
the house, they “released [Easter] on scene and then watched him leave
because he was leaving for the night.” And the next morning at 9:34 a.m.,
3 Officer Davis testified at trial, but Officer Sibbitt did not.
4
Easter sent a text message to Janice (listed in his phone as “Wife”) that read,
“Can you tell someone to let me in, please?”
On the evening of August 7, Willy Senn was in his front room with the
door open watching television when he “heard one shot go off across the
street.” Senn called 911 and reported the shot, and then “got up and went
out to the front door and went out onto the front porch.” Senn then “heard
three more shots go off” and started walking across the street. When he got
to the middle of the street, he saw a “truck drive off at a high speed.” He did
not see the driver, but he recognized the truck as belonging to Easter because
he had sold it to him a “[w]eek or two” prior. Another neighbor, Jovan
Pervoe, saw a bald black male with a beard exit the Easter home, lock the
door, and drive away.4
Other neighbors on Army Street also heard gunshots. Marisa Avila
was on her way to her car when she heard a single gunshot, followed by a
female scream. She ran back inside her house and told Pervoe, her husband,
“I think somebody got shot.” She then heard two additional gunshots. And
Margarita Reyes heard one gunshot, followed by a “pause” of “a few seconds,”
and then several more gunshots. Jose Roman was taking the trash out with
his mother when he heard “just one” gunshot, and “seconds” later, several
more.
Senn went across the street to Easter’s house and found the door
locked. He knocked, but no one answered. Soon police officers began to
arrive, and at 11:21 p.m. they forced entry to the house by kicking the door
down. Inside, they found Janice on the couch with multiple gunshot wounds
to her torso and a “faint pulse.” Various belongings were gathered on and
4 At Easter’s 2015 trial, Pervoe identified this man as Easter, and in
2022, testified that Easter “looked similar.”
5
around the couch, including a toolbox and a shoebox. Officers administered
first aid, which was continued by paramedics when they arrived, but Janice
died shortly thereafter of blood loss.
One of Janice’s daughters, Tasha Sargent, testified that earlier that
evening, around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., she and her children went by the Easter
house and stayed for about 45 minutes. When Sargent asked her mother
about Easter, Janice said “[h]e was not there,” and seemed “tense.” When the
prosecutor showed Sargent a photograph of her mother’s living room as the
police found it after the murder, with various items on and around the couch,
Sargent identified the items as belonging to Easter and stated that “my mom
would never have things out like that on the couch.”
Paris Washington, Sargent’s older sister, also visited the Easter home
on August 7, first at 8:00 a.m. and later at 1:00 p.m., each time in order to
deliver some money to her. She also called her mother around 5:00 p.m. that
evening to “remind her I was going to Vegas the next day and tell her about
my hair and having girl talk.” When the prosecutor asked, “In the time that
you knew defendant Kevin Easter living [on] Army Street, did you ever see a
firearm in the house?,” Washington answered, “Yes,” and when asked, “Did
you tell your mom anything about that firearm,” she answered, “I told her
that she needed to somehow, some way get it out of the house because I
believed it was a dangerous situation.”
Meanwhile, around 3:00 a.m. the morning after the murder, Easter
knocked on the door of his cousin, George Neal, on Linda Vista Avenue in
Pittsburg. Easter told Neal that he had been in Stockton, that “someone had
called him and said that his wife had been shot,” and asked if Neal would
take him to the police station. Neal did so, and Easter left behind some keys,
his cell phone, and his cell phone battery on Neal’s coffee table.
6
Dr. Arnold Josselson, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on
Janice on August 9, 2013. According to his testimony, Janice had been shot
five times, but sustained six gunshot wounds because one of the bullets
entered and exited her body twice. Three of those shots were fatal because
they “went through the chest,” causing a great deal of blood loss, such that
Janice “essentially . . . bled to death.” Dr. Josselson opined that Janice would
have become unconscious “within less than five minutes” of being shot, and
would have died “in less than ten minutes or so.”
On December 12, 2013, a city worker retrieved a Taurus revolver from
a storm drain at Front Street and Odessa Avenue in Pittsburg, around the
corner from Neal’s house on Linda Vista Avenue. The revolver contained five
casings but no live rounds, and was marked with serial number DW63853.
The Taurus revolver could hold up to five bullets of two types: .38
special cartridges and .357–magnum cartridges. Ten .38-caliber bullets were
found in Easter’s home. After test firing the revolver, Contra Costa County
Deputy Sheriff Criminalist Eric Collins opined that the revolver “more likely
than not” fired four of the five bullets recovered from the crime scene, and
that it was “possible” it fired the fifth bullet as well, although “[t]here was
just not enough detail there to draw a conclusion.”
The Jury Deliberations and Verdict
On December 7, after having deliberated for less than two hours, the
jury found Easter guilty of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by
a felon, and found the firearm enhancement true.
On December 12, after the prosecutor dismissed one of the prior strike
allegations as duplicative, the trial court found the remaining three prior
strike allegations and the two prior serious felony convictions true.
7
Sentencing
At sentencing on February 17, 2023, the trial court struck the firearm
enhancement and the two five-year prior serious felony enhancements in the
interests of justice under section 1385. The trial court then sentenced Easter
to 25 years to life on the first degree murder conviction, tripled by operation
of the Three Strikes Law to 75 years to life, and to the middle term of two
years on count 2, but stayed execution of the sentence on that count pursuant
to section 654, resulting in a total indeterminate term of 75 years to life.
Easter filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. There Was No Prejudicial Error With Respect to Evidence of
Officer Sibbitt’s Request that Dispatch Run a Check for the Murder
Weapon’s Serial Number
Additional Background
As one of his motions in limine, defense counsel moved to exclude “the
record of radio communications generated by Officer Sibbitt on or about
8/4/13 . . . unless and until the reliability of . . . Officer Sibbitt[] is
established.” The trial court took the matter under submission. Two days
later, in discussing the motion with counsel, the trial court stated, “[t]his is
one of these types of motions where I need to see what happens at trial and
what foundation, if any, is laid. I need to see how [the prosecutor] is going to
try and introduce this evidence, if at all, by what mode. So please object at
the time if you think he’s doing so and in an improper way. There is no
substantive ruling for me to make . . . [¶] . . . [¶]. . . one way or another at this
time.”
Several days later when defense counsel again raised the issue, the
trial court stated, “I’m completely fine at some point working in argument or
even a [Evidence Code section] 402 hearing, if needed, to address that so that
8
both sides have clear guidance from me about opening statements . . . [b]ut
let’s not delay jury proceedings further today.” The trial court made a “note
to myself that this is a lingering in limine issue that we have to resolve.”
The next day, defense counsel again raised the issue of the motion, and
the parties offered brief argument, with the prosecutor arguing that even if
Officer Sibbitt did not testify, the CAD log was still admissible under the
business record exception to the hearsay rule, and defense counsel arguing
that the evidence was not admissible as a business record unless there were
independent indicia of Officer Sibbitt’s reliability. The trial court then ruled
that “to the extent the defense is seeking an advisory ruling from me now
excluding this evidence without first a [Evidence Code section] 402 hearing
where Sibbitt appears to establish independent reliability, that’s denied,” but
“without prejudice . . . to . . . waiting for the record to occur.”5
On the first day of trial, during the testimony of Erinn Riley—the
dispatch supervisor for the Contra Costa Sheriff’s Department—the
prosecutor asked several questions about the background of computer-aided
dispatch logs, and then showed Riley an exhibit Riley described as “a CAD log
dated 8/4 of ’13.” Defense counsel objected on hearsay and foundation
5 The trial court explained: “A lot has to play out for me to make a final
determination here. Assuming that Mr. Sanders can lay a foundation for the
CAD log as a business record . . . which simply records that certain events
happened and that the people entering this data into the system were under
a business duty to do so, I don’t presumptively see, assuming that can be laid,
an admissibility problem per say. But I also don’t know whether Officer
Sibbitt will be brought to the stand or not. I don’t know whether Officer
Davis will be brought to the stand, what he might testify to. I don’t know
whether they’ll simply be relying on the document to prove that this event
occurred. In other words, this serial number was read into police dispatch by
Officer Sibbitt. Or whether they’re asking me to accept it for its truth and let
the jury accept it for its implied truth, that he looked at a particular gun in
the house at that point, and it had a particular number on it.”
9
grounds. After the prosecutor indicated that he was “moving to introduce the
exhibit to establish that certain actions were taken by law enforcement at
given times,” and “not seeking to admit [any potential hearsay content] for its
truth,” the trial court overruled the objection, and immediately admonished
the jury that they should consider the exhibit “as a record of what various
officers did and the time that they did it on the night of,” but were “not to
consider it for its truth.”6
When the prosecutor asked Riley about Officer Sibbitt’s request that
dispatch query a firearm’s serial number, defense counsel again objected on
hearsay grounds, and eventually made a standing objection, which objections
the trial court overruled, “[f]or the limited purposes I mentioned.”7 Riley
then testified that, according to the CAD log, while inside the Easter
residence, Officer Sibbitt asked dispatch to query a firearm with serial
number DW63853.
6 The trial court’s full admonition was as follows:
“Ladies and gentlemen, I’m admitting the exhibit. For the current
purposes, you can consider it as a record of what various officers did and the
time that they did it on the night of. If there’s anything in the log where the
officers are relating a statement or information that implies that they took a
statement or did something off record, you’re not to consider it for its truth.
“So as a record of the officers doing certain things at a given time, it’s
admitted for that purpose only at this point over objection. And we can
reserve further sidebar if we need to expand the admissibility of the exhibit.
It is in. It’s admitted.”
7 The trial court’s admonition was as follows:
“Folks, I’m allowing the answer as a record of what Officer Sibbitt did
at that time. To the extent the substance of the answer implies that Officer
Sibbitt did or spoke to people at the scene, received certain information,
you’re not to consider that for its truth since we don’t have Officer Sibbitt
here. But as a record of what he did at the time, I’m admitting it over
objection.”
10
The next day, defense counsel sought to make sure that his objection to
admission of the CAD log was in the record, and the prosecutor responded
that the log “was I believe admitted under [Evidence Code sections] 1271 and
1280 . . . since the custodian of records testified and she was person who
authenticated it back in 2013.” The trial court indicated that “my ruling
yesterday admitting the CAD log stands,” but without prejudice to defense
counsel “renew[ing] a motion to strike later in the trial if Mr. Sanders [the
prosecutor] doesn’t establish the relevance or if you’re worried that the
lingering potential hearsay value will still be considered by the jury.”
Later, after the close of the prosecution’s case, defense counsel asked to
“renew[] our hearsay and foundation objections to strike the serial number
that was transmitted” because “[t]here is now no foundation that’s been put
in as to what it was describing, a business record, what condition or event it’s
describing, as required.” After the trial court twice confirmed that defense
counsel was not asking “to strike the CAD log from the record entirely and
instruct the jury to disregard it,” but rather to have the court “strike the
serial number itself and to admonish the jury about it,” the prosecutor argued
that the relevance of the serial number was “circumstantial evidence of the
hole in the ground of the floor found later,”8 and “of the ammunition found in
the residence three days later.”
The trial court “agree[d] with [defense counsel] on this,” concluded that
“[t]he relevance, if any, for a circumstantial chain of reasoning is minimal;
and it’s exceeded in large part by substantial risk of prejudice,” and indicated
that “I’m going to grant the defense motion and will re-admonish the jury
about that,” “the fact that [Officer Sibbitt] ran a firearm, let alone, a firearm
8 Tasha Sargent had testified that, at some unspecified time, she saw a
small hole in the floor of the living room in the Easter home.
11
with that serial number . . . will be stricken,” and “[t]he jury will be directed
to disregard those.” The trial court concluded that “[t]he rest of the CAD
log . . . is admissible.”
The trial court later admonished the jury as follows:
“Folks, there’s one exhibit, People’s 16. It was characterized as what’s
called a CAD log. It is a record of police activity heading to the Easter
residence a few days before the death. So on August 4, 2013, you may
remember that. I did admit the exhibit at the time, although I gave you some
directions to limit your consideration of its contents a bit. [¶] . . . [¶]
“At this time, based on how the trial evolved and the rest of the
evidence played out, this remains in evidence. You still can consider it. It’s
still admissible evidence.
“However, the testimony that—the part of this exhibit and the
testimony relating to it where you received testimony that Officer Sibbitt
requested, at a time when he was in the home on the detail, to run a records
check on a particular firearm of a particular serial number. The fact that he
requested while in the home that a registration be done on a firearm, period,
let alone a firearm of a particular serial number, that’s stricken from the
record in its entirety on my order. You must disregard that information that
you heard during the course of the trial. You cannot consider it for any
purpose.
“So to the extent that’s written in here or mentioned in here or that
there was testimony about that on the record, it is stricken. You must
disregard it. I won’t go into the reasons why we did not hear from Officer
Sibbitt in this trial. But bottom line is, the evidence that you received
relating to the CAD log, both the testimony explaining it and the contents of
the log itself, it remains admissible, but for, the testimony and contents
12
asserting that Officer Sibbitt requested that records check on a particular
firearm of a particular serial number. The rest of it is in.
“So if Officer Sibbitt is mentioned as someone in that exhibit who went
to the scene and you heard that from other officers as well, that remains
admissible evidence. But his act of requesting a firearm be run for
registration of a particular serial number is stricken. You must disregard it
for all purposes and not consider it at all during your deliberations.”
The trial court then polled the jury, asking whether there was any juror
who did “not understand my order” or “cannot follow that order,” and no
jurors raised their hand.9
Discussion
Easter argues that the trial court “should have realized” earlier that
the CAD log would ultimately be inadmissible and irrelevant for any non-
hearsay purpose, and that in “ruling that it would need to wait until the
court learned whether the prosecutor ‘is going to try and introduce this
evidence,’ ” the trial court caused incurable prejudice to the defense. He also
argues that the testimony regarding the serial number violated his rights
9 Later, as part of the jury instructions prior to deliberations, the trial
court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 303 as follows:
“During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.
“So just as one example, folks, I may have at certain points . . . allowed
you to consider some hearsay testimony only for its impact on the witness
and whether they did subsequent investigation but not for the truth of the
statements of the out-of-court witnesses. That’s one example of
circumstances during trial where I limited your consideration of testimony
for certain purposes. So, again, you’re bound by those rulings throughout
trial.”
13
under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford).
The Attorney General makes several arguments in response. First, he
argues that Easter has forfeited any argument that the trial court’s
admonitions to the jury were insufficient to cure any prejudice by failing to so
argue to the trial court, and by failing to move for a mistrial or a new trial on
this basis. Second, he argues that the CAD log itself was admissible under
the business record exception to the hearsay rule, and that Officer Sibbitt’s
request that dispatch run a records check on serial number DW63853 was
just a request, that a request has no truth or falsity to it, and therefore it
cannot be hearsay. Third, he argues that the trial court had discretion under
Evidence Code section 403 to conditionally admit the evidence while
preserving the option to later strike it if the prosecution failed to demonstrate
its relevance. Fourth, he argues that Easter’s rights under Crawford were
not violated. Fifth and finally, he argues that any error was harmless.
To begin with, we agree that Easter has forfeited his argument. As
noted, the trial court ultimately granted defense counsel’s motion along with
the relief requested, admonishing the jury that “[t]he fact that [Officer
Sibbitt] requested while in the home that a registration [check] be done on a
firearm, period, let alone a firearm of a particular serial number” was
“stricken from the record in its entirety,” and that the jury must “disregard”
it and “not consider it for any purpose.” Defense counsel did not argue below
this admonition was insufficient to avoid any potential prejudice, nor did he
request a different admonition. (See People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622,
728 [“To the extent defendant contends on appeal that the trial court’s
admonition was insufficient, he forfeited such a claim by failing to request a
different admonition”].) And if Easter believed that he had suffered prejudice
14
incurable by admonition, it was incumbent upon him to move for a mistrial
on that basis.10 “[A] defendant who receives a curative admonition, but who
makes no other objection and seeks no other action, may not complain on
appeal. Defendant may not argue that the court should have granted a
mistrial he did not request . . . .” (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344,
368; see People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 965 [same].) Easter did
neither, and accordingly his argument is forfeited. Likewise with respect to
Easter’s confrontation clause argument, which he never raised at all before
the trial court. (See People v. Lewis & Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1028, fn.
19; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186 [confrontation clause
argument waived where “[t]here was neither a ‘specific’ nor ‘timely’ objection
below predicated on the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause”].)11
10 On reply, Easter asserts that “no rule or precedent exists that
requires a criminal defendant to move for a mistrial upon the introduction of
inadmissible evidence, particularly when the evidence was admitted
pursuant to an earlier ruling of the trial court,” going on to cite authority
regarding the standard of our review of the denial of a motion for a mistrial,
and concluding, with no citation to authority, that “[t]he fact that trial
counsel opted not to move for a mistrial as a tactical matter is irrelevant.”
But Easter did not move for a mistrial, and so it is the standard of our review
of such a motion that is “irrelevant,” not the fact that Easter did not file such
a motion at all—which, as discussed, is not irrelevant but indeed, dispositive.
11 On reply, Easter argues that his argument is not forfeited because
“[o]nce the trial court had ruled how it intended to proceed[], to do more than
defense counsel had already done in objecting to the introduction of the
evidence would have been futile.” But we do not understand how this can be
the case, given that the trial court expressly reserved making a final decision
on the issue in order to see how the prosecution would develop the record,
and once it had done so, agreed in full with defense counsel’s position.
In addition—and for the first time—on reply, Easter argues that his
confrontation clause argument is not forfeited, relying on People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 and asserting that his argument is “merely an
expansion of the argument made at trial.” We decline to consider this
15
In any event, Easter’s argument fails on its merits. Because the trial
court admonished the jury not to consider the statement at issue for its truth
from the moment it was introduced into evidence, and ultimately ordered the
jury to “disregard” it entirely and not to “consider it for any purpose,”
Easter’s argument depends entirely on the assumption that the jury failed to
obey those instructions. But the law is pellucidly clear that we must assume
the opposite. As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Homick (2012) 55
Cal.4th 816: “ ‘Any prejudice that the challenged information may have
threatened must be deemed to have been prevented by the court’s limiting
instruction to the jury. We presume that jurors comprehend and accept the
court’s directions. [Citation.] We can, of course, do nothing else. The crucial
assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors
generally understand and faithfully follow instructions.’ ” (Id. at pp. 866–
867; see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 [“The presumption is
that limiting instructions are followed by the jury”]; People v. Lindberg (2008)
45 Cal.4th 1, 26; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107.)
Thus, as our Supreme Court stated in People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137,
in words equally applicable here, “the jury was repeatedly instructed that
they were not to consider [the alleged hearsay] statements for the truth of the
matter asserted . . . [and] [w]e presume that the jury followed the court’s
argument, raised for the first time in Easter’s reply brief. (See People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 [“It is axiomatic that arguments made for
the first time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness
to the other party”].) In any event, as we next discuss, because we must
assume the jury did not consider the statement for its truth, his confrontation
clause argument fails on the merits. (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th
665, 681 [“Neither the hearsay doctrine nor the confrontation clause is
implicated when an out-of-court statement is not received to prove the truth
of a fact it asserts”].)
16
instructions.” (Id. at p. 190; see People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663,
705 [“Absent affirmative evidence in the record showing otherwise, we
presume the jury followed the court’s instruction and considered [the
testimony] only for its [limited purpose] and not for its truth”].) Easter has
pointed to nothing in the record that would overcome that presumption
here.12
12 The four cases Easter cites in arguing that limiting instructions may
not be effectual could not be more inapposite. He begins with colorful
language from United States v. Garza (5th Cir. 1979) 608 F.2d 659, 666:
“ ‘[I]f you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can’t instruct the jury not to
smell it.’ ” But that case involved extensive inappropriate commentary by the
prosecutor in closing argument regarding the “critical credibility choice” faced
by the jury, in which “he introduced for the jury’s consideration his own
personal opinion as to this choice, suggested the existence of information
beyond that presented at trial to support his witnesses’ credibility, and
sought to use the status and influence of the entire government investigatory
apparatus to bolster the believability of his case,” such that it was
“impossible to imagine this strategy did not have substantial influence on the
jury.” (Id. at pp. 665–666.) This case is a far cry. And Justice Jackson’s
concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 440, in
which he wrote that “[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instruction to the jury [citation], all practicing lawyers know to
be unmitigated fiction,” was discussing the “difficult situation” faced by a
defendant charged with conspiracy “proved by evidence that is admissible
only upon assumption that conspiracy existed,” not the ordinary evidentiary
admonition at issue here. (Id. at p. 453 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.).) The third
case cited by Easter—People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897—concluded
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence the defendant and
his witnesses were affiliated with a youth gang, where there was no limiting
instruction at all. (Id. at p. 904.) And in People v. Gibson (1976) 56
Cal.App.3d 119, the Court of Appeal concluded that testimony regarding
defendant’s prior criminal acts should have been excluded under Evidence
Code section 352, and that the resulting prejudice was not cured by
instructing the jury that it could consider the evidence for intent and motive
but not propensity. (Id. at pp. 127–131.) But our Supreme Court has
explained that prior bad acts evidence “may be highly inflammatory” (People
v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602) and “ ‘is so prejudicial that its admission
17
2. The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct in Referring to
the Serial Number in Opening Statement
Easter argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he “kept
silent during the in limine motions and also later during trial when the
subject arose of whether Officer Sibbitt would be available to testify,”
although “the record discloses he could not possibly have not been aware that
Sibbitt would not testify.” According to Easter, this is so because of “the fact
that Officer Sibbitt did not testify at the first trial and had indicated his
intention to invoke his rights under the Fifth Amendment and the prosecutor
provided no reason from which it could be adduced that that issue had been
resolved.”
“[A] prosecutor’s ‘misbehavior “violates the federal Constitution when it
comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach that level nevertheless
constitutes misconduct under state law, but only if it involves the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or jury.’ [Citation.]
When, as here, misconduct is asserted ‘based on the prosecutor’s comments
before the jury, “ ‘the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an
objectionable fashion.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102,
184 (Nadey).)
Generally, prosecutorial misconduct claims are forfeited unless the
defendant makes a timely and specific objection at trial and requests that the
jury be admonished to disregard the improper statements. (Nadey, supra, 16
requires extremely careful analysis’ ” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380,
404), distinguishing Gibson from the case before us.
18
Cal.5th at p. 185.) “Failure to raise a timely objection and request an
admonition will be excused only ‘ “if doing either would have been futile, or if
an admonition would not have cured the harm.” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “[a]
defendant claiming that one of these exceptions applies must find support for
his or her claim in the record. [Citation.] The ritual incantation that an
exception applies is not enough.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Because defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s mention of
the serial number during opening statement, his argument is forfeited.
(Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 185.) In any event, it fails on the merits.
Easter’s brief contends that the prosecutor not only “kept
silent . . . when the subject arose of whether Officer Sibbitt would be
available to testify,” but “[i]ndeed, he even affirmatively indicated that he
expected that the former officer would be available to testify,” with citation to
pages 3307 and 3308 of the reporter’s transcript. But this is simply a
misrepresentation of the record. The cited pages contain the prosecutor’s
representation that “Officer Davis is available” to testify, but no
representation by the prosecutor regarding Officer Sibbitt.
Easter also asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he
“extensively discussed the fact of the weapon being found” during opening
statements, although he does not provide any citations to the record in
support of this assertion, which is fatal to his argument. (See California
Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1), (a)(1)(C) [“Each brief must . . . [s]upport any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears”]; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [“ ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the
19
necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have
been waived’ ”].)13
In support of his argument, Easter relies on the rule that “[i]t
is . . . misconduct for a prosecutor to make remarks in opening statements or
closing arguments that refer to evidence determined to be inadmissible in a
previous ruling of the trial court.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839;
see People v. Fusaro (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 877, 886 [“[t]he deliberate asking
of questions calling for inadmissible and prejudicial answers is misconduct”].)
But “ ‘ “remarks made in an opening statement cannot be charged as
misconduct unless the evidence referred to by the prosecutor ‘was “so
patently inadmissible as to charge the prosecutor with knowledge that it
could never be admitted.” ’ ” ’ (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 762.)”
(People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 72.) Obviously, this rule is inapplicable
here, where the trial court had not only never ruled that the evidence was
inadmissible, but instead had expressly reserved decision on that issue.14
13 In fact, the prosecutor only twice referenced the serial number during
opening statement, telling the jury that “Officer Sibbitt . . . made contact to
the dispatcher requesting a serial number check for DW63853,” and later
that a city worker “retrieved an item which the officers collected, seized into
evidence. And it was a revolver. The serial number DW63853.”
14 Given our conclusion that there was no misconduct, we need not reach
the three-part test for prejudice relied on by Easter and set forth in People v.
Barajas (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809: “First, was an objection lodged or a
motion in limine made? [Citations.] Second, was the jury informed by the
court or by the prosecution opening statement is not evidence? [Citations.]
Third, did opening statement result in a violation of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation?” But we observe that no part of that test
is satisfied here. Defense counsel never sought to limit the prosecutor’s
opening statement, nor did he object during the statement itself. Just before
opening statements began, the trial court told the jury, “The statements of
counsel are not evidence themselves, but this is their opportunity to frame for
you kind of a summary of what they think the evidence will show.” And as
20
3. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err in Admitting
Certain Hearsay Statements by Janice Easter and Easter’s Prior Acts
of Domestic Violence Against D.C. under Evidence Code Section 1109
Before trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to admit testimony from
Tasha Sargent regarding two statements allegedly made by Janice: (1)
Sargent’s proffered testimony that Janice told her, in response to a question
about where Easter was on August 7, 2013, that “they had been arguing over
the weekend and she kicked him out,” pursuant to the hearsay exception for
a declarant’s then-existing state of mind (Evid. Code, § 1250); and (2)
Sargent’s proffered testimony that a “couple months prior” to August 7,
Janice told her that she “awoke to find [Easter] standing over her with a
baseball bat threatening to kill her,” and that he told Janice “he was going to
kill her with the bat and nobody would know she was dead in the house,”
pursuant to the hearsay exceptions for state of mind and a threat of infliction
of injury (Evid. Code, § 1370).
Two Out-of-Court Statements of Janice Easter
With respect to Janice Easter’s first statement, the trial court denied
the prosecution’s motion to admit it, finding that “even if offered for the
reason requested by the People to prove the defendant’s state of mind,
motive, or conduct on that particular day, I would have to assume or the jury
would have to find the statement itself to be true that they had a fight of
some sort, an argument, and that she actually kicked him out.” The court
denied the motion without prejudice to the prosecution “attempting to prove
already discussed, because the jury was instructed not to consider the
statement at issue for its truth, and ultimately to disregard it altogether, the
confrontation clause is not implicated. (See People v. Sanchez, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 681 [“Neither the hearsay doctrine nor the confrontation clause
is implicated when an out-of-court statement is not received to prove the
truth of a fact it asserts”].)
21
what the defendant’s state of mind was through other circumstantial
evidence,” in which case the trial court indicated that “then, with a limiting
instruction that it couldn’t be considered for its truth but only for effect on
hearer, I would consider admitting it.”
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court concluded that
the statement should not be admitted for its truth, but that it could
potentially be admissible to show Janice’s state of mind, provided that
testimony established that the statement was made on the day of the murder
and that Easter’s clothing “was moved to the couch because that’s what [the
prosecutor is] trying to explain.” The trial court then advised defense counsel
that “if the evidence at trial doesn’t come out the way that [the prosecutor]
predicts, you can renew your objection at that time and I’ll make a ruling on
the spot.”
With respect to Sargent’s testimony regarding Janice’s statement
describing the incident with the baseball bat, after again hearing argument
from counsel, the trial court concluded that the statement could not be
admitted for its truth, but could presumptively be admitted under Evidence
Code section 1250, “again, assuming [the prosecutor] can establish the
relevance of her state of mind towards the defendant and to explain conduct
relating to the homicide day . . . without prejudice to [defense counsel]
making a contemporaneous objection at time of trial.”
A few days later, defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s determination that Janice’s statement about the baseball bat
was admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1250. The next day, after
hearing further argument, the trial court denied the motion.
Before Sargent’s testimony, defense counsel renewed his objection to
her proffered testimony regarding the incident with the baseball bat, and the
22
trial court responded that “I think we need to wait and see what happens,”
and that “at the time [the prosecutor] ask[s] the questions soliciting that
evidence, the onus is on the defense to object if it thinks insufficient
foundation has been laid and we’ll take it from there.”
Sargent then went on to testify in relevant part as follows:
“Q. When you were with your mom that day on the 7th, that evening
talking to her, did you ask her about Kevin?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And did she indicate whether or not she was arguing with Kevin
that day?
“A. I don’t recall.
“Q. Has your mom ever kicked Kevin out of the house?
“A. Yes.
“MR. SANDERS [prosecutor]: Your Honor, may we approach in
chambers very briefly?”
After a brief sidebar held off the record, her testimony resumed:
“Q. Ms. Sargent, did you ever have a conversation with your mom in
which she told you about an incident in which Kevin Easter threatened her
with an object?
“A. Yes.
“MR. BURACK: Your Honor, at this point, as the Court has instructed
we’re going to lodge our objection under the grounds of relevance, not
appropriate, Evidence Code 1250 evidence, as well as foundation.
“THE COURT: Okay. Consistent with our previous discussions,
Counsel, both sidebar and before, the objection is overruled.
“Folks, I’m going to allow some inquiry by Mr. Sanders with Ms.
Sargent into a brief conversation that she may have had with her mother
23
about a prior incident involving Mr. Easter. This—the answers provided by
Ms. Sargent may only be used by you as it might explain Ms. Easter’s state of
mind at the time of these events, the previous event and potentially leading
up to the evening of her death. You cannot accept and use the testimony as
evidence for its truth that there was a prior incident, that certain things
happened, that Mr. Easter may or may not have done things to her. That’s
hearsay. You cannot use it for that purpose. Okay. There’s no witness for
that. Ms. Easter will not testify to that. And my understanding is there will
be no witness who can testify to that.
“So while you’re allowed to receive this testimony over defense
objection, you’re not allowed to use and accept it for its truth that there was a
prior incident of this nature. You can use it as a statement by Ms. Easter to
her daughter about Ms. Easter’s state of mind about the state of the
relationship with Mr. Easter.
“Everyone understand? [¶] A lot of nodding heads. [¶] All right. With
that limitation, the objection is overruled. I’ll allow the objection to remain
standing for this subject matter, Mr. Burack, so you don’t have to repeat it
each time.”
Sargent went on to testify that in November of 2012, Janice told her
that Easter threatened her with a baseball bat, and “told her he would take
the bat and beat her to death, lock her in the house, and no one would find
her.”
Discussion
We review the trial court’s ruling on whether to admit evidence, along
with its determination of issues concerning the hearsay rule, for abuse of
discretion (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590), that is, we ask
whether the ruling “ ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” (People v. Osband
24
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666.) And we easily conclude that the trial court’s
ruling here did not.
According to the prosecution’s motions in limine, Sargent’s proffered
testimony was that on August 7, 2013—the day of the murder—she “asked
her mother where Kevin (defendant) was, to which Ms. Easter responded
‘they had been arguing over the weekend and she kicked him out.’ ” But
Sargent’s testimony on this point was ultimately only the answer “Yes” to the
question, “Has your mom ever kicked Kevin out of the house?” The parties
dispute whether Janice’s statement to Sargent that she had thrown Easter
out of the house qualifies for the hearsay exception for a “statement of the
declarant’s then existing state of mind” (Evid. Code, § 1250). But Sargent’s
testimony as it ultimately took place did not contain any statement by Janice,
and was therefore not hearsay. (See Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a) [“ ‘Hearsay
evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated”], emphasis added.)
As for Sargent’s testimony to Janice’s statement that Easter told her
“he would take the bat and beat her to death, lock her in the house, and no
one would find her,” just before this testimony, the trial court admonished
the jury that it could “only be used by you as it might explain Ms. Easter’s
state of mind at the time of these events,” and could not “use the testimony as
evidence for its truth that there was a prior incident, that certain things
happened, that Mr. Easter may or may not have done things to her.” The
Attorney General concedes that the statement was not admissible pursuant
to Evidence Code section 1250 as “a statement of the declarant’s then existing
state of mind,” (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)), but argues it was admissible as
evidence of a prior act of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section
25
1109. On reply, Easter argues that prior domestic violence must still be
proved by admissible evidence, with citation to People v. Gobert (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 676, 682, 684: “[Evidence Code s]ection 1109, subdivision (a)(1)
is not a hearsay exception. Nor does it independently authorize the
admission of hearsay. . . . [¶] . . . . ¶] [E]vidence . . . [of] Gobert’s past acts of
domestic violence is only relevant to show Gobert’s propensity to commit
future acts if the past abuse occurred—that is, only if the declarant’s
statements are true. Because the use of this evidence to show propensity
under section 1109 was inadmissible hearsay, and any nonhearsay use of the
evidence was not relevant, the trial court erred in allowing it.”
We think Easter has the better of this argument. However, we
conclude that he has failed to demonstrate prejudice from the alleged error.
“Even if a trial court abuses its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence, we
do not reverse unless there is a reasonable probability the defendant would
have achieved a more favorable result absent the out-of-court statement.”
(People v. Lozano (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 366, 381–382, citing People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) 15 As noted, just before Sargent
testified to the statement, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider it
for its truth, and as already extensively discussed, we presume the jury
followed those instructions. (See People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp.
866–867; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 725.) And the sum total of
Easter’s argument regarding prejudice is that admission of the statement
“was prejudicial in that it was used by the prosecutor, along with all the
propensity evidence improperly admitted, to argue that appellant had a
‘motive’ to commit the crime which led to his argument that the murder was
15 Easter does not contend that any other standard of prejudice is
applicable.
26
of the first degree.” But the prosecutor’s argument regarding motive was
that Easter killed Janice because she was “in the beginning stages of the
process” of “kicking him out.” As to this, the prosecution relied on the
photograph of Easter’s belongings gathered around the couch at the time of
the murder, together with Sargent’s testimony that “my mom would never
have things out like that on the couch.” The fact of Janice’s statement
regarding the baseball bat incident added little to nothing to this evidence—if
anything, it spoke only to Janice’s motive in asking Easter to move out.16 We
conclude that Easter has failed to demonstrate a “reasonable probability
[of] . . . a more favorable result” had the testimony not been admitted.
(People v. Lozano, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 381–382.)
Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Involving D.C.
The prosecution also moved in limine to admit evidence of two incidents
of prior domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109: (1) a
March 2005 incident with respect to D.C.—whom Easter was “dating off and
on for approximately 10 years” and with whom he had two children—that in
March 2005 Easter threw a coffee table and metal plant holder at D.C.; and
(2) that in November of that year, D.C. saw Easter in a parking lot and he
confronted her, called her “a slut, whore, and bitch,” drove after her when she
walked away, got out of his car and “punched her in the head and kicked her
in the thigh and stomach,” and subsequently “went to her residence
and . . . began punching and kicking [her] until she fell to the ground and
16 Indeed, the prosecutor’s only reference to the statement in his closing
argument discussed it in terms of Janice’s motive: “I mean, according to
Paris, she described her mom telling her that defendant threatened to kill
her with a bat and that he would look [sic] the door and no one would know.
That evidence you can use to understand Janice’s state of mind as to why
she’s kicking the defendant out of this house, why she’s trying to make her
home safe.”
27
curled into the fetal position.” On April 24, 2006, as a result of this second
incident, Easter was convicted by plea of misdemeanor corporal injury to a
cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)).
The trial court ultimately ruled that both incidents involving D.C. were
admissible under Evidence Code section 1109 as prior acts of domestic
violence. The court found that the two incidents were “not so remote in
time . . . to not be probative,” that they were “probative to . . . counter the
argument that any violence committed against the incident in this case was a
one-off situation,” that they “support the idea that there was a domestic
violence propensity on the defendant’s part,” that they were “less serious
than the charges before the Court, which is murder with a firearm,” which
“cuts in favor of admitting them and undercuts the potential prejudicial value
of them.” The court further found that the incidents would not involve an
undue consumption of time because “they could be proven with one witness
alone, [D.C.]” The trial court also ruled that the prosecution could “use the
actual conviction for [Evidence Code] section 1109 purposes, as well as
presenting the underlying conduct through the percipient witness, including
[D.C.] and any officers that are necessary.”
D.C. later testified briefly regarding the two incidents, and a certified
copy of Easter’s record of conviction was introduced into evidence.
Discussion
Easter argues that the trial court erred in admitting D.C.’s testimony
regarding the two prior incidents of domestic violence against her pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1109, and in admitting the certified record of his April
2006 conviction of misdemeanor corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)).
28
Section 1109, subdivision (a)(1) provides, with certain exceptions not
applicable here: “[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of
an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section
1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” Easter
does not dispute that he was “ ‘accused of an offense involving domestic
violence.’ ” (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222,
1233–1237 [defendant was “accused of an offense involving domestic violence”
within the meaning of section 1109 when he was charged with the first
degree murder of his girlfriend because “murder is ‘the ultimate form of
domestic violence’ ”].)
“By its incorporation of section 352, section 1109, subdivision (a)(1)
makes evidence of past domestic violence inadmissible only if the court
determines that its probative value is ‘substantially outweighed’ by its
prejudicial impact.[17] We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision to
admit such evidence for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]
“ ‘ “The principal factor affecting the probative value of an uncharged
act is its similarity to the charged offense.” ’ [Citation.] Section 1109 was
intended to make admissible a prior incident ‘similar in character to the
charged domestic violence crime, and which was committed against the
victim of the charged crime or another similarly situated person.’ [Citation.]
Thus, the statute reflects the legislative judgment that in domestic violence
cases, as in sex crimes, similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt
17 “Section 352 provides: ‘The court in its discretion may exclude evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.’ ”
29
in a later accusation. [Citation.] Indeed, proponents of the bill that became
section 1109 argued for admissibility of such evidence because of the
‘typically repetitive nature’ of domestic violence.[18] [Citations.] This pattern
suggests a psychological dynamic not necessarily involved in other types of
crimes.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 531–532.)
Easter argues, in one brief paragraph, that “the incidents involving
[D.C.] . . . were not in any manner similar to the murder” because “[o]ne of
the incidents involved an argument that had ripened into mutual combat,
and while [Easter] had thrown an object, he had not armed himself with a
deadly weapon let alone a firearm,” and that the trial court “did not appear to
consider the question of similarity at all as required.”
As to the former, we cannot entirely agree that the prior incidents of
domestic violence were “not in any manner similar to the murder.” The
March 2005 incident, like the murder, involved acts of physical violence
against D.C., with whom he was at the time cohabitating, and which
evidently took place in their living room, as it involved damage to their coffee
table and entertainment center. And the second incident also included
Easter committing a violent assault against D.C. after he went to her
residence and “found his clothing in a bag left outside,” similar to the charged
incident in which the prosecution argued that Easter murdered Janice after
she gathered his belongings on and around the couch where she was killed,
presumably in an effort to kick him out of the house. The fact that Easter
18 “ ‘The propensity inference is particularly appropriate in the area of
domestic violence because on-going violence and abuse is the norm in
domestic violence cases. Not only is there a great likelihood that any one
battering episode is part of a larger scheme of dominance and control, that
scheme usually escalates in frequency and severity. Without the propensity
inference, the escalating nature of domestic violence is likewise masked.’
[Citation.]”
30
was not armed with a firearm during the prior incidents makes them more,
not less, probative, because “ ‘[t]he propensity inference [of Evidence Code
section 1109]’ ” is aimed specifically at the “ ‘escalating nature of domestic
violence.’ ” (See ante, fn. 18.)
As to the fact that the trial court did not expressly discuss the
similarities between the prior domestic violence and the charged offenses,
“we apply the general rule that ‘that a trial court is presumed to have been
aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1107, 1114; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 398 [same]; McDermott Will & Emery, LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103 [“We presume the trial court knew and properly
applied the law absent evidence to the contrary”].) Easter has pointed to no
evidence in the record to rebut that presumption here.
Although Easter does not challenge the trial court’s Evidence Code
section 352 analysis, we note that evidence of the prior assaults came from an
independent source, which reduced the danger of fabrication and weighs in
favor of admissibility. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 404–
405.) In addition, Easter was convicted of one of the prior offenses. The fact
that the prior misconduct had resulted in conviction reduced the likelihood
that Easter could have produced evidence to rebut D.C.’s testimony.
Therefore, the unfairness of forcing Easter to mount a defense against
evidence of a long–past incident weighed less heavily against the
admissibility of the evidence of the prior incidents of domestic violence in this
case. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915–916.)
Finally, Easter argues that the trial court erred in permitting the
prosecution to admit the certified record of his conviction for corporal injury
on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) based on the second incident involving
31
D.C., under what he describes as the “rationale . . . that documentary
evidence of a conviction is not a reliable indicator of the underlying
conduct”—a “rationale” he purports to derive from People v. Chatman (2006)
38 Cal.4th 344 (Chatman). (See id. at p. 373 [finding no abuse of discretion
in trial court’s decision not to admit evidence of conduct underlying conviction
for misdemeanor giving false information to a peace officer].) But even if
Chatman stands for such a “rationale,” surely it has no application here,
where D.C. also testified at trial to the conduct underlying Easter’s
conviction. And as Easter acknowledges, the proposition that the trial court
may not admit a record of conviction in place of live testimony under
Evidence Code section 1109 has been rejected by at least one recent decision
of the Court of Appeal. (See People v. Robinson (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1345,
1359 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting record of conviction
under Evidence Code section 1109 “rather than [through] more time-
consuming live witness testimony”].) In any event, even assuming error,
Easter offers no argument that such error was prejudicial, and given D.C.’s
testimony to the conduct underlying his conviction, we can discern none.
4. Easter Has Not Established His Trial Counsel Provided
Ineffective Assistance In Failing to Object to Paris Washington’s
Testimony that She Saw a Firearm in the Easter Home
Easter’s next argument is that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the “testimony of Paris Washington
. . . includ[ing] . . . observations” that Easter “had possessed a gun on prior
occasions.”
To begin with, and again, Easter’s brief provides no citation to the
record identifying the testimony at issue, which, as discussed with respect to
his allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, provides the first reason we will
32
reject his argument. (See California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1),
(a)(1)(C).)
The argument also fails on its merits.
“ ‘In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s
performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness [¶] . . . under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.]
Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial
strategy.” [Citation.] . . . If a defendant meets the burden of establishing that
counsel’s performance was deficient, he or she also must show that counsel’s
deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a “reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” ’ ([People v.] Ledesma [(2006)] 39 Cal.4th [641,] 745–746; see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688.)” (People v. Bell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125–126.)
“When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court
defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. It
is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more
33
appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citations.]” (People v.
Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
With respect to firearms, Paris Washington testified, without defense
objection, as follows:
“Q. In the time that you knew defendant Kevin Easter living [on] Army
Street, did you ever see a firearm in the house?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Did you tell your mom anything about that firearm?
“A. I told her that she needed to somehow, some way get it out of the
house because I believed it was a dangerous situation.”
The prosecutor’s questioning then moved on to another topic.
Easter argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to this testimony, relying on the rule, established by our Supreme Court in
People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 577 (Riser), that “it is generally error to
admit evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon that could not have
been the one used in the charged crime.” (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th
14, 55; see Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 577 [“When the prosecution
relies . . . on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other
weapons were found in [the defendant’s] possession, for such evidence tends
to show, not that he committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of
person who carries deadly weapons”].) He asserts that “not only were both[19]
incidents of the gun possession well before the charged offense, no nexus
whatsoever was established with the events of August 7, 2013,” and “[t]hus,
the admission of evidence, through the testimony of Paris Washington, that
19 It is unclear what Easter’s brief means by “both.” As noted,
Washington testified only that she had seen a firearm in the Easter home at
some unspecified time.
34
years earlier he was in such possession as well, where there was no
evidence[] it might have been the murder weapon, was error.”
To begin with, the rule of Riser does not apply here, because it was not
the case that a firearm in the Easter home “could not have been” the murder
weapon. (People v. Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 55.) Quite the opposite,
given that Janice was killed with a firearm in her own living room.
The Attorney General posits that, in arguing that the gun possession
took place “years earlier,” Easter “is apparently relying on Washington’s
testimony at the previous trial,” where she “testified that she saw [Easter]’s
pistol ‘two and a half years ago,’ ” that is, “two-and-a-half years before she
testified . . . on November 2, 2015.” And according to the Attorney General’s
brief, and as Easter does not dispute, at Easter’s first trial Washington
testified that “she attended Janice’s birthday party at the Easter house on
July 20, 2013—18 days before Janice was murdered. Washington testified
that [Easter] ‘decided to show me that he had a gun in the house for
protection. And he was very flashy about it, and I looked at him and I asked
him why does he have a gun? And he said, “It’s just for protection,” and that,
“Your mother is aware because it’s in her name.” And after he did that, I
went outside and told my mother what he said.’ . . . [¶] Washington then
testified that [Easter] showed her the gun in the living room. He opened the
gun and showed her the bullets. Then [Easter] put it in his pants and walked
outside.”20
20 On November 15, 2024, we granted Easter’s request that we take
judicial notice of the record in his previous appeal, including the reporter’s
transcript of Washington’s testimony. On reply, Easter argues, without
explanation, that the Attorney General’s argument relying on Washington’s
former testimony “should be disregarded.” But we fail to see why, especially
since we took judicial notice of the record in his first trial, including
Washington’s testimony, at his own request.
35
The record thus discloses a rational tactical purpose for defense
counsel’s failure to object: As it stood, Washington’s testimony left unclear
when she saw a firearm in the Easter home, but objecting on the ground that
the firearm was not sufficiently linked to the murder—in addition to being
meritless—could well have prompted the prosecutor to attempt to lay a better
foundation for her testimony, including by eliciting Washington’s testimony
that she saw the firearm only 18 days before the murder. Defense counsel,
presumably familiar with Washington’s prior testimony, may well have made
the tactical decision that it would be preferable to leave it unclear in the
minds of the jury exactly when Washington saw the firearm, rather than
objecting and prompting the prosecution to clarify that she did so only 18
days before the murder took place. Because this rational tactical purpose
could explain defense counsel’s failure to object, Easter’s claim of ineffective
assistance must fail.
5. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury With
CALCRIM No. 371 Regarding Flight and CALCRIM No. 372
Regarding Suppression of Evidence
The trial court instructed the jury on suppression of evidence pursuant
to CALCRIM No. 371 and on evidence of the defendant’s flight pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 372.21 As Easter sidewise concedes, the trial court did so
without objection by defense counsel.
Easter argues that it was error to give the flight instruction “for three
reasons: first: because such an instruction is not be to [sic] given in a case
21 The instructions as given read as follows:
“If the defendant tried to hide evidence, that conduct may show that he
was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such an
attempt, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However,
evidence of such an attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.”
36
where identity is at issue; second, because the court did not specify to
whether it pertained to all forms of homicide or just first degree murder; and
third, rather than fleeing, after arriving at Neal’s residence, he actually went
to the police department and surrendered.” He argues that it was error to
give the suppression of evidence instruction “because it suggested to the jury
such evidence was supportive only of the theory that appellant had
premeditated the crime and hence was guilty of first degree murder,” and
that the trial court should have clarified the instruction by telling the jury
that “ ‘this evidence may be considered by you in deciding whether the
defendant is guilty of murder, but not in deciding the degree of the murder’,
or words to that effect.”
As the Attorney General argues, Easter’s arguments regarding the
instructions are plainly forfeited by his failure to object to them.
In arguing to the contrary, Easter cites People v. Smith (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 196 (Smith), asserts that “[i]nstructional errors which affect a
defendant’s fundamental rights are reversible even without an objection by
the defense where such failure . . . is inadvertent and not tactical,” and thus
essentially argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the instructions
was not invited error. (See id. at p. 207, fn. 20 [“[M]erely acceding to an
erroneous instruction does not constitute invited error”].) But invited error
and forfeiture are distinct doctrines. (See San Mateo Union High School
District v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 436 [discussing
And:
“If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was
committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you
conclude that the defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the
meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the
defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”
37
the different doctrines]; People v. Hampton (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1103
[same].) Under the forfeiture doctrine, a reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not
made in the trial court. (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46.) “ ‘The
“ ‘doctrine of invited error’ is an ‘application of the estoppel principle’: ‘Where
a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from
asserting it as a ground for reversal’ on appeal.” [Citation.] The purpose of
the doctrine is to “prevent a party from misleading the trial court and then
profiting therefrom in the appellate court.” [Citation.]’ ” (San Mateo Union
High School District v. County of San Mateo, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p.
436.) “Invited error . . . will only be found if counsel expresses a deliberate
tactical purpose in resisting or acceding to the complained-of instruction.”
(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115.)
Easter’s reliance on Smith itself is unavailing. There, the Court of
Appeal held that the trial court violated its “sua sponte duty ‘ “[to] instruct on
the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence” ’ ”
by giving an instruction that “incorrectly . . . permit[ted] a ‘true’ finding as to
the [firearm enhancement under] section 12022, subdivision (c) . . . based
solely on vicarious liability,” “i.e., on the fact another principal was armed.”
(Smith, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 206–207.) Here, by contrast, the
instructions as given were correct statements of the law. Our Supreme Court
has rejected numerous challenges to jury instructions related to
consciousness of guilt, including those concerning flight and suppression of
evidence, explaining that “[t]hese standard instructions explicitly state that
any inference regarding guilt to be drawn from the circumstances described
by them—a willfully false or misleading statement, destruction or
suppression of evidence, and flight—is permissive and insufficient alone to
38
prove guilt.” (People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1024 [considering
CALJIC consciousness of guilt instructions].) Our Supreme Court has also
concluded the instructions are neither argumentative nor improperly
favorable to the prosecution. (See, e.g., People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th
96, 142 [“ ‘cautionary nature of the [CALJIC consciousness of guilt]
instructions benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection
regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively
inculpatory’ ”]; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 630 [CALJIC
consciousness of guilt instructions not impermissibly argumentative]; People
v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223–1224 [CALJIC consciousness of guilt
instructions not improperly pro-prosecution and do not lessen burden of
proof], abrogated on other grounds by People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602,
607.) While these cases concerned the CALJIC consciousness of guilt
instructions, their reasoning is entirely applicable to CALCRIM Nos. 371 and
372. And the trial court “has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an
accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and
failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the
claim of error for purposes of appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620,
638.) Easter’s arguments are forfeited.
In any event, the arguments have no merit. As noted, Easter first
argues that the flight and suppression of evidence instructions are “not be to
given in a case where identity is at issue.” But the only two cases Easter
cites in claimed support actually expressly reject his argument. In People v.
London (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 896 (London), after acknowledging that “if
identity is the only issue in a case, evidence of flight is irrelevant and the
instruction is improper” (id. at p. 903), the Court of Appeal went on at length
to consider and reject the further proposition that “withhold[ing] the flight
39
instruction [is required] whenever identity is one of the issues,” concluding
that “[i]f the People rely upon evidence of flight to show consciousness of
guilt, then CALJIC No. 2.52 [flight] is proper,” and that because
“[o]verwhelming evidence of identity made it virtually certain that the jury
would resolve that issue against the defendant and proceed to the issue of
guilt . . . [t]o have withheld the instruction on flight would have hampered
the jury’s proper deliberations by forbidding a permissible inference from
relevant evidence.”22 (Id. at pp. 902–906.) So too here—Janice was murdered
in the living room she shared with Easter, and her murderer had the ability
both to lock their front door and then to drive away in a vehicle known to
belong to him, making it “virtually certain that the jury would resolve [the
identity] issue against the defendant.” (Id. at p. 906.) And in People v.
Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, the defendant, as here, argued that the flight
instruction is erroneous “whenever ‘identity is a contested issue,’ ” and our
Supreme Court “reject[ed] the argument,” relying on London to conclude that
“[i]f there is evidence identifying the person who fled as the defendant, and if
such evidence ‘is relied upon as tending to show guilt,’ then it is proper to
instruct on flight.” (People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 943; see id. at pp.
942–942.) Easter has failed to demonstrate error.
We likewise reject Easter’s argument that giving the instructions was
error because the trial court “did not specify . . . whether [they] pertained to
all forms of homicide or just first degree murder,” based on what he claims is
22 London also held that “similar considerations” applied to an instruction
on the destruction of evidence, concluding that such an instruction “has no
place when the defense concedes that the person who destroyed evidence—
whoever it may have been—committed the offense. But when the elements of
the crime are also at issue the instruction serves a legitimate purpose.” (Id.
at p. 906.)
40
the rule that “[w]here multiple offenses may be in question, a clarification
should be given as to which count the instruction applies.” Again, the cases
he cites stand for precisely the opposite proposition. In People v. Crandell
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, abrogated on another ground in People v. Crayton
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 365–366, our Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the trial court was required to limit the instructions on flight and
suppression of evidence to certain charges, reasoning that “[t]he instructions
do not assume the existence of evidence relating to each charge; they merely
instruct the jury on the use of such evidence should it be found to exist.
Accordingly, the instructions were neither erroneous nor irrelevant. If
defendant desired limitation or clarification of the instructions, it was
incumbent upon him to request it.” (Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 870–
871; see People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 180 [“[i]t is for the jury to
determine to which offenses, if any, the inference [of consciousness of guilt]
should apply”].)
Finally, Easter’s argument that giving the instructions was “error in
that once he believed he was suspected in the shooting[, he] turned himself
in” deserves only brief mention. It was for the jury to determine what weight,
if any, to give to the evidence of how and when Easter went to the police, and
we do not revisit their determination on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Wilson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 903, 916.)
6. There Was No Cumulative Error
Having concluded that Easter’s challenges to his murder conviction are
without merit, we in turn reject his claim of cumulative prejudice resulting
41
from the asserted errors. There is no prejudicial error to cumulate. (See
People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 818.)
7. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding of
Premeditation and Deliberation
Easter’s final argument is that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s
finding of premeditation and deliberation and thus its conclusion that he is
guilty of first degree murder.
Our Supreme Court described the standard we apply to Easter’s claim:
“ ‘In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a
limited one. “ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]
On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738–739 (Smith II).) ‘ “ ‘Although we must ensure the
evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the
exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a
witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination
depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute
our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’ ” ’ (Id. at
p. 739.)” (People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 470 (Alvarez); accord,
People v. Abillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a). ) “If the murder is ‘willful, deliberate,
and premeditated,’ it is first degree murder. (Id., § 189, subd. (a).) ‘ “ ‘In this
context, “premeditated” means “considered beforehand,” and “deliberate”
42
means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful
thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course
of action.” ’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and
deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection
rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” [Citations.] “The true test is
not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.
Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10
Cal.5th 76, 88; accord, In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 580; see People v.
Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1333–1334; People v. Disa (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 654, 664–665.)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 (Anderson), our
Supreme Court “identified three factors commonly present in cases of
premeditated murder: ‘(1) [F]acts about how and what defendant did prior to
the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity
directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what
may be characterized as “planning” activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s
prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could
reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim, which inference of motive,
together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that
the killing was the result of “a pre-existing reflection” and “careful thought
and weighing of considerations” rather than “mere unconsidered or rash
impulse hastily executed” [citation]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing
from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular
and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
“preconceived design” to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a
“reason” which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).’ ”
43
(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081; see People v. Morales, supra,
10 Cal.5th at pp. 88–89; People v. Serrano, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p.
1333.)
However, “[o]ur high court has cautioned that Anderson ‘ “did not
refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of
murder in any way.” [Citation.] In other words, the Anderson guidelines are
descriptive, not normative. “The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes
of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder,
nor are they exclusive.” ’ (People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1081.)
Thus, the Anderson ‘factors need not be present in any particular
combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
[Citation.] However, “[w]hen the record discloses evidence in all three
categories, the verdict generally will be sustained.” ’ (People v. Stitely (2005)
35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)” (People v. Disa, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 665; see
People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 276 [“ ‘ “ ‘Anderson was simply intended
to guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the evidence supports an
inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection
rather than unconsidered or rash impulse’ ” ’ ”].)
We turn first to planning. Easter argues that there was no evidence of
even “the slightest planning,” because he did not “tell anyone of such a plan,”
“make any threats to kill Janice,” nor “was there any indication that
[he] . . . ma[d]e any realistic plans for an undetected getaway.” But as the
prosecutor aptly observed in his closing argument, a firearm is “not an object
that one keeps in their pocket in their own home.” And Easter’s own brief
acknowledges that “[t]he weapon was apparently stored in the house,” and
thus Easter must have therefore chosen to arm himself at least “shortly
before he committed the crime.” Viewed in the light most favorable to the
44
judgment, this evidence supports a reasonable inference that Easter retrieved
the firearm from where it was stored, approached Janice, and subsequently
shot her, and thus planned the murder, even if only “shortly” before it took
place. (See People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1026 [finding that
“carrying the loaded, concealed pistol [a short distance] to the position behind
the hood of the truck” where defendant shot the victim was sufficient
evidence of planning]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 578
[evidence showed premeditation and deliberation where the defendant
“armed himself with a loaded firearm, approached the victim, who was asleep
at the bar, grabbed him and shot him repeatedly in the back from very close
range”].) And even “planning activity occurring over a short period of time is
sufficient to find premeditation.” (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 34,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390,
421, fn. 22.)
Furthermore, multiple witnesses testified that after they heard the
first shot, there was a “pause” of several seconds—and according to Marissa
Avila, a “female scream”—before the others. Indeed, according to Willy
Senn’s testimony, the pause between the first shot and the subsequent four
was long enough for him to call 911 and then to step out his front door onto
his porch. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Easter had
time during this pause to reflect and consider his actions before choosing to
shoot Janice four more times—at least two of which shots, according to the
testimony of the pathologist who performed her autopsy, were independently
fatal. (See People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658 [“[t]he act of
planning—involving deliberation and premeditation—requires nothing more
than a ‘successive thought[] of the mind’ ”]; People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62
45
Cal.App.5th 477, 493 [“To repeat, what matters . . . is the extent of the
defendant’s reflection on his actions, not its duration”].)
As to motive, Easter argues that none was “ever established” as to why
he would have decided to kill Janice “on that day and at that time,” and there
was “no evidence that something had unexpectedly occurred that day” that
would have prompted such a decision. To the contrary, viewed in the light
most favorable to the judgment, the evidence showed that only three days
prior to the murder, Janice and Easter had some sort of domestic dispute
resulting in a call to 911, and that as a result Easter agreed to—and
evidently did—spend the night elsewhere. And shortly after the murder, the
police arrived to find Easter’s belongings gathered on and near the couch
where Janice was shot, a photograph of which prompted Sargent to testify
that “my mom would never have things out like that on the couch.” Viewed
in the light most favorable to the judgment, the jury could permissibly infer
from this evidence that Janice had asked or insisted that Easter move out of
the house, that he or she had begun the process of gathering his belongings to
do so, and that he shot her in response and in retaliation.
As to the manner of killing, Easter argues that “tragically, the firing of
even multiple shots can occur in a few seconds resulting from a state of mind
in which the perpetrator is immediately regretful.” Perhaps. But the jury
here was amply justified in concluding otherwise based on the evidence. That
evidence showed that Janice was shot five times—shots that produced six
gunshot wounds because one bullet entered and exited her body twice—
meaning that Easter fired every bullet in the Taurus revolver, and hit Janice
with each and every shot. Three of these five shots would have been
independently fatal. And far from acting in a way consistent with being
“immediately regretful” after killing Janice, Easter instead left the house and
46
locked the door behind him, thereby delaying the arrival of the police—who,
as noted, nevertheless arrived to find Janice still alive—and presumably, the
subsequent arrival of the paramedics. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the judgment, this manner of killing supports the inference that Easter acted
with premeditation and deliberation. (See, e.g., People v. Gonzales & Soliz
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295 [“The manner of killing—a close-range shooting
without any provocation or evidence of a struggle—additionally supports an
inference of premeditation and deliberation”]; People v. Silva (2001) 25
Cal.4th 345, 369 [“The manner of killing—multiple shotgun wounds inflicted
on an unarmed and defenseless victim who posed no threat to defendant—is
entirely consistent with a premeditated and deliberate murder”]; People v.
Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 332 [the manner of killing supports a finding of
premeditation and deliberation where “[b]oth victims died of multiple
gunshot wounds, several of which would have been fatal individually”].)
In sum and in short, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that Janice’s murder “ ‘ “occurred as the result of preexisting thought and
reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’ ” (People v. Morales,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 88.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
47
RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
MILLER, J.
(A167502N)
48
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