Daniel D. v. Zoya K. CA1/4

CourtListener 10761753Calctapp19.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/19/25 Daniel D. v. Zoya K. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DANIEL D.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169287, A170016
v.
ZOYA K., (Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. HF22135320)

In this consolidated appeal, we consider challenges from defendant,
Zoya K. (mother), to family court orders to renew and modify a domestic
violence restraining order (renewed DVRO) and to deny her motion for
reconsideration after a hearing.1 Mother, proceeding in propria persona,
contends the trial court abused its discretion and committed legal error by
(1) adding her son, Leonardo D. (minor), as a protected party, under the
renewed DVRO and (2) refusing to admit or consider her new evidence
supporting her motion for reconsideration.

1 We consolidate mother’s two related appeals for purposes of this

opinion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g) [“An order denying a motion
for reconsideration made pursuant to subdivision (a) is not separately
appealable. However, if the order that was the subject of a motion for
reconsideration is appealable, the denial of the motion for reconsideration is
reviewable as part of an appeal from that order”].)

1
Plaintiff, Daniel D. (father), also proceeding in propria persona,
responds that mother, his former wife, failed to provide an adequate record or
otherwise meet her burden on appeal to affirmatively show error. He further
contends the trial court properly considered and rejected her evidentiary
showing on reconsideration. We agree with the father on both contentions.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and father have, by all accounts, had a contentious
relationship—spanning their marriage; divorce; and, now, their coparenting
of 12-year-old minor. Indeed, the parties have been on either side of
restraining orders, contempt proceedings, and accusations of child abuse in
both juvenile and family court, first in Los Angeles County and now in
Alameda County. No purpose would be served by our documenting their
complete, tumultuous history. We thus recite only facts necessary to our
resolution of this consolidated appeal.
On August 16, 2018, following a contested hearing, a family court judge
in Los Angeles County issued an order to renew a DVRO (Judicial Council
Forms, form DV-730) naming father as the protected party and mother as the
restrained party for a five-year period ending on July 27, 2023. Under this
DVRO, mother was prohibited from, among other things, harassing,
attacking, stalking, or disturbing the peace of father, and was required to
stay at least 100 yards away from his person, work and vehicle. Mother was,
however, permitted to have monitored visitation with minor.
On January 14, 2020, a family court judge in Los Angeles County
granted father sole legal custody of minor. On December 16, 2021, after
mother expressed confusion regarding the status of minor’s custody, the same

2
court confirmed this order was still in place. In doing so, the court also
denied mother’s request to modify the current custody and visitation orders.2
On July 11, 2023, just weeks before the five-year DVRO was set to
expire, father filed a request to renew a DVRO (Judicial Council Forms, form
DV-700) in Alameda County Family Court that included a request to add
minor as a protected party. Mother filed a response to his request on July 25,
2023.
A contested hearing began on September 21, 2023, with mother
appearing in propria persona and father appearing through counsel.
Following a continued hearing on October 19, 2023, the trial court granted
father’s request. Specifically, the court issued a renewed DVRO (Judicial
Council Forms, form DV-730), effective until October 19, 2028, which,
consistent with father’s request, added minor as a protected party pursuant
to Family Code section 6320, subdivision (a).3 The renewed DVRO included a
provision requiring mother to stay at least 100 yards away from father and
from minor while he is at school, childcare or his therapist’s office.
Under this order, mother was permitted to have “brief and peaceful
contact with [father] to only communicate about [minor] for court-ordered
visits” and “contact with [minor] only during court-ordered contact or visits.”
Mother thus continued to have unmonitored visitation with minor every
other weekend, Saturday and Sunday 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and every
Wednesday from 3:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., with exchanges occurring at the
Dublin Police Department. Finally, the court consolidated all existing
custody and visitation orders to facilitate the parties’ compliance.

2 Mother was granted unmonitored visitation starting August 21, 2021.

3 The court filed an amended version of the renewed DVRO with

substantially the same terms on October 20, 2023.

3
On November 2, 2023, mother moved for reconsideration of the
renewed DVRO to the extent it added minor as a protected party.
On December 5, 2023, mother filed a notice of appeal from the DVRO
issued on October 19, 2023 (to wit, case No. A169287). Mother then filed a
declaration with accompanying exhibits in support of her motion for
reconsideration. She also issued a subpoena to minor’s therapist to testify at
the hearing.
Father filed a response and then, a week later, a separate in limine
motion to exclude confidential dependency court records and requests to seal
evidence and for sanctions, all relating to mother’s declaration and
accompany exhibits. Mother opposed the motion on January 8, 2024.
At the contested hearing held January 18, 2024, the trial court heard
mother’s motion for reconsideration. Afterward, the court reaffirmed its prior
orders, concluding: “There is nothing new that is a substantial change of
circumstances that warrant changing any previous orders . . . .” The court
also granted father’s motion to seal the declaration and exhibits attached to
mother’s motion.
On February 13, 2024, mother filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s
January 18, 2024 order (to wit, case No. A170016).
DISCUSSION
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200
et seq.)4 authorizes a court to issue a DVRO “if an affidavit . . . shows, to the
satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§ 6300, subd. (a).) This abuse can take many forms, including molesting,

4 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the

Family Code.

4
stalking, threatening, harassing, coming within a specified distance of, or
disturbing the peace of the other party. (§ 6320, subd. (a).)
Section 6345 allows for the renewal of valid restraining orders after
hearing. The statute “ ‘permits a court to extend the term of an order
“without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order.”
This renewal may be “for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion
of the court.” ’ ” (Navarro v. Cervera (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 229, 237
(Navarro).) “In evaluating whether to grant renewal of a DVRO, ‘the
question is whether a reasonable person, in the petitioner’s circumstances,
would fear repetition of the abuse if the order expired.’ ([Citation]; [citation]
[‘The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected party
entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.’].) This question only
requires petitioners to demonstrate ‘ “it is more probable than not there is a
sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension
genuine and reasonable.’ ” (Id. at pp. 237–238.)
On appeal, an order to renew or modify a restraining order is reviewed
for abuse of discretion, with the court’s underlying factual findings reviewed
for substantial evidence. (Navarro, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.) “The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason.” (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.)
This abuse of discretion standard also applies to an order denying a motion
for reconsideration. (Hudson v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
392, 408.)
I. The Renewed DVRO.
Mother challenges the renewed DVRO to the extent it includes minor
as a protected party on the grounds that: (1) father’s failure to file the correct
form (Judicial Council Forms, form DV-100) deprived the trial court of

5
jurisdiction to issue the renewed DVRO with minor as an additional
protected party; (2) the court abused its discretion by improperly accessing
and relying on sealed juvenile records and failing to consider exculpatory
evidence; and (3) substantial evidence did not support a finding that minor
was in need of protection under the renewed DVRO. None of these claims
has merit.
II. Procedural Deficiencies Do Not Warrant Reversal.
Mother argues that since minor was “not listed as a protected party in
any valid or current DVRO at the time of the 2023 renewal request, the
proper legal procedure would have been to file a new petition using [Judicial
Council Forms] Form DV-100. Respondent did not do so. As a result, the
inclusion of [minor] in the renewed restraining order issued on October 19,
2023, was procedurally improper and legally invalid.”
Mother’s argument fails. Even assuming for the sake of argument
father should have filed Judicial Council Forms, form DV-100, the form for a
new DVRO request, rather than form DV-700, the form for a DVRO renewal
request, mother has not established reversible error. The law is quite clear
“ ‘ “a mere irregularity . . . ” ’ . . . does not constitute reversible error absent a
showing of prejudice. . . .” (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 211, 221–222; accord, F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099,
1107 [Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13, “expressly preclude[s] reversal absent
prejudice”].) Mother has identified no prejudice.
In any event, mother’s complaint about an incorrect form does not
affirmatively demonstrate the trial court erred by issuing the renewed DVRO
with minor included as a protected person. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [judgment is presumed correct on appeal and the appellant
must affirmatively demonstrate error].) Mother had notice of, and the

6
opportunity to contest, father’s request to add minor to the DVRO. Under
these circumstances, the trial court had “broad authority under the DVPA to
issue ‘a panoply of remedial orders’ [citation] to ‘prevent acts of domestic
violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the
persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable
these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.’ (§ 6220; see
also § 6320 et seq. [authorizing issuance of a variety of ex parte orders];
§ 6340 et seq. [authorizing issuance of additional orders after noticed
hearing].) ‘The Legislature has . . . expressed an intent to entrust the courts
with some latitude in applying these remedies.’ ” (Parris J. v. Christopher U.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 132 (Parris J.).) “ ‘ “Therefore, the courts must be
entrusted with authority to issue necessary orders suited to individual
circumstances, with adequate assurances that both sides of the dispute will
have an opportunity to be heard before the court.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles here, we find no cause to overrule the trial
court’s authority to grant father’s request to add minor as a protected party
in issuing the renewed DVRO.
III. There Was No Abuse of Discretion.
Mother next contends the trial court abused its discretion by
(1) accessing and relying on minor’s confidential juvenile dependency records
in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and
(2) “overlook[ing] material evidence regarding her loving relationship with
minor. Not so.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 authorizes only specified
individuals to inspect juvenile court records without a court order. These
individuals include: “A judge, commissioner, or other hearing officer assigned
to a family law case with issues concerning custody or visitation, or both,

7
involving the minor . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827, subd. (a)(1)(L).) As
such, the trial court was indeed authorized to review minor’s records in
ruling on father’s DVRO renewal request. However, that is not what
occurred here. Rather, at the hearing, father’s counsel questioned mother
about certain allegations and findings made in the dependency proceedings
involving minor. However, at no point did father or counsel offer into
evidence any of the underlying juvenile records, and, as such, the court had
no cause to review them. Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 was thus
never triggered.
As to mother’s “overlooked” evidence—specifically, a video in which
minor asked a Los Angeles County judge to allow mother to pick him up from
school—the trial court sustained father’s objection to its admission on
relevance and hearsay grounds. In doing so, the court accepted father’s
argument that the video, made over two years earlier for other court
proceedings, was not relevant to his current renewal request.
On appeal, mother has not established, with citation to relevant
authority, that the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. While she
insists the evidence “demonstrates a level of trust and emotional comfort”
between her and minor, she fails to address the stale nature of the two-year-
old video or the court’s hearsay concerns. As such, her argument is forfeited.
(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 [when a party
raises an issue but “fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations
to authority, we treat the point as waived”].)
IV. Substantial Evidence Supported the Renewed DVRO.
Mother also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
renewed DVRO. Her challenge fails.

8
As an initial matter, we agree with father that mother forfeited her
challenge by failing to “ ‘set forth in [her] brief all the material evidence on
the point and not merely [her] own evidence.’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881, italics omitted.) As the reviewing court, we
“ ‘start[] with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain
every finding of fact.’ ” (Ibid.) In light of mother’s failure to adequately
address the record before the trial court, this presumption is not overcome.
In any event, our own brief review of the record confirms the renewed
DVRO was well supported. The prior DVRO prohibited mother from, among
other things, harassing, threatening, following, stalking or disturbing the
peace of father. Father submitted evidence of multiple violations of these
prohibitions. This evidence included an incident on June 5, 2023, wherein
mother engaged in stalking-type behavior at the office of minor’s therapist on
a day when father was scheduled to bring minor in for a therapy session.
Emails from the owner of the business reflect that mother visited several
times, demanding to speak to minor’s therapist, and then refused the owner’s
requests that she leave. When father and minor arrived for the scheduled
session, they observed mother parked nearby in her vehicle. The owner
subsequently wrote an email to mother, warning: “Please understand that
this behavior is unacceptable and endangers your child’s therapy by crossing
boundaries and being intrusive. Our job is to provide high quality counseling
services that meet the client’s needs and address the presenting problem. We
can only do that within healthy boundaries and protecting all clients’
confidentiality.”
Father also presented evidence that mother, while communicating by
email with him about visitation issues, repeatedly (over a dozen times)

9
threatened that he “ ‘deserve[d] to go to jail,’ ” his “ ‘place is in jail,’ ” and the
like.
Not only did mother’s conduct in these instances disturb father’s peace,
but also her conduct disturbed minor’s peace. This is particularly so given
that, in the first instance, it occurred at minor’s therapist’s office, which
should be reserved as a safe place for him to visit and seek treatment. Based
on the totality of circumstances, we conclude father established a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse directed at him and minor such that he was
entitled to the renewed DVRO. (E.g., Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 170, 181 [“ ‘any violation of a restraining order is very serious,
and gives very significant support for renewal of a restraining order’ ”];
Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 121 [“the relevant inquiry [under
§ 6320] is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought
engaged in ‘conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
destroy[ed] the mental or emotional calm of the other party.’ (§ 6320, subd.
(c).)”].)
While other evidence in the record provided additional support for the
renewed DVRO, we need not discuss it. “[T]he appellate court’s power begins
and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582), that is,
“ ‘ “ ‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People
v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117–1118.) Here, this standard is met.
V. The Court’s Order on Mother’s Motion for Reconsideration
Stands.
Lastly, mother contends the trial court erred by (1) sealing and refusing
to consider evidence she submitted with her motion relating to father’s
previous history of domestic violence when the case was in juvenile court;
(2) refusing to permit testimony from minor’s therapist, whom mother

10
subpoenaed, regarding “the child’s mental health and any impact of custody
arrangements”; and (3) failing to consider minor’s best interests before
reaffirming the renewed DVRO.5 None of her contentions has merit.
First, the trial court did not, as mother claims, refuse to consider her
domestic violence evidence. The court not only accepted mother’s evidence
but also gave mother the opportunity to address the evidence in argument,
which she did as follows: “So Petitioner brought some new documents as an
appeal. . . . Petitioner was also found guilty in all the counts of sexual abuse
of the child and the domestic violence perpetrator. . . . [¶] The section about
Kung Fu and punched in the nose this is false. I never admitted I abused my
child. . . . [¶] Again, he’s making false allegations. Again, he’s lying that I
admitted and he’s lying again about his own part of, you know, trauma to the
child that he caused.” (Sic.) After mother’s argument, the court expressly
stated: “I read and considered all the filings in this case as I indicated. I’ve
heard both parties today.” Nonetheless, the court reaffirmed the renewed
DVRO.
The court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The court could
have reasonably concluded that mother’s evidence provided no grounds for

5 Mother raises two additional arguments in her briefs: (1) the court’s

May 3, 2024 order granting sole legal custody to father lacked notice or legal
basis; and (2) the court failed to address father’s “longstanding pattern of
interfering with [mother’s] parenting time, which has been raised repeatedly
in prior proceedings.” Neither contention is properly before us. Mother’s
notices of appeal identify only two orders: the October 19, 2023 renewed
DVRO and the January 18, 2024 order on mother’s motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, prior court orders regarding custody or
visitation are outside the scope of these appeals. As to custody, father
correctly notes he has had sole legal custody of minor since the “unappealed”
order of January 14, 2020. As to mother’s “parenting time” concern, we also
deem the issue forfeited since she raised it for the first time in her reply brief,
unfairly depriving father of the opportunity to respond.

11
disturbing the renewed DVRO given that it was neither new nor related to
the issue at hand, to wit, whether father established grounds for renewing
the DVRO. (See Navarro, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 237 [the relevant
inquiry for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected party entertains a
reasonable apprehension of future abuse].)
Nor did the court refuse to allow minor’s therapist to testify. Rather, at
the hearing mother argued that the therapist should be permitted to testify
regarding minor’s mental health. Father objected on the grounds that any
such testimony would violate the confidentiality of the patient–therapist
relationship. Mother did not respond to father’s objection. Nor did she ask
the court to rule on the admissibility of the therapist’s proposed testimony.
Instead, the court and the parties pivoted to other issues and never returned
to the issue of whether the therapist could testify. Given mother’s failure to
secure a ruling from the court, she forfeited her right to seek review of this
issue on appeal. (Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 848
[“ ‘[appellant’s] failure to press for a ruling . . . waives the issue on appeal’ ”].)
Finally, mother contends the trial court failed to consider minor’s best
interests before adding him as a protected party. She insists the
“inconsistency” between adding minor to the DVRO while continuing to allow
her unmonitored weekly visitation “highlights a lack of coherent reasoning
and a failure to properly consider [minor’s] best interests.” We disagree.
Again, applying the presumption of correctness to the renewed DVRO
(Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564), we conclude the court
could have reasonably found minor’s interests would be best served by
restricting mother’s time with him to the court-ordered visitation schedule
while restricting her access to him at other times, such as when he was

12
attending school, therapy or visiting friends. Despite having the burden of
proof (ibid.), mother makes no showing otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The trial court orders of October 19, 2023, and January 18, 2024, are
affirmed.

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A169287, A170016/Daniel D. v. Zoya K.

13

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.