CourtListener 10761187•People v. Fields CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Fields CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B342220
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24AVCF00270)
FITZGERALD FIELDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Emily J. Cole, Judge. Reversed.
Naomi L. Svensson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Fitzgerald Fields appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of kidnapping and assault. Fields argues that
substantial evidence did not support his conviction for
kidnapping and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
on kidnapping. We conclude that substantial evidence supported
Fields’s conviction, but that the trial court prejudicially erred in
failing to instruct the jurors that they could consider whether
Fields’s movement of the victim was incidental to his committing
assault. Therefore, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fields and his cousin Marilyne Adams lived in a supportive
housing complex that served people experiencing homelessness,
mental health issues, and substance abuse issues. Fields lived in
the complex’s temporary “dorms,” and Adams lived in a
permanent apartment. Adams was in her late 60’s, appeared “a
bit frail,” suffered from dementia, and had a history of substance
abuse.
One day in February 2024 a surveillance camera captured
a two-minute encounter between Fields and Adams. As Adams
walked away from her apartment through a courtyard area,
Fields came out of the apartment and walked quickly toward
Adams. Fields put one arm around Adams’s neck and forcibly
walked her back toward her apartment. Halfway back to the
apartment, Adams fell to the ground, and Fields dragged her by
her neck the rest of the way. When they reached the door to the
apartment, Fields stood over Adams, with only Fields’s back
2
visible in the surveillance recording. A few seconds later Fields
pulled Adams to her feet by her hands and pushed her inside the
apartment.
Forty seconds later security guard Nicco Gaines arrived at
Adams’s apartment. Gaines testified Adams’s front door was
partially open. Gaines went inside, where he heard screaming
and Adams saying, “‘Get out.’” Fields told Gaines that Adams
was his cousin and that “she [had] his drugs or . . . his money or
something in the house.” Gaines told Fields to go back to his
dorm and escorted Fields out of the apartment.
Later that day, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy
Ignacio Morales went to the housing complex, viewed the
surveillance video, and interviewed Adams and Fields. Adams
showed Deputy Morales where the physical encounter with Fields
began. Deputy Morales’s partner measured the distance from
that location to Adams’s front door, which Deputy Morales
testified was “11 steps.” Deputy Morales saw redness on Adams’s
neck “resembling some type of strangulation,” as well as redness
on her ear and the left side of her face.
The People charged Fields with kidnapping (Pen. Code,
§ 207, subd. (a))1 and assault with force likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). A jury found Fields guilty of
kidnapping, not guilty of assault with force likely to produce
great bodily injury, but guilty of the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor assault (§ 240).
After Fields waived his right to a jury trial on the alleged
aggravating factors, the trial court found four of them true under
California Rules of Court, rules 4.421(b)(1)-(3) & (5), and found
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
Fields had four prior serious or violent felony convictions, within
the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The court granted Fields’s motion to
strike three of the four prior serious or violent felony convictions
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
The court also granted the People’s motion to dismiss the
misdemeanor assault conviction under section 1385. The court
sentenced Fields to 16 years on his conviction for kidnapping (the
upper term of eight years, doubled under the three strikes law).
Fields timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supported Fields’s
Conviction for Kidnapping
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 207, subdivision (a), provides: “Every person who
forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes,
or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries
the person . . . into another country, state, or county, or into
another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.” “To
prove the crime of simple kidnapping, ‘the prosecution must
generally “prove three elements: (1) a person was unlawfully
moved by the use of physical force or fear; (2) the movement was
without the person’s consent; and (3) the movement of the person
was for a substantial distance.”’” (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th
401, 469 (Hin); see People v. Bell (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 435
4
(Bell).)2 “This last element, i.e., that the victim be moved a
substantial distance, is called the ‘asportation’ element.” (Bell, at
p. 435.)
In “determining whether the movement in question was
‘“‘substantial in character,’”’ ‘the jury should consider the totality
of the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, in a case where the
evidence permitted, the jury might properly consider not only the
actual distance the victim is moved, but also such factors as
whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that
which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of
detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s
foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced
opportunity to commit additional crimes.’” (Hin, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 469; see People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225,
237, overruled on another ground in People v. Fontenot (2019)
8 Cal.5th 57, 70; People v. Hall (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1077,
1089.)
“‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
2 Aggravated kidnapping (§ 209) requires carrying ‘“away an
individual to commit robbery, rape, oral copulation, sodomy,”’ or
certain enumerated sex crimes. (People v. Hall (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089; see People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th
876, 890 [“Aggravated kidnapping builds on the definition of
kidnapping in section 207.”]; People v. Ledesma (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 830, 836 [aggravated kidnapping under
section 209 “requires proof of certain elements not required for”
simple kidnapping under section 207].)
5
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 451; see People v. Collins
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307.) “‘“‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably
justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding.’”’” (People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s
Finding Fields Moved Adams a Substantial
Distance
Fields argues there was insufficient evidence he moved
Adams a substantial distance. He contends that he moved
Adams only 10 or 11 steps from the courtyard to her apartment
and that Adams’s “circumstances did not change significantly
during their interaction.” Substantial evidence, however,
supported the jury’s finding Fields moved Adams a substantial
distance. Though Fields moved Adams only 10 or 11 steps,
‘“no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation
requirement.”’ (People v. Waqa (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 565, 578
(Waqa); see id. at p. 583 [moving the victim eight to 10 feet was
sufficient]; People v. Singh (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 175, 187-188
[moving a child five steps or 10 feet was sufficient].)
A reasonable juror could find that moving Adams indoors
from the public courtyard, which was accessible to others and
monitored by security guards and surveillance cameras,
increased the risk of harm to Adams by decreasing the likelihood
of detection and increasing Fields’s opportunity to commit
additional crimes. (See Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 469-470
[substantial evidence supported the finding of asportation where
6
the defendants moved the victims 30 to 35 feet downhill from a
park path to a more secluded area]; Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th
at p. 583 [substantial evidence supported the finding of
asportation where the defendant dragged the victim from a small
restroom stall to a larger stall, which was farther from the
restroom’s exit and gave the defendant “more room to maneuver,
facilitating the rape and other potential crimes”]; People v. Singh,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [substantial evidence supported
the finding of asportation where the defendant picked up a two-
year-old child on a bus and moved him five steps away from the
bus before the child’s mother caught up]; People v. Arias (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435 [trial court did not err in denying a
motion for acquittal where the defendant moved the victim
15 feet to the inside of the victim’s apartment].)
Fields argues that, though Adams “ended up inside her
apartment, away from the observation of the surveillance camera
or others, the door remained open and she could still be heard
outside.” To be sure, the risk of harm to Adams would have been
greater with the door closed. But moving her from the public
courtyard into the apartment—even with the door partially
open—increased the risk of harm. That the security guard
arrived shortly after Fields moved Adams inside, which may have
prevented Fields from committing additional crimes, does not
mean the movement did not increase the risk of harm. (See
People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 [“‘“that these dangers
do not in fact materialize does not, of course, mean that the risk
of harm was not increased”’”], overruled on another ground in
7
People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104; Waqa, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 580 [same].)3
The cases Fields relies on are distinguishable. In People v.
Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590 the defendant moved the victim
10 feet from the sidewalk to the middle of the street, which did
not decrease the likelihood of detection or increase the
defendant’s ability to commit additional crimes. (Id. at p. 599.)
In People v. Daly (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 47 the defendant moved
the victim 40 feet across a parking structure in an unsuccessful
attempt to get the victim into his van. The court in Daly stated:
“The entire movement was within the parking structure and we
cannot say on this record the risk of harm to the victim was
increased by the movement of this short distance.” (Id. at p. 57.)
Fields moved Adams from a public outdoor space to a private
indoor space.
B. The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred in Not
Instructing the Jury on the Associated Crime Factor
1. Relevant Proceedings
The trial court instructed the jury on kidnapping with
CALCRIM No. 1215 as follows: “To prove that the defendant is
guilty of this crime, the People must prove that 1. the defendant
3 In People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th 830 the defendant was
convicted of aggravated kidnapping, and in Waqa, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th 565 the jury found true an aggravated kidnapping
circumstance, both of which required that “the movement of the
victim substantially increased the risk of harm” “over and above”
that necessarily present in the underlying offense. (Vines, at
p. 869; see Waqa, at p. 573.)
8
took, held, or detained another person by using force or by
instilling reasonable fear; 2. . . . that in using that force or fear,
the defendant moved the other person a substantial distance; and
3. the other person did not consent to the movement.”
The trial court gave the following definition of “substantial
distance” from CALCRIM No. 1215: “Substantial distance means
more than a slight or trivial distance. In deciding whether the
distance was substantial, you must consider all the
circumstances relating to the movement. Thus, in addition to
considering the actual distance moved, you may also consider
other factors such as whether the movement increased the risk of
physical or psychological harm, increased the danger of a
foreseeable escape attempt, or gave the attacker a greater
opportunity to commit additional crimes, or decreased the
likelihood of detection.” The court, however, did not give a
bracketed portion of CALCRIM No. 1215, which would have
instructed the jury that, in deciding whether Fields moved
Adams a substantial distance, the jury could also consider
whether the distance Adams was moved “was beyond that merely
incidental to the commission of” the assault.4
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
In “‘criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the
trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant
to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general
principles of law governing the case are those principles closely
and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which
4 The bench notes for CALCRIM No. 1215 state: “The court
must give the bracketed language on movement incidental to an
associated crime when it is supported by the evidence.”
9
are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’” (People v.
Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1189; see People v. Merritt (2017)
2 Cal.5th 819, 824 [the “trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged
offense”].) “We review a claim of instructional error de novo.”
(People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382; see People v.
Delacerda (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 282, 288 (Delacerda)
[we review “‘the wording of a jury instruction de novo’” and
determine “whether ‘the instructions are complete and correctly
state the law’”].)
3. The Court Erred in Not Instructing the Jury To
Consider Whether the Movement Was Incidental
to the Assault
Fields contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury sua sponte to consider whether his movement of Adams
was merely incidental to the assault.5 Fields is correct.
5 The People argue Fields forfeited the issue by not asking
for this portion of the pattern instruction. As discussed, however,
the trial court had “a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury fully as
to the essential elements of the charged offense.” (People v.
Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 463.) “[F]ailure to instruct
on movement merely incidental to an associated crime violates
‘defendant’s right to a correct jury instruction on all the elements
of the offense of simple kidnapping.’” (Delacerda, supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 289; see People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th
400, 409 [“no objection is required to preserve a claim for
appellate review that the jury instructions omitted an essential
element of the charge”]; People v. Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
818, 823 [“Instructional error as to the elements of an offense is
not waived by trial counsel’s failure to object.”].)
10
In a kidnapping case “involving an associated crime, the
jury should be instructed to consider whether the distance a
victim was moved was incidental to the commission of that crime
in determining the movement’s substantiality. . . . [S]uch
consideration is relevant to determining whether more than one
crime has been committed.” (People v. Martinez, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 237; see People v. Williams (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
644, 671.) Accordingly, when “supported by the law and
evidence,” the trial court must give an associated crime
instruction. (Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 434-435, 439;
see Delacerda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 288-289.) An
‘“associated crime”’ is “any criminal act the defendant intends to
commit where, in the course of its commission, the defendant also
moves a victim by force or fear against his or her will. It is not
more complicated than that.” (Bell, at pp. 438-439; see People v.
Singh, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 184; Delacerda, at p. 289.)
Delacerda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 282 is instructive. In
that case the defendant went to his ex-girlfriend’s home and
accused her of cheating on him. (Id. at pp. 285, 291-292.) She
tried to run away, but each time the defendant tackled her. (Id.
at pp. 285-287.) After the third time the defendant dragged her
from the front door to the bedroom, shoved her into a closet, and
blocked her exit. (Id. at p. 286.) A jury convicted the defendant
of, among other crimes, simple kidnapping and battery against a
person with whom the defendant had a dating relationship
(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). (Delacerda, at p. 284.)
The court in Delacerda held that the defendant’s battery
against his ex-girlfriend was an associated crime and that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider whether
the movement of the victim was merely incidental to the battery.
11
(Delacerda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 284.) The court
concluded there were “multiple acts of harmful or offensive
touching that occurred . . . before, during, and after the dragging
movement which comprised the kidnapping.” (Id. at p. 291.)
Thus, the court in Delacerda held, because “the jury could have
found that in the course of that harmful or offensive touching,
[the victim] was moved . . . against her will,” the trial court
“should have instructed the jury that in determining whether
defendant’s movement of [the victim] was substantial, they could
consider whether the movement was merely incidental to the
crime of domestic violence battery.” (Id. at p. 293.)
Similarly, here there was evidence Fields moved Adams by
force in the course of committing an associated crime—the
assault. “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another.” (§ 240.) Fields committed multiple acts of assault: he
put his arm around Adams’s neck and forcibly walked her toward
her apartment; he dragged her by the neck after she fell to the
ground; and he pushed her inside the door to her apartment.
Though during closing argument the prosecutor stated the
assault was “complete” when Fields “knocked [Adams] down” to
the ground, the prosecutor also argued Fields continued to
assault Adams as he forcibly moved her. In discussing the
elements of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury,
the prosecutor stated that Fields’s act of “dragging her
off . . .[made] the assault worse” and that during the dragging
Adams’s neck was “jerked off to the side” and “twisted,” which the
prosecutor argued “can cause great bodily injury all by itself.”
The prosecutor also argued the surveillance video showed that,
once Fields got Adams to the front door of her apartment, there
12
were “sharp jolts” that could have been Fields punching Adams,
there was a “bang on [Adams’s] shoulder,” and there was
movement by Fields to push Adams into the apartment.
Thus, the evidence showed “multiple acts” of assault that
occurred “before, during, and after the dragging movement which
comprised the kidnapping.” (Delacerda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th
at p. 291.) Because the jury could have found Fields moved
Adams in the course of committing the assault, the trial court
erred in not instructing the jurors that they could consider
whether the movement was merely incidental to the assault.
(See Delacerda, at p. 289; Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.)
The People argue the “associated crime instruction . . . was
not warranted by the evidence” because Fields’s “assault on
Adams was complete by the time he ‘knocked her down’ to the
ground.” The People also argue that, even if the assault was an
associated crime, Fields continued to move Adams after he
completed the assault, making the movement “more than
incidental” to the assault. As discussed, however, there was
evidence and argument by the prosecutor that Fields continued to
assault Adams after he knocked her down and began to move her.
Whether the movement was more than incidental to the assault
was a question for a properly instructed jury.
4. The Error Was Not Harmless
“An instructional error that improperly describes or omits
an element of the crime from the jury’s consideration is subject to
the ‘harmless error’ standard of review set forth in” Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (People v. Lamas (2007)
42 Cal.4th 516, 526; see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
686, 709.) Because the trial court’s failure to instruct on the
13
associated crime factor resulted in an incomplete instruction on
the asportation element of kidnapping, we apply the Chapman
standard of review. (See Delacerda, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
p. 294 [applying Chapman to the trial court’s error in failing to
instruct on the associated crime factor]; Bell, supra,
179 Cal.App.4th at p. 439 [same].) Under Chapman we “consider
whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
instructional error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.”
(Lamas, at p. 526; see Martinez, at p. 709.) For an instructional
error to be harmless, the evidence must be “‘of such compelling
force as to show beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the erroneous
instruction ‘must have made no difference in reaching the verdict
obtained.’” (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 431; see People
v. Calderon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1311.)
In determining whether an instructional error was
harmless, we also consider whether “‘“the factual question posed
by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to
the defendant under other, properly given instructions.”’” (People
v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 595; see People v. Flood (1998)
18 Cal.4th 470, 484; Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.) We
consider “‘the specific language challenged, the instructions as a
whole[,] the jury’s findings’ [citation], and counsel’s closing
arguments to determine whether the instructional error ‘would
have misled a reasonable jury.’” (Bell, at p. 439.)
The instructional error here was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whether Fields moved Adams a substantial
distance was not necessarily resolved adversely to Fields under
any other jury instruction, and no other instruction, finding, or
argument indicated the jurors knew that, in deciding whether the
distance was substantial, they could consider whether the
14
movement was merely incidental to the assault. Whether the
distance from the courtyard to Adams’s apartment was
substantial was a key issue; in closing argument counsel for
Fields conceded that Fields used force in moving Adams, but
argued that the “10 to 11 steps” from the courtyard to Adams’s
apartment was not a “substantial distance.” In addition, the jury
appeared to struggle with the issue. During deliberations the
jury asked: “Is there any further clarification of substantial
distance?” The trial court responded: “Instruction 1215 provides
the only definition for substantial distance that can be provided.
The Court would refer you back to the entire paragraph of this
definition in [Instruction] 1215.” (See In re Martinez (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1216, 1226-1227 [jury’s question is relevant in
evaluating prejudice]; People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116,
1130 [“[i]n determining whether there was prejudice,” we
consider “any communications from the jury during
deliberations”].)
A properly instructed jury could have found Fields’s
movement of Adams was merely incidental to the assault.
“‘[I]ncidental movements are brief and insubstantial, and
frequently consist of movement around the premises where the
incident began. [Citations.] By contrast, relatively short
distances have been found not to be incidental where the
movement results in a substantial change in “the context of the
environment.”’” (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 578; see
People v. Diaz (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 243, 247.)6 Such a jury
6 Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 565 and People v. Diaz, supra,
78 Cal.App.4th 243 involved aggravated kidnapping
circumstances under section 667.61, not simple kidnapping under
15
could have found Fields’s movement of Adams was brief (less
than one minute), insubstantial (10 or 11 steps), and not a
substantial change of environment. (See Cotton v. Superior Court
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464 [where the victims were “pushed to the
ground, dragged around, chased, and assaulted,” any asportation
was “natural in a riot or assault” and “only incidental to the
assault and rioting”]; People v. Washington (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 290, 299 [moving the victims 15 feet from the
teller area of a bank to the vault was incidental to the robbery].)
The People argue the error was harmless because whether
the movement was incidental to the assault was “just one factor”
in determining whether Fields moved Adams a substantial
distance. The People contend no reasonable juror could have
found the distance was not substantial in light of the other
asportation factors—the actual distance, Adams’s vulnerability,
the increased risk of harm, the decreased likelihood of detection,
and Fields’s increased opportunity to commit additional crimes.
As discussed, substantial evidence of these factors supported the
jury’s finding Fields moved Adams a substantial distance.
However, the People have not shown the evidence was so
compelling that a properly instructed jury could not have reached
a contrary finding. Fields moved Adams a relatively short
distance from the courtyard to her apartment. Though the
section 207. Waqa and Diaz are nonetheless relevant because the
asportation element for both simple kidnapping and the
aggravated kidnapping circumstance, as well as aggravated
kidnapping under section 209, “requires that the movement be
‘“more than that which is merely incidental to the commission or
attempted commission of”’” the associated crime. (Waqa, at
p. 578; see People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 1141, 1150.)
16
apartment was a more secluded and therefore more dangerous
place, Fields did not close the door, which would have further
removed Adams from public view and prevented others from
hearing cries for help. (Cf. Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 469-470
[defendants moved victims 30 to 35 feet downhill from a park
path to a more secluded area]; People v. Corcoran (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 [defendant “herded the victims
approximately 10 feet from a public area to a small back office
without windows and with a solid door”].)
The People also argue the movement was not incidental to
the assault because “it was not necessary for [Fields] to move
Adams in order to assault her.” The People assert that Fields
assaulted Adams before she fell to the ground and that moving
Adams after she fell was “not necessary to the assault” and was
‘“excessive.”’ “‘Lack of necessity is a sufficient basis to conclude a
movement is not merely incidental.’” (People v. Leavel (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 823, 835; see Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
p. 584 [that the defendant “did not need to move [the victim] to
rape her further supports the conclusion that the movement was
not merely incidental”].) As discussed, however, Fields continued
to assault Adams as he moved her, and the jury could have found
Fields needed to move Adams to accomplish his goal of
recovering, through the use of force, his belongings from her
apartment. (See People v. Washington, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at
p. 299 [moving bank robbery victims to the vault room was
incidental to the robbery because “there was no excess or
gratuitous movement of the victims over and above that
necessary to obtain the money in the vault”]; cf. People v.
Corcoran, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 279-280 [movement was
not incidental to the attempted robbery where “the movement of
17
the victims had nothing to do with facilitating taking cash from
the bingo hall; defendant and his accomplice had aborted that
aim, and their seclusion of the victims in the back office under
threat of death was clearly ‘excess and gratuitous’”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
18
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