Ward v. Kramer CA2/4

CourtListener 10761180Calctapp18.12.2025

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Filed 12/18/25 Ward v. Kramer CA2/4
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

LARRY WARD, et al., B344983

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV37781)
STEPHEN KRAMER,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah L. Christian, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
Mitchellweiler Law Corporation, J. Dana Mitchellweiler,
Meridith J. Mitchellweiler, Justin Montgomery, and Elissa
Schilling for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Nemecek & Cole, Mark Schaeffer, and Kenny C. Brooks for
Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal arises from a dispute over Elyse Ward’s
inheritance from her late brother, Stephen J. Lengel.1 Plaintiffs
Larry Ward and Gayle Jolley (Elyse’s children, acting as her
attorneys in fact)2 filed an action against other relatives and
Stephen Kramer, the attorney who drafted decedent’s estate
plan. Kramer demurred to the operative second amended
complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend and entered judgment for Kramer.
Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment in Kramer’s favor.
They argue the trial court erred in sustaining Kramer’s demurrer
or, in the alternative, erroneously denied leave to amend. We
agree the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer only as to
plaintiffs’ cause of action for financial elder abuse. We reject
plaintiffs’ other arguments. We therefore reverse the judgment of
dismissal as to the first cause of action for financial elder abuse
and affirm the judgment as to the second cause of action for legal
malpractice.

ALLEGATIONS

We briefly summarize the relevant facts alleged in the
second amended complaint. At this stage in the proceedings, we
assume ultimate facts are true, but do not assume true
contentions or conclusions of law or fact. (See Fox v. JAMDAT
Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.)

1 For convenience and clarity, we sometimes use the first
names of people who share surnames.
2 At times, the second amended complaint indicates one or
both plaintiffs also bring claims on their own behalf as
individuals.

2
In 2018, Stephen Lengel retained attorney Kramer to
create an estate plan. Stephen’s initial trust named his sister
Elyse Ward 50% residual beneficiary. In 2019, Lengel revoked
the prior trust and executed a new trust instrument providing
nothing for Elyse Ward.
Stephen suffered from dementia in 2019. Carol Lengel (the
wife of Stephen’s late brother, Ronald) and Andrew Lengel
(Carol’s son) unduly influenced Stephen to disinherit Elyse.
Stephen did not truly intend to disinherit Elyse. Kramer knew
that but acted against Stephen’s wishes to assist in Carol and
Andrew’s scheme. Alternatively, Andrew deceived Stephen by
“swapp[ing] key pages” of the trust instrument to disinherit
Elyse.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2022, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against
Andrew, Carol, and Kramer. Kramer demurred. Plaintiffs filed a
first amended complaint before the trial court heard Kramer’s
demurrer.
The first amended complaint brought causes of action
against Kramer for financial elder abuse and legal malpractice.
Kramer again demurred, asserting three grounds: (1) Larry Ward
was not a proper party, (2) plaintiffs did not comply with Civil
Code section 1714.10’s requirement for court approval before
filing suit against attorneys in specified circumstances, and
(3) plaintiffs did not allege Kramer breached any duty to Elyse
Ward. The trial court sustained Kramer’s demurrer with leave to
amend. In its written order, the trial court found each of
Kramer’s arguments meritorious.
Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint asserting
the same two causes of action against Kramer. Kramer

3
demurred to the second amended complaint on the same three
grounds as his prior demurrer. The trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of
dismissal for Kramer. The record on appeal includes neither a
written ruling nor a transcript of the hearing on Kramer’s
demurrer to the second amended complaint.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of dismissal after the
trial court sustained Kramer’s demurrer without leave to amend.
We “examine the operative complaint de novo to determine
whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017)
4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
I. Civil Code Section 1714.10 Does Not Apply
Kramer contends both of plaintiffs’ causes of action are
barred because they did not comply with Civil Code section
1714.10. This statute limits “a party’s right to sue an attorney
for conspiring with his or her client.” (Central Concrete Supply
Co., Inc. v. Bursak (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1095.) A
plaintiff must obtain “prefiling court-approval” before filing an
action subject to the statute. (Ibid.) “The purpose of the statute
is to ‘discourage frivolous claims that an attorney conspired with
his or her client to harm another. Therefore, rather than
requiring the attorney to defeat the claim by showing it is legally
meritless, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing before
being allowed to assert the claim.’ ” (MMM Holdings, Inc. v.
Reich (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 167, 186.)
We begin our analysis with the threshold question of
whether Civil Code section 1714.10 applies to plaintiffs’ claims.

4
(Cortese v. Sherwood (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 445, 454 (Cortese).)
This section applies to a “cause of action against an attorney for a
civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to
contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which is based
upon the attorney’s representation of the client.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1714.10, subd. (a).) Courts sometimes divide this analysis into
two steps: (1) whether the complaint alleges a cause of action
against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client,
and (2) whether that cause of action arises from an attempt to
contest or compromise a claim or dispute. (See Cortese, supra, 26
Cal.App.5th at pp. 454–458.)
Kramer’s demurrer below contended Civil Code section
1714.10 applies because plaintiffs’ claims seek to hold him liable
for conspiring with his client Andrew Lengel. On appeal,
plaintiffs contend their claims arise from Kramer’s
representation of decedent Stephen, not Andrew. They argue the
statute does not apply because Kramer and Andrew merely
“happen to have an attorney-client relationship in another
context.” (Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1110.) We
need not and do not address this issue because the second step of
the analysis is dispositive.
Even if plaintiffs’ claims would otherwise be subject to Civil
Code section 1714.10, the statute does not apply because their
causes of action do not “aris[e] from any attempt to contest or
compromise a claim or dispute.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The phrase
‘arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim’
suggests the statute’s prefiling requirements apply ‘to situations
in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s
representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal
dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.’ ” (Cortese, supra, 26
Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) The representation must relate to a

5
“dispute” with the plaintiff, though it “need not have matured
into litigation.” (Ibid.)
In their briefs, the parties focus on two cases that address
whether a cause of action for civil conspiracy against an attorney
arose from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or
dispute: Stueve v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 327
(Stueve) and Cortese.
Stueve held Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a) did
not apply because the cause of action did not arise from an
attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute. (Stueve,
supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 331–332.) The plaintiffs sued their
own attorneys for an alleged “Ponzi scheme . . . to siphon off
[plaintiffs’] assets.” (Id. at p. 329.) The defendant attorneys
allegedly diverted plaintiffs’ funds to others, including some of
their other clients. (Id. at p. 331.) The court reasoned that
plaintiffs’ claims against the attorneys arose not from
representing clients in an attempt to contest or compromise a
claim or dispute, but “from transactional activities—the
siphoning off of assets through fraudulent estate planning,
including the misappropriation of the [plaintiffs’] assets through
the diversion of those assets to entities created and controlled by
the defendants, including [defendant law firm’s] other clients.”
(Ibid.)
The plaintiffs in Stueve thus did not allege the defendant
attorneys harmed them by representing their clients in any claim
or dispute with plaintiffs. They alleged the attorneys harmed
them by secretly stealing from them. The purported Ponzi
scheme only became a dispute later, once the plaintiffs discovered
it. (See Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 303, 310–312, 320–321 [companion appeal discussing
same pleading’s allegations at length].)

6
Cortese, on the other hand, held the plaintiff’s claim arose
from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.
(Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 457–458.) Like this case,
Cortese was a dispute over an inheritance. The defendant
attorney represented a man in his capacity as the executor of his
wife’s estate and trustee of his wife’s trust. (Id. at pp. 450–451.)
The man’s stepdaughter sued the attorney for breach of trust.
(Id. at 452.) She alleged that “during the administration of her
mother’s estate, she ‘questioned’ ” her stepfather and his attorney
“ ‘about the low value of the Estate.’ ” (Id. at p. 451.) She further
alleged the attorney then “persuaded or ‘induced’ [her] not to
challenge” her stepfather’s actions regarding her mother’s estate
“and to agree to early termination of [her mother’s] trust, by
representing she would receive a large inheritance from [her
stepfather’s] estate when he died.” (Id. at p. 455.)
Cortese held the plaintiff’s “allegations that [the attorney]
induced her not to challenge” her stepfather’s conduct as her
mother’s executor and trustee “qualify as conduct arising from
the compromise or settlement of a dispute.” (Cortese, supra, at p.
457.) The court distinguished Stueve because the stepdaughter
“allege[d] she did question and challenge [the client’s] conduct,
but was induced not to act on her concerns by representations
about her inheritance.” (Id. at p. 458.)
The distinction between Stueve and Cortese hinges on the
plaintiff concurrently knowing of and objecting to the alleged
conspiracy between the defendant attorney and client. When an
attorney conspires with a client to harm an unaware third party,
there is no “claim or dispute” (Civ. Code, § 1714.10, subd. (a))
until the third party learns about and objects to the harmful
actions.
In another context, the Court of Appeal consulted “general
and legal dictionaries” on the word “dispute” and concluded “a

7
dispute does not arise solely from the alleged [harmful] conduct.”
(Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 214, 222 [interpreting federal statute on
arbitration].) Rather than arising from the harm itself, “[a]
dispute arises when one party asserts a right, claim, or demand,
and the other side expresses disagreement or takes an
adversarial posture.” (Ibid.) Normally, people cannot dispute or
assert a claim over something, however harmful it may be, before
they know about it.
Plaintiffs allege that is what happened here. The second
amended complaint does not allege facts showing plaintiffs’
claims arise from attorney Kramer representing a client in “any
attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute” (Civ. Code,
§ 1714.10, subd. (a)) with Elyse, Larry, or Jolley. Instead, it
alleges that during Kramer’s representation of any client,
plaintiffs did not and could not have any claim or dispute about
Elyse’s inheritance because they did not know about it.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Kramer seek to hold him liable for
modifying Stephen’s estate plan in 2019 to disinherit Elyse.
Plaintiffs allege Kramer “knows [Stephen] never truly intended”
to disinherit Elyse but nevertheless drafted a trust excluding her.
They further contend doing so constituted financial elder abuse
because Kramer participated in using “fraud and undue
influence” to make Stephen execute the 2019 trust disinheriting
Elyse. Plaintiffs also allege Kramer’s conduct constituted legal
malpractice because Kramer “fail[ed] to properly determine
[Stephen’s] true testamentary intentions . . . or properly and
adequately test for capacity and/or properly determine that
[Stephen] was of sound mind and not acting through the undue
influence of others.”
When Kramer performed the legal services for which
plaintiffs seek to hold him liable, there was no dispute over

8
Elyse’s inheritance. Plaintiffs concede they initially “had no
knowledge that [Stephen] had signed the 2019 Trust”
disinheriting Elyse. They only learned about it after Stephen
died in April 2020. Plaintiffs did not and could not dispute
Stephen’s 2019 trust or assert any claim about Elyse’s
inheritance until after the deed was done.
As in Stueve, the defendant attorney allegedly represented
a client in harming plaintiffs before any claim or dispute arose.
The plaintiffs then discovered the alleged harm and brought a
lawsuit over it. In both cases, the only dispute or claim was the
instant action. Plaintiffs are not suing Kramer for legal services
performed in the course of this action. They are suing him for the
transactional legal services performed in 2019, before any dispute
or claim existed. Plaintiffs’ claims against Kramer therefore do
not “aris[e] from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or
dispute.” (Civ. Code, § 1714.10, subd. (a).)
Kramer’s reliance on Cortese is misplaced. There, the
plaintiff “question[ed] and challenge[d]” the harmful conduct,
“but was induced not to act on her concerns by representations
about her inheritance.” (Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p.
458.) Questioning and challenging her stepfather and his
attorney constituted a claim or dispute between the plaintiff and
her stepfather. Effectively, the attorney negotiated a compromise
of that dispute: plaintiff “agree[d] to early termination of” her
mother’s trust because the attorney “represent[ed] she would
receive a large inheritance from” her stepfather. (Id. at p. 455.)
In other words, she agreed not to pursue a claim over her
mother’s estate in exchange for a promised inheritance from her
stepfather.
Here, plaintiffs allege no such interaction with Kramer.
They did not question or challenge Stephen’s 2019 trust—and did
not interact with Kramer at all—until after Stephen died.

9
Assuming Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a) would
otherwise apply, Kramer did not represent a client in any
“dispute” with plaintiffs or regarding any “claim” by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs seek to hold Kramer liable for transactional services
rendered before any dispute or claim existed, not for representing
a client in the dispute that resulted from those services. Civil
Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a) does not apply.
Kramer also cites Klotz v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1339 (Klotz). There, the court
held Civil Code section 1714.10 barred a claim against attorneys
that “arose in the course of the provision of services in connection
with the settlement of a claim or dispute, namely, [their client’s]
withdrawal” as a partner or member of plaintiff’s business “and
request for advice on a new business opportunity that potentially
conflicted with [plaintiff’s] interests.” (Klotz, at p. 1352.) Like
most cases on the subject (see Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at
p. 332–333), Klotz did not consider whether the cause of action
against the attorney arose from an attempt to contest or
compromise a claim or dispute. Klotz discussed Civil Code
section 1714.10 in general (Klotz, at p. 1350–1351), then analyzed
only whether the exemptions in subdivision (c) applied (id. at pp.
1351–1352). Klotz therefore does not serve as precedent for the
issue in this appeal. (See Stueve, at p. 332–333.)
Even if Klotz had addressed the relevant issue, it is
distinguishable. There, the client “consulted” with the defendant
attorneys “individually to procure legal advice adverse to”
plaintiffs. (Klotz, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344.) For their
client, the attorneys prepared an agreement that would dissolve
the plaintiffs’ business and release their client “from all claims
and obligations under the [plaintiff entity’s] operating
agreement.” (Id. at p. 1345.) The proposed agreement was thus
an attempt to negotiate the compromise of a claim or dispute

10
between plaintiffs and the client. By contrast, in this case,
Kramer did not draft any proposed agreement between his client
and Elyse. He did not represent any client in a dispute with
Elyse and did not interact with Elyse until months after
performing the relevant legal services.
The trial court incorrectly applied Civil Code section
1714.10. That does not, however, end our review. We proceed to
consider the other grounds for Kramer’s demurrer.
II. Larry Ward May Bring This Action
Kramer also contends Larry is not a proper party to either
of plaintiffs’ causes of action because (a) he does not allege he
suffered any damages and (b) to the extent he brings the action in
his capacity as Elyse’s attorney in fact, his involvement is
superfluous.
Larry need not allege he personally suffered damages. He
alleges he brings this action both as Elyse’s attorney in fact and
“pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3
sub[division] (d)” as decedent’s successor in interest. The second
amended complaint includes Larry’s declaration (made jointly
with Jolley) stating he is decedent’s successor in interest. (See
Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.11, 377.32.)
Kramer provides no authority nor any persuasive reason
why only one plaintiff can act on someone’s behalf as attorney in
fact or as a decedent’s successor in interest. By making
conclusory assertions unsupported by citation to legal authority,
Kramer forfeits the issue. (See Sweeney v. California Regional
Water Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1149;
Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.)
We also reject Kramer’s argument on the merits. The
statutory scheme on survival actions contemplates that multiple
successors in interest may jointly bring or continue such an

11
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32, subd. (b) [“Where more than
one person executes the affidavit or declaration” to establish they
are successors in interest, “the statements required by
subdivision (a) shall be modified as appropriate to reflect that
fact”]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (e) [stating procedure
when “two or more persons … claim to have standing to
commence or maintain an action for elder abuse”].) Regardless of
whether Larry’s participation in this action is superfluous,
Kramer gives no reason why that constitutes grounds for
sustaining a demurrer.
III. The Trial Court Erroneously Sustained the Demurrer to
Plaintiffs’ Financial Elder Abuse Claim
Kramer demurred to plaintiffs’ first cause of action for
financial elder abuse solely on the two grounds we reject above.
By raising no other basis for demurrer to this cause of action,
neither before the trial court nor in his appellate brief, Kramer
forfeits any other grounds for demurring to this cause of action.
(See Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd.,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1149; LaChance v. Valverde (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 779, 789.) We therefore reverse the judgment of
dismissal as to plaintiffs’ cause of action for financial elder abuse.

IV. The Trial Court Correctly Sustained the Demurrer to
Plaintiffs’ Legal Malpractice Claim
A. Kramer Owed No Duty to Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs allege insufficient facts for their second cause of
action for legal malpractice.3 This cause of action requires that

3 The second amended complaint erroneously labels it the
third cause of action.

12
the attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff and breached that duty.
(Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095 (Paul).)
Kramer never represented Elyse, Larry, or Jolley.
“Generally, ‘ “an attorney owes a duty of care, and is thus
answerable in malpractice, only to the client with whom the
attorney stands in privity of contract.” ’ ” (Paul, supra, 235
Cal.App.4th at p. 1095.) “However, courts have extended an
attorney’s duty of care to nonclients—including will and trust
beneficiaries—in limited circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 1095–1096.)
“Whether an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient beneficiary ‘is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1096.)
Courts sometimes enumerate six nonexclusive factors:
“[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury,
[5] the policy of preventing future harm” (Lucas v. Hamm (1961)
56 Cal.2d 583, 588) and “[6] whether the recognition of liability to
beneficiaries of wills . . . would impose an undue burden on the
profession” (id. at p. 589; accord Paul, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1100). Other opinions list eight factors. (See Gordon v. Ervin
Cohen & Jessup LLP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 543, 555 (Gordon).)
Gordon divided eight factors “into three groups.” (88
Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) The first group includes factors one
through five above, focusing on how “clear[ ] it is that the client
intended to affect (that is, to benefit) the nonclient plaintiff.”
(Ibid., italics added.)4 The second group concerns whether a duty

4 In this group, Gordon also included another factor: the
morality of the attorney’s actions. (Gordon, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 555, fn. 4.) The court noted “this factor is

13
to the nonclient would interfere with the “lawyer’s ‘paramount’
and ‘primary’ duty . . . to carry[ ] out the client’s intent.” (Id. at p.
556.) “[C]ourts are less willing to impose a duty running from the
client to a nonclient plaintiff if recognizing that additional duty
might interfere with the lawyer’s chief duty to the client.” (Ibid.)
Finally, “[t]he third group of factors assesses whether the
recognition of a duty” to a nonclient would unduly burden the
legal profession, “either by (a) making the lawyer ‘subject to
conflicting duties to different sets of [nonclient] beneficiaries’
[citations] or (b) saddling the lawyer with open-ended liability
that could act as a disincentive for lawyers to practice in that
area of law and hence dry up access to the legal services in that
area.” (Ibid.)
Gordon continued: “After balancing the factors articulated
above, the California courts have uniformly settled upon the
following rule: A lawyer has a duty to a nonclient third party only
if the client’s intent to benefit that third party (in the way the
third party asserts in their malpractice claim) is ‘clear,’ ‘certain’
and ‘undisputed.’ ” (Gordon, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 556.)
“[C]ourts will recognize a duty to a nonclient plaintiff—and
thereby allow that plaintiff to sue the lawyer for legal
malpractice—only when the plaintiff, as a threshold matter,
establishes that the client, in a clear, certain and undisputed
manner, told the lawyer, ‘Do X’ (where X benefits the plaintiff).”
(Ibid.) “California courts have routinely insisted that nonclient
plaintiffs bringing malpractice claims adduce clear, certain and
undisputed evidence of the client’s intent to benefit them in the
way they are seeking to vindicate.” (Id. at p. 557.)

‘rarely appl[ied]’ ” when analyzing an attorney’s duty to a
nonclient. (Ibid.)

14
Under the relevant factors and the “uniform[ ]” rule stated
above (Gordon, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 556), Kramer owed no
duty of care to Elyse as a matter of law. The first group of factors
weighs heavily against plaintiffs. Kramer’s services of drafting
the 2019 trust intended to affect Elyse—but not to benefit her.
Disinheriting her was among the 2019 trust’s primary ends.
Kramer’s allegedly tortious conduct did not involve the client
(whether Stephen or Andrew) telling him to do something that
benefited Elyse.
The second and third groups of factors also favors Kramer.
Imposing a duty from an attorney to a former beneficiary in these
circumstances would likely interfere with the attorney’s duty to
his client. Kramer would have had to consider conflicting duties
owed to every potential beneficiary of Stephen’s estate plan.
Nor can plaintiffs “establish[ ] that the client, in a clear,
certain and undisputed manner” (Gordon, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at p. 556) instructed Kramer to do the opposite of what he did in
2019. As with any legal instrument, courts primarily determine
a trustor’s intentions based on his or her objective
manifestations; most importantly, via the document the trustor
executed. (See Marsh v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1977) 66
Cal.App.3d 674, 682.)
Plaintiffs dispute Stephen’s objectively manifested intent to
disinherit Elyse. They do so by alleging various things that do
not add up to a clear, certain, and undisputed showing that
Stephen never intended to disinherit Elyse. They allege Stephen
suffered from cognitive decline in 2018 and 2019, as purportedly
corroborated by several documents. His general cognitive
decline, however, does not necessarily mean he did not intend to
disinherit Elyse. Plaintiffs also allege other facts that, at most,
could circumstantially support the conclusion that Stephen did
not intend to disinherit Elyse. For example, they allege that

15
Kramer directed the estate planning documents to Andrew, not
Stephen, and that Stephen signed the revised trust the day after
he signed the other estate planning documents.
Several allegations in the second amended complaint reveal
that plaintiffs’ claims boil down to what they “believe” happened:
“Plaintiffs believe that . . . Decedent did not want to sign a new
trust . . . . Plaintiffs believe that Decedent was pressured . . . to
sign the 2019 Trust . . . . Plaintiffs believe that Decedent was
told that he needed to make the changes.” Plaintiffs further
allege they “believe” an inconsistent alternative theory:
“Alternatively, Plaintiffs believe that Decedent refused to sign
the” 2019 trust as drafted and had it revised to include Elyse, but
“Andrew . . . swapped key pages” of the document to disinherit
Elyse. And they allege they did not know about any of these
events until months later.
Plaintiffs’ allegations and post facto beliefs about Stephen’s
subjective intent fall far short of showing it is clear, certain, and
undisputed that Stephen did not intend to disinherit Elyse.
Plaintiffs therefore fail to establish the “threshold matter”
necessary (Gordon, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 556) to find
Kramer owed a duty to Elyse.
This case is analogous to Chang v. Lederman (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 67 (Chang). There, the plaintiff made the conclusory
allegation that “the decedent intended to benefit the plaintiff and
the lawyers responsible for the decedent’s estate plan were aware
of that intent.” (Id. at p. 83.) The court nonetheless held the
attorney owed no duty to the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 86.) The court
reasoned: “[A]ny disappointed potential beneficiary” could allege
the attorneys knew an instrument did not express the testator’s
intent, “and, without requiring an explicit manifestation of the
testator’s intentions, the existence of a duty—a legal question—

16
would always turn on the resolution of disputed facts and could
never be decided as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 83.)
The Chang court further explained: “Expanding the
attorney’s duty of care to include actual beneficiaries who could
have been, but were not, named in a revised estate
plan . . . would expose attorneys to impossible duties and
limitless liability because the interests of such potential
beneficiaries are always in conflict.” (Chang, supra, 172
Cal.App.4th at p. 86.) “[T]he results in such lawsuits, if allowed,
would inevitably be speculative because the claim necessarily will
not arise until the testator or settlor, the only person who can say
what he or she intended or explain why a previously announced
intention was subsequently modified, has died.” (Ibid.)
Chang’s reasoning applies equally here. Elyse was an
actual beneficiary of Stephen’s 2018 trust. She could have been,
but was not, named in the revised 2019 trust. Plaintiffs’
malpractice claim requires proving that Stephen—then suffering
from dementia, and now dead—intended the opposite of what he
did. Just as Elyse claims Kramer breached a duty to her by
revising Stephen’s trust, Stephen’s other relatives could claim
Kramer breached a duty to them by not revising the trust.
Imposing a duty to Elyse here would unduly burden estate-
planning attorneys both by subjecting them to conflicting duties
to different sets of beneficiaries and by saddling them with open-
ended liability.
Moreover, the second amended complaint alleges Kramer
breached a purported duty that, under settled law, does not exist.
“ ‘[A]n attorney preparing a will for a testator owes no duty to the
beneficiary of the will or to the beneficiary under a previous will to
ascertain and document the testamentary capacity of the client.’ ”
(Chang, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 85.) An attorney has “no
duty to evaluate whether the client has the mental capacity to

17
make a directive that disinherits the nonclient plaintiff.”
(Gordon, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 560.) “[A] lawyer’s duty to a
nonclient does not extend to being a babysitter, a risk mitigation
strategist, a sounding board, or a mental health specialist for the
client. Making a lawyer liable in malpractice to a nonclient for
failing to act in any role beyond the role of implementing the
client’s undisputed intent to benefit that nonclient is bad public
policy because it places an ‘incentive [on the lawyer] to exert
pressure on [the] client to complete and execute estate planning
documents summarily’ [citation], a result that contravenes the
lawyer’s overarching duty of loyalty to the client.” (Ibid.)
The second amended complaint alleges Kramer breached
his duty to Elyse “by failing to properly determine Decedent’s
true testamentary intentions as reflected by the prior versions of
the Trust, or properly and adequately test for capacity and/or
properly determine that Decedent was of sound mind and not
acting through the undue influence of others.” In substance,
plaintiffs allege Kramer breached a duty to evaluate Stephen’s
mental capacity and to babysit and protect Stephen from himself
and from relatives who sought to unduly influence him. As a
matter of law, Kramer owed no such duty to Elyse.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, Paul does not support
their position. There, the plaintiffs alleged the attorney
“admitted to a drafting error in another action.” (Paul, supra,
235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100.) The court concluded, “That is not an
allegation most disappointed beneficiaries can make.” (Ibid.)
The plaintiffs’ complaint also included as exhibits a letter by the
attorney admitting to the mistake and a transcript of a deposition
where he made the same admission. (Id. at pp. 1091, 1093–
1094.) Here, plaintiffs allege something any disappointed
beneficiary could. They make the conclusory assertion that
Kramer knew Stephen did not intend to disinherit Elyse. They

18
do not allege Kramer admitted that. The present case is thus
factually distinguishable from Paul.
Opening the door to claims by disappointed beneficiaries so
long as they merely allege the attorney knew the client did not
intend the bequest would excessively burden estate-planning
lawyers. Plaintiffs do not cite any cases that support imposing a
duty under these circumstances, and we decline to expand the
scope of an estate-planning attorney’s duty in this case.
B. Plaintiffs Show No Reasonable Possibility of Curing
the Defect
The trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs leave to
amend as to their cause of action for legal malpractice. Where
“the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we
consider whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the defect
in the complaint could be cured by amendment.” (King v.
CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050.) “The burden is
on plaintiffs to prove that amendment could cure the defect.”
(Ibid.)
Plaintiffs do not meet that burden. They make only
conclusory arguments that they can expand the same sorts of
allegations that Kramer knew Stephen lacked testamentary
capacity and knew Stephen did not intend to disinherit Elyse.
Inserting more text into the pleading to expand these legally
insufficient allegations would not cure the defect in plaintiffs’
malpractice claim. Plaintiffs do not specify any allegations they
can make that will satisfy the requirements to hold an attorney
liable to a nonclient under Gordon, Paul, and Chang.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed as to the second
amended complaint’s first cause of action against Kramer for

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financial elder abuse. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed as to
the second amended complaint’s second cause of action against
Kramer for legal malpractice. The matter is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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