People v. Calderon CA2/6

CourtListener 10760091Calctapp17.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/17/25 P. v. Calderon CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336462
(Super. Ct. No. BA514203)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

JAYMES CALDERON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jaymes Calderon appeals the judgment after a jury
convicted him of aiding and abetting second-degree robbery (Pen.
Code,1 § 211). He contends there was insufficient evidence of
force or fear and intent to support the conviction. He also
contends there was a jury instruction error. We affirm.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal

Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Byeonggeon Kim owned a consignment store in Los Angeles
that specialized in selling handbags. About two and a half years
before the current offense, Kim’s store was robbed, and he
experienced “trauma” from that previous robbery. Since then,
Kim maintained a store policy of admitting only one customer at
a time.
In March 2023, Kim was working alone when Calderon
entered his store. Kim then broke his own policy and allowed a
second individual inside his store. Kim had seen this other
individual talking with Calderon outside the store. Upon
entering the doorway of the store, the second individual used his
left shoulder to push Kim into the store, while making a waist-
level motion with his right hand. Kim did not see a weapon, but
he believed the man was indicating he possessed a gun. Kim
testified he was in fear. Kim pushed past the second individual
in the doorway. He exited his store and stood outside next to it.
The second individual stayed at the doorway and held the door
open. Meanwhile, Calderon began grabbing multiple items from
inside the store. Calderon and the second individual then ran out
of the store. Kim testified they ran in the same direction across
the street—both of them weaving in and out of traffic. He
estimated the total value of the stolen items to be around
$13,750.
Hussein Saab owned a clothing store one block from Kim’s
store. Around the time of the robbery, Saab was outside his store
when two individuals carrying handbags ran past him. They
were running towards a champagne-colored Infiniti with a white
male standing by the open driver’s side door. The two men got

2
into the back seat of the Infiniti. The driver got into the vehicle,
made a U-turn, and drove away.
About a month later, police officers searched Calderon’s
apartment and found a backpack that had been taken from Kim’s
store.
The jury found Calderon guilty of second-degree robbery
(§ 211). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that
Calderon had two prior “strike” offenses. (§§ 667, subd. (d);
1170.12, subd. (b).) The court granted Calderon’s Romero2 motion
and struck one strike offense. The court sentenced Calderon to
10 years state prison (upper term of five years, doubled for the
strike).
DISCUSSION
Substantial evidence
Robbery is the “felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from [their] person or immediate presence,
and against [their] will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211.) Calderon challenges the “force or fear” element,
contending there was insufficient evidence that the taking of the
handbags was accomplished by force or fear. We disagree.
Whether force or fear was sufficient to satisfy that element
for robbery is a factual question for the trier of fact. (People v.
Muniga (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1707-1708.) On appeal, we
will uphold the finding so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence. On a substantial evidence review, “we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

3
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) It is “the province of
the trier of fact to decide whether an inference should be drawn
and the weight to be accorded the inference.” (People v. Massie
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374.) “An appellate court will not
interfere with the decision of the trier of fact, even if the court
believes that a contrary conclusion would have been reasonable.”
(Ibid.)
“To establish a robbery was committed by means of fear,
the prosecution ‘must present evidence “. . . that the victim was
in fact afraid, and that such fear allowed the crime to be
accomplished.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 765, 772.)) The force or fear element of robbery is
satisfied if the force or fear “causes the victim to part with his
property, and the victim perceives any overt act connected with
the commission of the offense.” (People v. Brito (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 316, 325 [force applied by the defendant caused
victim to flee and enabled the defendant to take the victim’s
property].) The fear which induces the victim to part with his
property ‘may be either: … 1. The fear of an unlawful injury to
the person or property of the person robbed, or of any relative of
his or member of his family; or … 2. The fear of an immediate
and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the
company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.’ (Pen.
Code, § 212.)” (People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 100.) “The
threat to inflict injury required for a robbery, moreover, need not
be accompanied by the present ability to carry it out. Thus, the

4
use of an unloaded gun [citations], a toy gun [citation] or a
simulated gun [citation] is sufficient if it causes the victim to part
with his property.” (Ibid.)
Under an aiding and abetting theory, an aider and abettor
is liable for their accomplices’ actions as well as their own. “It
obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider and abettor
and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played
which role.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120.)
Thus, it is not necessary to show Calderon personally used force
or fear, as he can be held liable if substantial evidence supports
his accomplice used force or fear to accomplish the taking.
Here, substantial evidence supports that the taking of
property was accomplished by use of fear. The surveillance
videos and Kim’s testimony reflect that the second individual
stood in the doorway, pushed Kim with his shoulder, and made a
motion near his waistline. Kim testified that he understood this
motion to mean the individual had a gun. He said that he felt “a
lot of fear,” and believed that “something bad may happen” to
him. He felt he “need[ed] to get out of [his] store” at that
moment. The surveillance video allowed the jury to observe the
accomplice’s interactions with Kim, including his movements
pushing Kim into the store and his hand movements near his
waistline. Together, this evidence was sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that fear was used to accomplish the taking.
Calderon asserts there was insufficient evidence of fear
under an objective standard. In so arguing, he focuses on Kim’s
subjective testimony that he felt fear and that his previous
“trauma[tic]” robbery experience shaped his subjective fear. But,
even if we are to assume there is both a subjective and objective
component to the force or fear element, the evidence is still

5
sufficient to support that a person in Kim’s position would
objectively and reasonably feel fear. The jury was able to observe
the interaction through the surveillance video from which they
could draw such a reasonable inference.
Calderon also contends there was insufficient evidence to
prove specific intent to commit the robbery. We again disagree.
To convict a person of robbery, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator harbored a
specific intent to permanently deprive the person of the property.
(People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994.) An aider and
abettor is guilty of robbery if they act with “(1) knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose
of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the
offense, [and] (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman 35
Cal.3d 547, 561.) In order to be held liable as an aider and
abettor, “the requisite intent to aid and abet must be formed
before or during such carrying away of the loot to a place of
temporary safety.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1161,
italics omitted.) Among the factors which may be considered in
determining aiding and abetting are presence at the crime scene,
companionship, conduct before and after the offense, and flight.
(In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095.)
Substantial evidence supports that Calderon shared with
his accomplice the specific intent to permanently deprive Kim of
his property. Here, there was evidence that Calderon and the
second individual were working together. Kim testified that he
observed Calderon and the other individual talking outside the
store before Calderon entered the store. He also said the two

6
men ran in the same direction across the street when they left
the store.
Calderon contends the evidence that they left in the same
direction is disputed by the video showing that the two men left
the store in different directions. But, if our review of the record
shows that there is substantial evidence to support the judgment,
we must affirm, even if there is also substantial evidence to
support a contrary conclusion and the jury might have reached a
different result if it had believed other evidence. (People v. Riley
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1165-1166.) In any event, the
surveillance videos depict only a limited view of the doorway
area, and thus, it does not necessarily contradict Kim’s testimony
that the two men headed in the same direction after leaving the
store and crossing the street.
Kim’s testimony was further corroborated by Hussein’s
testimony that he saw two men carrying handbags run past him
and get into the backseat of a vehicle around the same time and
location of where the robbery took place. Furthermore, the jury
saw multiple surveillance videos from which they could draw
inferences that the two men were working together. The
surveillance video depicts Calderon grabbing multiple bags
almost immediately after Kim left the store while his accomplice
remained standing around the doorway and held the door open.
After Calderon grabbed the bags, both men left at the same time.
The accomplice grabbed no additional items. A reasonable jury
could infer that the accomplice’s role was to watch the doorway
while Calderon’s role was to grab the handbags. In sum, the
evidence was sufficient to support that Calderon knew of his
accomplice’s unlawful purpose, intended to commit and facilitate
the robbery, and actually aided in the robbery. The evidence is

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sufficient to support that Calderon and his accomplice worked
together and his accomplice shared the same intent to deprive
Kim of his property.
Jury instruction
Calderon contends the trial court erred in instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 224 instead of CALCRIM No. 225. We
conclude there was no reversible error.
CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 are both instructions
regarding circumstantial evidence.
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 224 as follows:
Before you may rely on
circumstantial evidence to conclude that
a fact is necessary to find the defendant
guilty has been proved, you must be
convinced that the People have proved
each fact essential to that conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, before you may rely on
circumstantial evidence to find the
defendant guilty, you must be convinced
that the only reasonable conclusion
supported by the circumstantial evidence
is that the defendant is guilty. If you can
draw two or more reasonable conclusions
from the circumstantial evidence, and
one of those reasonable conclusions
points to innocence and another to guilt,
you must accept the one that points to
innocence. However, when considering
circumstantial evidence, you must accept
only reasonable conclusions and reject
any that are unreasonable.
CALCRIM No. 224 should be given when the prosecution
relies on circumstantial evidence to prove any element of the

8
case. (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1171-
1172 (Samaniego).) But it need not be given where
circumstantial evidence is incidental to and corroborative of
direct evidence. (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 676.)
CALCRIM No. 225 is a more specific alternative instruction
used in place of CALCRIM No. 224 “ ‘when the defendant’s
specific intent or mental state is the only element of the offense
that rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence.’ ”
(Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.)
Here, the trial court rejected Calderon’s request to instruct
on CALCRIM No. 225 in lieu of CALCRIM No. 224 because it
found “the People are relying on circumstantial evidence for
reasons other than just the specific-intent portion.” Calderon
argues this was error because “[n]o other element of the crime is
substantially supported by circumstantial evidence except for
specific intent.” However, any error in instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 224 was harmless under either standard of error.
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836 [error harmless where no reasonable probability
the defendant would have received a better outcome].)
“CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 provide essentially the same
information on how the jury should consider circumstantial
evidence, but CALCRIM No. 224 is more inclusive.” (Samaniego,
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) “ ‘Because the trial court
delivered the more inclusive instruction under [CALCRIM No.
224], its refusal to . . . instruct with [CALCRIM No. 225] clearly
was not prejudicial error.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) This is so because
CALCRIM No. 224 instructed the jury how to evaluate
circumstantial evidence with regard to intent, as well as the

9
other elements of the crime. (Ibid.) The jury was instructed that
all elements of robbery, including intent, must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Therefore, any error, if present, was not
prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

HIPPACH, J.*

We concur:

BALTODANO, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

* Judge of the Santa Barbara Superior Court assigned by

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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