CourtListener 10759393•People v. Tello CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Tello CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B337382
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA094101)
v.
KEVIN TELLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole, Judge. Affirmed in part, and
remanded with directions.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys
General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, the trial court sentenced Kevin Tello to an
aggregate term of 27 years in state prison. In 2024, the superior
court recalled Tello’s sentence pursuant to Penal Code1 section
1172.75 and resentenced him. The court dismissed one prior
prison term enhancement and sentenced Tello to 26 years in
prison.
On appeal, Tello contends: (1) the court erred in
reimposing the upper term in count 2 (§ 211) based on
aggravating factors not stipulated to or found true beyond a
reasonable doubt in a court or jury trial; (2) the court erred by
failing to sua sponte apply Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699) (Assembly Bill 333); and (3) the court
erred by failing to award Tello custody credits for actual days in
custody between his original sentencing and resentencing dates.
The People contend that the court properly reimposed the high
term, but concede Tello’s remaining contentions.
We remand the matter for the court to consider whether to
vacate Tello’s gang enhancement and afford the People the
opportunity to prove the gang enhancement pursuant to
Assembly Bill No. 333, and to calculate Tello’s custody credits. In
all other respects, the order is affirmed.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. Plea and Sentencing
In 2013, Tello pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery.
(§ 211, counts 1 & 2.) As to both counts, Tello admitted personal
firearm use (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)) allegations. Tello also admitted to a prior prison term
allegation pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The court sentenced Tello to a total of 27 years in prison.
In count 2, the court imposed the upper term of five years, plus
10 years for the personal firearm use enhancement, 10 years for
the gang enhancement, and one year for the prior prison term
enhancement. In count 1, the court imposed a term of one year
(one-third the middle term).
B. Resentencing Pursuant to Section 1172.75
In 2022, the court recalled Tello’s sentence pursuant to
section 1172.75 and appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel
filed a resentencing petition emphasizing that multiple
enhancements had been alleged, and requesting that all
enhancements be dismissed and Tello be resentenced to six years
in prison. The petition included attachments evidencing Tello’s
progress toward rehabilitation while in prison. The People
agreed that the one-year prior prison term allegation should be
stricken, but opposed striking the 10-year personal fire arm use
2 Because the issues presented are purely legal, we do not
include a recitation of the facts.
3
and 10-year gang enhancements on the ground that Tello was a
threat to public safety. The People argued that Tello was a gang
member who used a gun in two robberies, had accumulated eight
rules violations in prison since February of 2018, and had been
convicted and sentenced, while incarcerated, to 15 years in prison
for attempted murder, battery with serious bodily injury, and
assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury.
The court recalled and resentenced Tello. The court struck
the prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), but
declined to strike either of the remaining enhancements because
it found that striking the enhancements would endanger public
safety. The court resentenced Tello to 26 years in prison.
The court did not re-calculate Tello’s custody credits to
account for days in custody between his original sentencing
hearing and the resentencing hearing.
DISCUSSION
A. Reimposition of the High Term Pursuant to Section
1172.75, Subdivision (d)(4)
1. Legal Principles
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that a prior
prison term enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision
(b) imposed prior to January 1, 2020, is invalid, except for an
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense. Section 1172.75, subdivision (c), provides that if the
court finds that the defendant’s current judgment includes an
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invalid prior prison term enhancement, the court must recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.
“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this
section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one
originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
“The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The court may consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id., subd.
(d)(3).)
2. Analysis
Until 2007, section 1170, subdivision (b) provided that
“ ‘the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless
there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the
crime.’ (See § 1170, former subd. (b); Stats. 1977, ch. 165,
§ 15 . . . .)” (People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 370,
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review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628 (Mathis).) “In 2007,
however, the United States Supreme Court held that California’s
upper term sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial because it allowed a defendant’s prison
sentence to be increased beyond the statutory maximum based on
facts that had not been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by
a jury or admitted by the defendant. [Citations.]” (Ibid., citing to
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 274–275
(Cunningham).)
In Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270, the United States
Supreme Court explained that the Sixth Amendment requires
any fact that exposes a defendant to a potentially greater
sentence, except for prior conviction allegations, must be found
true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (Mathis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at p. 370.) “Cunningham noted that California could
comply with the Sixth Amendment either by [(1)] requiring jury
findings for any facts necessary to impose an aggravated
sentence, or by [(2)] authorizing sentencing courts ‘ “to exercise
broad discretion . . . within a statutory range.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 370–
371.) The California Legislature responded to Cunningham by
amending section 1170, subdivision (b) to grant trial courts broad
discretion to choose between the lower, middle, and upper
terms—i.e., it adopted Cunningham’s second option. (Mathis,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature changed course
and instead adopted Cunningham’s first option, amending section
1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) in part to provide that when a
“ ‘statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its
sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term,’ ” except that the court may impose a sentence
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exceeding the middle term when “ ‘there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ [Citations.]”
(Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.) Section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) provides, “Unless the court originally imposed
the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding
the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
Tello contends that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)—
which directs the resentencing court to “apply any other changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so
as to eliminate disparity of sentences”—requires the resentencing
court to apply amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) when
determining whether to deviate from the presumptive middle
term upon resentencing. Tello argues that the resentencing court
was prohibited from imposing the upper term because Tello did
not stipulate to facts in aggravation and no aggravating facts
were found true beyond a reasonable doubt in a trial by a judge
or a jury.
Courts are split regarding whether the exception contained
in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) permits a trial court to
reimpose an upper term sentence where the facts underlying an
aggravating circumstance were neither stipulated to by the
defendant nor found true by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable
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doubt. (Compare People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 455, 466–467 (Brannon-Thompson) [a court may
reimpose an upper term originally imposed] and People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 330 (Gonzalez) [rejecting
Brannon-Thompson’s construction of section 1172.75, subd.
(d)(4)].) Our Supreme Court has granted a petition for review on
this issue. (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 373, fn. 6, citing
People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review
granted May 14, 2025, S289903.)
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, we agree with
Brannon-Thompson’s analysis that giving section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) “its plain meaning, it is evident the Legislature
intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper
term for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing. Section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) is, therefore, an exception to the
general rule that the trial court must apply ameliorative changes
in the law at a section 1172.75 resentencing.” (Brannon-
Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–467, italics added.)
Here, the sentencing court previously imposed the high term.
Accordingly, the court did not err in resentencing Tello to the
upper term.3
3 Tello’s contention that the court was unaware of its
discretion is not supported by the record. “Absent evidence to the
contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the
governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1390.) There is no basis for reversal on this ground.
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B. Assembly Bill No. 333
Tello contends, and the People concede, that the trial court
erred by not sua sponte considering whether to vacate Tello’s
gang enhancement and afford the People the opportunity to prove
the gang enhancement pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 333. We
accept the People’s concession.
“In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 333,
enacting the STEP Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699,
§ 1.) ‘Assembly Bill 333 made the following changes to the law on
gang enhancements: First, it narrowed the definition of a
“criminal street gang” to require that any gang be an “ongoing,
organized association or group of three or more persons.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Second, whereas section
186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s
members “individually or collectively engage in” a pattern of
criminal activity in order to constitute a “criminal street gang,”
Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such pattern have been
“collectively engage[d] in” by members of the gang. (§ 186.22,
subd. (f), italics added.) Third, Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed
the definition of a “pattern of criminal activity” by requiring that
(1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang
activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently
charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the
offenses were committed by two or more gang “members,” as
opposed to just “persons”; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a
criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern
of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged
offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).) Fourth, Assembly Bill 333
narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly
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benefitted a street gang, requiring that any “common benefit” be
“more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)’ ([People v.] Tran
[(2022)] 13 Cal.5th [1169,] 1206.)” (People v. Lopez (2025) 17
Cal.5th 388, 395–396.)
Pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745
(Estrada), when ameliorative legislation goes into effect we
presume that the benefits apply retroactively to all cases not yet
final. (People v. Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 395.) Assembly
Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply retroactively
under Estrada. (Id. at pp. 395–396.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) provides that, upon
resentencing: “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
Accordingly, the trial court was required to consider whether to
vacate Tello’s gang enhancement and afford the People the
opportunity to prove the gang enhancement pursuant to
Assembly Bill 333. We reverse to permit the court to make that
determination.
C. Error in the Abstract of Judgment
We agree with the parties that the trial court erred by not
recalculating Tello’s custody credits upon resentencing. The
amended abstract of judgment reflects only presentence custody
credit awarded for Tello’s time in custody prior to his original
sentencing hearing, and omits credit for subsequent days spent in
custody. It is well-established that “when a prison term already
in progress is modified . . . the sentencing court must recalculate
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and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the
defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and
whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26
Cal.4th 20, 29.) On remand, the trial court must recalculate
Tello’s custody credits, including the days that Tello was in
custody between the date of his original sentencing and the date
of resentencing.
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter for the superior court to consider
whether to vacate Tello’s gang enhancement and afford the
People the opportunity to prove the gang enhancement pursuant
to Assembly Bill No. 333, and to recalculate Tello’s custody
credits. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J. KUMAR, J.
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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