CourtListener 10759265•People v. Sullivan CA2/3
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Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Sullivan CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B336139
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA117076)
v.
VICTOR SULLIVAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Christopher G.
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted Victor Sullivan of second degree murder,
attempted murder, evading a peace officer, and resisting an
executive officer. The jury also found true a firearm
enhancement as to two counts. On appeal, Sullivan contends the
trial court’s exclusion of his mother, a potential witness, from the
courtroom violated his constitutional right to a public trial. He
also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to strike a firearm enhancement under Penal Code
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),1 and that his trial attorney’s
failure to request a Franklin hearing violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2021, Sullivan’s cousin Solana Villegas, Alexis
Esteban, and Jose Monge drove to an apartment complex in San
Pedro, where Villegas’s aunt lived. They parked and entered a
stairwell, where they got into an argument with Sullivan.
Sullivan shot Esteban in the head. The injury was fatal.
Sullivan shot Monge twice, but he survived.
After the shooting, Villegas went to her aunt’s apartment
and told her that Sullivan had just shot Esteban. Villegas also
told a detective that she saw Sullivan shoot Esteban.
Surveillance videos showed a white Nissan at the
apartment complex on May 7, 2021. The license plate on the
white Nissan was registered to Sullivan. An eyewitness heard a
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
gunshot and then saw a white car exit the complex’s parking lot.
Villegas later identified Sullivan as having been in a white car at
the scene.
The next day, a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
deputy sheriff was on patrol in Rancho Palos Verdes when she
saw Sullivan in a white Nissan Sentra take off at a high speed
and run a red light. The area was a mixed residential and
business neighborhood, with busy streets. The deputy followed
as Sullivan continued to speed and change lanes, without
signaling, in heavy traffic. She turned on her marked car’s lights
and siren to conduct a traffic stop. Sullivan failed to stop, sped
up, ran another red light and stop signs, and continued to drive
recklessly. Eventually, he parked in an alley and fled on foot.
A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputy saw Sullivan run
across the 110 freeway to an embankment. Sullivan resisted
when the officer attempted to arrest him. They struggled and fell
down the embankment. Eventually, the officer was able to detain
and arrest Sullivan.
Law enforcement recovered two firearms thrown from
Sullivan’s vehicle during the pursuit. One was loaded. An expert
testified at trial that one of the two recovered firearms was used
to shoot Monge and Esteban.
In August 2023, a jury convicted appellant of the second
degree murder of Esteban (§ 187; count 1); attempted murder of
Monge (§§ 664, 187; count 2); evading a peace officer (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2; count 3); and resisting an executive officer (§ 69;
count 4). The jury also found true two firearm enhancements
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
3
Sullivan admitted a prior strike (§ 667, subds. (b)–(j)), and
two aggravating circumstances (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(2), (b)(1)).
The trial court sentenced Sullivan to 15 years to life, plus
10 years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancement on
count 1, 7 years on count 2, 8 months on count 3, and 8 months
on count 4.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Sullivan’s Right To a
Public Trial
Sullivan contends the trial court violated his constitutional
right to a public trial by twice excluding his mother from the
courtroom. The court excluded Sullivan’s mother at the
beginning of the trial pursuant to Evidence Code section 777
because she was a potential witness. Although she was later
allowed to return, the court apparently excluded her again during
defense counsel’s closing argument, until the end of trial, due to
her disruptiveness in the courtroom. Although Sullivan frames
the alleged error as a violation of his constitutional right to a
public trial, the trial court did not close the proceedings to any
spectators. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding and removing Sullivan’s mother from the courtroom, or
violate Sullivan’s constitutional rights to an open trial.
A. Background
On August 9, 2023, the trial court granted the People’s
motion in limine “to exclude potential witnesses” pursuant to
Evidence Code section 777. Based on this motion, the
prosecution moved to exclude Sullivan’s mother, Nellina Hill,
from the audience. Defense counsel objected on the basis that
Hill was not going to be called as a witness, explaining “she was
4
in a video, but she can’t speak to any of the relevant facts related
to what [the prosecutor] has to prove.” The prosecutor responded
that Hill was a percipient witness to evidence that would be
presented through officer testimony. Thus, she was a potential
witness. Defense counsel argued that it was unlikely the People
would call Hill as a witness and “[j]ust because she’s in a video
does not mean she should be excluded.” The prosecutor replied:
“She’s not only in the video, she is there for a scene that will be
presented to the jury, so I think she has to be excluded.”
The court inquired about the contents of the video. The
prosecutor explained that it was recorded two weeks before the
murder and showed Sullivan being stopped and arrested in the
same vehicle he was driving on the day of the murder, thus
corroborating that he drove the vehicle the day of the murder.
The prosecutor stated, “So it’s corroborating evidence that even
though it’s not the murder charge, it’s very relevant to the
People’s case and our evidence.”
The court responded that “it does sound as though she’s a
potential witness and she needs to be excluded. So I’m going to
exclude her this morning. We can revisit it at lunchtime before
1:30[ ] [i]f you have any additional facts to support the belief that
she will not or could not be called as a witness.” Defense counsel
added that the video was the best evidence and that Hill would
only offer cumulative evidence. The court stated, “I hear you, and
I will reconsider at a later point in time. But for now, I want to
maintain the status quo, and she will be excluded.” The court
then excluded Hill as a “potential witness.”
Defense counsel did not raise the issue of Hill’s exclusion
after lunch, or during the next two days of trial, Thursday and
Friday, August 10 and 11.
5
On the morning of Monday, August 14, the prosecutor told
defense counsel it was “fine” with him if Hill wanted to return to
the courtroom. The prosecution called two more witnesses before
Sullivan asked the court, “I was wondering, because my mom got
kicked out.” Defense counsel interjected, “I’m sorry, I meant to
ask. Your honor, my client wanted to ask the court if his mother
can be allowed back in.” The prosecutor informed the court he
had already told defense counsel she could return, and the court
allowed Hill into the courtroom.
The next day, during defense counsel’s closing arguments,
the record indicates the following:
“Unidentified speaker: (Unintelligible.)
“The court: Hold on. We’re going to take a pause. We
need another deputy here. [¶] Ma’am, step outside.
“Unidentified speaker: I am, your honor. Can I have
a—
“The court: I want someone to exclude her.”
After defense counsel completed his closing argument, the
court stated: “The record will reflect, out of the presence of the
jurors, that the court excluded an individual who walked into the
courtroom during the middle of [defense counsel’s] closing
argument. I think the individual might be the defendant’s
mother. She came in with a suitcase. She was disruptive. She
was talking to people, [and] disrupted his closing argument.
She’s ordered permanently excluded from the rest of the
proceedings.” Defense counsel did not object to the exclusion,
even when the court subsequently asked if there was anything
else it needed to put on the record.
6
B. Applicable law
“The judge’s power to control the progress and, within the
limits of the adversary system, the shape of the trial includes
broad power to sequester witnesses before, during, and after their
testimony.” (Geders v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 80, 87
(Geders).) Evidence Code section 777 provides that the “court
may exclude from the courtroom any witness not at the time
under examination so that such witness cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses.” (Id., subd. (a).) A trial court has
“ ‘broad power’ ” to exclude witnesses under Evidence Code
section 777, subdivision (a). (See People v. Aguirre (2025) 18
Cal.5th 629, 701 [Evid. Code, § 777, subd. (a), codifies the broad
authority in Geders].) We review a ruling on a motion to exclude
a witness for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Dunn (2025) 18
Cal.5th 129, 171.)
In criminal trials, both the United States and California
constitutions guarantee the right to a public trial. (U.S. Const.,
6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; People v. Woodward
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 382 [“Every person charged with a criminal
offense has a constitutional right to a public trial, that is, a trial
which is open to the general public at all times.”].)
C. Forfeiture
As an initial matter, the People argue Sullivan has
forfeited his argument by failing to object below. The People
assert Sullivan forfeited any objection to his mother’s first
exclusion (before opening statements and during the evidentiary
part of trial) by not renewing the objection after lunch, as the
court advised he could. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96,
133 [tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling does not preserve an
objection if appellant could have, but did not, renew the objection
7
or offer of proof and press for a final ruling].) Sullivan does not
dispute that his counsel never raised the issue of his mother’s
first exclusion again; however, he argues that any objection
would have been futile. We disagree. The trial court expressly
stated that it would reconsider the issue and entertain further
arguments, as early as that same day. At a minimum, Sullivan
could have renewed the objection earlier than he did, with the
knowledge that the court had expressed a willingness to consider
the issue anew. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to
consider Sullivan’s argument of constitutional error in regard to
the trial court’s first exclusion of Hill. (See, e.g., People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 327; In re Alexandria P.
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1340, fn. 10.)
However, we do not extend that discretionary review to
Sullivan’s argument that the court violated his right to a public
trial by permanently excluding the person we will assume was
Hill, after she disrupted defense counsel’s closing argument.2 It
is not clear that this ruling was disadvantageous to Sullivan at
the time, and Sullivan’s failure to object at all forfeited the claim
on appeal. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 161; People v.
Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 157.)
2 As the People observe, it is not clear from the record if the
court excluded Hill during closing arguments. The court merely
stated the excluded person “might” have been Sullivan’s mother.
The People also point out that Hill was later present for
sentencing, despite the court permanently excluding this
unknown person. Regardless of the identity of this individual,
Sullivan forfeited the argument by not objecting in the trial court.
8
D. The trial court permissibly excluded Hill as a
potential witness
Sullivan contends the exclusion of Hill constituted a court
“closure,” which infringed on his constitutional right to a public
trial. He thus asserts the trial court erred in failing to apply the
factors relevant to a court’s determination of whether the
presumption of openness is overcome and closing a courtroom to
the public is necessary. We disagree that this analysis is
applicable here. The trial court excluded only potential witnesses
from the courtroom, including Hill, pursuant to Evidence Code
section 777. We have no basis to conclude that a trial court
ruling under Evidence Code section 777 is subject to the
constitutional analysis required before a court may close
proceedings to non-witness spectators.
The constitutional right to a public trial is well-established
as “ ‘a trial which is open to the general public at all times. (See
U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; see also
. . . § 686, subd. 1.)’ . . . ‘Nearly a century ago [the California
Supreme Court] declared in People v. Hartman (1894) 103 Cal.
242, 245 . . . : “The doors of the courtroom are expected to be kept
open, the public are entitled to be admitted, and the trial is to be
public in all respects, . . . with due regard to the size of the
courtroom, the conveniences of the court, the right to exclude
objectionable characters and youth of tender years, and to do
other things which may facilitate the proper conduct of the
trial.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bui (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 675,
680.)
However, we are aware of no authority, and Sullivan has
identified none, concluding that individuals who will be called as
witnesses in the trial are properly considered “the general
9
public.” Nor does Sullivan identify any authority concluding that
the trial court’s exercise of its responsibility to facilitate the
proper conduct of the trial, and to ensure the integrity of the
proceedings through the appropriate exclusion of witnesses, in
any way infringes upon the presumption of openness.
As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
“ ‘ “ ‘The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the
accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not
unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested
spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their
responsibility and to the importance of their functions. . . .’ ” ’
[Citations.] [¶] In addition to ensuring that judge and prosecutor
carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages
witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury.” (Waller v.
Georgia (1984) 467 U.S. 39, 46, fn. omitted.) Likewise, “[t]he
purpose of [an exclusion] order is to prevent tailored testimony
and aid in the detection of less than candid testimony.” (People v.
Valdez (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 680, 687, citing Geders, supra, 425
U.S. at p. 87.)
We find persuasive the decisions of several federal courts of
appeals which have concluded the federal equivalent of an
Evidence Code section 777 exclusion order did not violate a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. In United
States v. Ricker (8th Cir. 2020) 983 F.3d 987, 994, the trial court
excluded the defendant’s father from the courtroom as he was
identified on the government’s witness list. The father was
sequestered during the entire trial but was not called as a
witness. In addressing the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
argument on appeal, the court explained: “The Supreme Court
has said ‘that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his
10
friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what
offense he may be charged.’ [Citation.] This entitlement is not
absolute, however, and does not necessarily prohibit the
sequestration under Rule 615 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence]
of the defendant’s friends or relatives who may be called as
witnesses. [Citations.] Because [the defendant’s father] could
have been called to testify during his son’s trial, we conclude that
the district court did not err when it excluded him from the
courtroom under Rule 615.” (Ricker, at pp. 994–995; accord,
Zornes v. Bolin (8th Cir. 2022) 37 F.4th 1411, 1416; see also
United States v. Love (9th Cir. 2018) 743 Fed.Appx. 138, 138–139
[“Rule 615 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] sequestrations do
not violate the Sixth Amendment’s public-trial guarantees.”],
quoting United States v. Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 962 F.2d 1349,
1356 [“ ‘The right to a public trial [ ] is not absolute and must
give way . . . to other interests essential to the fair administration
of justice’ ”].) These cases are consistent with our high court’s
conclusion over 140 years ago in People v. Sprague (1879) 53 Cal.
491, 493, that a defendant’s right to a public trial was not
violated by an order excluding all witnesses, including the
defendant’s wife and child.
Sullivan’s reliance on People v. Baldwin (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 1416, is therefore misplaced. The Baldwin court
concluded there was a violation of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial when the trial court closed the
courtroom “to all spectators” based only on the People’s assertion
of a victim’s discomfort. (Baldwin, at p. 1419.) Baldwin does not
concern the court’s authority to exclude a potential witness—not
a mere spectator—under Evidence Code section 777. The Sixth
Amendment applied in Baldwin because the right to a public
11
trial serves to “provide an opportunity for spectators to observe
the judicial system . . . .” (Baldwin, at p. 1421, italics added.)
For the same reasons, Sullivan’s reliance on People v. Scott (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 524, and Vidal v. Williams (2d Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d
67, both of which concerned the exclusion of the defendant’s non-
witness, spectator family members, is unpersuasive. Neither
case addressed the exclusion of a witness.
We thus turn to whether the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding Hill under Evidence Code section 777.
Sullivan contends the prosecution’s reasons for excluding Hill
were “vague” and “irrelevant,” since the video she appeared in
was recorded two weeks before the murder, and there was other
evidence that Sullivan was the shooter. He asserts the “court
should have been critical of what the prosecutor was saying
before excluding a family member as important as a defendant’s
mother.”
However, the prosecution explained that the exclusion of
Hill furthered the purpose of allowing her potentially to be called
to corroborate evidence that Sullivan drove a certain car that was
seen at the apartment complex on the day of the murder. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in reasoning that “it does
sound as though she’s a potential witness and she needs to be
excluded.” The trial court ascertained why the prosecution
sought to exclude Hill. That her potential testimony might not
have been critical to tie Sullivan to the white car at the
apartment building, or was potentially cumulative, does not
render the trial court’s ruling an abuse of discretion.
Sullivan also appears to suggest that because his mother
was only a potential witness, she did not fall within Evidence
Code section 777. However, the reasoning underlying Evidence
12
Code section 777 applies to both potential and actual witnesses.
(See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 190, 228
[“petitioners, as potential witnesses, were excluded from the
courtroom”]; see also Wige v. City of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal., Aug.
27, 2010, CV 09-01369 MM (PLAx)), 2010 WL 11473911, p. *5 [“it
is common practice in California courts to exclude potential
witnesses from the courtroom while others are testifying” (italics
added)].) If a potential witness becomes an actual witness, the
goals of ensuring the witness does not tailor his or her testimony
based on that of earlier witnesses and of sequestering the witness
to aid in the detection of “ ‘less than candid’ ” testimony still
apply. Thus, although the prosecution did not ultimately call Hill
to testify, or play the video she appeared in for the jury, these
facts do not change our conclusion.
Sullivan argues that the order excluding Hill was
“manifestly overbroad.” We disagree. The trial court’s order
excluded Hill on the first morning of trial. The court made clear
it would revisit the order when counsel presented additional facts
as to whether Hill would be called as a witness. When counsel
eventually raised the issue again, the court allowed Hill to return
to the courtroom. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
order excluding Hill until it could be determined that she would
not be called as a witness at trial.3
3 Sullivan relies on People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d
224, 330, however, the court in that case did not hold that an
exclusion under Evidence Code section 777 must be narrowly
tailored. Cooks stated: “At the commencement of trial the court
ruled that witnesses would be excluded from the courtroom only
during testimony about the incident to which the witness would
later testify. A witness would not be excluded from the entire
13
Finally, Sullivan has not asserted that he suffered any
prejudice from Hill’s exclusion. We do not reverse an error under
Evidence Code section 777 without an indication that the error
resulted in prejudice. (Morales v. 22nd Dist. Agricultural Assn.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 504, 536; Cooks, supra, 141 Cal.App.3d at
p. 330.)
We find no violation of Sullivan’s constitutional rights to a
public trial and no basis for reversal.
II. Sullivan Has Not Established that the Trial Court
Abused Its Discretion By Declining To Strike One
Firearm Enhancement Under Section 1385,
Subdivision (c)(2)
Sullivan challenges the trial court’s denial of his request
that the court strike a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a))
on count 1 pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). He
argues the evidence did not support the trial court’s basis for
denying his request, and the trial court abused its discretion by
only considering his “past conduct” in determining dismissal of
the strike would endanger public safety. We reject both
trial, as the defense requested. Simon now complains that the
trial court’s order denied him a fair trial. He fails to point out,
however, how he was prejudiced by the order. Simon does not
explain, nor does the record show, that any witness was in the
courtroom when other testimony about a given incident was
being presented. We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was
not an abuse of discretion. (See Evid. Code, § 777.)” (Cooks, at
p. 330.) That the trial court in Cooks issued a limited exclusion
order in that case does not indicate the court’s less specific order
here was an abuse of discretion. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1250, 1268, fn. 10 [“cases are not authority for propositions not
considered”].)
14
contentions.
A. Additional background
Two probation reports detailed Sullivan’s juvenile and
adult criminal history. In May 2018, a juvenile court sustained a
petition for battery involving Sullivan twice picking a fight with a
classmate. (§ 243.) In August 2018, a juvenile court sustained a
petition charging Sullivan with taking a vehicle without the
owner’s consent and fleeing a pursuing police officer while driving
recklessly. (Veh. Code, §§ 10851, 2800.2.) In August 2019,
Sullivan and an accomplice robbed a gas station. The accomplice
pointed a gun at a victim while Sullivan tried to open the cash
register and stole cigarettes. The juvenile court sustained a
petition for second degree robbery.
A probation report stated that while Sullivan was on
juvenile probation, he failed to attend school, used drugs, and
failed to report to court. The report also indicated that, as a
minor, Sullivan had been provided “multiple opportunities at
rehabilitation to address his drug use, gang affiliation, and
failure to participate in school . . . . Within six months of
terminating from juvenile probation, the defendant was arrested
on the present matter [fleeing from police while driving recklessly
and with a loaded handgun] and a pending murder case.” The
report opined that Sullivan’s “expanding criminal history within
a short time frame, gang affiliation, history of failed probation
rehabilitation, and serious actions in the current [matter]
demonstrate that he is unwilling to alter his criminal conduct.
As such, he is a direct threat to the safety and security of the
public.”
At the sentencing hearing, Sullivan’s counsel requested
that the court strike both section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
15
allegations under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). The court
asked if it was required to strike the enhancements because their
application could result in a sentence of over 20 years, apparently
referencing section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), which lists as a
mitigating circumstance: “The application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the
enhancement shall be dismissed.” Both parties clarified that this
understanding was incorrect. Defense counsel explained the
court retained its discretion not to dismiss the enhancement if
doing so would endanger public safety. Defense counsel then
argued that given Sullivan’s lengthy sentence, striking the
enhancements would not endanger the public because it would be
“decades” before he was eligible for parole.
The court imposed the section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
enhancement on count 1, but struck the same enhancement on
count 2. On count 1, it reasoned Sullivan would be eligible for
parole on that count after 15 years, and stated it was adding 10
years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancement to run
consecutively. The court explained that under section “1385,
subdivision (c)(2) . . . not imposing this term would pose an
extreme danger to society. The gentleman’s behavior, not only on
this day in which he killed Alexis [Esteban], but on the time
period leading up to it, was out of control. It was increasing in
severity. His criminal behavior was increasing in severity.
There was just a complete disregard for all other people.”4
4 On count 2, the court found: “I do find that not imposing
the middle term would be dangerous to society because, as I
indicated, his behavior is just so out of control, not only on this
day in which he killed Alexis, but on the following day in which
16
Sullivan waived his right to a trial on the alleged
aggravating factors and admitted two factors, one of which was
that he had “engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).)
B. Applicable law
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) now provides that “the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute.” Subdivision (c)(2) provides that “the court
shall consider and afford great weight” to evidence of certain
enumerated mitigating circumstances. “[T]he presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (Ibid.)
However, “[s]ection 1385(c) does not mean that, whenever a
listed mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court must
dismiss all enhancements unless it finds dismissal would
endanger public safety. The California Supreme Court has
explained that, even without ‘a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety,’ the trial ‘court retains the discretion to
he led police on a reckless chase. He also had guns on that day.
His behavior before the murder, his long criminal history was
increasing in severity. So I believe the middle term under
1170(b)(6) is appropriate. I will stay the 12022.5(a) as to count 2
only.”
17
impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value’ to the presence of any listed mitigating
circumstances.” (People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144,
1157 (Bravo), quoting People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,
1029.) “In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal
would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of
an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ [Citation.]” (Walker, at p. 1029.)
We review a trial court’s decision not to strike an
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez).) This
includes our review of the determination that dismissal would
endanger public safety. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) A court abuses its discretion if its decision
is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377
(Carmony).) It also abuses its discretion if it reaches its decision
without exercising informed discretion, or if the court is unaware
of the scope of its discretionary powers. (People v. Fredrickson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary.” ’ ” (Carmony, at p. 376.)
C. Analysis
Sullivan argues the trial court abused its discretion
because the evidence did not suggest that in the time period
before the underlying offenses he was “out of control” or his
18
“criminal behavior” was “increasing in severity,” as the trial court
found. Not so.
As detailed above, Sullivan’s criminal acts were increasing
in severity from school fights to reckless driving while fleeing a
pursuing police officer, then to robbery committed with an armed
accomplice, and then to murder and attempted murder. The trial
court reasonably described Sullivan’s behavior as “out of control.”
The probation report also noted that Sullivan had been provided
opportunities for rehabilitation, but his criminal behavior had
nonetheless escalated quickly in severity. Sullivan also admitted
the aggravating factor that he engaged in violent conduct
constituting a danger to society.5 We further note that although
the trial court struck Sullivan’s prior strike, it could still consider
the prior juvenile adjudication for other purposes. (See People v.
Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 499 [“when a court has struck a
prior conviction allegation, it has not ‘wipe[d] out’ that conviction
as though the defendant had never suffered it; rather, the
conviction remains a part of the defendant’s personal history, and
a court may consider it when sentencing the defendant for other
convictions, including others in the same proceeding”].) The
evidence supported the court’s reasons for declining to dismiss
the firearm enhancement.
Sullivan next maintains that the trial court erred by
focusing only on his current and past conduct to determine that
dismissal of the count 1 enhancement would endanger public
safety. Relying on Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215,
5 The trial court explicitly relied on this admission when
sentencing Sullivan, although not in its analysis regarding the
enhancement.
19
Sullivan argues the trial court was required to consider that he is
serving a “long prison sentence.”
In Gonzalez, the defendant contended the trial court should
consider his release date in determining whether he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to the public. (Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at pp. 221, 223–224.) The record affirmatively
showed that the trial court only focused on the defendant’s
current dangerousness when deciding whether to strike an
enhancement. The Court of Appeal held that “the trial court
erred because it considered only whether Gonzalez currently
posed a danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal of the
firearm enhancement would ‘endanger public safety.’ (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) In light of Gonzalez’s sentence of 50 years to life for
the murder conviction, the trial court also should have considered
the date on which Gonzalez could be released if the firearm
enhancement was dismissed and the fact that the release would
be subject to a review by the Board of Parole Hearings and the
Governor.” (Id. at pp. 230–231.)
Gonzalez is distinguishable. Here, the trial court did not
expressly limit its reasoning to Sullivan’s current or past
dangerousness. We thus must presume it considered the length
of Sullivan’s sentence in making its determination, as there is
nothing in the record that establishes it did not. “We assume the
trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.” (People v.
Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724; see also People v.
Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 [a court’s sentencing
decision implies requisite subsidiary findings].) The court was
not required to expressly state what time period it was relying on
in considering whether to dismiss the enhancement. Indeed, if a
trial court declines to dismiss an enhancement, it is not
20
mandated to use any “particular language” in doing so. (Bravo,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157.) While “[s]ection 1385,
subdivision (a), requires a trial court to state its ‘reasons for [a]
dismissal . . . orally on the record,’ ” there is no similar statutory
requirement when a court declines to dismiss an enhancement.
(Ibid.) Thus, a trial court need not make any express findings on
the record for us to find a proper exercise of discretion in denying
a motion under section 1385. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 378 [“[w]here the record is silent” we affirm].)
Moreover, in Gonzalez, the court was considering that the
defendant had been sentenced to 50 years to life. (Gonzalez,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 230–231.) Sullivan will be eligible
for parole in less than half that time. Sullivan states that,
without the punishment for the firearm enhancement, he would
not be eligible for parole for 17 years, when he is 36 years old,
and he asserts that “[a] lot changes between 18 [when he
committed the present offenses] and 36 years of age.” For this
proposition, he cites People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 846,
which states that in expanding section 3051, “the Legislature
considered scientific evidence that neurological development,
particularly in areas of the brain relevant to judgment and
decisionmaking, continues beyond adolescence and into the mid-
20’s.” Aside from his citation to Hardin regarding brain
development, Sullivan provides no evidence that he will be
rehabilitated in 17 years or will be too elderly to pose a danger to
society. His argument is therefore based on his age and the
passage of time. He has not established an abuse of discretion
under the reasoning of Gonzalez.
21
Sullivan has not established that the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to strike both firearm enhancements
under section 1385.
III. Sullivan Has Not Established Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel By Failing To Request a Franklin Hearing
Finally, Sullivan contends he was denied the right to
effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment because his trial
attorney should have requested a hearing under People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), and presented
evidence to create a record for a future youth offender parole
hearing. Sullivan has not established ineffective assistance of
counsel.
A. Applicable law
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, guarantee
a defendant the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal
prosecutions. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the defendant suffered
prejudice as a result. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687–692 (Strickland).) The first element “requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant [under] the
Sixth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 687.) The second “requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Ibid.)
“[A] reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if there is
affirmative evidence that counsel had ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical
purpose’ ” ’ for an action or omission.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2
22
Cal.5th 181, 198.) Accordingly, “if the record ‘ “sheds no light on
why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” ’ we
must reject the claim ‘ “unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488.) There is a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913,
954.) “We review the legal question of whether defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated de novo.” (People v. Palmer
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280.)
In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, the California Supreme
Court considered the rights of defendants who will be entitled to
youth offender parole hearings after 25 years of imprisonment
under section 3051, at which, under section 4801, the Board of
Parole Hearings must “ ‘give great weight to the diminished
culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased
maturity’ [citation].”6 (Franklin, at p. 268; see id. at p. 269.) The
court observed that the “criteria for parole suitability set forth in
Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 contemplate that the Board’s
decisionmaking at [the defendant’s] eventual parole hearing will
be informed by youth-related factors, such as his cognitive ability,
character, and social and family background at the time of the
offense.” (Franklin, at p. 269.) Thus, the court held that in
preparation for such a hearing, a defendant must be provided an
“adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of
mitigating evidence tied to his youth.” (Ibid.)
6 The People do not dispute that Sullivan will be entitled to a
youth offender parole hearing.
23
Because sections 3051 and 4801 “contemplate that
information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a
youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s
consideration,” “[a]ssembling such statements ‘about the
individual before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at
or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades
later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or
destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated
or passed away.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–284.)
In Franklin, the record was unclear as to whether the
defendant had been given a sufficient opportunity to make a
record, so the court remanded, instructing that on remand the
court could receive relevant evidence for the defendant’s eventual
youth offender parole hearing. This included prosecution
evidence demonstrating the youth’s culpability or maturity, and
evidence otherwise relevant to the youth-related factors.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
B. Analysis
The record does not affirmatively show why defense counsel
did not request a Franklin hearing. We therefore must “presume
counsel’s decision not to raise the claim was a reasonable, tactical
one unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise.”
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 443.) Nothing in the
record creates an inference that counsel’s decision was anything
other than a tactical one. Thus, as in People v. Campos (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1299 (Campos), the “record does not support a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
Defense counsel’s reason for not requesting a Franklin hearing
could be one of several. While ineffective assistance is one
24
possibility, another possibility is that defense counsel’s research
and evaluation led him to conclude that, on balance, ‘delving into
the past’ in a Franklin hearing would not be ‘beneficial’ [citation]
to this particular defendant. Because the record does not
affirmatively establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we reject
it on direct appeal.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Sullivan asserts “[t]here is no conceivable reason on this
record why counsel would not ask for [a] Franklin hearing”
pointing to school records he submitted when he made a Marsden
motion.7 He highlights an Individualized Education Program
(IEP) document indicating that he had a learning disability and
noting a discrepancy between his “average reasoning ability” and
his reading skills. Sullivan asserts that this document, which is
in the appellate record, should have been filed by his counsel for
“purposes of a future Franklin hearing” and “such a record would
have triggered competent counsel to have investigated further
and asked for the appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist to
evaluate appellant and file a report.” He contends trial counsel’s
statements regarding a continuance suggested he either did not
read the IEP or did not appreciate the import of its content.
We disagree that this evidence establishes deficient
performance by counsel. There is no indication that counsel did
not read or appreciate the contents of the IEP. There is also no
basis for this court to infer that competent defense counsel would
necessarily have ordered an evaluation by a psychiatrist or
psychologist based on an IEP focused on academic achievement.
In addition, at the time of sentencing, the probation reports
were already part of the record, and they described several
mitigating circumstances. The record does not reveal the extent
7 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
25
to which defense counsel had already conducted further
investigation into possible Franklin evidence. As in Campos, the
record is “silent as to whether defense counsel made a tactical
conclusion that, in spite of [witnesses who might have provided
insight into the appellant’s background and social issues], a
Franklin hearing would not have been beneficial to defendant on
balance.” (Campos, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1299, fn. 11.)
Because Sullivan has not established that his trial
counsel’s performance was deficient, we need not determine
whether he was also prejudiced. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 697 [no need “to address both components of the inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”].) Sullivan has
not established ineffective assistance of counsel.
26
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
27
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