CourtListener 10758534•Moon v. Na CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/15/25 Moon v. Na CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
KAP SOON MOON, B343381
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. 19STCV08038)
SUNG JOO NA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Jane Chung, Jane G. Chung and Eric S.
Chung; Law Offices of James B. Kropff and James B. Kropff for
Defendant and Appellant Jongju Na.
Sung Joo Na and Kyonga Nam, in pro. per., for Defendants
and Appellants.
Law Office of Andrew E. Smyth and Andrew Smyth for
Plaintiff and Respondent Kap Soon Moon.
INTRODUCTION
The parties to this action and their assignees have filed at
least four lawsuits against each other, all pretty much about the
same thing: a $100,000 investment by Kap Soon Moon in a
company called Leading Town SDUS, Inc., with which Kyonga
Nam, Sung Joo Na, and Jongju Na were somehow affiliated. (See
Lim v. Moon (Aug. 12, 2022, B314481) [nonpub. opn.]; Super. Ct.
L.A. County Nos. 19STCV08038 (Moon v. Na, et al.),
19STCV14007 (Lim v. Moon), 22STCV12566 (Lim v. Moon).) In
this case (19STCV08038) Moon obtained a $400,435 default
judgment against Nam and the Nas. In another case, Nam’s
assignee obtained a $27,000 judgment against Moon. The
litigation appears to be continuing apace.
In this appeal Jongju Na (but not Nam or Sung Joo Na)
argues the default judgment against him is void because the
proof of service of the summons and complaint shows he was not
properly served. Moon served the complaint on Jongju Na by
personally serving Sung Joo Na, who said, according to the
process server, he was “authorized to receive service for Jongju
Na as part of Leading Town.” The trial court denied a motion by
Jongju Na (and the other two defendants) to set aside the default
judgment. All three defendants appealed. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Moon Sues for Breach of Contract and Obtains a
Default Judgment
Moon filed this action in March 2019 against Leading Town
and the three individual defendants for breach of contract,
2
promissory estoppel, false pretenses, and fraud. Moon alleged
that in November 2018 he agreed to invest $100,000 in Leading
Town, in exchange for a 55 percent interest in the company and
the right to hire a manager and an assistant manager. Moon
alleged that Nam and the Nas “openly repudiated the agreement
but only after accepting approximately $100,000.00 in cash and
vendor contract from [Moon] for the company. Acting as the alter
ego for Leading Town, [Nam and the Nas] arranged for others to
make the rent payment, stating there never was any agreement
between the parties and making no effort to recompense” Moon.
Moon also alleged Nam and the Nas fired the manager and
assistant manager and “never disclosed recordkeeping or finances
to” Moon.
Moon served Leading Town, Nam, and the Nas with the
summons and complaint. Moon served Leading Town by
personally serving Sung Joo Na (who told the process server he
was authorized to receive service for Leading Town),1 served
Sung Joo Na by personally serving him, served Kyonga Nam by
personally serving Sung Joo Na (who said he was authorized to
receive service for Kyonga), and served Jongju Na (the defendant
at issue in this appeal) by serving Sung Joo Na (who said he was
also authorized to receive service for Jongju Na). None of the
defendants responded to the complaint, and on April 11, 2019 the
trial court entered their defaults. On November 26, 2019 the
trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Moon and
1 Sung Joo Na is the registered agent for service of process
for Leading Town. The address on file with the Secretary of
State for Sung Joo Na is the business address of Leading Town.
3
against Leading Town, Nam, and the Nas in the amount of
$400,435.
B. The Trial Court Denies a Motion by Nam and the Nas
To Set Aside the Default Judgment
In July 2024 and (after the trial court denied the first
motion without prejudice) again in September 2024, almost
five years later, Nam and the Nas filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment. They argued and stated in substantially
identical declarations that they were never served with any
documents in this action and that they only learned about the
case in the course of litigating one of the other cases involving the
same parties (22STCV12566). They argued that, because the
proofs of service were defective, the default judgment was void on
its face. They attached, among other things, the four proofs of
service of the summons and complaint in this action (including
the one for Jongju Na that states Sung Joo Na, while sitting in
his “white automobile,” told the process server he “was
authorized to receive service for Jongju Na as part of Leading
Town”), a copy of this court’s opinion in Lim v. Moon, supra,
B314481, and a proposed answer.2 They did not argue (or state
in their declarations) Sung Joo Na was not authorized to accept
service on behalf of the other defendants.
Moon opposed the motion, arguing that it was untimely and
that the judgment was not void on its face. Moon asserted each
defendant was properly served with the summons and complaint,
2 Nam and the Nas also asked the court to set aside the
default judgment under its “inherent equitable power.” They do
not pursue that argument on appeal.
4
“as evidenced by the proofs of service.” Moon also argued the
three defendants improperly relied on extrinsic evidence (i.e.,
their declarations) to show the judgment was void on its face.
The trial court denied the motion to set aside the default
judgment. The court ruled “the proofs of service executed by a
registered process server demonstrate service on the
Defendants.” The court concluded “there is no defect on the face
of the record. Again, the proofs of service facially demonstrate
proper personal service on each defendant. Defendants have not
presented evidence sufficiently rebutting the presumption of
valid service.” Nam and the Nas timely appealed.3
DISCUSSION
Jongju Na (and only Jongju Na) argues the trial court erred
in denying his motion to vacate the default judgment under Code
of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d),4 because “the proof
of service on Jongju is defective on its face,” and therefore the
judgment against him is void on its face. He contends that “Moon
relied on the statement recorded by the process server—namely,
3 An order denying a motion to vacate a judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure section 473 is appealable. (Jackson v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 166, 171;
Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1004,
1009.) Nam and the Nas purport to appeal from the default
judgment, which the court entered in November 2019, but the
time to appeal from the judgment has long since expired.
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
5
that Sung Joo Na said he was authorized to accept service on
Jongju’s behalf”—and that “[n]o other basis for service was
offered.” Jongju Na cites Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 1426, where the court held a person’s
extrajudicial statement he or she is someone else’s agent is not
admissible to prove the person is an agent, unless the principal is
present for, or learns of, the statement of agency and acquiesces
to it. (Id. at p. 1437.)
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court ‘may, on
motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside
any void judgment or order.’” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments
Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020; see W. Bradley Electric,
Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.)
A judgment is void if the trial court lacked jurisdiction in a
fundamental sense, such as where it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction or lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
(Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339;
People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
653, 660; W. Bradley, at p. 13.) “When a court has fundamental
jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or
judgment is merely voidable.” (American Contractors, at p. 661;
see Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 138; People v.
The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 226, 233-234.)
“In determining whether an order is void for purposes of
section 473, subdivision (d), courts distinguish between orders
that are void on the face of the record and orders that appear
valid on the face of the record but are shown to be invalid
through consideration of extrinsic evidence. ‘This distinction may
6
be important in a particular case because it impacts the
procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment [or
order], when the judgment [or order] may be attacked, and how
the party challenging the judgment [or order] proves that the
judgment [or order] is void.’ [Citation.] [¶] An order is
considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent
from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without
consideration of extrinsic evidence. . . . If the invalidity can be
shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as
declarations or testimony, the order is not void on its face.”
(Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1020-1021.) There is no time limit to bring a motion for relief
from a judgment under section 473, subdivision (d), in the
original action on the ground the judgment, though valid on its
face, is void for lack of proper service. (California Capital Ins.
Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 225.)
“What the judgment roll consists of differs depending on
whether any defendant answered the complaint.” (OC Interior
Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
1318, 1328, fn. 2.) “In case the complaint is not answered by any
defendant,” section 670 defines “judgment roll” as including “the
summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint;
the request for entry of default with a memorandum indorsed
thereon that the default of the defendant in not answering was
entered, and a copy of the judgment.” (§ 670, subd. (a); see
Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370 [section 670,
subdivision (a), lists what the judgment roll consists of “[w]hen a
default judgment has been taken”]; OC Interior Services, at
p. 1328, fn. 2 [the definition of “judgment roll” in section 670,
subdivision (a), applies “[i]n default situations”].)
7
“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal
jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process ‘the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by
proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’”
(Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) The
filing of a proof of service by a registered process server creates a
rebuttable presumption service was properly effected if the proof
of service conforms to the statutory requirements. (Evid. Code,
§ 647; Pacifica First National, Inc. v. Abekasis (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 654, 656; Dalessandro v. Mitchell (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1091, fn. 4; Yolo County Dept. of Child
Support Services v. Myers (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 42, 47-48, fn. 2;
see Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [under
Evidence Code section 647, “a registered process server’s
declaration of service establishes a presumption that the facts
stated in the declaration are true”]; Palm Property Investments,
LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1427, 1428 [“where
service is carried out by a registered process server,” the trial
court must “apply the evidentiary presumption afforded by
Evidence Code section 647”].) We review “de novo whether the
judgment is void and, if it is, determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in deciding not to set it aside.” (W. Bradley
Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 12; see Nixon Peabody LLP v. Superior Court (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 818, 822 [“Evaluating an order or judgment as
void is a question of law, reviewed de novo.”].)
8
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Jongju’s
Motion To Set Aside the Default Judgment
A registered process server effected service on Jongju Na by
serving an agent authorized to accept service, Sung Joo Na, while
Sung Joo Na was in a car outside the business address of Leading
Town in San Diego. That was a valid method of service that
conformed to the statutory requirements of service of process.
(See § 416.90 [summons may be served by delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint “to a person authorized by him to
receive service of process”]; American Express Centurion Bank v.
Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389 [“A defendant may . . . be
‘personally’ served by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized to accept service on behalf of
that defendant.”].) Under Evidence Code section 647, we
presume Jongju Na was properly served.
As Jongju Na correctly points out, an “extrajudicial
statement of a person that he or she is the agent of another is not
admissible to prove the fact of agency unless the statement is
either made in the presence of or communicated to the principal
and the principal acquiesces in that statement.” (Dill v. Berquist
Construction Co., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437.) And, as
Jongju Na rightly states, Moon “has never claimed—and the
record contains no evidence—that the alleged statement was
made in Jongju’s presence or communicated to him with his
acquiescence. In fact, the proof of service itself confirms that
[Jongju Na] was not present when service was attempted, which
is precisely why the server relied on Sung Joo Na’s statement.
His absence at the scene precludes any argument that he adopted
or confirmed the agent’s claim.”
9
There are several problems, however, with Jongju Na’s
argument. First, he never made it in the trial court. True, a
party can argue a default judgment is void on its face any time,
even for the first time on appeal. (Grados v. Shiau (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1050; Calvert v. Al Binali (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 954, 962; Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42.) And Jongju Na argued in the trial court
the judgment is void under section 473, subdivision (d). But he
did not argue Sung Joo Na was not authorized to accept service
on his behalf. (See W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell
Engineering, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 12 [“an appellant
cannot contend that the trial court erred by rejecting an
argument the appellant had not raised in its briefing to that
court” in an appeal from an order denying a motion under
section 473, subdivision (d)]; see also Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1350, fn. 12 [“‘[a] party is
not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and
different theory on appeal’” because to “‘permit him to do so
would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust
to the opposing litigant’”].) Nor (though it would have been
inadmissible extrinsic evidence under section 473,
subdivision (d)) did Jongju Na state in his declaration Sung Joo
Na was not authorized to accept service on his behalf. While
Jongju Na complains “the trial court did not evaluate whether
Sung Joo Na was legally authorized to accept service under
section 416.90,” that was because Jongju Na did not raise the
issue.
Second, though an agent’s statement of agency, without
more, is insufficient to prove the agency (Dill v. Berquist
Construction Co., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 1426), there is no
10
evidence (nor, on a motion under section 473, subdivision (d), can
there be) of what the process server, Moon, or Moon’s attorney
knew about the relationship between Song Joo Na and Jongju
Na. Had Jongju Na filed a timely motion under section 473,
subdivision (b), or section 473.5,5 Moon in response to such a
motion could have submitted a declaration from himself, his
attorney, or the process service responding to any claim by
Jongju Na that Song Joo Na was not authorized to accept service
on his behalf. But because Jongju Na did not file his motion to
set aside the default judgment until approximately four and a
half years after the trial court had entered the judgment, he had
to proceed under section 473, subdivision (d), which did not allow
him (or Moon) to submit any declarations or other extrinsic
evidence.6
5 Nam and Sung Joo Na admitted they had actual notice of
this case in January 2022. Jongju Na stated he learned of this
case in January 2024. The deadline for filing a motion for relief
under section 473, subdivision (b), is a reasonable time, not to
exceed six months from the entry of default (here, six months
from April 11, 2019). (Backlund v. Stone (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th
580, 596-597.) The deadline for seeking relief under section 473.5
is a reasonable time, not to exceed the earlier of six months after
written notice of the default judgment on the defendant or two
years from receiving actual notice. (Luxury Asset Lending, LLC
v. Philadelphia Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
894, 908.)
6 Which distinguishes this case from the one Jongju Na
principally relies on, Summers v. McClanahan, supra,
140 Cal.App.4th 403, where this court held delivery to the
defendant’s personal manager was not proper service under
11
Third, section 416.90 authorizes the plaintiff to personally
serve a defendant by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to the defendant’s agent. The proof of service of
summons form adopted by the Judicial Council, Form POS-010,
requires the process server, when serving a person other than the
party being served, to specify the “name and relationship to the
party named” as the person being served. Had the process server
here written “Sung Joo Na” and “authorized,” there would be
nothing on the face of the proof of service suggesting the
authorization to accept service was based, in whole or in part, on
a statement by the agent. It would be anomalous to find the
section 416.90. (Summers, at p. 411.) The court in Summers
cited extrinsic evidence, including testimony by the manager
that, though she “‘immediately’ forwarded the documents” she
received to the defendant’s attorney, “she had ‘never been
authorized by [the defendant] to accept service of process on her
behalf’ and had never ‘represented to anyone, either expressly or
impliedly, that [she had] authority to accept service of process on
her behalf.’” (Id. at pp. 406, 414.) In reversing an order denying
the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment filed
six days after entry of the judgment (id. at p. 406), the court in
Summers stated that the plaintiff did not dispute the manager’s
testimony and that the record was “devoid of any evidence” the
defendant and her manager “had a close business or personal
relationship, which would make it highly likely [the manager]
would inform [the defendant] she was being sued by” the
plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 415-416.) Putting aside that neither Jongju
Na nor Sung Joo Na ever denied the latter’s authority to accept
service on behalf of the former, this is precisely the kind of
extrinsic evidence the court cannot consider on a motion to set
aside a default judgment under section 473, subdivision (d).
12
proof of service defective for including more information than the
form requires.
Jongju Na also focuses on the language “as part of Leading
Town” that appears after the language “he stated he was
authorized to receive service for Jongju Na.” Jongju Na argues
that the “qualifying phrase—‘as part of Leading Town’—to the
extent it has any legal meaning, is legally insufficient to support
a finding of actual appointment under [section] 416.90” and that
the “phrasing implies a flawed theory: that because Jongju was
allegedly ‘part of’ Leading Town, by law he could be served
through the company’s designated agent. . . .” The “as part of”
language in the proof of service is ambiguous: It could mean
Sung Joo Na was saying he was authorized to accept service on
behalf of Jongju Na because both men were associated with the
same company. Or it could mean Sung Joo Na was trying to say
he was authorized to accept service on behalf of the company of
which Jongju Na was a part. But resolving that ambiguity would
require extrinsic evidence (see Burch v. Premier Homes, LLC
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 730, 743; Steller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 175, 183), which on a motion to vacate
under section 473, subdivision (d), is not admissible. In the
absence of such evidence, the presumption of valid service
prevails.
Jongju Na is not without a potential remedy. A “judgment
or order valid on its face but claimed to be void based on extrinsic
evidence may be attacked in an independent equitable action
without time limits.” (California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 215.) “A suit in equity instituted for the
purpose of vacating a judgment is a direct attack” on the
judgment (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 558;
13
see Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436,
440), and in such an action “[e]xtrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence
outside the judgment roll, may be presented . . . .” (OC Interior
Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1328; see Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 [“‘[O]n direct attack, lack of
jurisdiction may be shown by extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence
outside the judgment roll.’”].)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion
by Nam and Sung Joo Na To Set Aside the Default
Judgment
Nam and Sung Joo Na argue in their separate opening
brief the trial court erred in denying their motion to set aside the
default judgment, but they do not discuss section 473,
subdivision (d), Evidence Code section 647, service of the
summons and complaint, agency, or any issues relating to the
motion. Instead, they argue the merits of their position Moon
never paid them $100,000. They maintain that the default
judgment should be reversed “regardless of the procedural issues
of proofs of service of the complaints” and that their attorney in
the trial court “distract[ed] and interfer[ed] with the proper
attention of the trial court” by filing a motion that “consisted of
about 90% for the procedural issues of proofs of service of the
complaints and about 5-10% only for the substantive facts,” a
mistake they claim to correct on appeal by focusing 95 percent on
the “substantive facts” and 5 percent on “the procedural issues of
proofs of service.” The merits of Moon’s claims, which again
depend on extrinsic evidence, are not relevant to this appeal.
(See Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 887 [“entry of
14
default bars [the appellant] from advancing contentions on the
merits”]; Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 813, 824 [“appellants’ efforts to argue the merits
of their case are barred substantively by the default judgment,
which operates as an admission of the allegations of the
complaint, and are also barred procedurally by the entry of a
default”]; see also OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar
Mortgage, LLC, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th 1318 at p. 1327 [party
challenging a judgment as void on its face may not rely on
extrinsic evidence].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion by Kyonga Nam, Sung Joo
Na, and Jongju Na to vacate the default judgment is affirmed.
Moon is to recover his costs on appeal.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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