In re L.A. CA4/2

CourtListener 10758477Calctapp15.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/15/25 In re L.A. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.A. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085756

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400530 &
DPRI2400532)
v.
OPINION
K.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,

Judge. Affirmed.

Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I. INTRODUCTION

K.A. (Father) appeals from a dispositional order removing three of his children,

L.A., P.A., and V.A., from his custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section

361, placing the children in the physical custody of their respective biological mothers

and terminating jurisdiction. On appeal, Father argues: (1) the juvenile court’s

jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the juvenile court’s

findings in support of removal are not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the

juvenile court abused its discretion in issuing an exit order granting sole legal custody of

P.A. and V.A. to their biological mother. We conclude that substantial evidence in the

record supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and order of removal. We

further conclude that Father has not met his burden to establish an abuse of discretion

with respect to the juvenile court’s exit order terminating jurisdiction. Therefore, we

affirm the orders.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Petitions

Father is the biological father of five children—Ka.A., L.A., P.A., V.A., and

J.A.—from three different biological mothers.2 In October 2024, DPSS received a

referral alleging general neglect and physical abuse of his children. After conducting an

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Specifically, Ka.A. and L.A. are children from Father’s first marriage; P.A. and
V.A. are children from Father’s second marriage; and J.A. is the child of Father’s current
live-in girlfriend. None of the mothers are parties to this appeal.

2
investigation, DPSS filed dependency petitions on behalf of all five children pursuant to

section 300 et seq. in December 2024. With respect to the children subject of this

appeal,3 the petitions alleged that (1) Father neglected L.A., P.A., and V.A. by failing to

provide appropriate care and supervision; (2) Father struggled with unresolved substance

abuse involving alcohol;4 and (3) Father engaged in inappropriate physical discipline of

L.A.

B. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

In March 2025, the juvenile court held contested jurisdictional and dispositional

hearings on the petitions. With respect to each petition, it accepted into evidence the

detention report, jurisdictional/dispositional reports, and two addendum reports filed by

DPSS.5 There was no live testimony presented.6

3 This appeal involves only the petitions pertaining to L.A., P.A., and V.A. Ka.A.
reached the age of majority prior to the jurisdictional hearing in this case, and the
allegations pertaining to him were dismissed in an amended petition. The petition
involving J.A. was subject to a separate appeal in which Father raised the same
substantial evidence arguments raised in this appeal, but Father decided not to request
consolidation of the appeals. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our opinion
affirming the jurisdictional and dispositional order as to J.A. in case No. E085702.

4 The petition also alleged that Father had a history of substance abuse involving
marijuana and that the children’s biological mothers knew or should have known of
Father’s substance abuse but failed to take action to protect the children. However, DPSS
later amended the petitions to remove these allegations.
5 While the juvenile court held separate contested hearings with respect to the
allegations pertaining to L.A. and those pertaining to P.A. and V.A., the reports submitted
in each case disclosed identical facts to the juvenile court. As such, we combine the
summaries of the evidentiary facts set forth in each type of report admitted into evidence.

6 The record shows that on the date of the hearing, Father filed a series of
documents related to his participation in a therapeutic program, his recent drug testing
[footnote continued on next page]

3
1. Detention Reports

According to the detention reports Father has five biological children—Ka.A.,

L.A., P.A., V.A., and J.A. In October 2024, P.A. reported that Father and J.A.’s mother7

frequently consumed alcohol, smoke, and go out to bars while leaving the children

unsupervised at home. P.A. was 11 years old at the time. According to P.A., the lack of

supervision resulted in injuries from physical altercations between the children,

unsanitary conditions in the home, and no responsible adult to care for the youngest

sibling, J.A.

In response to the report, social workers separately interviewed Ka.A., L.A., P.A.,

V.A., and J.A., who were 17, 15, 11, nine, and seven years old, respectively. V.A.

reported that she never saw any physical fights but could hear them occurring in the

home; that Father “dr[ank] alcohol and smoke[d] cigarettes” but not directly in front of

the children; and that she generally felt safe in Father’s home except when the other

children begin to fight. L.A. admitted she had been involved in at least one physical

altercation with P.A. in Father’s home; reported that Father regularly smoked cigarettes

and consumed alcohol in his room; and further reported that Father and his live-in

history, and attempts to control pests in his home. The record does not show that the
juvenile court admitted these items into evidence, and it does not show that counsel
requested admission of these items into evidence at the time of hearing. Additionally, at
the contested hearings, Father’s counsel made reference to the live testimony received in
a separate hearing pertaining to J.A, but the transcript of the testimony was not made part
of the record in this appeal.

7 P.A. reported that J.A.’s mother was Father’s live-in girlfriend. We take judicial
notice of the fact that this reference was to J.A.’s biological mother.

4
girlfriend (J.A.’s mom) had left the children unsupervised in the home on multiple

occasions. P.A. acknowledged being in at least one physical altercation with L.A. and

reported that Father often left the children unsupervised in order to smoke cigarettes and

consume alcohol in his bedroom. She stated that she often smelled alcohol on Father’s

person. Ka.A. reported that there was typically very little supervision while at Father’s

home, that Father drank “ ‘often’ ” but “ ‘d[id] not get drunk’ ”; and that Father typically

left the home unkept, but Father’s current live-in girlfriend would clean and care for the

children. J.A. reported that L.A. and P.A. “always f[ought]” while in the home; that

Father consumed alcohol frequently; and that his mother often got upset with Father for

doing so.

The biological mother of P.A. and V.A. reported she was aware of fights in

Father’s home but explained that she sent her children to the home as part of a family law

custody order. However, she also represented that the custody order specified that Father

was not to consume alcohol while the children were in his care and was not to smoke

because P.A. suffered from asthma. The biological mother of Ka.A. and L.A. reported

that she was not aware of physical fights in Father’s home; but, she acknowledged that

L.A. often reported there was a lack of supervision and expressed her desire not to go to

Father’s home due to his “ ‘heavily drinking.’ ”

When a social worker contacted Father to request an interview, Father expressed

that he was unavailable due to his work schedule.

Social workers conducted separate follow-up interviews with each child. P.A.

expressed her desire not to return to Father’s home; recalled an incident in which she

5
intervened when Father attempted to “choke” J.A.; and recalled witnessing a different

incident in which Father “slapped J.A. across the face.” L.A. also expressed a desire not

to return to Father’s home; stated that Father consumed significant amounts of alcohol on

a daily basis; and that she “always smell[ed] alcohol” on Father. L.A. also recalled a past

incident in which Father lunged at her when he became angry; witnessed Father

“strangl[e]” J.A. and “ ‘slap’ J.A. across the face”; and witnessed Father drive his

children in a car while reeking of alcohol, expressing his belief that it was safe because

“his alcohol tolerance was so high.” Ka.A. confirmed that he witnessed Father consume

alcohol but had not seen Father acting drunk. He also denied witnessing any incidents in

which Father physically harmed J.A.

In the follow-up interview with J.A., he reported that Father “dr[ank] excessively”

and “ ‘g[ot] pissed off’ ” when he disciplined J.A. J.A. disclosed prior incidents in which

(1) Father punched him in the stomach with a closed fist, leaving a red mark; and

(2) Father strangled him by grabbing him by the throat. When Father learned of this

interview, he contacted the social worker, expressed that she should not believe the things

that a seven-year-old child states, and stated that he would refuse to comply further with

DPSS’s investigation. He declined a request to voluntarily submit to a substance abuse

test.

Social workers attempted to make two, unannounced visits to Father’s home.

During the first visit, they discovered the children had been left unsupervised. During the

second visit, no one answered the door. When social workers contacted Father and his

6
live-in girlfriend (J.A.’s mom) by phone, they both denied permission for social workers

to enter the home.

DPSS reported that J.A.’s mother was generally cooperative with their

investigation, agreeing to speak with social workers and to submit to a drug screening

test. She witnessed one incident where Father slapped L.A. across the face but did not

believe Father was typically physically aggressive with any of the children. She also

reported that she usually worked from 7:30 a.m. until 6 p.m. and, as a result, was “not

sure if [Father] dr[ank]” during the day. She did confirm that Father would consume

alcohol in the evenings but did not observe him becoming drunk or aggressive during

these times.

The detention report noted that P.A., V.A., and L.A. remained in the custody of

their biological mothers as part of a negotiated safety plan.

2. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Report

The jurisdictional and dispositional report provided additional background related

to Father’s relationship with his children. In 2011, Father separated from the mother of

Ka.A. and L.A.; a family law court order provided Father with joint legal and joint

physical custody of these two children, with a division of custody time. However, in

2013 the mother of Ka.A. and L.A. sought to modify the custody order. In support of her

request, she submitted a declaration alleging that Father was not making sufficient efforts

to ensure the children were properly supervised and was “ ‘constantly drink[ing] alcohol’

” in the children’s presence. She also recalled an incident in which Father called her to

pick up the children because he was “ ‘drunk and unable to drive’ ” and recalled a second

7
incident in which the mother of P.A. and V.A. contacted her to inform her that Father had

been drinking “ ‘all day’ ” and it was no longer safe for the children to be in Father’s

presence. Father disputed these allegations in competing declarations. Ultimately, the

family court ordered the parties to meet with a child custody recommending counselor

and maintained joint physical and joint legal custody.

In 2015, Father separated from the mother of P.A. and V.A., purportedly due to

Father’s alcohol abuse. According to a declaration filed by the mother of P.A. and V.A.

in family court, Father would repeatedly relapse into alcohol abuse and poorly manage

childcare during these times. At one point, the family law court issued orders

conditioning Father’s visitation time with P.A. and V.A. on Father’s not consuming

alcohol 24 hours prior to any visits and not consuming alcohol during their visits with

Father.

Social workers conducted follow-up interviews with each of the children. Ka.A.

confirmed that Father rarely supervised the children but noted that the children were

usually left under his care or the care of J.A.’s mother. Ka.A. stated that Father would

often consume “two to three beers” upon his return home from work, but this would

rarely result in Father’s getting “drunk.” He acknowledged that, on more than one

occasion, he had witnessed Father consume alcohol to the point of slurring his words and

having difficulty standing but could not remember the last time he witnessed this. L.A.

continued to allege that she had witnessed Father consume alcohol while at home with

the children; stated that she would often smell alcohol on Father’s breath when he

interacted with them; and recalled incidents in which Father had driven her while under

8
the influence of alcohol. Both P.A. and V.A. continued to allege that they were often

unsupervised while in Father’s care and that they regularly witnessed Father consuming

alcohol while in their presence.

DPSS reported that Father initially declined to participate in any follow-up

interview, but he eventually agreed to meet with a social worker. During this interview,

Father declined to provide requested information regarding his family background, his

educational background, or his past relationships with the mothers of his children. Father

also declined to discuss any history of substance abuse.

Finally, DPSS attached a police report from July 2023 in which the mother of P.A.

and V.A. reported she had to respond to a call for help from her daughters while they

were in Father’s care. When she called Father to find out what was happening, Father

was breathing heavily, was slurring and mumbling his words, and was “obviously

intoxicated.” She reminded Father that he was not supposed to consume alcohol while

her daughters were in his care, but Father denied being intoxicated. He initially resisted

when she offered to pick up the girls but relented when confronted with the fact that he

was not supposed to consume alcohol while they were in his care and could be subject to

a breathalyzer test if she called law enforcement. Upon picking up P.A. and V.A., the

girls confirmed that Father had been drinking alcohol. She filed the police report simply

to document the incident if future family court proceedings became necessary.

Based upon the information detailed in the detention report and jurisdictional and

dispositional report, DPSS recommended that the juvenile court find true allegations of

9
the dependency petitions and remove the children from Father’s physical custody

pursuant to section 361.

3. Addendum Reports

In January 2025, DPSS filed addendum reports. On the advice of counsel, Father

voluntarily contacted a social worker to offer to submit to a drug test. Father also

requested to meet and submit to an interview with the social worker, but he later implied

that he was only doing so out of duress because he believed the government was holding

his children hostage until he complied with its demands. When Father met with the

social worker, he stated he would like to provide a formal response to the allegations of

the petitions, and proceeded to dispute various allegations made by the other witnesses

detailed in previous reports. After submitting to two drug tests, Father notified the social

worker he would not submit to any additional tests and had only submitted to the two

tests under duress. The reports also stated that Father continued to deny permission for

social workers to enter or inspect his home. The addendum reports also clarified that

DPSS was recommending that the juvenile court grant the children’s biological mothers

sole physical and sole legal custody of L.A., P.A., and V.A. in lieu of dependency, with

supervised visitation rights to Father.

In February 2025, DPSS filed additional addendum reports. DPSS reported that

Father had been hesitant to provide any updated information to social workers in advance

of the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Father declined to speak directly

with a social worker and would only engage via text message. Additionally, Father

expressed that he did not trust social workers, did not want to speak with them directly,

10
and would not comply with requests to let social workers inspect his home. He

represented that he had privately enrolled in some type of therapeutic program to “ ‘see if

[he had] any substance abuse issues’ ” but would not permit release of any information to

DPSS regarding his participation in the program.

C. Dispositional Order and Appeal

The juvenile court found insufficient evidence to sustain the allegations that Father

engaged in inappropriate physical discipline of L.A. or that the children’s biological

mothers failed to intervene to protect the children from Father’s alcohol abuse. However,

the juvenile court found true the allegations that Father failed to provide his children with

appropriate care and supervision and that Father has an unresolved history of alcohol

abuse. It found clear and convincing evidence justifying removal of the children from

Father’s physical custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c), and ordered the

children formally removed. However, the juvenile court adopted the recommendations of

DPSS to grant the children’s biological mothers sole physical and sole legal custody of

P.A., V.A., and L.A. in lieu of dependency. The juvenile court also provided that Father

was entitled to supervised visitation with the children.

Father appeals from the dispositional orders.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdictional Findings

The first argument raised on appeal is that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional

findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that the jurisdictional

finding that Father’s substance abuse involving the use of alcohol placed the children at

11
substantial risk of physical harm is supported by substantial evidence. Given this

conclusion, we need not separately address Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional finding

that he failed to provide adequate supervision.

1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“Section 300 enumerates the various ways in which a child may come within the

dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 537.)

One such circumstance is where substance abuse impairs a parent’s ability to provide

regular care for a child. (In re N.R., at p. 538; § 300, subd. (b)(1).) Another such

circumstance is where the parent engages in physical discipline that causes a child to

suffer serious physical harm or places the child at risk of suffering serious physical harm

in the future. (In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639-640 [physical discipline may

form basis of jurisdiction under § 300, either subds. (a), (b), or (j)]; In re Cole C. (2009)

174 Cal.App.4th 900, 904, 907 [allegations of excessive or not age-appropriate discipline

can constitute basis of jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (b)].)

“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In

making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to

support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light

most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and

credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)

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2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Findings Related to Alcohol Abuse

Here, we conclude substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that Father struggled with substance abuse involving alcohol. Despite being

interviewed separately, all five of Father’s children reported witnessing Father consume

alcohol on a regular basis. This was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that

Father regularly consumed alcohol while supervising his children.

Additionally, substantial evidence in the record supports a reasonable conclusion

that Father’s alcohol consumption placed P.A., V.A., and L.A. at risk of serious physical

harm. L.A. reported that Father attempted to drive a car with his children as passengers

while reeking of alcohol, and further reported that he had driven her while intoxicated in

the past. Ka.A. reported that, on more than one occasion, he had seen Father intoxicated

to the point where Father would slur his words and have difficulty standing.

Additionally, records from Father’s two separate family law cases included declarations

by both L.A.’s biological mother and P.A. and V.A.’s biological mother detailing

incidents in which Father’s ability to care for the children had been seriously impaired by

excessive alcohol consumption, including an incident in which the mother of P.A. and

V.A. expressed fear that it was not safe for her or any of the children to be in the home

due to Father’s excessive alcohol consumption. Additionally, because J.A.’s mother told

social workers she had never witnessed any of these incidents, the juvenile court could

reasonably infer that Father’s excessive alcohol consumption occurred when he was the

only adult charged with supervising the children in the home. From this evidence, the

juvenile court could reasonably conclude that consuming alcohol to the point of being

13
unable to speak clearly; unable to stand; and unable to appreciate the dangers of

attempting to drive one’s children while intoxicated presents a risk of physical harm to

the children.

On appeal, Father argues that L.A. and P.A.’s statements were not credible

because they were motivated by a desire to remain permanently in their respective

mothers’ care. However, under the substantial evidence standard of review, “[t]he

appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or

indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court.” (In re Michael G. (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589; In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238 [“ ‘[I]ssues of fact

and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ”].) Thus, even accepting that the

evidence showed L.A. and P.A. had potential motives to fabricate or exaggerate their

reports to social workers, it was within the province of the juvenile court to assess the

credibility of these reports and determine what weight to give them.

3. We Need Not Address the Additional Jurisdictional Finding Against Father

“[T]he principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to his or

her parent’ [citation], means that ‘ “[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional

finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023)

14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284.) Review of a challenge to jurisdictional findings under these

circumstances is discretionary (ibid.), and “an appellate court may decline to address the

evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has

been found to be supported by the evidence” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484,

14
1492, overruled in part by In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; In re E.E. (2020)

49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212).

Here, we have already concluded that the jurisdictional allegation that Father’s

alcohol abuse placed P.A., V.A., and L.A. at substantial risk of physical harm is

supported by substantial evidence. Given our conclusion, it is unnecessary to address

Father’s alternative claim that substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional

finding that he failed to adequately supervise the children while they were in his care.8

B. Dispositional Order Findings

Father also advances three arguments as to why reversal of the dispositional order

of removal is required: (1) there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that any

risk of harm to P.A., V.A., and L.A. was ongoing at the time of disposition because

Father “was on the verge of completing his substance abuse treatment program”; (2) there

was no substantial evidence to support the findings that there were no reasonable means

by which the children’s physical health could be protected short of removal; and (3) the

juvenile court failed to state the facts upon which its order of removal was premised. As

we explain, we find no basis for reversal in the record before us.

8 We do have discretion to reach the merits of a jurisdictional challenge that is
otherwise rendered moot because at least one jurisdictional finding is unchallenged or
one jurisdictional finding is valid. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283-284.)
However, Father has not separately argued that any factors supporting the exercise of
discretionary review exist in this case.

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1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“After a juvenile court exercises jurisdiction over a child pursuant to section 300,

it must determine the appropriate disposition for that child.” (In re M.D.(2023)

93 Cal.App.5th 836, 856.) Generally, “[t]he juvenile court has broad discretion in

crafting a disposition pursuant to a child’s best interest” (In re Nada R. (2001)

89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179), and a reviewing court “cannot reverse the juvenile court’s

determination, reflected in the dispositional order, of what would best serve the child’s

interest, absent an abuse of discretion” (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 64-65;

In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1140-1141 [juvenile court’s decisions regarding

provisions of reunification services in dispositional order are generally subject to review

for abuse of discretion]). However, “[t]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified

standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling

under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is

reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008)

43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712; In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165.)

With respect to removal of a dependent child from parental custody, the juvenile

court’s discretion is limited by statute. As relevant to this case, “section 361 restrains a

juvenile court from removing a child from the physical custody of her parents unless

there is clear and convincing evidence of two conditions: (1) ‘[t]here is or would be a

substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional

well-being’ of the child if she is returned home, and (2) ‘there are no reasonable means

16
by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without removing’ her from the

parent’s physical custody.” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960; § 361,

subd. (c)(1).) Thus, because the juvenile court’s discretion with respect to removal of a

child is specifically limited by statute, we review this aspect of the juvenile court’s

dispositional order to determine if substantial evidence supports the finding that the

statutory bases for removal exists. (In re M.V., at p. 960; In re M.D., supra,

93 Cal.App.5th at p. 857.)

Additionally, because the findings in support of removal must be made under the

clear and convincing evidence standard (§ 361), we keep this standard in mind when

assessing whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. (In re I.R.

(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) When reviewing a finding made under the clear and

convincing evidence standard, we determine whether there is evidence that is reasonable,

credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude it is

highly probable that the fact was true. (In re K.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 910, 914.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding an Ongoing Risk of Harm

Here, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that the risk of harm to

P.A., V.A., and L.A. was ongoing at the time of disposition. First, the evidence in

support of the jurisdictional finding is also relevant to support a finding of an ongoing

risk of harm. This evidence included interviews with each of defendant’s five children.

All of the children reported that Father would consume significant amounts of alcohol

17
while they were under his supervision;9 and different children recalled separate occasions

in which they had seen Father lose control of his motor functions or exhibit impaired

judgment as the result of consuming alcohol while they were in his care.10 Thus, the

evidence showed that Father’s substance abuse occurred in situations “in which it was

physically hazardous to do so” and was not “confined to [his] private moments alone.”

(In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 842, 850.) And “the juvenile court may consider

past events to determine whether the child is presently in need of juvenile court

protection” because “ ‘past failure [can be] predictive of the future.’ ” (In re A.F. (2016)

3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289.)

Second, the evidence showed that Father refused to acknowledge any substance

abuse at all. Father told social workers that he was only submitting to drug testing under

duress, and suggested that his engagement with voluntary services through a private

provider was not because he believed he had issues with alcohol abuse but merely to see

if he had an issue. However, denial of an ongoing problem “increases the risk of it

recurring” and is substantial evidence to support a risk of ongoing harm. (In re V.L.

9 We also observe that each child was interviewed separately on multiple
occasions; the children lived separately with their respective mothers while not in
Father’s custody; and the oldest two children were already teenagers during these
interviews. Under these circumstances, the fact that multiple children corroborated
Father’s alcohol abuse adds to the credibility of their statements.

10 P.A. reported that Father would leave the children unsupervised while drinking
alcohol such that the children would frequently engage in physical fights when
unsupervised; and L.A. reported that Father had driven with his children as passengers in
the vehicle while “smelling like alcohol.” Ka.A. reported that he could recall more than
one occasion in which Father was “very drunk” such that he would slur his words and
have trouble standing.

18
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156; see In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 213 [A

parent’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the conduct giving rise to dependency

can support a finding that children face a current risk of harm.].)

Third, the evidence showed that Father repeatedly refused to cooperate with

DPSS’s attempts to investigate the existence of a substance abuse problem or the degree

of its impact on Father’s ability to safely care for J.A. Social workers reported that

Father would not permit any DPSS representative access to inspect his home, had ignored

requests to meet with social workers for an interview, refused to release information

permitting social workers to verify the type of voluntary services he had enrolled in and

his progress in those services, and had refused to submit to ongoing substance abuse

screening initiated by DPSS. Evidence of past substance abuse combined with evidence

of present “evasive behavior” and “resistance to monitoring and services” gives rise to a

reasonable inference that the substance abuse has not been resolved. (In re E.E., supra,

49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214-215.)

Father’s reliance on competing evidence in the record does not persuade us to

reach a different conclusion. The fact that six months had passed without any reported

incidents of excessive alcohol consumption has little persuasive value, as the children

were maintained outside of Father’s custody pursuant to safety plans with their biological

mothers. Additionally, the juvenile court was not required to place any particular weight

on Father’s participation in a voluntary outpatient program. Father declined to release

information to social workers in order to permit them to review the nature of the program

or evaluations of Father’s progress in the program. Instead, the evidence on this issue

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consisted of a letter submitted directly by Father on the date of the dispositional

hearing.11 While the letter stated Father had completed 33 substance abuse group

sessions, it did not explain what Father’s treatment goals were, how much progress

Father had made towards those goals, or how many additional sessions were anticipated

as part of Father’s program. Finally, the juvenile court was not required to place much

weight on the six negative substance abuse tests that Father received through his

voluntary program. Notably, all six of the reported tests occurred during the 45 days

immediately preceding the contested dispositional hearing. Given the repeated reports of

a persistent alcohol abuse problem, the juvenile court was not required to infer that this

relative brief period of sobriety was sufficient to dispel any risk of future harm to J.A.

Thus, when viewed as a whole, we hold the record contains credible evidence of

solid value from which the juvenile court could reasonably conclude there was a high

probability that Father’s substance abuse was not resolved and would continue to present

a risk of physical harm to L.A., P.A., and V.A. if they were returned to his custody.

3. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding There Were No Reasonable Means To

Protect the Children Short of Removal

We also disagree with Father’s contention that there was no substantial evidence

to support the juvenile court’s finding that there were no reasonable means to protect J.A.

short of removal.

11 We further observe that it is unclear from the record whether the juvenile court
ever admitted these documents into evidence in the cases involving L.A., P.A., and V.A.

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Evidence in the record shows that Father repeatedly refused to cooperate with any

DPSS investigation or monitoring. He expressly told social workers he would not

cooperate with any investigation efforts; refused to release information to permit DPSS to

assess the nature of any voluntary services he had obtained for himself or his progress in

those services; and expressly stated he would not comply with any DPSS requests to

submit to random drug screening. Father repeatedly refused to permit social workers to

enter his home, and his live-in girlfriend indicated she would not give permission for

social workers to enter the home without Father’s consent. Further, there was evidence in

the record to suggest that Father had disobeyed prior family law orders and custody

agreements with respect to P.A. and V.A.

Taken together, this was credible evidence of solid value from which the juvenile

court could reasonably conclude that there were no reasonable means to protect L.A.,

P.A., and V.A. short of removal. Notably, some lesser form of family maintenance as an

alternative to removal requires that a parent have insight into the problems leading to

dependency (In re M.D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 858-859), as well as a willingness

to work with social workers, such that social workers can continue to ensure the

dependent child’s safety and wellbeing (see In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 171

[One factor to consider in determining whether removal is appropriate is whether a parent

“was largely cooperative.”]). There is no assurance that social workers can effectively

monitor the safety and wellbeing of a dependent child upon return to parental custody

where a parent repeatedly and expressly states he is unwilling to provide social workers

with relevant information and unwilling to permit social workers access to his home.

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Based upon this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude there were no

reasonable means of protecting the children short of removal.

4. Failure To State Facts on the Record

Finally, Father contends that reversal is required because the juvenile court failed

to state the facts upon which it relied to remove L.A., P.A., and V.A. at the time of

disposition. We agree with Father that a juvenile court is required to state the facts on

which the decision to remove the minor is based (§ 361, subd. (e)) and that the juvenile

court does not appear to have clearly done so in this case. “However, ‘cases involving a

court’s obligation to make findings regarding a minor’s change of custody or

commitment have held the failure to do so will be deemed harmless where “it is not

reasonably probable such a finding, if made, would have been in favor of continued

parental custody.” ’ ” (In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 247.) Specifically, we ask

whether the juvenile court would have removed the dependent minor “had the juvenile

court reflected upon and stated the facts as required under section 361.” (In re D.P.

(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1069.) In this case, we conclude that any failure to state

facts in support of removal was harmless.

Notably, before making its jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, the

juvenile court repeatedly commented it was “intimately familiar” with Father’s three

separate dependency cases involving all this children. It specifically asked counsel to

focus their arguments on specific issues based upon the juvenile court’s own review of

the evidence. Thus, this is not a case in which the juvenile court was silent and merely

adopted the recommendations of DPSS in a pro forma manner. Rather, the juvenile

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court’s colloquy makes clear that it fully considered the evidence before reaching its

decision. Given this record, Father has not shown it is reasonably probable the juvenile

court would have reached a different decision, even if it had been reminded to state the

facts upon which its decision was premised.

Because the juvenile court’s express and implied findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and because the record does not suggest it is

reasonably probable the juvenile court would have reached a different decision had it

been required to state its findings in greater detail, we conclude that Father has not met

his burden to show reversal of the dispositional order removing L.A., P.A., and V.A.

from Father’s physical custody is warranted on appeal.

C. Exit Order Removing Legal Custody from Father

Finally, Father argues that the juvenile court erred in issuing its exit order

terminating jurisdiction. Specifically, Father contends it was an abuse of discretion for

the juvenile court (1) to grant sole legal custody of P.A. and V.A. to their biological

mother, and (2) to require that his visitation with all three children must be supervised.

We disagree.

“ ‘When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it is

empowered to make “exit orders” regarding custody and visitation. [Citations.] Such

orders become part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child and will

remain in effect until they are terminated or modified by the family court.’ ” (In re A.C.

(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799; In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 871;

§ 362.4.) “ ‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody orders when it

23
terminates its jurisdiction in a dependency case.’ [Citation.] We review a custody (or

‘exit’) order pursuant to section 362.4 for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb the

order ‘unless the court “ ‘ “exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary,

capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th

1090, 1094.) “ ‘ “ ‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the

facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial

court.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)

In this case, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s decision to grant sole

legal custody of P.A. and V.A. to their biological mother was arbitrary or capricious

under the circumstances. “An order granting a parent sole legal custody ‘means that one

parent shall have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the

health, education, and welfare of a child.’ ” (In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th

210, 227.) Here, the record shows that Father was already actively violating an existing

family law order pertaining to the care of P.A. and V.A. by repeatedly consuming alcohol

and smoking cigarettes while they were in his care. DPSS reported that the order

prohibiting smoking cigarettes was imposed specifically to protect P.A.’s health due to an

asthma. Where the record shows that Father has been unwilling to comply with court

orders specifically designed to protect the health and welfare of his children, it is not

arbitrary or capricious for the juvenile court to conclude that sole legal custody should be

given to the children’s biological mothers.

We also conclude that the record does not show an abuse of discretion with respect

to the supervised visitation provisions of the exit order. As Father admits in his opening

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brief, “reviewing courts tend to affirm supervised visitation orders when such an order

[is] necessary to protect the minor, due to remaining safety concerns,” and Father’s sole

argument on this point is premised on his contention that “there were no remaining safety

concerns at the time of the dispositional hearing.” However, at the time of disposition,

the juvenile court found that there was an ongoing risk of harm posed by Father such that

removal of the children from his physical custody was warranted pursuant to section 361,

and we have concluded that the juvenile court’s finding on this point is supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Where the evidence in the record permits the juvenile

court to reasonably conclude that Father poses an ongoing risk of physical harm to the

children, it is not arbitrary or capricious for the juvenile court to require that any

visitation remain supervised.

IV. DISPOSITION

The dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.
We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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