CourtListener 10754798•People v. Young CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/12/25 P. v. Young CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168131
v.
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, (Napa County
Super. Ct. No. 20CR001796)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Christopher Young appeals a judgment entered upon a jury
verdict finding him guilty of murder and other crimes. He contends the trial
court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process by admitting
photographs of the victim while alive, photographs of himself holding a gun,
and evidence of an uncharged incident of criminal conduct a week before the
murder. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was convicted of killing 18-year-old Nathan Garza, who was
apparently a complete stranger to him, in the parking lot of a Safeway store
where Garza worked. According to surveillance video, Garza was fatally shot
just after noon on August 16, 2020 by someone in a white Cadillac that had
been parked in the lot. The theory of the defense was that defendant’s friend
Tyler shot and killed Garza from the passenger seat, while defendant drove
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the car.1 Before examining the defense case, we set forth the prosecution’s
evidence.
Tyler’s Car and Gun
Defendant and Tyler were friends and spent a lot of time together.
Tyler had recently purchased the white Cadillac used in the murder. He
never let defendant or anyone else drive the car. Both he and defendant kept
some of their belongings in the car. Tyler also owned a Smith and Wesson
.45 caliber firearm. He kept extra ammunition in his car and had shown it to
defendant. The two of them had shot the gun together from the car windows
a few days previously, and defendant had taken a video of it that showed
Tyler’s face and defendant’s arm as they passed the gun and shot it out of the
window.
Events at the Rental House
On August 15, 2020, the day before the killing, Tyler had been driving
with defendant in the Cadillac. That evening, the two of them went to a
Safeway store in American Canyon and ingested drugs in the parking lot.
According to Tyler, neither he nor defendant had slept in “probably” a couple
of days.
Later that night, Tyler and defendant went in the Cadillac to a house
in American Canyon that had been rented by another friend, Latoya, and
defendant smoked methamphetamine. Also present in the house were
Latoya’s sister, Tawnya, and some of the sisters’ children. The evidence at
trial showed that at the time of Garza’s murder, all of the adults in the house
regularly used methamphetamine or other drugs, and Latoya acknowledged
that her memory of events was “foggy.” Nevertheless, the versions of events
1 In the interest of privacy, we will refer to some of the participants in
these events by their first names. We intend no disrespect.
2
to which Tyler, Tawnya, and Latoya testified at trial were largely consistent
with each other.
During the course of the night, Latoya saw Tyler asleep on a bed where
Tawnya was also sleeping, on top of the covers. When Tawnya awoke twice
during the night, she saw Tyler still sleeping next to her and defendant in the
bedroom doorway. She awoke sometime around 11:30 a.m. and saw Tyler
still sleeping next to her.
Tyler testified that he went to sleep shortly after arriving at the house,
and his car key and the loaded gun were with him. Latoya and Tawnya were
also on the bed, all fully clothed. When Tyler awoke, he saw that his keys
and his gun were gone, and he made telephone calls in an unsuccessful effort
to track defendant down. When Tyler told Tawnya his car was gone, Tawnya
called for defendant, but he was not in the house. Tyler made multiple phone
calls, and said, “he’s not answering.” He appeared “frantic” and upset. He
went outside to look for the Cadillac. Surveillance video shows him walking
down the driveway of the house at 1:05 p.m., apparently in search of the car.
Records for Tyler’s cell phone showed that he made a call from the area
around the rental house at 9:33 a.m.; no other calls were made until 12:25
p.m., after which the phone made multiple calls from the vicinity of the rental
house, including several calls to defendant’s phone between that time and
1:57 p.m. Tyler also texted someone else at 12:33 asking where defendant
was. And location data on Tyler’s phone showed that it was in the vicinity of
the rental house between 11:57 a.m. and 12:03 p.m., the time of the murder.
Latoya arranged for a ride to Vallejo. Tyler was still present at the
house; according to Tawnya, he had not left it from the time he woke up. On
her way to Vallejo, Latoya saw a Safeway taped off, like a crime scene. She
had been trying to get in touch with defendant, and she knew Tawnya and
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Tyler were also looking for him and the Cadillac, so she contacted them and
told them they should check to see if the crime scene had anything to do with
defendant. Tawnya and Tyler went to the Safeway, and someone there told
Tawnya a person had been shot.
Evidence of Defendant’s Movements Before Killing
An analysis of defendant’s cell phone records showed that after 7:00
that morning his phone traveled south from American Canyon to Vallejo.
License plate readers showed the Cadillac crossed the Carquinez Bridge at
7:53 a.m., was farther south in Hercules at 8:27 a.m., and crossed the bridge
again heading north at 8:49 a.m. A Snapchat video showed defendant driving
what appears to be the Cadillac at 8:52 a.m. Surveillance video showed the
white Cadillac returned to the rental house at 9:34 a.m., then a person
returned to the car, which left again just before 11:30 a.m. The person
appeared to have somewhat dark skin and no tattoos on his forearms, was
wearing a black shirt, and was carrying black and white gloves.2 The white
Cadillac was next seen in surveillance video in the parking lot of a Safeway
store in American Canyon, pulling into one of the spots reserved for drive-up-
and-go orders at 11:51 a.m. At 11:54, from a location near this Safeway store,
defendant’s phone made a call to a number associated with Safeway’s drive-
up-and-go service.
The Killing
Garza worked at the Safeway in American Canyon and was on duty
that day to handle drive-up-and-go orders. Video from inside the store
showed Garza receiving a call at 11:54 a.m., the precise time defendant’s cell
phone records showed he made a call to Safeway’s drive-up-and-go service.
Garza told his supervisor he had received a call but could not understand the
2 Tyler had tattoos on his forearms.
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person on the line, aside from the name Chris or Christopher. The supervisor
checked the list of orders but did not see any in that name. Garza said he
would go outside and ask the customer for more details.
Surveillance video showed the white Cadillac was parked in the lot,
and it began to back up at 11:59 a.m. Garza came out of the store with an
order of groceries for another customer, and the Cadillac pulled back into the
parking space. Garza brought the groceries to the vehicle next to the
Cadillac and loaded them into the trunk. As he walked away, the Cadillac
once again pulled out of the parking space and stopped, the driver’s side
closest to Garza. The video shows the Cadillac beginning to move forward as
Garza walked past it, then, at approximately 12:02 p.m., Garza falling to the
ground and the Cadillac speeding away. Witnesses heard gunshots and saw
smoke coming from the driver’s side window. Two bullets struck Garza’s
torso, one of them quickly causing his death.
A witness parked in the spot next to the white car—with the white car
on the driver’s side of the witness’s car—testified that she thought she saw
two people in the white car. She thought the person in the passenger seat
was lean and had a shaved head, and she could not tell whether the
passenger was a tanned Caucasian person or a light-skinned person of color
with a shaved head. But she expressed some uncertainty as to whether there
had been a person in the passenger seat at all. She heard the sound of three
or four gunshots, Garza fell to the ground, and the white car sped away
toward the highway. Another witness provided a partial license plate
number for the car that corresponded to that of Tyler’s Cadillac.
Events After the Killing
About two minutes after the shooting, the Cadillac parked in front of a
house in American Canyon. Video from a nearby security camera showed
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only one person, a light-skinned African American man with a full head of
hair and wearing a red shirt, leaving the car and walking away from it. The
man, identified as defendant, ran through yards in the residential area,
jumping over fences, before he was apprehended. He provided a false name
and date of birth when he was detained. Defendant’s blood was tested, and it
was positive for methamphetamine.
When the Cadillac was later searched, its contents included a backpack
containing clothing, a .45 caliber Smith and Wesson firearm and
ammunition, and black and white gloves. The firearm was later identified as
the weapon that shot the bullets that killed Garza. There were handprints
on the weapon; Tyler was excluded as the source of the prints, but defendant
could not be excluded, and defendant’s fingerprints matched those found on
an ammunition magazine found in the car. DNA consistent with defendant’s
was found in the interior driver door handle, the steering wheel, a black and
white glove found in the car, and the handle of the backpack. Gunshot
residue was found inside the car, as well as on black and white gloves and a
black shirt found in the car, items consistent with what the suspect was
wearing in a surveillance video at the rental house before the killing.
Clothing collected from Tyler the same day showed a few characteristic
particles of gunshot residue, and a few more particles that are “consistent
with” gunshot residue, meaning they are not “the more unique type of
particles,” but are sometimes seen in residue.
In recorded calls from jail in the ensuing days, defendant told a friend,
Cinthia, that the car had been stolen from the rental house, that Tyler was
not driving it, and that defendant was running through yards in an effort to
get a bike so he could find the car. He told a similar story to another friend.
In a call a few weeks after the killing, he acknowledged to Cinthia that
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surveillance video showed him getting out of the car after the murder, and he
said he did not know how he was going to “fight that.” Defendant made other
incriminating statements in recorded calls, among them telling Cinthia that
someone, apparently his attorney, was trying to have the video from Safeway
enhanced “because as of right now, you can’t see [anything]. And I was like,
‘Why are you trying to enhance the video if . . . you can’t see anything?’
That’s a good thing.” He also told her it was “better” that the video did not
show the shooter clearly.
The Defense Theory
The theory of the defense was that Tyler was in the car with defendant
and that he, not defendant, shot Garza by suddenly leaning over from the
passenger side to shoot from the driver’s-side window.
A woman who lived next door to the rental house testified that on the
day of the shooting she saw a young white man with short hair walking
toward the rental house, and that he was later arrested. She initially
testified this happened around lunchtime or around noon, but on cross-
examination she acknowledged that all she remembered was that it was
before 1:00 or 2:00 in the afternoon.3 A man who also lived next door testified
that around 11:30 or 11:45 on the day of the shooting, he saw a white
Cadillac park in the driveway of the rental house, then it pulled out and
drove off shortly afterward. He vaguely remembered it was driven by “a
white guy,” with an African American man sitting in the passenger seat. The
man acknowledged, however, that he had been interviewed four or five times
by the defense and they had kept asking him leading questions. And his
3 After Tyler reported his car stolen, police officers came to the rental
house and arrested him, apparently because of an outstanding warrant for
his arrest.
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testimony was undercut by other evidence: He told the police the day of the
shooting that he had left at 10:30 or 11:00 that morning, that he had not seen
a white guy associated with the rental house, and that he never saw anyone
driving the Cadillac. And surveillance video showed this witness’s truck left
the property at 11:03 a.m. and did not return until 5:39 p.m. the day of the
killing. Video also showed the Cadillac leaving the rental house at 11:24
a.m.—after the witness’s truck drove away—Tyler coming down the driveway
apparently in search of his car at 1:05 p.m., Latoya leaving at 1:42 p.m., and
Tawnya and Tyler leaving together at approximately 1:52 p.m.
As we have already noted, the Safeway customer who was parked next
to the Cadillac thought she saw someone in the passenger seat. She was
asked to view pictures of various people the evening of the killing. She
thought one person depicted, who appears from the photograph to be white,
was “maybe” someone she had seen in the Cadillac; underneath the picture,
she wrote, “If it was this person his hair was definitely shaved when I saw
him. I’m not sure it was him.” The person she identified was Tyler, and the
picture—apparently Tyler’s booking photograph—showed he was a young
white man with dark hair.
Other eyewitnesses saw only one person in the white Cadillac. Two
people who worked at the Safeway gas station heard gunshots, saw a white
car speeding away, and saw only a single person in the car, a male who
appeared either Mexican or mixed-race. According to one of them, the
driver’s side window was down, and the driver was wearing a black shirt.
Neither witness was able to identify defendant as the driver.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count 1), and in connection with this count
8
found true allegations that he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that he killed
the victim by lying in wait and by intentionally firing from a motor vehicle
with the intent to kill, both special circumstances (Pen. Code, § 190.2,
subd. (a)(15) & (21)). It also found him guilty of shooting from a motor
vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100, subd. (d); count 2), with an enhancement that he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 3); unlawful possession of ammunition (Pen. Code,
§ 30305, subd. (a); count 4); and giving false information to a police officer
(Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a); count 5). The trial court found true a number
of special allegations and factors in aggravation. (Pen. Code, §§ 1203,
subd. (k), 12022.1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.)
The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of
parole for count 1, with an additional 25 years to life consecutive for the
firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)); imposed and stayed
the aggravated term of three years for count 2, with an additional 25 years to
life for the firearm enhancement; and imposed a consecutive term of three
years for count 3, a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm) for
count 4, and a concurrent 180 days for count 5, with credit for 180 days. The
court also imposed and stayed an additional two years for an out-on-bail
enhancement. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.) This timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Photographs of Victim While Alive
At trial, the jury viewed four pictures of Garza while he was still alive:
two of him outdoors, smiling, one of him with a fish he had caught, and one
with his parents after his high school graduation. Defendant contends the
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trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of his due process rights by
admitting these exhibits.
Additional Background
Before trial, both the People and defendant made motions in limine.
One of the People’s motions was for introduction of photographs of Garza
while alive, as well as crime scene and coroner photographs. The
photographs of Garza while alive, the People argued, were relevant to
establish the victim’s identity, and the pictures of him after death further
established identity and showed the bullet entry points. Defendant moved
that no photographs or other evidence “describing or depicting emotionally
upsetting or otherwise prejudicial images be presented to the jury.” (Boldface
and underlining omitted.) This motion was based on the theory that the trial
court has discretion to exclude victim photographs that are “unduly gruesome
or inflammatory,” such as gory autopsy photographs, and defendant argued
that since he did not dispute the cause of death, the medical evidence should
be presented without referring to autopsy photographs that would amount to
an appeal to the jury’s emotions.
When the court and the parties were discussing these motions, the
court asked the prosecutor how many photographs she had in mind, and she
replied that she would use only two or three images of Garza while alive,
“[a]nd then for the victim after death, it’s not only photographs that we need
for purposes of testimony by our coroner, . . . at autopsy, but we also have
some photographs at the scene that we need to introduce.” Defense counsel
said, “As the court knows, I’m objecting to that. Cause of death is not an
issue.” The prosecutor argued that she was entitled to prove how Garza died
and the number of injuries he sustained, and defense counsel reiterated that
there was no dispute about the cause of death, that the coroner could explain
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his findings to the jury, and that showing the jury “these photographs” would
be prejudicial, then said, “Submitted.” The court asked what type of photos of
Garza while alive would be presented, and the prosecutor repeated that she
would use two or three adult photos. The court said it would allow two or
three pictures when Garza was alive but would reserve ruling on the autopsy
pictures; the court indicated, however, that it intended to allow some of the
autopsy pictures in over defendant’s objection. Defense counsel pointed out
that there were a number of photos and that he had not yet seen the photos
the prosecutor sought to introduce, and the court answered, “And you reserve
the right to object.”
During her opening statement, the prosecutor displayed a graduation
photo of Garza, telling the jury that she did so “because we are not going to
be talking about Nathan for a large part of this case. And Nathan should not
be forgotten.” She went on to tell the jury that Garza loved his friends, his
family, and his girlfriend, that he loved baseball and fishing, and that he had
a “summer job [that] cost him his life.” Defendant made no objection either to
the argument or to the display of the photograph. The People’s first witness
was Garza’s mother, who described her son in moving terms. While
questioning her, the prosecutor asked the court to admit the four photographs
of Garza while alive that we have described. The trial court asked defense
counsel if he had any objection to their admission, and he replied, “No.” The
photographs were then admitted.
At the outset of her closing argument—apparently without displaying
any photographs—the prosecutor again pointed to Garza’s humanity, saying
he was full of life and promise, loved his family and friends, loved fishing and
baseball, had just graduated high school, and was about to start college.
Defendant interposed no objection.
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Analysis
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited his challenge to
admission of the photographs of Garza while alive by failing to raise an
objection at trial. This point is well taken. In general, a party may not
complain on appeal about erroneous admission of evidence unless a timely
objection on the same ground was made in the trial court. (People v. Boyette
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 423–424 (Boyette) [defendant forfeited objection to
photographs by failure to raise timely objection]; see People v. Delgado (2017)
2 Cal.5th 544, 580–581; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Defendant argues that
his motion in limine seeking to bar “emotionally upsetting or otherwise
prejudicial images” is broad enough to encompass pictures of Garza while he
was alive. (Boldface and underlining omitted.) In our view, that stretches
defendant’s motion past the breaking point. The motion makes no mention of
images of Garza while alive, but instead focuses its attention on “gruesome or
inflammatory” and “gory” images such as autopsy photographs. Similarly,
defendant’s arguments at the hearing on the motions in limine were directed
entirely to the post-death photographs. At no point did defendant argue that
images of Garza while alive would be unduly prejudicial. And, although the
trial court established that defendant reserved his right to object to
photographs and expressly gave him the chance to object before admitting
into evidence the photographs of Garza while alive, defense counsel told the
court he had no objection. We are satisfied that defendant forfeited his
challenge to the photographs.
Challenging this conclusion, defendant argues the trial court had
allowed him to reserve the right to object only to the images of Garza after
his death and that it would have been futile to raise a new objection to
pictures of him while alive. (See People v. Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 94,
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101 [duty to object excused when objection would have been futile].) We see
no reason to interpret so narrowly the court’s statement that defendant
reserved his right to object, but regardless, the court then asked defendant
immediately before admitting the four photographs whether he had any
objection, and defendant expressly said that he did not. In these
circumstances, the rule of forfeiture bars defendant’s claim.
Even if defendant had preserved this claim, we would reject it for
failure to prove prejudice. He argues the four photographs were substantially
more prejudicial than probative (Evid. Code, § 352) because there was no
dispute that Garza was the person killed and because the images would elicit
an emotional reaction against defendant by underscoring the horrific nature
of the loss of Garza’s life. (See People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 867
[trial court should “carefully consider the actual relevance of photos of
murder victims while alive” to avoid risk they will “ ‘merely generate
sympathy for the victims’ ”].) Our high court has cautioned against
admission of images of murder victims while alive if unnecessary to prove a
disputed point. (See People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230; Boyette,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 424; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 323.) But
even if the photographs were not relevant to any question in dispute, we see
no possible prejudice here. The photographs were shown to the jury at the
outset of a six-week-long trial, during which the jury heard testimony from,
by our count, more than 80 witnesses and viewed many exhibits, among
them, video showing the moment of the shooting. The evidence that
defendant was driving the Cadillac at the time of the killing and that Tyler
was at the rental house at that time was strong, and the evidence that Tyler
was in the car was tenuous at best and contradicted by surveillance video and
cell phone evidence. That evidence included videos showing only one person
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in the area of the Cadillac before it left the rental house at 11:24 a.m.;
defendant emerging alone from the vehicle a few minutes after the killing;
location data showing Tyler’s cell phone was at the rental house at the time
of the killing; Tyler making phone calls, including attempted calls to
defendant, from the vicinity of the rental house beginning at 12:25; and Tyler
walking around outside the rental house at 1:05, times that are consistent
with the testimony of himself, Tawnya, and Latoya that he was “frantic”
when he learned his new car and defendant were missing and that he made
multiple phone calls. The evidence also included recordings of defendant’s
jail phone calls when, for instance, he said he did not want his attorney to
enhance the Safeway surveillance videos and he initially told his friends that
Tyler’s car had been stolen and defendant ran through back yards looking for
a bike so he could search for the Cadillac—a story that was inconsistent not
only with the evidence but also with defendant’s position at trial. We see no
cause for concern that the photographs the jury saw more than a month
previously distracted it from its duty to consider the evidence impartially.
Nor do we see any possibility that the jury would have reached any other
conclusion had it not seen the photos. (See Winn, at p. 867 [no prejudice in
admission of photo of victim because of strength of evidence against
defendant].)
II. Earlier Incident at a Safeway Store
The trial court allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of an
incident defendant was involved in at a different Safeway store a week before
the crime at issue here. Defendant contends the trial court abused its
discretion and deprived him of due process by admitting this evidence.
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Additional Background
Before trial, the People moved to introduce evidence of an incident that
took place a week before the killing of Garza at a different Safeway store, in
which defendant, Tyler’s brother, and the brother’s girlfriend were arrested
after a Safeway employee reported to the police that one of them was
carrying a gun. The motion argued the evidence was admissible to show
defendant’s motive in killing Garza—that is, retaliation for the cashier at the
other store “ ‘snitching’ ” to the police—as well as to show malice. Over
defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the evidence.
The jury heard evidence that on August 9, 2020, a week before Garza
was killed, defendant was in a Safeway store in Cordelia. He tried to
purchase gift cards worth more than $250 with multiple credit cards, but the
transactions were declined. The cashier told defendant to wait, got his
manager, then clocked out and went outside to the parking lot to wait for his
father, who also worked at the store. While waiting, the cashier saw a car
park in the lot, a white man get out of the passenger’s seat and put on a
backpack, and the grip of a handgun at the man’s waist. The man went into
the store, and soon afterward the driver, who was a woman, also entered the
store. The cashier called 911.
Police officers arrived and handcuffed defendant, the passenger, and
the driver. The cashier recognized all three people from previous encounters
in which they had been suspected of shoplifting.
All three were detained and searched, and defendant was found to have
MDMA, or Ecstasy, in one of his pockets and a phone charger that he
admitted he had stolen from the store. The man with the gun initially
identified himself to a police officer with Tyler’s name, but the officer later
learned he was Jordan, Tyler’s brother. Jordan had a loaded gun on his
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person. An officer told him that someone from the store had reported he had
a gun. Samantha, the woman with them (apparently Jordan’s girlfriend),
had heroin in her possession. Defendant was arrested, cited, and released
because possession of MDMA was only a misdemeanor, and the others were
taken to jail.
Officers spoke with the cashier as he waited in the parking lot; the
three suspects were still at the scene.
Defendant later discussed the incident with Tyler; both were upset
about the events.
The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence of
another offense only if the People proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that defendant committed it, and only for the limited purpose of deciding
whether he had a motive to commit the charged offense.
Analysis
As a general rule, evidence of specific instances of a person’s conduct
may not be used to prove his or her conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid.
Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Such evidence may, however, be admitted “when
relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan knowledge, identity, [or] absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than
his or her disposition to commit such an act.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
To be admissible for these purposes, the evidence must be relevant to a
material fact in issue, must have a tendency to prove that fact, and must not
violate other rules of admissibility, including Evidence Code section 352.
(People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 18.) Under that provision, “ ‘the trial
court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of
particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion
or consumption of time.” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 275
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(Garcia); Evid. Code, § 352.) We do not disturb that exercise of discretion
unless it was made “ ‘ “in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Although
evidence of a prior offense is “inherently prejudicial,” it must be excluded
under Evidence Code section 352 only if the prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs the probative value, that is, only if “ ‘it poses an intolerable “risk to
the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.” ’ ” (People v.
Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047 (Tran).) And because motive provides an
incentive for criminal conduct, “ ‘ “its probative value generally exceeds its
prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its
existence.” ’ ” (Garcia, at p. 275.)
In some circumstances, the prior act must be similar to the charged
offense, as when the prosecution uses the prior act to show identity. (People
v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 273 (Cage) [charged and uncharged offenses
must “ ‘ “ ‘share distinctive common marks’ ” ’ ”].) Less similarity is needed to
show intent. (Id. at pp. 273–274.) And where evidence of prior bad conduct is
offered to show motive, “the other crimes or conduct evidence may be
dissimilar to the charged offenses provided there is a direct relationship or
nexus between it and the current alleged crimes.” (Id. at p. 274; accord,
People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018.)
Defendant contends admission of the evidence of the August 9 incident
at the Cordelia Safeway store violates these principles because the connection
between that incident and the murder of Garza is too speculative to support a
conclusion that the August 9 incident provided a motive. He argues that the
cashier who called the police on August 9 was not wearing clothing that
identified him as a Safeway employee and that he was in a car when police
led defendant out of the store, so defendant had no reason to connect his
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citation with the Cordelia Safeway store, let alone the different Safeway store
where Garza worked. And, he points out, in a jail phone call on July 25,
2021, when defendant briefly mentioned that Jordan had gone to jail in
Cordelia for possessing a gun, he expressed no animosity toward anyone over
the incident.
While these factors could provide fodder for argument to the jury, we
are not persuaded they negate the possibility of an inference that defendant
held a grudge against Safeway. There was evidence that defendant was out
of custody on bail and that his actions on August 9 violated his bail
contract—which barred him from committing any further offenses and
required him to abide by all laws—thus putting him at risk of forfeiture of
the bond and resulting incarceration. There is also evidence that defendant
and Tyler spent time smoking drugs in the parking lot of the American
Canyon Safeway the evening before the killing, showing their familiarity
with that store, and that defendant was under the influence of
methamphetamine and had not slept when he shot and killed Garza,
supporting an inference that his thinking might not have been a model of
clarity. The killing of Garza was, on its face, a senseless act, and the trial
court was within its discretion to admit evidence of defendant’s detention—
and potential loss of liberty—after committing a crime at a nearby Safeway
store as a possible motive for killing a Safeway employee a week later. (See
People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 668 [evidence of prior crime
admissible to show defendant shot deputies to avoid being apprehended and
returned to prison for illegally possessing firearms]; People v. Daniels (1991)
52 Cal.3d 815, 856–858 [evidence of earlier robbery committed by defendant,
in which he was injured during exchange of gunfire with police, admissible to
show he later killed officers in revenge].)
18
Nor are we persuaded the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
any prejudicial effect of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value.
The jury was instructed it could consider the evidence of another offense only
for the limited purpose of deciding whether defendant had a motive to
commit the charged offense, and we presume it followed the court’s
instruction. (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662; People v. Arjon
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 185, 194.) The events of August 9 were not
particularly shocking, especially in light of other evidence that defendant and
everyone else in the house the night before the killing used illegal drugs
regularly, and that both defendant and Tyler were convicted felons. The
August 9 incident merely showed that defendant was in possession of drugs
and appears to have engaged in shoplifting and attempted fraudulent
purchase of gift cards. These facts pale in comparison to the horror of the
crime with which defendant was charged, and the trial court could
reasonably conclude that the potential for prejudice did not outweigh the
evidence’s probative value. (See Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1047 [potential
for prejudice decreased when evidence of uncharged acts is “no stronger or
more inflammatory” than evidence of charged offense].) Nor do we see any
cause for concern that the jury might have been inclined to convict defendant
of first degree murder out of concern that he might not have been punished
for the far less serious incident of potential theft and drug possession. (See
ibid.)
Defendant also contends admission of the evidence deprived him of his
federal due process rights by rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. (See
People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [admission of evidence, even if
erroneous, violates due process “only if it makes the trial fundamentally
unfair”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 75 [concluding challenged
19
evidence did not “ ‘so infuse[] the trial with unfairness as to deny due process
of law’ ”].) Admission of evidence does not violate due process unless “ ‘there
are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.’ ” (People
v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229 (Albarran); accord, Garcia,
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 275; People v. Casillas (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
135, 152.) And “ ‘[e]ven then, the evidence must “be of such quality as
necessarily prevents a fair trial.” ’ ” (People v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
811, 817.) “ ‘The dispositive issue is . . . whether the trial court committed an
error which rendered the trial “so ‘arbitrary and fundamentally unfair’ that it
violated federal due process.” ’ ” (Albarran, at pp. 229–230.)
Defendant has not made this showing. As we have explained, there is a
permissible inference the jury could reasonably draw from the evidence—that
defendant held a grudge against Safeway and sought revenge because the
August 9 incident put his freedom at risk. We therefore reject his contention
that admission of the evidence deprived him of his due process rights.
(Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.)
III. Photographs of Defendant with Guns
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted two photographs of
defendant holding guns. Defendant contends admission of these photographs
was an abuse of discretion and deprived him of a fair trial.
One of two photographs, exhibit 393, depicted defendant, apparently
seated in a car, looking directly at the camera and holding a handgun that
was also pointed to the camera. The other, exhibit 400, is dated May 15,
2018 and shows defendant with a smile on his face, his tongue a fluorescent
pink, holding a handgun pointed upward. There is no indication that either
gun was the murder weapon.
20
During trial, the prosecutor sought to introduce these photographs,
along with others dating back to 2017, to show defendant’s familiarity with
guns. Defendant objected, citing sections 1101, subdivision (a) and 352 of the
Evidence Code. A few days later, the issue was discussed again, and
defendant again asked that the photographs be excluded. Defense counsel
went on to ask, however, that if the trial court saw fit to admit one or two
photographs, it limit them to photographs taken shortly before the crime.
Counsel continued, in a reference to exhibit 393, “There is a photo with him
holding a firearm in a car that’s dated August 10th of this year, so I’ll submit
on that,” and asked the court to exclude the remaining photos.4 The trial
court admitted the two photographs described above, concluding they showed
defendant was familiar with guns, a fact relevant to the offense of shooting
from a motor vehicle, and that they were relevant to the knowledge element
of the charges for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a prohibited
person. And, the court stated, defendant’s knowledge of guns was relevant
because the person who killed Garza was “probably a pretty good shot,” as
only one bullet missed the victim.
Exhibit 400 was shown to the jury during testimony, and near the
beginning of her closing argument, the prosecutor showed both exhibits to the
jury while arguing that one of the “truth[s]” of the case was that defendant
4 The Attorney General contends that by “submit[ting],” defendant
withdrew his objection to exhibit 393. This contention is meritless. The
record shows clearly that defendant objected to all photographs of himself
with guns, and suggested limiting the photos to only the most recent as a
fallback. We do not read this fallback argument as an abandonment of his
more general objection.
21
was the shooter and telling the jury that defendant “wants you to walk him
right out that door.”5
Defendant contends that the photographs were impermissibly
inflammatory and that they were unnecessary to show his familiarity with
guns, a fact already established by the recording of him shooting a gun out of
the Cadillac’s window with Tyler. And, he argues, there was nothing
distinctive enough in the manner of killing to make the photos relevant to his
identity. (See Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 273 [to show identity, prior act
and charged offense must “ ‘ “ ‘share distinctive common marks’ ” ’ ”].)
We agree with defendant that the photographs had only a limited role
in showing he was familiar with guns and supporting an inference that he
was a good enough marksman to hit Garza’s torso from a moving vehicle.
But that is partly because the jury also saw a video of both Tyler and
defendant shooting the murder weapon out of the window of the Cadillac and
laughing a few days before the murder. And in any case, the photographs are
not particularly shocking. The trial court could reasonably find that they
were relevant to a material issue and that any prejudicial effect did not
substantially outweigh their probative value. (See Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 1047.)
We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant’s reliance on People v.
Archer (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1380. The defendant there was convicted of
murder, with a finding that he used a knife in committing the crime. (Id. at
pp. 1383–1384.) The trial court admitted evidence of videotapes, books, and
catalogs seized from his home and storage locker. They included a book with
5 The parties do not direct our attention to any other point at which the
jury was shown exhibit 393, and the record reflects some ambiguity as to
when it was actually entered into evidence.
22
a chapter entitled “ ‘Knife Attack’ ”; catalogs in which certain advertised
items, including videotapes related to knife fighting and articles and books
related to knife fighting and killing, had been marked; catalogs from which
weapons, including knives, could be ordered; and an instructional video on
how to manufacture silencers. (Id. at p. 1393.) The appellate court concluded
admission of this material was error: although some of it dealt with the
purchase or use of knives, other items had no relevance to the issues at trial,
and there was no indication that the knife used in the murder was unusual
enough that it might have been ordered from a specialized catalog. (Id. at p.
1394.) The Archer court concluded, given the volume and “inflammatory
nature” of the material, that there was a serious possibility of prejudice that
outweighed the “very limited probative value” of the books and videotapes.
(Ibid.) The court also concluded that multiple errors at trial—not only
admission of the weapons evidence but also the erroneous admission of a
codefendant’s extrajudicial statement and the erroneous exclusion of evidence
impeaching a witness who provided some of the strongest evidence of guilt—
were prejudicial and required reversal. (Id. at pp. 1394–1397.)
No similar facts exist here. Although the challenged photographs may
have limited probative value, they also do not have the shock value of the
materials in Archer. This is especially true to the extent they are cumulative
of other evidence that defendant enjoyed guns. Under the circumstances, we
are not persuaded the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
photographs.
Defendant also contends admission of the photographs deprived him of
his federal constitutional right to due process. But, as we have explained,
admission of evidence, even if erroneous, violates due process only if “ ‘there
are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.’ ”
23
(Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) The photographs provide
some—albeit not overwhelming—evidence to support an inference that
defendant was familiar enough with firearms that he could hit a target from
a moving vehicle. And, in any case, the pictures were not shocking, the jury
already had evidence that defendant and Tyler had shot the murder weapon
from the car a few days beforehand, and there was strong evidence that
defendant was driving the Cadillac alone the day of the killing. We see no
possibility that admission of the photographs inflamed the jury against
defendant or caused it to reject his defense that Tyler was the true culprit.
At oral argument before this court, defendant’s counsel emphasized
that the prosecutor showed the photographs of him with guns to the jury
during her closing statement, shortly after noting that Garza was a young
man full of life and promise and while telling the jury that defendant wanted
it to “walk him right out that door.” But defendant made no objection to this
argument, and we are not persuaded it undermines the propriety of the trial
court’s ruling based on the parties’ arguments about the admissibility of the
photographs.
Finally, defendant argues the errors he asserts, even if individually not
prejudicial, caused cumulative prejudice. We have not found multiple errors,
and even if we had found all the challenged rulings improper, we are not
persuaded that they cumulatively caused prejudice in light of the evidence as
a whole, as discussed above.6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
6 In his opening brief, defendant also contends the trial court
committed sentencing error, but he abandons this argument in his reply
brief, and we do not consider it.
24
TUCHER, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
PETROU, J.
People v. Young (A168131)
25
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