People v. Padilla CA4/2

CourtListener 10754668Calctapp12.12.2025

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Filed 12/12/25 P. v. Padilla CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E085827

v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF089999)

ALBERT ANDREW PADILLA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn R. Pulliam,

Judge. Affirmed.

Albert Andrew Padilla, in pro. per., and Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In this postconviction matter under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

(Delgadillo), defendant and appellant Albert Andrew Padilla appeals from the trial court’s

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denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 Defendant has

filed a supplemental appellate brief under Delgadillo. However, no jury instructions

were given in defendant’s trial that would have permitted his murder conviction on a

theory of imputed malice, only his own malice aforethought. (CALJIC No. 8.10.) There

was therefore—as a matter of law—no error in the trial court’s decision denying

defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. Nor do we find any reason to reach defendant’s

contentions raised for the first time on appeal, which are beyond the scope of his

resentencing petition below. In particular, to the extent defendant suggests he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at his underlying trial, the claim is not suitable for

review in this appeal from denial of his section 1172.6 petition. We therefore affirm the

court’s order denying the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. FACTS2

In July 1999, Louis Gonzalez (victim) was stabbed to death, suffering numerous

wounds inflicted by a small-bladed knife, as reflected in this court’s opinion in

defendant’s prior appeal challenging his conviction for murdering the victim.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 We briefly summarize the underlying facts (which we have taken from this
court’s prior unpublished opinion, People v. Padilla, July 12, 2005, E035167 [nonpub.
opn.) to put the jury’s verdict and findings in context; only undisputed facts or those
resolved by the jury’s verdict and findings bear on our analysis of defendant’s petition.
(See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 453 [“relevant jury finding[s]” may be
“preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings”].)

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Defendant and another man, Rick Burt, who, like defendant also lived with and

frequently used methamphetamine with the victim, were charged with the victim’s

murder. Separate juries were empaneled. A witness testified that after the victim

allegedly made a derogatory comment about defendant, which was relayed to him,

defendant replied that the victim would “get his.” Another witness testified that on

July 11, 1999, after defendant, Burt, and the victim emerged from a room in the witness’s

apartment where all of them lived together, defendant said the trio was going to the park.

The witness knew the park was a common place to buy drugs, which were often shared at

her home. The witness never saw the victim again. A different witness testified that later

in the day, defendant told her that the victim had been “taken care of,” and that he and

Burt had beaten-up the victim.

The following week, on July 18, 1999, the victim’s body was discovered in an

advanced state of decomposition near a lake in the park. Evidence was admitted that

shortly before he was arrested, defendant told “another of [his] girlfriends” that he had a

fistfight with a guy in the park and had stabbed the man to death. Among defendant’s

belongings when he was arrested at the girlfriend’s house was a folding knife with a

blade that was two inches long and about an inch wide or less. No blood was found on

the knife.

Defendant was convicted of the murder and Burt was acquitted. Defendant’s jury

found true the allegation that he personally used a knife in killing the victim. The trial

court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for murder, plus one year for the knife-use

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enhancement. On appeal, defendant raised various evidentiary challenges, but none had

merit.

B. PETITION FOR RESENTENCING

In July 2024, defendant filed a form petition seeking resentencing under

section 1172.6.

At a hearing on March 28, 2025, the trial court found defendant failed to make the

requisite prima facie showing to proceed to an evidentiary hearing on his petition for

resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) The prosecutor had argued in opposing the

petition that “[n]o applicable jury instructions were given” at defendant’s trial. Defense

counsel responded, “I reviewed it all, and we’re objecting for the record, but I agree with

counsel.” The trial court denied the petition on grounds that defendant was “statutorily

ineligible for relief.”

After the trial court denied defendant’s petition, he appealed, and this court

appointed appellate counsel. Counsel subsequently filed a brief stating that her legal

research and record review uncovered no arguable appellate issues, including after

consultation with Appellate Defenders, Inc. (See People v. Johnson (1981)

123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [threshold for “an arguable issue” requires “a reasonable

potential for success” on appeal].) Counsel summarized the background relevant to

defendant’s appeal and, while recognizing that we need not do so, requested that we

independently review the record for arguable issues. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th

at p. 232.) Counsel advised that she had considered and rejected briefing the following

issues, which she listed for our potential independent reconsideration: whether defendant

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was afforded the requisite due process in consideration of his petition, and whether the

trial court’s reasoning was sufficient to support denial of defendant’s petition.

Defendant then filed his own supplemental brief, which we address below.

DISCUSSION

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) amended the law

of murder “ ‘ “to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement

in homicides.” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986.) “Now, ‘[m]alice shall

not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ (§ 188,

subd. (a)(3).)” (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 433.) To this end, the new

legislation limited the scope of the traditional felony murder rule and eliminated the

natural and probable consequences doctrine as a valid basis to support a murder

conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) As a result, murder liability

can no longer be “ ‘imposed on a person who [was] not the actual killer, [who] did not act

with the intent to kill, or [who] was not a major participant in the underlying felony who

acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 959.) Conversely, it is

similarly true that “Senate Bill 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the

actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the underlying

felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13

Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)

Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95 (now renumbered § 1172.6), which

created “a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to

seek retroactive relief.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; see § 1172.6, subd. (a).)

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A first step toward potential resentencing under section 1172.6 is to file a petition

that establishes a prima facie basis for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c).) One of the

requirements for the prima facie showing is that the petitioner “could not presently be

convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189”

made effective by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Defendant checkmarked a

box alleging exactly that in his petition. Nonetheless, “ ‘if the record, including the

court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”

then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the

petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [examining record “allow[s] the court

to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless”]; see

People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935 [record of conviction includes “the

charging document, verdict forms, closing arguments, and jury instructions”].)

If the record of conviction, including “factual findings made by a jury in the

defendant’s underlying trial,” establishes the petitioner is ineligible for relief under

section 1172.6 as a matter of law, the petition must be denied. (See People v. Curiel,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451, 453 [noting preclusive effect of jury’s verdict]; Lewis,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “ ‘This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de

novo.’ ” (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)

The trial court properly denies a petition at the prima facie stage if the record of

conviction establishes the petitioner was convicted on a theory not affected by Senate Bill

No. 1437. (See, e.g., People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849 [“Senate Bill 1437

does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider

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and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought”], superseded by statute on

another ground as recognized in People v. Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362, 370; People

v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1257 (Williams).) Jury findings may reflect “the

jury necessarily rejected any reliance on [a] theory of . . . murder under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a

person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Williams, at p. 1259.)

Thus, a petition is properly denied where the petitioner’s murder conviction is

necessarily based on the jury finding the defendant harbored actual malice. (People v.

Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 182–183 [murder conviction based solely on intent

to kill is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief].) That is the case here where the only theory

of murder on which the jury was instructed required malice aforethought. (CALJIC

No. 8.10.) Indeed, the court modified the instructions so that the jury only considered—

and had to find—express malice: an unlawful, actual intent to kill. (CALJIC No. 811.)

Proposed instructions regarding felony murder were withdrawn (CALJIC Nos. 8.27,

8.34), as was an instruction for second degree murder based on a conscious disregard for

human life but without intent to kill (CALJIC No. 8.31). Nor were any instructions given

on the now-proscribed natural and probable consequences doctrine. A defendant “d[oes]

not make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief [when] the jury instructions

given at his trial conclusively demonstrate as a matter of law that he was not convicted of

murder under a natural and probable consequences theory or of felony murder.” (People

v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1059; see also People v Van Winkle (1999) 75

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Cal.App.4th 133, 148 [juries are presumed to follow the instructions given].)

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.

Defendant’s statements in his supplemental brief are also unavailing to reverse the

trial court’s ruling. Defendant filed the brief to highlight facts from his trial that he

claims undercut his conviction. He also asserts he has “availed [him]self of any and all

rehabilitative efforts” while incarcerated. Additionally, he regrets not following, based on

his trial attorney’s advice, his “initial instinct [to] testify on [his] own behalf.”

Defendant’s supplemental briefing is misdirected. A resentencing petition “does

not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021)

71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) As the Supreme Court has stated, “Had the Legislature

intended to permit wholesale relitigation of findings supporting murder convictions in the

context of section 1172.6 resentencing, we expect it would have said so more plainly.”

(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.) In particular here, as is generally the case, “[a]

claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel] is more appropriately decided in a habeas

corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under

section 1172.6 is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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