CourtListener 10754103•People v. Bushee CA1/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Bushee CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172603
v.
ANDY BUSHEE, (Solano County Super. Ct.
Nos. FCR197955, FCR205793)
Defendant and Appellant.
Andy Bushee, who has been committed under the Mentally Disordered
Offender Act (Pen. Code,1 § 2962 et seq.) as a Mentally Disordered Offender
(MDO) since 2006, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request to be
released to an outpatient setting after a bench trial in which the court found
Bushee continued to be an MDO and extended his commitment to the
Department of State Hospitals (DSH) from March 10, 2025, to March 10,
2026. Bushee argues evidence presented at the one-day trial “would cause a
reasonable person to have a strong suspicion that Bushee could be safely and
effectively treated in the community,” and “[s]ubstantial evidence did not
support the trial court’s ruling to the contrary.” We disagree and affirm the
commitment.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
In 2002 and again in 2003, Bushee pled no contest to two separate
counts of battery on a non-confined person by a prisoner (§ 4501.5) and was
sentenced to an aggregate term of three years in state prison. In 2006,
Bushee was committed to the DSH as an MDO, and in 2009, he was
transferred to Patton State Hospital, where he is currently housed.
On August 23, 2024, pursuant to section 2970, the prosecution filed a
petition to extend for a period of one year Bushee’s civil commitment that was
set to expire on March 10, 2025, alleging that Bushee continued to suffer
from a severe mental disorder that was not in remission and/or could not be
kept in remission without treatment, and that he represented a substantial
danger to others.
Bushee denied the allegations of the petition and waived his right to a
jury trial; a court trial was held on January 29, 2025, at which Bushee
appeared via Zoom. On January 28, 2025, the Conditional Release Program
(CONREP) filed a placement report with the court that was provided to the
parties but was not admitted into evidence.2
At trial, Dr. Joshua Craig testified as an expert in the field of
psychology and as Bushee’s primary treating psychologist at Patton State
Hospital since June 2021. Dr. Craig represented he treats Bushee for a
severe mental disorder and testified as to the related symptoms that Bushee
displays, including “highly delusional beliefs,” anxiety, and aggression
“towards himself and to others.” These symptoms “come in waves,” but
“they . . . aren’t getting better. . . . [T]hey are staying consistent.” Bushee’s
attendance in group sessions has been “poor,” somewhere “in the 40 to 50
2 No party appears to have sought the report’s admission, thus we do
not refer to or rely on its contents.
2
percent range”; he has been unable to implement coping strategies for his
illness without guidance from Dr. Craig or other staff; and he “frequently”
uses supplementary medication (in addition to his regularly prescribed
medication) to control his anxiety and other harmful thoughts and symptoms.
Dr. Craig represented that Bushee was rated a “low risk” for violence
and for substance abuse “in the hospital setting”; however, his single
incidence of violence in 2024 occurred the day after Bushee’s “low risk”
assessment was made.
Dr. Mario Souza, a senior psychologist specialist in the forensic
evaluation department at Patton State Hospital also testified as an expert.
Dr. Souza conducted an “extension evaluation” of Bushee pursuant to section
2970 for the period from March 2024 through March 2025. As part of his
evaluation, Dr. Souza interviewed Bushee in person in July 2024 and
reviewed Bushee’s medical records, incident reports, progress notes,
attendance records, and treatment plans. He also listened to the testimony of
Dr. Craig at trial.
When Dr. Souza met with Bushee in July, Bushee “had notable
bleeding from his scalp area” caused by “picking” that Bushee engages in
“when he’s very anxious or nervous or feeling paranoid.” During the
interview, Bushee represented he had been experiencing daily auditory
hallucinations and denied experiencing delusional beliefs, but then “on his
own, spontaneously produced . . . delusional beliefs regarding his peers and
staff.” Ultimately, Dr. Souza opined that Bushee suffered from a qualifying
mental disorder that is not in remission and “absolutely” impairs Bushee’s
thought and emotional processes and behavior. Dr. Souza stated, “I do
believe Mr. Bushee represents a substantial danger of physical harm to
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others due to his severe mental disorder” and explained Bushee’s “paranoia,
delusions, and auditory hallucinations have in fact led to violence in the past.
They contributed to his . . . committing offenses, and they’ve also contributed
to violence that he’s engaged in previously in previous reporting periods in
DSH.” Without appropriate treatment and medication, Dr. Souza opined that
Bushee’s symptoms would “absolutely” worsen, which would “significantly”
increase the likelihood of elevating his violence risk.
Bushee was then given the opportunity to testify. When his attorney
asked if he felt he was “ready to be released from the hospital,” Bushee
replied, “Uh, apparently, um, no.” The attorney followed up and asked, “Do
you desire to go to CONREP?” Bushee replied, “Yes.” Bushee’s attorney
inquired about the 2024 incident of violence: “Why did you punch . . . your
peer in the chest?” Bushee answered, “Apparently, um, it was -- it was me,
but it was led me on. It wasn’t -- um, it was just such a mental -- it wasn’t,
like, you know I did it on purpose. You know. Um, yeah.” In response to
further questioning, Bushee represented that if released to CONREP, he
would take his medications, would be involved in therapy, and would refrain
from hitting people.
In closing argument, Bushee’s attorney “submitted” to the “petition for
the one-year extension” but asked the court “to consider releasing Mr. Bushee
to CONREP” pursuant to section 2972, subdivision (d). The court declined
the request as “premature” despite Bushee’s assessment as low risk in an
institutional setting and acknowledging Bushee’s “many positive things.”
“[B]ased upon the evidence,” the trial court extended Bushee’s commitment,
in part because, “today, he did not show insight into that assaultive
behavior.” The court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bushee has
a severe mental disorder; it is not in remission; and that by reason of a severe
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mental disorder, he continues to represent a substantial danger of physical
harm to others.”
Bushee timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Bushee does not challenge his recommitment as an MDO,
rather he contends the trial court’s refusal to release him to CONREP under
section 2972, subsection (d) was error that requires reversal. We disagree.
The Mentally Disordered Offender Act “requires that an offender who
has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder
and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment
until the disorder can be kept in remission.” (People v. Harrison (2013)
57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218.) Specifically, section 2972, subdivision (c) mandates
that if the trier of fact finds that “the patient’s severe mental health disorder
is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and
that by reason of the patient’s severe mental health disorder, the patient
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the court shall
order the patient recommitted to the facility in which the patient was
confined at the time the petition was filed . . . .” If, however, “the committing
court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the committed
person can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis,” then the
person “shall be released on outpatient status.” (§ 2972, subd. (d).) To obtain
outpatient treatment, “the patient must raise a strong suspicion in a person
of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective.”
(People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 319 (Gregerson).)
In the MDO context, we review the trial court’s findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082;
Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.) This substantial evidence
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standard is the same standard of review used in determining a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case. (People v. Rish (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1385, citing People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
913, 919–920.) Thus, “ ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the [trier of fact] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.
[Citation.] . . . A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support’ ” the . . . verdict.’ ” (People v. Manibusan (2013)
58 Cal.4th 40, 87, quoting People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; see
also People v. Clark, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082 [“In considering the
sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, an appellate court must
determine whether, on the whole record, a rational trier of fact could have
found that defendant is an MDO beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all
the evidence in the light which is most favorable to the People, and drawing
all inferences the trier could reasonably have made to support the finding”].)
The party seeking relief in MDO proceedings bears the burden of proof
that such treatment is appropriate. (Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 315–316.) The “reasonable cause” burden set forth in section 2972,
subdivision (d) has been likened to the “probable cause” and “sufficient cause”
standards. (Gregerson, at p. 319, citing Cooley v. Superior Court (2002)
29 Cal.4th 228, 251 and Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at 29B
pt. 1A, West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2011 ed.) foll. § 115, p. 17].) “Reasonable
cause” is “objective and fact driven: Does the evidence raise reasonable cause
to believe outpatient treatment would be safe and effective? The evidence
does so if it would raise a strong suspicion of that in a person of ordinary
prudence.” (Gregerson, at p. 320.) If the court denies a request for outpatient
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treatment, “its order will be affirmed if substantial evidence shows there was
no such reasonable cause.” (Ibid.)
On appeal, Bushee asserts he introduced evidence at trial “that would
cause a reasonable person to have a strong suspicion that Bushee could be
safely and effectively treated in the community.” He claims that Bushee’s
testimony, which included promises to take his medications, continue his
therapy, and refrain from hitting others “satisf[ies] the very low reasonable
cause standard,” particularly when, he contends, the prosecution witnesses
did not specifically address his suitability for outpatient treatment or opine
as to whether Bushee’s current medication and therapy sessions could be
provided in an outpatient setting. We are not persuaded.
Bushee’s characterization of the reasonable cause standard as “very
low” does not change the court’s statutory requirement to recommit Bushee
“to the facility in which the patient was confined at the time the petition was
filed” if the court finds that Bushee has a “severe mental disorder [that] is not
in remission” that causes Bushee to represent “a substantial danger of
physical harm to others.” (§ 2972, subd. (c).) Those are the specific findings
the court made—that are not challenged on appeal—and it is uncontested
that Bushee suffers from a severe mental disorder that requires medication,
is not in remission, and moved him to commit another assault in 2024. It
therefore became Bushee’s burden to demonstrate “reasonable cause” to
believe that he could be “safely and effectively treated on an outpatient
basis.” (§ 2972, subd. (d).)
In this context, Bushee’s testimonial promises do not satisfy the
reasonable cause standard. (See, e.g., People v. Rish, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1385 [“This testimony alone, however, is insufficient to show that there
was reasonable cause to believe that Rish was suitable for treatment on an
7
outpatient basis. Even if accepted as true, such evidence does not come close
to addressing how Rish intended to comply with outpatient treatment and
how such treatment would be safe and effective”].) First, when initially
asked if he was ready to be released, Bushee answered, “no.” Second, when
asked about the 2024 assault, Bushee tried to avoid blame, “[i]t was me, but
it was led me on . . . it was just such a mental . . . it wasn’t like, you know, I
did it on purpose.” Third, Bushee’s trial attorney did not ask either Dr. Craig
or Dr. Souza if outpatient treatment was suitable for Bushee or would be safe
or effective.
In contrast, Dr. Craig opined that Bushee’s severe mental disorder is
not in remission and testified that Bushee regularly fails to attend group
sessions, is not able to implement coping mechanisms independently, and
frequently requires supplemental medication in addition to his regular
prescriptions in order to manage his symptoms. He clarified that Bushee’s
assessment as low risk for violence is “in a hospital setting,” and the day
following that low risk assessment, Bushee committed an assault.
Consistently, Dr. Souza noted scalp bleeding, which suggested Bushee was
picking in response to active symptoms of his disorder. He opined that
without appropriate treatment and medication, Bushee’s symptoms would
“absolutely” worsen, which would “significantly” increase the likelihood of
elevating his violence risk.
As such, insufficient evidence was presented to raise a strong suspicion
in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and
effective. (See Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.) Because Bushee
did not demonstrate reasonable cause to support outpatient release under
section 2972, subdivision (d), the court’s denial of Bushee’s CONREP referral
request was not error.
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
9
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
STEWART, P.J.
RICHMAN, J.
People v. Bushee (A172603)
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