CourtListener 10750906•People v. Cagle CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/10/25 P. v. Cagle CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A171799
v. (Napa County
EDWARD CAGLE, Super. Ct. No. CR137908)
Defendant and
Appellant.
Edward Cagle appeals from a judgment pursuant to Penal
Code sections 2970 and 2972 extending his commitment at
Coalinga State Hospital as an offender with a mental health
disorder (OMHD).1 He contends the trial court violated his due
process and equal protection rights because it allowed a
psychologist to opine that he represents a substantial danger of
physical harm to others without using an actuarial risk
assessment tool. Both of these challenges, however, are forfeited
by Cagle’s failure to raise them in the trial court. To the extent
we consider his equal protection challenge, it has no merit. He
further argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
1
on the meaning of one of the elements necessary to establish that
he was an OMHD. We conclude that any instructional error was
harmless. We also reject Cagle’s claim that his trial counsel
provided him ineffective assistance by failing to raise his novel
due process and equal protection challenges. We will therefore
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Cagle was convicted in 2010 for assault with a deadly
weapon with a prior serious or violent felony conviction. He was
sentenced to prison for four years.
Cagle was apparently committed to a state hospital as a
condition of parole, because in 2016 he was a patient at the
Atascadero State Hospital and a petition was filed to extend his
commitment for one year. His commitment was extended on that
occasion and thereafter.
Cagle was committed to Coalinga State Hospital in 2018.
His latest commitment before the present case was set to expire
on December 11, 2024. The Napa County District Attorney filed
a petition to extend Cagle’s commitment for one year, alleging he
continued to meet the definition of an OMHD.
The trial court held a trial on the petition in October 2024.
Cagle’s treating psychiatrist at Coalinga State Hospital,
Dr. Joseph Liu, testified that Cagle suffered from schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type. Cagle was prescribed several different
medications to treat his condition.
Cagle continued to exhibit symptoms of schizoaffective
disorder despite his medications. Dr. Liu observed Cagle exhibit
2
mood swings, disorganized thought, disorganized speech, and
auditory delusions. Dr. Liu described Cagle as easy to agitate
and said Cagle would quite often “explode.” Cagle believed he
was God, Jesus Christ, and the owner of the hospital. Cagle
lacked insight into his condition. He believed he did not need
medication and that doctors would use medications to kill him.
Cagle refused to take them without a court order, so the hospital
administered the medications pursuant to an involuntary
medication order. Cagle also did not voluntarily follow his
treatment plan. He would not attend his treatment team group
sessions.
A forensic psychologist, Dr. Amanda Dutton, testified that
she believed Cagle had schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She
observed symptoms of this disorder in an interview in which
Cagle expressed paranoia, said he was Jesus Christ, claimed
hospital staff were trying to harm him with medication, and
appeared to experience auditory hallucinations. Cagle’s speech
was pressured, which can indicate mania. Dr. Dutton concluded
Cagle had extremely limited insight into his illness, since he
repeatedly denied having an illness or needing medication or
other treatment. Cagle told Dr. Dutton that he would not take
his medications or continue mental health treatment if he were
unsupervised.
Dr. Dutton opined that Cagle represented a substantial
danger of physical harm to others, based on his history of mental
illness, his current functioning and symptoms, and his limited
insight. Dr. Dutton also relied on Cagle’s history of criminal
3
offenses and aggressive behaviors in the hospital. Cagle had
been convicted in 2000 for battery on a non-prisoner. Dr. Dutton
also considered Cagle’s 2010 conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon.
Cagle was involved in two aggressive incidents in April
2024. During the first April incident, Cagle became upset in the
patient dining room and started screaming. Cagle had also
altered his hospital-issued clothing, in violation of hospital rules,
to display swastikas and various flags. During the second
incident, he yelled unintelligibly and slammed his hands down on
the table while holding an orange.
In early August 2024, Dr. Liu decreased one of Cagle’s
medications. Later that month, Cagle punched another patient.
Cagle told staff members variously that the other patient had
ratted on him earlier in the day and that he was not sure why he
had punched the patient. He admitted that the other patient had
not hit him.
During the People’s discussion of the April and August
2024 incidents in closing argument at the trial, Cagle interjected
twice, once to claim that the other patient had attacked him in
August 2024 because he said the patient was a rat, and the other
seemingly to affirm that he had acted violently three times in the
confined setting of the hospital.
Dr. Dutton also relied on Cagle’s history of receiving
additional medication in specific instances to help him reduce his
aggression. Cagle had received such medication in July 2024 due
to verbal aggression and in response to the August 2024
4
punching incident. Dr. Dutton concluded that because Cagle
continued having aggressive and violent behaviors in the
hospital, she would expect that behavior to continue in the
community, especially if he did not attend treatment.
Dr. Dutton was trained in the use of formal risk
assessment tools. She was also trained to do risk assessments
without formalized tools, by using her clinical judgment to
identify risk factors. She did not use a formalized tool to assess
Cagle’s risk to determine whether he represented a substantial
danger of physical harm to others because it is neither required
nor commonly used for OMHD evaluations. Dr. Dutton had
reviewed hundreds of OMHD evaluations and had yet to find one
that used such a tool. Dr. Dutton admitted that formal risk
assessment tools are based on scientific studies and use
statistical analysis to validate their conclusions and
recommendations. She conceded that her opinion regarding
Cagle’s risk was not based on any statistical or scientifically
validated study and was only her professional clinical opinion.
After two days of testimony, the trial court instructed the
jury on the findings necessary to recommit Cagle as an OMHD.
The trial court delivered CALCRIM No. 3457, which told the jury
that the necessary elements were: (1) Cagle “has a severe mental
disorder”; (2) “[t]he severe mental disorder is not in remission or
cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment”; and
(3) “[b]ecause of his severe mental disorder he presently
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” The
instruction defined “remission” as meaning “that the external
5
signs and symptoms of the severe mental disorder are controlled
by either a psychotropic medication or psychosocial support.”
Although CALCRIM No. 3457 also provides an optional definition
of “cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment,” the
trial court omitted this definition.2
The jury found the petition true. The trial court signed an
order extending Cagle’s commitment to December 11, 2025.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background
“A mentally disordered offender proceeding is ‘civil, rather
than criminal, in nature.’ [Citation.] ‘The Mentally Disordered
Offender Act . . . requires that offenders who have been convicted
of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who
continue to pose a danger to society, receive mental health
treatment during and after the termination of their parole until
their mental disorder can be kept in remission. [Citation.]
Although the nature of an offender’s past criminal conduct is one
of the criteria for treatment as a mentally disordered
offender . . . , [the] Act itself is not punitive or penal in nature.
[Citation.] Rather, the purpose of the scheme is to provide
2 The omitted definition states, “A severe mental disorder
cannot be kept in remission without treatment if, during the
period of the year prior to [the date of trial], the person . . . [¶]
[w]as physically violent except in self-defense,” “[m]ade a serious
threat of substantial physical harm upon the person of another so
as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or
her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family,”
“[i]ntentionally caused property damage,” or “[d]id not voluntarily
follow the treatment plan.” (CALCRIM No. 3457.)
6
[mentally disordered offenders] with treatment while at the same
time protecting the general public from the danger to society
posed by an offender with a mental disorder.’ [Citation.]
“If the individual’s severe mental health disorder is not in
remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment after
the initial term, the district attorney may file a petition asking
the superior court to continue involuntary treatment for an
additional year. (§ 2970, subds. (a) & (b).) Each yearly extension
requires the court or jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
‘the patient has a severe mental health disorder, that the
patient’s severe mental health disorder is not in remission or
cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and that by
reason of the patient’s severe mental health disorder, the patient
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.’
(§ 2972, subds. (a)(2) & (c).)” (People v. Jenkins (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 142, 150 (Jenkins).)
II. Due Process
Cagle contends that the commitment order violates his
right to due process because the evidence at trial that he
represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others
consisted solely of Dr. Dutton’s professional opinion and did not
include the results of a formal risk assessment tool. Relying on
the concurring opinion of Justice Buchanan of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, Division One, in Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th
at pages 156–160, Cagle contends that mental health experts’
unstructured professional opinions are not sufficiently reliable on
their own to support an OMHD commitment.
7
Cagle frames his argument based on the four-factor
balancing test from Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th
802, 819 for determining what process is due to a defendant in a
civil commitment proceeding. But the thrust of Cagle’s argument
is not that the trial court’s procedures were flawed or that some
other procedure should have been used. His argument concerns
the sufficiency of the evidence against him. As Cagle admits in
his reply, his fundamental contention is that Dr. Dutton’s trial
testimony was “untethered,” “speculative,” and not sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict because she “explicitly did not use a
more reliable method” of determining dangerousness.3 Cagle’s
argument is thus more accurately framed as a Kelly- or Sargon-
type challenge to the reliability of unstructured expert opinions
for assessing an OMHD’s dangerousness.4
3 Notably, Cagle does not argue that clinical observations
should play no part in expert opinions as to dangerousness; he
instead “contends that the [OMHD] evaluation should also
include the use of one or more scientifically-based risk
assessment tools.” (Italics added.)
4 People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30, held that before
new scientific technique, theory, or process evidence can be
introduced, there must be a showing that, among other things,
the reliability of the technique, theory, or process is generally
accepted in the scientific community. A published appellate case
allowing the admission of evidence becomes controlling, “at least
until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in the
attitude of the scientific community.” (Id. at p. 32.) Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012)
55 Cal.4th 747, 771–772 (Sargon), held that trial courts must act
as gatekeepers to exclude expert opinion testimony that is
speculative or unreliable in other ways. This gatekeeping
function is independent of Kelly. (Id. at p. 772, fn. 6.)
8
In general, a claim that the evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment may be raised on appeal even when no
such argument was asserted in the trial court. (People v. Butler
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126; Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17.) But the claim may be deemed
forfeited when the appellant contends that expert opinion
testimony is insufficient for reasons that would have supported a
Sargon-type challenge to its admission. (See, e.g., Environmental
Law Foundation v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 307, 325; Bermudez v. Ciolek (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1339–1340.) “ ‘The reason for [the
forfeiture] rule is that “[i]t is both unfair and inefficient to permit
a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention
of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.”
[Citations.] “[T]he forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party
is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a
party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object,
awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] ‘Had [appellant] timely and specifically objected
below, the trial court presumably would have had an opportunity
to correct, and could have corrected, any error.’ ” (People v.
Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1101; accord, People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433–434.)
This rationale applies with full force here and dictates that
Cagle forfeited his due process argument by failing to raise it
below. Because Cagle did not object that Dr. Dutton’s opinion on
dangerousness was inherently unreliable, the People were never
9
asked to provide evidence of reliability or to accede to Cagle’s
position and evaluate him with a structured risk assessment tool.
Nor did the trial court have the chance to avoid the error Cagle
complains of by requiring the People to present evidence of the
result of a structured risk assessment tool.
While appellate courts have discretion to review some types
of forfeited claims, “a forfeited claim of trial court error in
admitting or excluding evidence is not subject to discretionary
appellate review,” except when the claim is a constitutional one
and is closely related to a challenge actually raised at trial to the
admission or exclusion of the evidence. (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7, italics added.) Because Cagle’s
contention is fundamentally an evidentiary challenge to the
admission of Dr. Dutton’s expert opinion on dangerousness and
he did not object to the admission of her opinion on any grounds
below, this rule bars consideration of his forfeited claim.
Moreover, even if we had discretion to do so, we would not
exercise it to review Cagle’s challenge here because his failure to
raise the issue below significantly hampers our consideration of
it. The only information before us regarding the reliability of
unstructured expert opinions comes from Justice Buchanan’s
concurrence in Jenkins. With no disrespect to Justice Buchanan,
we cannot conclude that unstructured professional opinions are
so inherently unreliable as to warrant exclusion based solely on
his concurring opinion. Justice Buchanan cited several treatises
regarding mental health evidence in support of his position that
unstructured professional opinions are less reliable than
10
structured risk assessment tools. (Jenkins, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–160 (conc. opn. by Buchanan, J.)
[citing, inter alia, Shuman, Psychiatric and Psychological
Evidence (Dec. 2022 update) § 16:2; Appelbaum, Reference Guide
on Mental Health Evidence in Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence (3d ed. 2011) p. 849; 2 Faigman et al., Modern Scientific
Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (2022–2023
ed.) § 9:11].) A Kelly or Sargon hearing with examination and
cross-examination of mental health professionals regarding the
reliability of expert opinions in this field is the proper method for
discerning whether Justice Buchanan’s views and those of his
sources are representative of those of the mental health
profession as a whole.
Even assuming the sources in Justice Buchanan’s
concurrence are correct that structured tools are more reliable
than unstructured opinions, this does not necessarily mean
unstructured opinions should be excluded, nor does it establish
what tools would be sufficient. A treatise cited by Justice
Buchanan suggests that most techniques, including those based
solely on clinical observation, exceed 60 percent accuracy at
predicting recidivism (with a coin toss being 50 percent accurate),
but very few achieve better than 75 percent. (Faigman, supra,
§ 9:11.) If unstructured opinions are not sufficiently reliable at
60 percent accuracy, it is not obvious what level of accuracy
makes a prediction sufficiently reliable. In addition, as Justice
Buchanan noted, different risk assessment tools have varying
degrees of structure (Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 157–
11
158 (conc. opn. by Buchanan, J.)), and there are tradeoffs
involved in choosing the degree of structure (e.g., Faigman,
supra, § 9:11). For example, the creators of one structured tool
advise a professional review before finalizing the score from the
tool because of the possibility that rare risk factors, which by
their nature would not appear in an actuarial instrument, would
influence the risk in a given case. (Ibid.) A Kelly or Sargon
hearing would be helpful for exploring such issues. We decline to
foist uncertainty upon the trial courts by declaring opinions like
Dr. Dutton’s to be inadmissible simply because they may be less
reliable than the alternatives, without being able to explain
precisely what bar they fail to clear or what tools can be used
instead.
The need for precision and nuance in this area also raises
the question of whether Justice Buchanan’s concerns are better
addressed by the Legislature, which can investigate the different
risk assessment tools available and mandate their use in specific
ways for OMHD assessments, as it has done in other areas of the
law.5 But if appellate courts are to lead the way in this area, at a
minimum we must have more information to do so. The only
information in the record here is Dr. Dutton’s testimony that
although she was trained in the use of formal risk assessment
tools, such tools are not commonly used for OMHD evaluations
and that she could assess Cagle’s risk without such tools because
5 We discuss post Cagle’s challenge to the Legislature’s
choice of mandating the use of a specific tool for sexually violent
predator commitments but not requiring the use of any tools for
OMHD commitments.
12
she was also trained in using her clinical judgment to identify
risk factors. With nothing in the record to contradict this
testimony, we cannot say that Dr. Dutton’s opinion should have
been excluded as inherently unreliable.
The People argue that People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d
306 (Burnick), which Justice Buchanan cited (Jenkins, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 157 (conc. opn. by Buchanan, J.)), has
already established that clinical expert opinions are admissible
and that we cannot gainsay Burnick. In language from Burnick
that Justice Buchanan cited, our Supreme Court acknowledged
that psychiatric predictions of civil committees’ future actions are
inherently speculative. (Burnick, at p. 328.) But Burnick
declined to hold that psychiatrists should be prohibited from
opining as to future dangerousness based on clinical observation
or that a civil commitment based on such opinions constitutes a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. (Ibid.) Instead,
the Burnick court relied on the speculative nature of psychiatric
opinions as one of several reasons to hold that the standard of
proof in civil commitment proceedings must be beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than a preponderance of the evidence.
(Ibid.)
Cagle contends Burnick can be distinguished because it
dealt with a mentally disordered sex offender commitment rather
than an OMHD commitment. Even if Burnick were
distinguishable on this basis, Burnick’s refusal to endorse the
argument that Cagle brings here makes it imperative that he
13
develop a record adequate for demonstrating a sound reason to
depart from Burnick. He has not done so.
III. Equal Protection
Cagle contends that his commitment as an OMHD without
the use of a structured forensic instrument also violated his right
to equal protection. He contrasts the lack of a requirement for
such tools in OMHD commitments with Sexually Violent
Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.; SVPA)
commitments. Cagle contends SVPA commitments routinely use
the Static-99R, an instrument that evaluates the recidivism risk
of a potential sexually violent predator (SVP). (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 6601, subd. (c).)
Cagle forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below,
just as he did with respect to his due process challenge. (See
People v. Sumahit (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 347, 354, fn. 3 [SVP
forfeited equal protection challenge by failing to raise it in the
trial court].) To determine whether the Legislature could
justifiably distinguish between SVP and OMHD commitments in
the use of structured risk assessment tools, we must first identify
a specific tool or tools that could be applicable to Cagle. The sole
tool to which Cagle points is the Static-99R, which appears to be
used only for sex offenders. (People v. Field (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 132, 152, fn. 8 [“The Static-99 test is an actuarial
instrument that allows an evaluator to place sexual offenders in
different risk categories based on historical (static) factors such
as age, marital status, the number of prior offenses, the
relationship of the offender to the victims and the gender of the
14
victims.”].) Cagle is not a sex offender. It seems likely that there
are other structured risk assessment tools comparable to the
Static-99R that the Legislature could use for OMHD
commitments. (See Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 157–
158 (conc. opn. by Buchanan, J.) [discussing different tools].) But
without a record identifying specific tools and documenting any
differences in reliability, cost, and other criteria between such
tools and the unstructured expert opinions currently used in
OMHD proceedings, it is impossible to decide whether the
Legislature justifiably distinguishes between SVPs and OMHDs
with regard to the use of such tools. (Cf. People v. McKee (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1330, 1339–1347 [discussing evidence
presented at 21-day hearing comparing SVPs and OMHDs to
justify differences between two types of commitments, including
length of term].)
In any event, to the extent that we can evaluate Cagle’s
argument on this record, we conclude it has no merit. “The right
to equal protection under both the federal and California
Constitutions is intended to ensure that the ‘government does not
treat a group of people unequally without some justification.’ ”
(People v. Cannon (2025) 18 Cal.5th 497, 517 (Cannon).) “[A]ny
unequal treatment that is based on suspect classifications or that
significantly burdens a fundamental right or interest is subject to
strict scrutiny analysis,” which is the most exacting level of
constitutional review. (Ibid.) “If the statutory classification,
however, does not differentiate based on a protected class or
significantly burden a fundamental right or interest, the
15
legislation is presumed valid unless the challenger can establish
‘ “there is no rational relationship between a disparity in
treatment and some legitimate government purpose.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Under this standard, “ ‘[t]he underlying rationale for a statutory
classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by
lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” [Citation.]
Evaluating potential justifications for disparate treatment, a
court reviewing a statute under this standard must “treat the
statute’s potential logic and assumptions far more permissively
than with other standards of constitutional or regulatory review.”
[Citation.] “If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts
may not second-guess its ‘ “wisdom, fairness, or logic.” ’ ”
[Citation.] “[T]he logic behind a potential justification need [not]
be persuasive or sensible — rather than simply rational.” ’ ” (Id.
at p. 518.)
“[D]espite the liberty interests involved, not ‘ “every detail
of every civil commitment program is subject to strict
scrutiny.” ’ ” (Cannon, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 518.) Our Supreme
Court recently held in Cannon that the more lenient rational
basis standard applied to an argument that the SVPA
commitment scheme violates equal protection because it lacks the
same jury trial advisement and waiver procedures as the OMHD
law or statutes for defendants pleading not guilty by reason of
insanity. (Cannon, at p. 509.) Although Cagle maintains that
Cannon was wrongly decided, the parties agree that Cannon
applies here and requires rational basis review of Cagle’s equal
protection challenge.
16
“The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment
of certain sex offenders before the end of their prison or parole
revocation terms.” (Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th
177, 190.) There is a “ ‘complex administrative and judicial
process’ ” required to civilly commit an individual as an SVP.
(Ibid.) The process “begins when the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation screens inmates at least six months before
their release date ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 6601, subd. (a))” to
determine whether they are potential SVPs. (Walker, at p. 190.)
“This screening shall be conducted in accordance with a
structured screening instrument developed and updated by the
State Department of State Hospitals in consultation with the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 6601, subd. (b).) If the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation determines an inmate is a potential SVP, the
commitment process then requires a full evaluation by the
Department of State Hospitals, the filing of a petition for
commitment in superior court, a probable cause hearing, and
finally a trial at which the trier of fact must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the inmate meets the SVPA criteria.
(Walker, at pp. 190–191.)
Cagle asserts the Static-99R is routinely used at SVPA
trials to establish an SVP’s likelihood of recidivism, while such
tools are not used in OMHD commitments. (E.g., Bennett v.
Superior Court (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 862, 876 [“likelihood of a
[SVP] defendant to reoffend is generally established by expert
testimony, which is usually based on the use of diagnostic tools,
17
such as the Static-99, to predict future violent sexual behavior”].)
But the SVPA does not mandate the use of structured
instruments at a trial to commit an inmate as an SVP; such tools
are required only as screening devices at the outset of the
process. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6603, 6601, subd. (b).) Even
assuming Cagle is correct that the results of the screening
instrument are commonly used at the eventual trial and are
therefore a de facto part of proof that an inmate is an SVP, there
is a rational basis for the Legislature to distinguish between
SVPA and OMHD commitments in this regard.
As the People point out, SVPA commitments are indefinite,
while OMHD commitments last one year. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 6604; Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (c).) Assuming for the sake of
argument that Cagle is correct that structured tools like the
Static-99R are significantly more accurate than unstructured
opinions, the Legislature could reasonably decide that indefinite
SVPA commitments demand the use of more reliable tools
because the consequences of error in an indefinite SVPA
commitment are more severe. It could decide that OMHD
commitments do not require such tools because OMHD inmates
have an annual opportunity to defeat the renewal of the
commitment, which is sufficient safeguard against error. (Cf.
People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1210 [“different classes
of individuals civilly committed need not be treated identically”];
People v. Washington (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 453, 474 [noting “the
significant liberty interests at stake for an alleged SVP facing a
potential indefinite commitment”].)
18
Cagle points out that the SVPA provided for two-year
commitments when its procedures were first established, so that
the indefinite nature of the commitment is not likely to have been
the actual basis for the Legislature’s decision to require a
structured risk assessment tool for the SVPA. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, former § 6604, as enacted by Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 3.) A
two-year SVPA commitment is still longer than a one-year
OMHD commitment, so the same rationale applies, albeit with
less force. Moreover, the SVPA was amended to make SVPA
commitments indefinite almost 20 years ago. (See People v.
McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1185–1187 [describing voters’
amendment that required indefinite commitment].) We may
assume that the greater difference in the length of the respective
commitments after that amendment explains the Legislature’s
decision since then not to add a requirement for a structured risk
assessment tool to the OMHD commitment scheme. Under the
applicable standard of review, the rationale for a difference in
treatment between two groups need not ever have been
articulated by the Legislature or have a foundation in the record.
(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881;
accord, Cannon, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 518.) “To mount a
successful rational basis challenge, a party must ‘ “negative every
conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory
disparity.” (Johnson, at p. 881.) The justification the People offer
supports the current disparity between SVPA and OMHD
commitments with regard to the use of structured risk
assessment tools like the Static-99R, which is sufficient to defeat
19
Cagle’s challenge here. (Cf. People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
pp. 1200–1201, 1210 [remanding for hearing regarding equal
protection challenge to different length of commitments of
OMHDs (under the prior name of mentally disordered offenders)
and SVPs but recognizing “ ‘the importance of deferring to the
legislative branch in an area which is analytically nuanced and
dependent upon medical science’ ”].)
Cagle insists that his commitment is effectively indefinite
like an SVPA commitment because he has been repeatedly
recommitted. But Cagle’s commitment has been repeatedly
extended only because the People have continued to allege and
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cagle still qualifies as an
OMHD. If at any point the People fail to persuade a jury of this,
then Cagle must be released. The placement of the burden on the
People to continue to justify Cagle’s commitment distinguishes
OMHD commitments like his from SVPA commitments. Cagle
also points out that even though an SVPA commitment is
indefinite, SVPs are evaluated at least annually, and the
evaluation can trigger a release process. (Welf. & Inst. § 6604.9,
subds. (a), (d).) He asserts that the Static-99R is used in each
annual SVP evaluation, but he cites nothing factual or legal to
support the assertion. (See id., subds. (a)–(b) [requiring only that
a SVP “have a current examination of his or her mental condition
made at least once every year” in the form of a declaration by a
professionally qualified person considering whether the person
meets the definition of an SVP and whether conditional or
unconditional release is in the person’s best interests].) The
20
Legislature could reasonably decide that for OMHDs, the
requirement of annual proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a
neutral decisionmaker, as opposed to an internal annual clinical
evaluation by the Department of State Hospitals, suffices to end
inappropriate OMHD commitments, without the need to use
structured predictive tool every year.
IV. Jury Instruction
Cagle next challenges the jury instructions on the second
element for an OMHD commitment, that his severe mental
health disorder “is not in remission or cannot be kept in
remission without continued treatment.” (§ 2972, subd. (c);
CALCRIM No. 3457.) Cagle faults the trial court for not
including CALCRIM No. 3457’s definition of “cannot be kept in
remission without treatment,” which he contends means the
opposite of the normal meaning of the phrase. CALCRIM
No. 3457 draws from section 2962, subdivision (a)(3), which lists
circumstances that will prove a defendant’s mental disorder
cannot be kept in remission without treatment. Those
circumstances are “a violent act except in self-defense, a serious
threat, intentional property damage or failure to follow the
treatment plan.” (People v. Burroughs (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
1401, 1407.)
It may have been preferable for the trial court to deliver
CALCRIM No. 3457 in full, since it would have given the jury a
check list to use if it wanted to consider whether the People had
established Cagle’s mental disorder could not be kept in
remission without treatment. However, the bench notes to the
21
instruction state, “Case law provides no direct guidance about
whether a finding of an enumerated act is necessary to show that
the disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment or
whether some alternative showing, such as medical opinion or
non-enumerated conduct evidencing lack of remission, would
suffice.” (CALCRIM No. 3457, Bench Notes.) As the notes
further observe, People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149,
1161, fn. 4, suggested that proof of an enumerated act is
necessary, though its observation was dictum. (CALCRIM No.
3457, Bench Notes.) But we need not decide whether the
omission of the definition of “cannot be kept in remission without
treatment” was error. If it was, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 989
[assessing prejudice in SVPA commitment with the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard].)
The second element for an OMHD commitment was
satisfied if Cagle’s disorder either was not in remission or could
not be kept in remission without treatment. Cagle concedes that
the People presented substantial evidence that his mental
disorder was not in remission despite treatment. The People
emphasized in closing Dr. Liu’s and Dr. Dutton’s testimonies that
Cagle’s disorder was not in remission and that there was no
evidence to the contrary. The People briefly noted Dr. Dutton’s
testimony that Cagle’s disorder could not be kept in remission
without treatment and that Cagle would decompensate if
released because he would not take his medication. But the
People told the jury that it did not “need to get to that” given the
22
evidence that his disorder was not in remission. Thus, the jury
had no reason to rely on the concept of “cannot be kept in
remission without treatment,” making the omission of the
definition of that phrase inconsequential.
Moreover, even if the trial court had delivered the
definition of “cannot be kept in remission without treatment,” the
jury assuredly would have found that aspect of the element true.
The definition states that a defendant’s condition cannot be kept
in remission without treatment if, during the last year, the
defendant was physically violent not in self-defense, made a
threat of violence, caused property damage, or did not voluntarily
follow the treatment plan. (CALCRIM No. 3457.) The evidence
showed that Cagle was violent with a fellow patient who did not
hit him, destroyed state property by drawing swastikas and
various flags on his clothing, refused to take medication without
a court order, and refused to attend his treatment team group
sessions. Cagle did not call any of this evidence into any
significant doubt. Because there is no question that the jury
would have found that Cagle’s disorder cannot be kept in
remission according to the omitted definition, any error in failing
to deliver that definition was harmless.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Cagle argues that to the extent he forfeited any of
his arguments by failing to raise them below, he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude Cagle
forfeited his due process and equal protection arguments, we
23
consider whether his counsel gave him ineffective assistance by
failing to raise those challenges below.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
“defendant must show, among other things, that his ‘counsel’s
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.’ ” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.) We
assess the reasonableness of a counsel’s representation “in light
of ‘the professional norms prevailing when the representation
took place.’ ” (In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773.) In a direct
appeal, reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel is warranted
“ ‘only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or
(3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ”
(Arredondo, at p. 711.)
Cagle’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for
failing to challenge the admissibility of Dr. Dutton’s expert
opinion on dangerousness or the lack of evidence from a
structured assessment tool. Cagle’s counsel’s actions are
assessed in light of prevailing professional norms, and as
discussed ante, Burnick was and is the latest case to squarely
address the subject. Burnick declined to exclude psychiatric
opinions based on clinical observation, so notwithstanding Justice
Buchanan’s concurrence in Jenkins, Cagle’s counsel was not
deficient for failing to try to exclude Dr. Dutton’s testimony.
(People v. Upsher (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1328–1329
24
[rejecting ineffective assistance claim in light of unsettled state of
the law supporting argument not raised in the trial court].)
Cagle’s position is that the law should be changed in accordance
with Justice Buchanan’s concurrence in Jenkins. But the
concurrence is just that: a concurrence, signed by only a single
justice and not precedential. (People v. Superior Court (Persons)
(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 191, 194 [“opinions of individual justices
which do not have the concurrence of a majority of the justices
are not precedent, and constitute only the personal views of the
writer”].) Even if Justice Buchanan’s concurrence could be said
to have created a split or uncertainty in the law, Cagle’s counsel
would still not be constitutionally ineffective for failing to move to
exclude Dr. Dutton’s opinion or demand evidence of a structured
assessment. Counsel’s representation does not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness for failing to raise an issue
on which the law is unsettled. (People v. Foster (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 379, 385 [“Given that there is no California
authority establishing whether or not [a prosecutor’s] questions
were proper, defendant cannot establish that counsel’s failure to
object to the prosecutor’s questions in this case ‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.’ ”]; cf. In re Grinder (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 845, 871 [“as a general rule, a failure to
anticipate changes in the law is not considered ineffective
assistance of counsel”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
25
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Cagle (A171799)
26
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