People v. Smith CA2/8

CourtListener 10749313Calctapp08.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/8/25 P. v. Smith CA2/8
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B331802

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA065744)
v.

KENNETH EDWARD SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Tony Cho, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson and Jennifer L. Peabody, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Kenneth Edward Smith pled no contest to one
count of attempted murder, and he admitted that he personally
used a firearm during the commission of the offense and
committed the offense for the benefit of a gang. Smith later filed
a resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
The People opposed the petition, arguing the preliminary hearing
and plea hearing transcripts established that Smith was the
actual shooter and, as a result, was ineligible for resentencing as
a matter of law. The trial court denied Smith’s petition at the
prima facie stage. We reversed that order in our original opinion,
concluding the record did not conclusively establish that Smith
was ineligible for resentencing relief and that the trial court
erred in relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny
Smith’s petition.
The California Supreme Court granted the People’s petition
for review. After deciding People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549
(Patton), the Supreme Court remanded the case to us with
directions to vacate our prior decision and to reconsider Smith’s
appeal in light of Patton. In Patton, the Supreme Court held that
a trial court may properly rely on uncontroverted evidence in a
preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations in
determining whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.6.
(Patton, at p. 564.)
Both parties filed supplemental briefs addressing Patton.
Smith does not argue that he made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for resentencing under Patton. Instead, he requests
only that we remand the case to the superior court with

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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directions to consider an amended petition, should he file one
within 30 days after the case is remanded. The People do not
oppose Smith’s request. Having considered Patton, we now
affirm the court’s order denying Smith’s resentencing petition but
remand the matter to allow Smith the opportunity to file an
amended petition.
BACKGROUND
1. The preliminary hearing
The court conducted a preliminary hearing in early June
2007. One of the responding officers, a gang expert, and the
victim named in the first count of attempted murder testified at
the hearing.
One evening, Davione McDowell was standing outside an
apartment near a group of men. While McDowell was on the
phone, he heard a series of gunshots. As McDowell ran away, he
felt bullets fly past his head. McDowell did not see who fired the
shots.
Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputy Alfonso Bertieri and his
partner were on patrol when they heard the gunshots. Although
it was dark out, they saw two men, one of whom was Smith,
standing outside a parked SUV. A third man was in the SUV’s
driver seat. Deputy Bertieri initially believed both men standing
outside the SUV were firing guns. He later realized that Smith
was the only person firing a gun, while the other man directed
Smith where to shoot.
When Smith saw Deputy Bertieri’s squad car, he and his
cohort got into the SUV. The officers followed the SUV for
several miles, as Smith fired at them from the rear passenger
seat. When the SUV finally stopped, the driver fled on foot while
Smith and the other cohort remained inside the car. The driver
was later apprehended with a gun. Neither Smith nor the other

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man inside the car had a gun when they were apprehended, and
no gun was found inside the vehicle.
A gang expert testified that Smith and his cohorts were
members of the 8-Trey Gangster Crips gang. McDowell was a
member of the Underground Crips gang. According to the gang
expert, the 8-Trey Gangster Crips and the Underground Crips
are rivals.
2. The information and plea
The People filed an information charging Smith and his two
cohorts with, among other crimes, seven counts of attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (§§ 664, 187.) As
to the seven counts of attempted murder, the People alleged that
Smith: (1) committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)); (2) “personally used a
firearm, a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code section
12022.53(b)”; and (3) “personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code section
12022.53(c).”
In November 2008, Smith pled no contest to attempted
murder in count 1. Smith also admitted that he personally used
a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and that he
committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
When the court took Smith’s admission to the firearm
enhancement, however, it stated that the section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) enhancement alleged that Smith “personally used
and discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense,”
even though the information alleged only that Smith personally
used a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel stipulated to a factual basis
based on the police reports, preliminary hearing transcript, and
the probation officer’s report. The court sentenced Smith to
29 years in state prison.

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3. The resentencing petition
In March 2023, Smith filed a form resentencing petition
under section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel to represent
him.
The People opposed Smith’s petition. The People argued
that Smith was ineligible for resentencing because his plea and
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established
that he was the actual shooter and acted with the intent to kill.
The People attached to their opposition, among other things,
copies of the preliminary hearing and plea hearing transcripts
and a copy of the minute order from the plea hearing.
In June 2023, the court held a hearing on Smith’s petition.
The court denied the petition, finding that, “based on . . . the
arguments [] put forth in [the People’s] opposition,” Smith was
ineligible for resentencing.
Smith appeals.
DISCUSSION
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to eliminate murder liability under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit
application of the felony murder rule. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel).) Now, except in cases of felony
murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be
convicted of murder, and malice “shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).)
In addition to changing the law of murder prospectively,
Senate Bill 1437 allowed defendants convicted of murder under a
now-invalid theory to petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) The
Legislature later enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), which clarified that defendants convicted of attempted

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murder or voluntary manslaughter under a now-invalid theory
are entitled to the same postconviction relief. (People v. Estrada
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 335.)
Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted of, among
other crimes, attempted murder may petition the sentencing
court to have his conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–
708.) The defendant must allege: (1) the information allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder or attempted
murder in which malice is imputed to the defendant based solely
on his participation in a crime under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; (2) the defendant was convicted following
a trial or accepted a plea in lieu of trial at which he could have
been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) the
defendant could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to the law made by Senate Bill 1437.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If the defendant files a facially sufficient petition
requesting appointment of counsel, the trial court must appoint
counsel and hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c).) If the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d).)
The court’s analysis at section 1172.6’s prima facie stage is
designed “to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 971.) The court may consider the record of conviction and
the allegations in the defendant’s petition. (Ibid.) When a
conviction results from a plea, the record of conviction includes
the preliminary hearing transcript and plea colloquy. (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 563–569.) The court may not engage in

6
factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion, and the court should not “ ‘reject the petitioner’s
factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
We independently review whether the court properly
denied a resentencing petition at section 1172.6’s prima facie
stage. (Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 337.)
In Patton, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may
refer to the record of conviction, including the preliminary
hearing transcript, to refute conclusory allegations in a
resentencing petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 564–568.)
Thus, a petitioner who offers only conclusory allegations in a case
where the “record of conviction [] demonstrates the petitioner’s
conviction was under a still-valid theory[] has not . . . made a
prima facie showing.” (Id. at p. 565.) As the Supreme Court
explained, accepting undisputed facts from the record of
conviction over contrary conclusory allegations “is not
‘ “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 565–566.)
The record of conviction in this case includes the
information, preliminary hearing transcript, and the plea
colloquy. Although count 1 of the information charged Smith and
his two cohorts with attempted murder, the officer who witnessed
the shooting testified at the preliminary hearing that Smith was
the only shooter. And while that officer initially believed that
both Smith and one of his cohorts were firing shots at the victim,
that officer later realized that Smith was the only shooter. No
other witnesses testified that anyone other than Smith fired
shots. Thus, the preliminary hearing transcript shows that the
People prosecuted Smith as the sole shooter and direct
perpetrator of the attempted murder to which he pled no contest.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 563, 569; see also People v.

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Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 [the natural and
probable consequences doctrine does not apply to direct
perpetrators].) In addition, Smith’s admission that he personally
used a firearm during the commission of the attempted murder
“tended to corroborate” the trial court’s conclusion that Smith
was not convicted under a now-invalid theory of attempted
murder. (See Patton, at p. 563.) In sum, the record of conviction
refutes Smith’s conclusory allegations that he is eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6.
In his supplemental brief, Smith requests an order
remanding the case to the trial court with directions to consider
an amended petition, should he file one within 30 days of
remand. (See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569 [ordering, out of
an abundance of caution, a remand with directions for the trial
court to consider an amended petition should the defendant file
one within 30 days of remand].) The People do not oppose
Smith’s request. Because Smith did not have the benefit of
Patton when he filed his resentencing petition, we remand the
case to allow him the opportunity to file an amended petition
with nonconclusory allegations showing he is eligible for relief
under section 1172.6.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Smith’s resentencing petition is
affirmed. We remand the matter with instructions for the trial
court to consider any amended resentencing petition Smith files
within 30 days of remand.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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