People v. Navarrete CA3

CourtListener 10749239Calctapp08.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/8/25 P. v. Navarrete CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C103763

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. MAN-CR-FE-
2022-0001923)
v.

AXEL DUARTE NAVARRETE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Axel Duarte Navarrete pled guilty to offering cannabis to a minor and
misdemeanor sexual battery. He later filed a motion to vacate his plea pursuant to Penal
Code section 1473.7.1 On appeal, Navarrete contends that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion. We disagree and thus affirm.
BACKGROUND
Navarrete was charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11361,
subdivision (a), offering cannabis to a minor and Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a),

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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lewd act on a child under the age of 14.2 At arraignment on these charges, Navarrete was
advised of his constitutional rights and the potential immigration consequences of
entering a plea via a preprinted form that included a section for noncitizens. It stated that
a noncitizen who enters a plea of guilty or no contest will be deported, excluded from
admission to the United States, or denied naturalization.
At the change of plea hearing, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the
complaint to add another count, Penal Code section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1),
misdemeanor sexual battery, which the court granted. Navarrete then agreed to plead
guilty to violating Penal Code section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1) and Health and Safety
Code section 11361, subdivision (a) in exchange for the prosecution dismissing the Penal
Code section 288 charge. In taking the plea, the court first verified with plea counsel that
he and Navarrete had discussed Navarrete’s constitutional rights and the consequences
resulting from the plea and that he understood them. The court then informed Navarrete
that by law it must advise everyone that resolves their case that, “if you are not a citizen
of the United States, a plea of guilty will result in your deportation or refusal of
naturalization, citizenship, amnesty, or re-entry into the United States.” Navarrete
confirmed that he understood. The trial court imposed two years of formal probation and
ordered Navarrete to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290.
After more than a year into his formal probation, Navarrete was issued a notice to
appear by the Department of Homeland Security and was taken into Immigration and
Customs Enforcement custody to begin removal proceedings, pursuant to section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.).
Navarrete retained counsel, who filed a motion to vacate Navarrete’s conviction
pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). In the motion, Navarrete argued there was

2 The facts underlying the conviction are not relevant to the resolution of this case
and, therefore, are omitted from the discussion.

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prejudicial error, which adversely impacted his ability to meaningfully understand and
accept the potential immigration consequences of his convictions and accept the plea
agreement. Specifically, Navarrete claimed the advisements regarding the immigration
consequences from the trial court were only generic advisements pursuant to section
1016.5, that there were no advisements from defense counsel, and the result was that he
did not understand that his plea would result in deportation. In support of this allegation,
Navarrete attached to his motion the form he signed indicating that he understood his
constitutional rights, his declaration, the notice to appear from the Department of
Homeland Security, and various minute orders from the trial court proceedings. At the
hearing on the motion to vacate the conviction, defense counsel offered no additional
evidence or argument and instead both parties submitted on their moving papers. The
court denied the motion, stating, “I think he was almost certainly advised twice, if not
more. So I’m going to deny the motion.”
DISCUSSION
I
Relevant Law and Standard of Review
Section 1473.7 allows for criminal defendants to move to vacate their convictions
if there was prejudicial error damaging their ability to “meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of
a conviction or sentence. A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (§ 1473.7 subd. (a)(1).) To prevail under
1473.7, a defendant must first show that he or she did not understand the immigration
consequences of his or her plea; next, a defendant must show that this misunderstanding
constituted prejudicial error. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319
(Espinoza).)
To show prejudicial error, a defendant must demonstrate there was a “reasonable
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly

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understood its actual or potential immigration consequences. When courts assess
whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they consider the totality of
the circumstances. [Citation.] Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant's ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding
deportation, the defendant's priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was
possible.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529-530 (Vivar), citing Lee v. United
States (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 367-371.) “These factors are not exhaustive, and no single
type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
A defendant must provide “objective evidence” to corroborate these factual
assertions. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) “Objective evidence includes facts
provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant's
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the
defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321; see also Vivar, at pp. 530-531.)
We apply independent review to evaluate whether a defendant has demonstrated a
reasonable probability that they would have rejected the plea offer had they understood
its immigration consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527, 529.) “ ‘[U]nder
independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine
whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 527.) When courts engage in
independent review, they must give deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if
they are based on “ ‘ “the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and
observed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) But when the trial court’s findings “derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,” the trial court and the reviewing court “ ‘are in the
same position,’ ” and no deference is owed. (Id. at p. 528; see also Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 320.)
Before beginning our analysis, we note the following. As the reviewing court, we
will not perform an independent, unassisted review of the record in search of error or

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grounds to support the judgment. (McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522.)
“Statements of fact that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by
the reviewing court.” (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947; see
Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5.) This principle
extends to any portion of an appellate brief, including argument. (Alki Partners, LP v.
DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8.) In this case, Navarrete
has risked forfeiture of his arguments by failing to cite to the record in the argument
section of the opening brief and has failed to cite to the record entirely in the reply brief.
Nevertheless, this court will conduct an analysis of the relevant law and legal arguments
presented.
II
Analysis
In his motion for relief, Navarrete argued he should be allowed to vacate his
convictions because “[a]t no point did [he] understand with certainty that his guilty plea
would automatically subject him to removal proceedings.” He further contended that he
never discussed the immigration consequences of his plea with counsel and the trial court
only provided generic advisements pursuant to section 1016.5. The trial court denied
relief, finding that Navarrete was advised at least twice of the immigration consequences
of his plea.
On appeal, Navarrete contends the trial court’s ruling was in error because his
claim that defense counsel failed to provide affirmative, individualized immigration
advice was not rebutted by the record and the trial court relied solely on the “rote” and
“generic” judicial advisements given to deny relief. He argues that section 1473.7 was
enacted as a remedial statute to ensure that a defendant’s actual understanding of
immigration consequences is meaningfully informed by competent legal counsel, not
merely by the court’s “recitation” of section 1016.5 advisements.

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The People argue the trial court correctly denied the motion to vacate because the
record shows that Navarrete understood that his plea would result in mandatory
deportation. During the change of plea hearing, the trial court provided the advisement
under section 1016.5 right before Navarrete entered his guilty plea. In addition,
Navarrete was informed in writing of the immigration consequences through the
constitutional rights form that he signed. The People emphasize the language used in
providing these advisements as providing certainty as to his deportation. On the
constitutional rights form, the section pertaining to noncitizens uses the word “will,” in
that “a plea of guilty or no contest will cause you to be deported . . . .” During the change
of plea hearing, the trial court stated, “a plea of guilty will result in your
deportation . . . .” There was no confusion or misunderstanding that if Navarrete pled
guilty to the charges he would be deported, or refused naturalization, citizenship,
amnesty, or re-entry into the United States and, therefore, Navarrete fails to show
prejudicial error on appeal. Navarrete has also failed to provide supporting evidence
regarding his claim that his attorney did not advise him on immigration consequences.
The record demonstrates that Navarrete had a Spanish interpreter during the
entirety of his case. At his arraignment, Navarrete reviewed and signed a constitutional
rights form with the help of the Spanish interpreter. Item No. 14 on the form is specific
to noncitizens and is highlighted, explaining that if the defendant is a noncitizen, “a plea
of guilty or no contest will cause you to be deported, be excluded from admission to the
United States or be denied naturalization.” Right after this advisement on the form, in
bold, it says “DO NOT SIGN THE STATEMENT UNLESS YOU FULLY
UNDERSTAND IT.” The form was signed by Navarrete, the Spanish interpreter, and the
judge all on the same date.
During the change of plea hearing nearly six months later, the court discussed the
maximum sentence Navarrete could receive on his conviction then asked Navarrete if he
had had enough time to speak with his attorney; Navarrete responded “yes.” The court

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then asked plea counsel if he was satisfied that Navarrete understood his constitutional
rights, the elements of each charge, possible defenses, and the consequences resulting
from the plea, to which counsel responded in the affirmative. After the court reviewed
some of the terms and conditions of the plea, the court advised Navarrete of his
constitutional rights and consequences of the plea. The court advised, “if you are not a
citizen of the United States, a plea of guilty will result in your deportation or refusal of
naturalization, citizenship, amnesty, or re-entry into the United States.” The court then
asked Navarrete if he understood, and Navarrete confirmed he did. The court then
reviewed the other constitutional rights that Navarrete would be giving up by pleading
guilty and Navarrete again confirmed he understood. At no point did Navarrete indicate
he was missing information or did not understand the consequences of his plea.
Navarrete’s claim that he did not meaningfully understand his immigration consequences
appears to be rebutted by the record.
Moreover, without evidence to the contrary, we presume counsel effectively
performed their duties and counseled Navarrete about the immigration consequences of
his plea. (Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 372.) As noted by the People, the
only evidence or documentation Navarrete has provided are minute orders, an advisement
of rights form, probation notices, a notice to appear by Department of Homeland
Security, and Navarrete’s signed declaration in support of the motion to vacate his
convictions. Furthermore, during the proceedings on the motion to vacate, the trial court
asked counsel if they had additional information or arguments, and counsel simply
submitted on the moving papers. Navarrete did not ask for an evidentiary hearing and,
having failed to provide any declarations from prior defense counsel, Navarrete provided
no objective evidence that prior defense counsel did not provide immigration
consequence advisements and that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea as a result of this failure. All we are left with is Navarrete’s
declaration stating that he did not understand his immigration consequences, contrary to

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his signed constitutional rights form and his affirmance that he understood the
consequences during the plea colloquy. “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of
post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his
attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to
substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” (Lee v. United States, supra, 582 U.S.
at p. 369; see also People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 212, 223-224 [however,
“[a]n allegation that trial counsel failed to properly advise a defendant is meaningless
unless there is objective corroborating evidence supporting appellant’s claimed failures,”
thus, a defendant’s claims require “corroboration and objective evidence because a
declaration by defendant is suspect by itself”].)
To support his argument to the contrary, Navarrete cites multiple cases in which
the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of a section 1473.7 motion. These
cases include People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, People v. Mejia (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 859, and Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th 510. These cases are easily
distinguishable from the case before us. In two of the cited cases, the defendants
provided corroborating evidence from defense counsel to prove that they did not have a
meaningful understanding of the immigration consequences. (See Vivar, at p. 519
[defense counsel advised the defendant to consult an immigration attorney and did not
advise him of the actual consequences of a plea]; Camacho, at p. 1002 [defense counsel
testified he discussed the topic of immigration but did not remember specifically
discussing immigration consequences with the defendant or what was said].) And in
Mejia, unlike here, the record showed the defendant was only advised via a preprinted
form that he may be deported or excluded from the United States as a result of the plea.
(Mejia, at p. 863.)
Navarrete has not provided any corroborating evidence that shows defense counsel
did not properly advise him about the consequences of his plea agreement. Instead, in the
motion to vacate the conviction, current counsel stated the record was silent as to whether

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the court and Navarrete discussed the immigration consequences specific to his situation,
and the “record is silent on critical factors that would establish [Navarrete’s] competency
to understand the immigration consequences of his plea.” However, to establish
prejudicial error Navarrete must show more than a silent record. A defendant must
demonstrate a “ ‘reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if
the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences’ ” and “must corroborate any assertions with ‘ “ ‘objective evidence.’ ” ’ ”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316, quoting Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529, 530.)
Navarrete has failed to meet this burden.
Here, the record refutes Navarrete’s claim that he did not understand the
immigration consequences of his plea and without corroborating evidence for his claims
to the contrary, he has failed to establish he is entitled to relief under section 1473.7.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, J.

/s/
MAURO, J.

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