People v. Bryant CA4/3

CourtListener 10748390Calctapp05.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/5/25 P. v. Bryant CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063490

v. (Super. Ct. No. 19HF0801)

RICKEY LAVELL BRYANT, JR., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Affirmed as corrected.
Richard L. Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Appellant Rickey Lavell Bryant, Jr., was convicted of second
degree robbery and petty theft based on two separate incidents at a Target
store. On appeal, Bryant contends that this Court should reverse his
convictions because the trial court failed to instruct jurors to restart
deliberations once an alternate was seated. Respondent maintains that the
conviction should be affirmed because deliberations had not begun prior to
the substitution of the alternate. Bryant further requests that this court
conduct an independent review of the records reviewed in camera by the trial
court during a Pitchess hearing. Finally, Bryant identifies an error in the
trial court’s minutes and abstract of judgment with respect to his sentence.
Respondent acknowledges that Bryant is correct, and agrees with the
proposed corrections. We agree. Other than the minutes and abstract of
judgment, we find no error, and therefore order both corrected. We affirm the
judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 25, 2016, Nicholas Rivas-Lopez, a loss prevention officer
(LPO), observed two individuals enter a Target store in Orange County.
Rivas-Lopez recognized the individuals from a LPO internal communication
warning of recent liquor thefts in various stores. He observed them on the
video surveillance system from within the LPO office. The parties later
stipulated that Rivas-Lopez identified Bryant as one of the suspects. Rivas-
Lopez watched as Bryant and his companion filled a shopping cart with
$534.38 worth of liquor.
After monitoring the surveillance footage, Rivas-Lopez left his
office and contacted the suspects. He identified himself as a LPO and told
them he would call the police if they exited the store without paying. Bryant
then turned towards Rivas-Lopez and threatened to stab him if he followed

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them out of the store. When Bryant made this threat, he placed his hand in
his pocket. Rivas-Lopez stepped back out of fear for his safety, returned to the
LPO office, and called the police. Bryant and his accomplice exited the store
without paying for the merchandise, and left in a red or burgundy sedan.
A few weeks later, on July 11, 2016, Rivas-Lopez witnessed
Bryant and the same companion enter the same Target store. This time,
Rivas-Lopez watched the individuals through the store’s video surveillance
system and called the police because he had been told not to approach them if
they returned. Bryant and his companion once again filled a shopping cart
with $570.84 worth of alcohol, exited the store without attempting to pay,
and left in a red vehicle.
On April 25, 2023, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office
charged Bryant with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211/212.5, subd.
(c);1 count one), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count two), and grand theft
(§ 487, subd. (a); count three). As to counts one and two the prosecution
alleged Bryant used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd.
(b)(1)). The information also charged Bryant with having been previously
convicted of a “strike” (§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1)) and a serious prior felony (§
1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)).
Trial began on April 20, 2023. Both incidents were captured on
surveillance video and the footage was shown to the jury. On April 27, 2023,
the prosecution dismissed the deadly weapon enhancement and the jurors
retired to deliberate. The jurors found Bryant guilty of robbery (count one)
and of the lesser-included offense of petty theft (count three). He was found

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

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not guilty of making criminal threats (count two) and of grand theft (count
three). Bryant waived his right to a jury trial on his prior offense allegations
and admitted the “strike” and prior serious felony.
At sentencing, the court imposed the middle term of three years,
doubled for a total term of six years, and struck the prior serious felony
finding. Sentence on count three was stayed. Appropriate custody credits
were awarded. Bryant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HANDLED THE REPLACEMENT OF A JUROR
On appeal, Bryant argues that the trial court did not properly
instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew after an alternate was seated.
Respondent contends no additional instructions were required as the jury had
not begun deliberating.
On April 27, 2023, a Thursday, the court gave the jury its final
instructions. Prior to sending the jury to the jury room to begin deliberations,
the court made the following comments:
“So ladies and gentlemen, it’s kind of getting a little late in the
day and it’s been a long day . . . . So what I was [going to] propose is that we
recess for the day and that you begin your deliberations. I had said that we
were not in session on Fridays for jury trials and that’s true, we don’t do jury
trials on Fridays but we do do deliberations on Friday.
“Now, I realize that I told you that we wouldn’t be in session on
Friday, so if that poses a scheduling problem for anybody—I’m seeing a few
nodding heads that it does. . . . [W]hat I’ll do then is just remind you not to
form or express any opinion about the case, don’t talk about the case. I’m

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going to ask the alternates to remain behind for a moment, but the 12 jurors
are free to go. But I need you to return here on Monday.
“Now, I know from a scheduling standpoint as well when it comes
to deliberating jurors, I let the jury decide when they want to start. And if
they want to take a shorter lunch hour, whatever. So if you want to come
back Monday at 9:00, that’s fine with the court. I don’t want to make it too
early because, again, I know people have probably made plans to drop off
kids.
“Is 9:00 am on Monday agreeable with everybody? Seeing no
indication there’s any problems with that. So I’ll direct the 12 of you, just the
12 of you to return Monday at 9:00. . . .
“So I look forward to seeing you all on Monday morning at 9:00.
Appreciate your attendance and patience throughout this very brief trial, and
I hope you have a very nice weekend and I look forward to seeing you all on
Monday morning, and if the alternates can stand by just one second.” (Italics
added.)
The court excused the jurors and addressed the alternates. Prior
to giving additional instructions to the alternates, the court said, “We’re still
on the record, both counsel present, the defendant’s present, the jury has
been released for the afternoon . . . .” Then the court excused the alternates,
remained on the record with the attorneys, and stated, “We’re still on the
record, both counsel present, the defendant is present, the alternates have
now been excused for the day as well. I hope [excusing the jury] was okay. I
didn’t want to get [the jury] started [at] 3:35, don’t like it when they feel
rushed, although I know weekend deliberations are no fun.” The court’s
minutes reflect that the jury retired to the jury room at 3:20 p.m., and left at
3:23 p.m.

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The following Monday, May 1, 2023, one of the jurors called the
court and informed the clerk that he or she had tested positive for COVID-19.
The court replaced the juror with an alternate. The court’s minutes reflect
that the jury commenced deliberations at 9:39 a.m. Later that same day,
after the verdicts had been received, defense counsel advised the court that
neither party had been notified of the substitution before it happened. The
court asked defense counsel if she wished to be heard on that issue, and she
declined.
On September 6, 2024, the trial court conducted a settled
statement hearing at Bryant’s request. Bryant asked the court to answer
several questions regarding the replacement of the juror. Prior to answering
the questions, the court offered an explanation for why it had such a vivid
recollection of the case:
“Ordinarily, it might be strange that the court would have such a
specific recollection of a case. I do about 25 felony trials a year. Why would I
remember what happened on this one? [¶] And the reason I remember what
happened on this one was because something unusual happened during the
course of the verdict. That is, that Mr. Bryant absconded and—he was out of
custody and he fled. He eventually turned himself in. That’s all a separate
story. It’s not important. But I just wanted to articulate that as to why I
remember this case because it was unusual.”
As to the court’s minute order and whether the jury began
deliberations when they were released on Thursday, April 27, 2023, the court
stated: “[T]he relevant part [of the minutes] is as follows—‘At 3:20 p.m., the
jury retired to the jury room to deliberate in charge of [bailiff], duly sworn for
that purpose.’ [¶] The next entry says, ‘At 3:23 p.m., the jurors left the jury

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room for the evening recess to return May 1st, 2023, at 9:00 a.m. in
Department C29 to resume deliberations.’”
The court continued: “This is an error. This is incorrect. The jury
did not begin deliberating and I need to state that. [¶] And I have an express
recollection of as much and I think that that is borne out circumstantially by
the fact that the minutes reflect the jury retiring to the jury room at 3:20
p.m. and then leaving the jury room at 3:23 p.m., three minutes later. [¶]
What occurred clearly is that the jury did not begin deliberations at all and I
don’t even believe they entered the jury room.” (Italics added.) The court went
on to state it had then replaced the juror who had called in with COVID with
an alternate. The court said it had directed the clerk to notify counsel, which
apparently did not happen until just before the verdicts came in.
In response to Bryant’s questions, the court clarified that the jury
had not yet begun deliberating before the juror substitution. The court
commented: “I am certain that they did not start deliberating. It was late in
the afternoon. And, again, consistent with my habit and custom, I’m not
going to send a jury to start deliberating for 15 minutes, not the least of
reasons which is because it’s my personal opinion that it can lead to jurors
feelings rushed to reach a verdict quickly so they don’t have to come back. I
avoid that at all costs just as a standard approach to circumstances like that,
a jury finishing instruction, then being ready to deliberate at 3:30 in the
afternoon. I’m going to tell them to come back the next day. I know that’s
what I would do. I know that is what I did do.”
The court also explicitly recalled that it did not read CALCRIM
No. 3575 after the alternate juror was replaced because the jury had not
begun its deliberations. Additionally, the court asked the parties if they
agreed with the proposed settled record, and neither party objected.

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Taken together, there is no evidence from the record that the jury
began deliberating before the juror substitution. Accordingly, the court had
no duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3575, which directs jurors to
begin deliberations anew after a juror is replaced. The duty to do so exists
only if the substitution occurs after deliberations have commenced, which
was not the case here. (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 978–979.)
Even before the settled statement hearing, the record did not
support Bryant’s contention. The reporter’s transcript reflects that the court
discussed scheduling with the jury, ordered them to return at 9:00 in the
morning on the following Monday, and then dismissed the jury, telling them
they were “free to go.”
Bryant hangs his hat completely on the statement in the minutes
that “At 3:20 PM, the Jury retired to the jury room to deliberate . . . .” Even if
this did not read like an auto-text entry, the court clarified at the settled
statement hearing requested by Bryant that this was “incorrect. The jury did
not begin deliberating . . . .” The minutes reflect that the jury went to the jury
room for only three minutes, and any claim that “deliberations” happened
during those three minutes, following the court’s dismissal, is pure
speculation. If Bryant can find evidence that exists outside the record on
appeal, he is free to seek relief through a habeas proceeding.
Even if the court erred in failing to instruct the jury to begin
deliberations anew, the error is harmless. Error in failing to provide the
proper admonishment to a jury after substitution of an alternate juror is
harmless if it is reasonably probable that the defendant would not have
achieved a better result without the error. (People v. Guillen (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 934, 1031–1032; People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552,
554 (Renteria).) Factors to consider in determining whether such an error

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was harmless include whether the case was close in terms of guilt and
innocence and the difference in deliberations before and after juror
substitution. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 537 (Proctor).)
Courts have found reversible error for improperly instructing a
jury upon substitution of an alternate when the case was “close.” (People v.
Martinez (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 661, 665; see Renteria, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th
at p. 561 [case deemed “close” because the only eyewitness to the crime did
not testify that the defendant committed the crime].) However, the same
error has also been found harmless when evidence of a defendant’s guilt was
“strong.” (Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 537.)
It is not reasonably probable that Bryant would have received a
different verdict had the court instructed the jurors to restart their
deliberations after the alternate was seated. The evidence against Bryant
was overwhelming. Additionally, there were very few issues for the jury to
resolve because the parties stipulated to Bryant’s identification as the person
captured on the surveillance video, on both occasions Bryant’s thefts from the
store were captured on video, and the videos were shown to the jury.
Here, once the alternate replaced the ill juror, the jury
deliberated for approximately three hours. This scenario resembles Proctor,
in which the jury deliberated for less than one hour prior to substitution and
for two and a-half days after the change. (Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp.
537–538; see Guillen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032 [harmless error
where “duration of deliberations prior to substitution of the alternate juror
was minimal compared to deliberations after substitution of the alternate
juror”].)
This three-hour deliberation following the substitution
demonstrates a lengthy and meaningful discussion, as opposed to a quick

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decision that may be more indicative of a jury not beginning discussions anew
or reviewing the evidence with the new juror. (Renteria, supra, 93
Cal.App.4th at pp. 560–561.) Although Bryant argues this was a “close” case
because the jury acquitted him of threatening the LPO, we are more
convinced that this acquittal demonstrates that the jury critically evaluated
the evidence and the credibility of the witness. Given the strength of the
evidence against Bryant, it was not reasonably probable that he would have
received a different result had the jury been instructed to restart
deliberations. Accordingly, even if there was error, it was harmless.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED PITCHESS MATERIALS
Rivas-Lopez, the LPO officer who conducted the investigation at
the Target store, became employed by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
after the robberies. Prior to trial, Bryant brought a motion pursuant to
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, seeking disclosure of Rivas-
Lopez’s personnel records related to excessive use of force, falsifying police
reports, and other misconduct. The court held an in camera hearing and
found there was no discoverable material. Bryant requests our independent
review of the court’s hearing. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232.)
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on both the good cause
and disclosure components of a Pitchess motion, and its ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. (Alford v. Superior
Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039.) A sealed transcript of the in camera
hearing was made part of the appellate record. After reviewing that
transcript, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to disclose the contents of Rivas-Lopez’s file.

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III.
THE ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT AND MINUTES SHALL BE CORRECTED
Bryant argues that the abstract of judgment and trial court
minutes incorrectly indicate that the trial court imposed the low term for
second degree robbery, when the oral record demonstrates that the trial court
sentenced him to the mid-term. Respondent acknowledges that Bryant is
correct, and agrees with the proposed corrections.
On November 8, 2023, the trial court sentenced Bryant to the
middle term (three years) for count one, doubled, pursuant to sections 667,
subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), for a total of six years. Notwithstanding the oral
record, the court’s abstract of judgment and minutes show that the court
imposed the low term—for a total of six years.2
“When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the
oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v.
Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073.) We order the trial court to
correct the minutes and abstract of judgment to reflect the actual sentence
imposed during the sentencing hearing. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185.)

2 Pursuant to section 213, subdivision (a)(2), the punishment for

second degree robbery is two, three, or five years in state prison.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court is ordered to correct the minutes and abstract of
judgment as discussed within this opinion, and forward a certified copy of the
corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

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