Gundersen v. Betenbaugh CA3

CourtListener 10747739Calctapp04.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/4/25 Gundersen v. Betenbaugh CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Glenn)
----

DALAS L. GUNDERSEN,

Plaintiff and Respondent, C095468

v. (Super. Ct. No. 15CV01484)

PAUL BETENBAUGH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Dalas Gundersen had worked as a financial advisor for Edward D. Jones & Co.,
LP (Edward Jones) in Willows, California, but after his employment was terminated in
December 2014 and advisors Paul Betenbaugh and Lisa Rodriguez took over his book of
business, Gundersen opened a competing financial services office. When Gundersen’s
former client complained about Rodriguez, Betenbaugh and Rodriguez believed
Gundersen had been involved in preparing the complaint. Betenbaugh was angry and
posted ads on Craigslist with Gundersen’s cell phone number, soliciting sex.

1
Gundersen began receiving texts, calls and lewd photographs on his cell phone in
response to the ads.
Gundersen sued Betenbaugh, Rodriguez, and Edward Jones for internet
impersonation, interference with prospective economic relations, unfair business practice,
false light, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Among other
things, and as relevant to this appeal, the jury found in favor of Gundersen and against
Betenbaugh, and awarded Gundersen $3 million for past noneconomic damages and $5
million for future noneconomic damages.
Betenbaugh now contends (1) there is insufficient evidence that Gundersen
would suffer future noneconomic damages that were reasonably certain to occur, and
(2) the $5 million award for the future noneconomic damages was excessive. Finding no
merit in those claims, we will affirm the judgment.1
BACKGROUND
Gundersen started working as a financial advisor for Edward Jones in Willows,
California in 1999. His employment was terminated in December 2014.
Betenbaugh worked as a financial advisor for Edward Jones in Orland, California,
and Rodriguez worked as a financial advisor for Edward Jones in Corning. Following

1 Gundersen asked this court to take judicial notice of two newspaper articles and the
following assertions stated therein: that the Sacramento Valley Mirror is a twice-weekly
newspaper in Glenn County, that it had a print circulation of 2,500, and that it had no
online presence other than Facebook. The truth of the contents of newspaper articles are
not judicially noticeable. (State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1133, fn. 7; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359,
1389, fn. 13.) Moreover, Gundersen acknowledges that the articles were not presented in
the trial court. Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court generally does not
take notice of evidence that was not presented to the trial court, and Gundersen has not
shown such circumstances exist. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)
14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3, overruled on other grounds involving jurisdiction as noted
in Halyard Health Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1074.)
The request for judicial notice is denied.

2
Gundersen’s termination, Betenbaugh and Rodriguez took over Gundersen’s book of
business.
Gundersen opened a competing financial services office in Willows in May 2015.
It was undisputed that a financial advisor must have a good reputation to be successful,
and that reputation and integrity were especially important for success as a financial
advisor in a small town.
In August 2015, one of Gundersen’s former clients made a complaint against
Rodriguez. Rodriguez and Betenbaugh believed Gundersen drafted or helped draft the
complaint against Rodriguez.
Betenbaugh posted ads on Craigslist using Gundersen’s cell phone number
because he was angry about the complaint. Betenbaugh posted two ads using an e-mail
account he created that contained Gundersen’s initials. One ad titled “Mature
professional – m4m” was posted on September 19, 2015, and contained a photograph of a
man performing oral sex. The ad was for “a potential romantic connection” and said the
person posting the ad was attracted to someone younger and preferred “a well trimmed
boy/man.” The ad ended with Gundersen’s cell phone number. Another ad, posted on
September 24, 2015, was titled “Ride with me -m4m,” solicited sex in explicit terms, and
contained Gundersen’s cell phone number. A third ad, using a different e-mail address,
was posted October 1, 2015, was titled “Long and Hard – m4m,” contained a photograph
of an erect penis, and stated the person posting the ad was “looking to meet a nice caring
man.” The third ad also contained Gundersen’s cell phone number.
Gundersen received texts, calls, and lewd photographs on his cell phone regarding
sex starting in September 2015. He received hundreds of texts. After hiring an attorney,
Gundersen discovered that Betenbaugh posted the Craigslist ads.
Gundersen sued Betenbaugh, Rodriguez, and Edward Jones for internet
impersonation, interference with prospective economic relations, unfair business practice,
false light, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. His complaint

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was based on the Craigslist posts by Betenbaugh, and Rodriguez’s alleged disparaging
remarks about Gundersen to Edward Jones clients.
Gundersen testified at the trial. He said that prior to his termination, he was a
happily married man, made millions of dollars at Edward Jones, and felt very good about
himself. But after the Craigslist ad incident, he could not sleep through the night, had
panic attacks, and functioned at only 50 to 60 percent daily. He said the texts and calls he
received from the Craigslist ads shocked, degraded, humiliated, disturbed, and terrorized
him, and they destroyed his business and personal life. Gundersen broke down and
became emotional at the trial. He testified that he struggled to come back from a depth of
loss and despair, was still making a comeback and struggling to improve his life, and was
not his former calm self. He testified that his reputation was tarnished and he was still
struggling to have a good reputation.
The trial court instructed the jury on the award of damages. It admonished that if
the jury found Gundersen had proved his claim against Betenbaugh, the jury must decide
how much money would reasonably compensate Gundersen for the harm, and the jury
should not speculate or guess in awarding damages. The trial court told the jury
Gundersen could recover for mental suffering, anxiety, humiliation, and emotional
distress; loss to reputation and standing in the community; loss of dignity and honor; and
shame. With regard to future emotional distress, the trial court instructed that Gundersen
must prove he was reasonably certain to suffer such harm, no fixed standard existed for
deciding the amount of those damages, and the jury must decide a reasonable amount
based on the evidence and common sense. The trial court also instructed that argument
by counsel was not evidence of damages and the jury’s award must be based on the jury’s
reasoned judgment applied to the testimony of witnesses and other evidence admitted at
trial.
The jury found in Gundersen’s favor on his claims against Betenbaugh,
and that Gundersen suffered damage as a result of Betenbaugh’s conduct.

4
It awarded Gundersen $3 million as reasonable damages for past noneconomic loss
and $5 million for future noneconomic loss. It further found that Betenbaugh acted
with malice, oppression or fraud. Betenbaugh stipulated to a $35,000 punitive damages
award.
The jury also found against Rodriguez and Edward Jones and awarded Gundersen
$8 million for past noneconomic loss and $22 million for future noneconomic loss
against those defendants. It found that Rodriguez acted with malice, oppression or fraud.
A judgment was entered for $937,500 against Rodriguez and $30 million against
Rodriguez and Edward Jones.
Rodriguez and Edward Jones moved for a new trial. The trial court found that the
verdicts against Rodriguez and Edward Jones far exceeded awards in other California
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, and that the $30 million
noneconomic damages award against Rodriguez and Edward Jones was excessive. It
granted them a new trial unless Gundersen agreed to a reduction to $10 million.
Gundersen accepted the reduction.
Betenbaugh moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
He asserted there was no evidence to support the award of past and future noneconomic
damages, the awards were excessive, and the awards were the product of the jury’s
passion and prejudice and improper argument by counsel. The trial court denied the
motions, rejecting the claim of insufficient evidence. The trial court ruled the posting of
the Craigslist ads was offensive and insulting to Gundersen, Betenbaugh’s conduct was
inflammatory, and the jury was offended by the conduct. It further concluded the award
against Betenbaugh was not excessive.
Additional background is set forth in the discussion as relevant to the contentions
on appeal.

5
DISCUSSION
I
Betenbaugh contends there is insufficient evidence that Gundersen would suffer
future noneconomic damages that were reasonably certain to occur.
A damages award may include reasonable damages for the pain and suffering
a plaintiff is reasonably certain to suffer in the future. (See Civ. Code, §§ 3283, 3359;
Pouchan v. Godeau (1914) 167 Cal. 692, 696-697; Behr v. Redmond (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 517, 533; Guerra v. Balestrieri (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 511, 519;
see generally Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 895.)
An award of future noneconomic damages must not be speculative and must be based
upon some reasonable ground. (See Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist. (1938)
11 Cal.2d 576, 588; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 350; Triton Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. National Chiropractic Ins. Co. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 829, 835;
Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 757, 764-766; Sommer v. Gabor
(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1472-1473.) A claim for future damages can be supported
by testimony that the plaintiff was still suffering from nervousness and pain at the time of
trial. (Yaffee v. Skeen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1321 (Yaffee); Loper v. Morrison
(1944) 23 Cal.2d 600, 611.) Expert testimony is not required. (Yaffee, at p. 1321.)
In his appellant’s opening brief, Betenbaugh argued, among other things, that
Gundersen’s counsel introduced homophobic undertones during closing argument, and
that the trial court seemed to incorporate some of the same themes in denying the motion
for new trial. But we have independently reviewed the record to determine whether
substantial, properly admissible evidence supports the award of future noneconomic
damages, and we conclude that it does. We do not adopt or condone any statement in the
record that might reasonably be perceived as bias or prejudice, and Betenbaugh has not
established that the jury’s verdict was the product of improper bias.

6
Gundersen testified that the lewd images, phone calls, and hundreds of texts he
received in response to the Craigslist ad damaged his personal life. When he found out
Betenbaugh was responsible for the ads, Gundersen became afraid. He had panic attacks
and could not sleep through the night. Gundersen testified that he fought to return from
loss and despair and had made progress, but he was not yet his former self and was still
struggling to recover. In his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel acknowledged
that Gundersen broke down and became emotional at the trial. The jury could observe
and assess Gundersen’s demeanor.
Gundersen also testified about receiving treatment from different counselors.
He was cross-examined about a January 2016 e-mail he wrote his therapist chronicling
his despair, shock, diminished cognitive function, panic attacks, lack of control, loss of
restful and sustained sleep, chronic fatigue, thoughts of “ultimate peace,” and lack of
purpose, value, self-confidence, and family engagement. An e-mail to the same therapist
in February 2016 that is part of the same trial exhibit, and that also chronicled
Gundersen’s sleep and other problems, mentioned Gundersen’s feeling that Betenbaugh
had harassed him.
The foregoing evidence allows us to independently conclude that substantial
evidence supports the jury’s award of future noneconomic damages. Betenbaugh’s claim
of insufficient evidence lacks merit.
II
Betenbaugh also argues that the $5 million award for the future noneconomic
damages was excessive.
There are no fixed standards for computing the amount of damages. (Seffert v. Los
Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 508 (Seffert); Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co.
(1938) 30 Cal.App.2d 77, 90, disapproved on another point in Fuentes v. Tucker (1947)
31 Cal.2d 1, 7.) In particular, the amount of damages for pain and suffering is “ ‘a matter
on which there legitimately may be a wide difference of opinion.’ ” (Seffert, at p. 508.)

7
Such a determination is a factual question committed to the discretion of the jury, which
sees and hears the witnesses and frequently sees the plaintiff’s injuries. (Id. at pp. 507-
508; Johnson v. Monsanto Co. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 434, 449 (Johnson); Yafee, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1321.) We review the jury’s award for substantial evidence,
giving great weight to the jury’s determination. (Bertero v. National General Corp.
(1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 64 (Bertero); Seffert, at p. 506; Johnson, at p. 449; J.P. v. Carlsbad
Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323, 342-343; Yafee, at p. 1321.) We
determine every conflict in the evidence in the respondent’s favor, give the respondent
the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the record, and will uphold
the jury determination whenever possible. (Seffert, at p. 508.) We will not set aside the
jury’s verdict except where the award is so large it shocks the conscience and suggests
passion, prejudice or corruption in the jury. (Seffert, at p. 507; Johnson, at p. 449; Yafee,
at p. 1321.)
The trial court instructed the jury that the amount of damages for future emotional
distress must be based on proof that Gundersen was reasonably certain to suffer that
harm, and the jury must use its judgment to decide a reasonable amount based on the
evidence and common sense. It admonished that damages cannot be based on
speculation. We presume the jury followed those instructions. (Soto v. BorgWarner
Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 200 (Soto).) The $8 million noneconomic
damages the jury awarded was substantially less than the $13 to $26 million Gundersen’s
counsel requested in closing argument, indicating that the jury exercised its discretion to
determine that $8 million was a reasonable amount to compensate Gundersen for
noneconomic damages. (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 319, 343-
344 (Phipps) [considering the significantly-lower-than-requested damages award in
assessing a claim that an award was the result of the jury’s passion and prejudice];
Johnson, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 450-451 [same].)

8
Betenbaugh does not challenge the propriety of the $3 million award for past
noneconomic damages. And he has not established that the challenged $5 million award
for future noneconomic damages was the result of improper jury passion or prejudice.
Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell-Wilson),
disapproved on another ground in Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 21, 38,
fn. 6, does not support Betenbaugh’s claim that the reduction of the damages award
against Rodriguez and Edward Jones also required a reduction of the award against
Betenbaugh. (Buell-Wilson, at pp. 552-555.) Moreover, Briley v. City of West Covina
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119 (Briley), a case Betenbaugh contends requires a retrial or
remittitur, is factually distinguishable. The plaintiff in Briley offered little detail about his
emotional distress claim, there was no evidence that any of the problems he described
was particularly severe, and many of those problems had substantially resolved or
significantly diminished at the time of trial. (Id. at pp. 141-142.) The problems
Gundersen testified about were far more serious in comparison, including chronic fatigue,
despair, and panic attacks. Gundersen’s testimony indicated his problems persisted at the
time of the trial.
Damage awards in published opinions referenced by Betenbaugh do not require a
different result. “The vast variety of and disparity between awards in other cases
demonstrate that injuries can seldom be measured on the same scale. The measure of
damages suffered is a factual question and as such is a subject particularly within the
province of the trier of fact. For a reviewing court to upset a jury’s factual determination
on the basis of what other juries awarded to other plaintiffs for other injuries in other
cases based upon different evidence would constitute a serious invasion into the realm of
factfinding. [Citations.] Thus, we adhere to the previously announced and historically
honored standard of reversing as excessive only those judgments which the entire record,
when viewed most favorably to the judgment, indicates were rendered as the result of
passion and prejudice on the part of the jurors.” (Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 65,

9
fn. 12; see Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 343, 356; Phipps, supra,
64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 344-345; Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 615-616;
contra, Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 508; Briley, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 141.) As
for summaries and other matter relating to verdicts in other cases, those do not provide
information sufficient to furnish a useful comparison and do not, therefore, support a
claim of excessive damages. (See Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 201.)
Betenbaugh further urges that Gundersen’s trial counsel made improper comments
or arguments during voir dire and closing argument. The claim is forfeited because
Betenbaugh did not object to the challenged remarks when they were made nor ask the
trial judge to give a curative admonition. (Sabella v. Southern Pac. Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d
311, 318-320; Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 509; Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 200;
Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1061.)
Finally, Betenbaugh contends the noneconomic damages verdict was the product
of prejudice due to media coverage and because the trial was conducted at the Glenn
County fairgrounds during the COVID-19 pandemic. But the trial court instructed the
jury not to allow anything that happened outside the courtroom to affect its decision.
It admonished that during the trial, the jury may not read, listen to or watch any news
reports about the case, including anything on the internet. It warned that jurors who
violated those prohibitions may be subject to jail time, a fine or other punishment. It also
instructed that the verdict may not be influenced by bias, sympathy, prejudice or public
opinion, and that the jury must decide the facts solely from the evidence presented during
trial. The trial court subsequently repeated its admonitions about not allowing anything
that happened outside the courtroom to affect the jury’s decision, not using any electronic
device or media to send or receive information about the case, and not reading any
reports about the case in the news or internet.

10
Betenbaugh does not point to anything in the record that shows the jury did not
heed the trial court’s instructions or that it was influenced by media coverage or a trial at
the county fairgrounds.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/S/
FEINBERG, J.

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