CourtListener 10747031•People v. Wallace CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Wallace CA1/4
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166181
v. (Alameda County
LEVESTER WALLACE, JR., Super. Ct. No. 19CR004871)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Levester Wallace, Jr. of corporal injury to
a relationship partner (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a)) and false
imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)), both committed against
his girlfriend T.S. The trial court imposed the four-year upper term for the
corporal injury charge and imposed (but stayed under section 654) an eight-
month term for false imprisonment.
On appeal, Wallace contends (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct
during voir dire and during her rebuttal closing argument at trial; and
(2) the court erred by imposing the upper term on the corporal injury
charge, in part because it relied on aggravating factors that were not found
true by the jury. In connection with both arguments, Wallace asserts his
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make sufficient
objections.
In an opinion filed May 29, 2024, we affirmed the conviction and
sentence subject to modification of the judgment in one respect. Wallace
subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and ultimately transferred the case
back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider it in light of
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076 (Wiley). We now vacate our
previous decision and file this opinion after reconsideration in light of Wiley.
We have no occasion to reach Wallace’s ineffective assistance
arguments; we reject Wallace’s prosecutorial misconduct argument; and, in
light of Wiley, we agree that the court committed prejudicial error by
imposing an upper term on the corporal injury charge in the absence of a
predicate jury finding. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of
conviction but vacate the sentence and remand for a full resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence Presented at Trial
In February 2019, T.S. lived on the third-floor in an apartment
complex in Oakland. She lived with Wallace, whom she had been dating
since May 2016. Wallace was six feet, two inches tall and weighed 360
pounds. T.S. was five feet, six inches tall and weighed 170 pounds.
T.S. testified about incidents of domestic violence that occurred prior
to the February 2019 incident that was the basis of the charges in this case.
In August 2017, T.S. and Wallace were in a car, and Wallace punched T.S.
in the jaw. T.S.’s jaw “felt like it dislocated.” T.S. asked Wallace, “What are
you doing?” Wallace threatened to crash the car with both of them in it.
T.S.’s jaw hurt for a week. She did not report the incident.
2
In March of 2018, in a parking lot outside T.S.’s home, Wallace
grabbed T.S. by her hair and asked her where she had been. Wallace
grabbed so tightly that he pulled T.S.’s hair and a few braided extensions
out. He let go, but after they walked from the parking lot into the
apartment, Wallace grabbed T.S.’s hair again. She dropped to the floor and
onto her back, thinking he would let go, but he did not. Instead, he put his
knee onto T.S.’s chest, which caused her pain, and he kept it there for some
time. T.S. pleaded that “that was hurting” and that she “couldn’t breathe.”
Wallace eventually got up. T.S.’s chest hurt for a “week or two after the
incident.”
On February 24, 2019, T.S. went to a parade celebrating African-
American culture and a concert, both in downtown Oakland. She went
home around 8:00 p.m. to change her clothes to go to a nightclub. Wallace
was also at the apartment, and it seemed to T.S. that he had had a lot to
drink. T.S. spent an hour at the apartment, then went out to the nightclub.
She consumed alcohol and marijuana during the daytime events and at the
nightclub.
T.S. returned to the apartment at around 2:00 a.m. on February 25,
2019. Wallace called T.S. a “bitch” and asked her where she had been. He
grabbed her hair and put his face close to hers. After he let go and walked
away, T.S. went to change into her pajamas.
While T.S. was changing her clothes, Wallace returned, said “Bitch,
where the fuck have you been,” and punched T.S. in the head. The force of
the punch pushed T.S. back up against the wall. As her back was against
the wall, Wallace approached, took “his hand and put it around [T.S.’s]
throat and start[ed] squeezing really hard.” T.S. dropped to the floor, and
Wallace put both of his hands around her neck. T.S. was on the floor, and
3
Wallace’s body weight was on her, so she could not move. Wallace straddled
T.S., sitting on her torso, making it difficult for her to breathe.
T.S. wriggled out from under Wallace and ran into the living room.
Because she was not fully dressed, she did not leave the apartment. She
tried to “negotiate” with Wallace so that he would not hurt her anymore or
attack her again. Wallace asked T.S. for her cell phone, and she gave it to
him. As he was going through her phone, T.S. put on some clothing.
T.S. then tried to leave the apartment, but Wallace blocked the door.
T.S. felt like “it was life or death” for her. She pushed the screen out of a
window and told Wallace that if he came near her, she would jump. She
climbed out and hung dangling from the outside of the window, holding onto
the window ledge. Wallace walked toward the window. Seeing him
approach, T.S. let go of the ledge and fell three stories to the ground.
When T.S. hit the ground, she “crumple[d].” She could not run away
as she had initially planned. Both her heels had shattered. She started
screaming for help. Wallace came out and grabbed T.S. by her hair. T.S.
told him that she was hurt and could not move. Wallace then left.
T.S.’s neighbor Lynell Fields heard a “thump” and then heard T.S.
scream for help. Fields ran to her window. She saw Wallace holding T.S.’s
arm and pulling her down the hill. T.S. was crying and screaming, “ ‘He’s
trying to kill me. Help me. He’s trying to kill me. Help me.’ ” Fields ran
outside. She held T.S.’s hand and called 911.
Wallace’s punch to T.S.’s head left her with a “knot” on her head for a
week. T.S. had extensive injuries to her heels, which required surgery and
physical therapy.
T.S. was initially taken by ambulance to the emergency department at
Oakland’s Highland Hospital. Among her injuries, medical staff noted a
4
“three-by-three centimeter contusion,” or “bruise,” on T.S.’s head. They also
noted that she felt “tender at the sternum” when “pressing on the breast
bone.” The medical records showed that T.S. showed “no obvious trauma”
and “no pain” to her head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat, and no “jugular vein
distention.”
T.S. drank alcohol and smoked marijuana before the incident and felt
“normal” and “functional.” On cross-examination, she testified her first
drink of alcohol was around 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. She had three to four
drinks in total that day and three marijuana blunts. She testified she was
not impaired or “drunk” that day.
At the hospital, medical staff noted that T.S. was intoxicated and
“could not consent to service provisions due to intoxication.” The “E-T-O-H”
screening, or ethyl alcohol screening, was not completed because T.S. was
intoxicated. Her blood alcohol level for ethyl alcohol was at a “0.191.” A
neurological evaluation of T.S. at the hospital produced normal results,
including that T.S.’s speech was fluent and she answered questions
appropriately.
A defense expert, Dr. Michael Laufer, testified that a woman who was
five feet, six inches tall and weighed 170 pounds would need to have about
10 drinks to get to a blood alcohol level of 0.19. Dr. Laufer estimated that if
a person had a 0.19 blood alcohol level at around 4:30 a.m., but stopped
drinking alcohol before 2:00 a.m., the person’s blood alcohol level would
likely have been higher at the time of their last drink. When asked whether
three to four drinks could get someone to a 0.19 blood alcohol level, Dr.
Laufer stated, “it really depends on the pattern.”
Dr. Laufer described various effects of alcohol. Alcohol slows reaction
time and causes difficulty with perception, including leading to tunnel
5
vision, where people “lose the ability to see the other things around the one
thing that they’re focusing on.” Dr. Laufer testified that at a blood alcohol
level of around 0.20, a person would be “profoundly sleepy,” may fall asleep
or fall over, and may have difficulty walking, as well as problems perceiving
distances, time, and whether something is safe or unsafe.
Memory loss may occur at a 0.24 blood alcohol level, but “ ‘almost
never less than [0].24.’ ” Dr. Laufer had previously testified that “ ‘with
alcohol alone, in order to lose your memory, you have to get to the point [of]
unconsciousness.’ ”
B. Procedural Background: The Charges, Verdict, and Sentence
A second amended information filed on July 12, 2022 charged Wallace
with corporal injury to a relationship partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1)
and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; count 2). As to each count, the
information alleged several circumstances in aggravation, including that the
crime involved great violence or great bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court,2
rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3));
and Wallace took advantage of a position of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)). The
information alleged Wallace had four prior convictions—for corporal injury
to a relationship partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), evading an officer with willful
disregard for safety (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), possession of a firearm
by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); now § 29800, subd. (a)(1)),3 and
possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5).
2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3 “Former section 12021[, subdivision ](a)(1) was repealed operative
January 1, 2012, but its provisions were reenacted without substantive
change as section 29800, subdivision (a)(1).” (People v. Sanders (2012)
55 Cal.4th 731, 734, fn. 2.)
6
On July 25, 2022, the jury found Wallace guilty of both charged
offenses: corporal injury under section 273.5, subdivision (a), and false
imprisonment by violence under section 236. The jury did not find, and was
not asked to find, the aggravating circumstances that were alleged in the
second amended information.
In a bifurcated court trial, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Wallace suffered the four prior convictions alleged in the second
amended information.
On September 8, 2022, the court sentenced Wallace to the upper term
of four years in prison for the count 1 conviction of corporal injury to a
relationship partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The court imposed an eight-month
term for the false imprisonment charge in count 2, but stayed that term
under section 654. As we discuss further below, in selecting the upper term
for count 1, the court found Wallace’s prior convictions were numerous (see
rule 4.421(b)(2)) and stated it was imposing the upper term based on that
finding.
Wallace appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Wallace contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during her
rebuttal closing argument by referring to statements made in voir dire, by
misstating the law about how the jurors should assess T.S.’s credibility
(specifically as to whether they should consider her intoxication), and by
vouching for T.S.’s credibility. In addition, Wallace suggests (in a less
developed argument) that the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir
dire through questions she posed to prospective jurors. We conclude that
7
Wallace forfeited the claims of error and that there was no prejudicial
misconduct in any event.
1. Additional Background
a. Voir Dire
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors (partly
through hypothetical questions) whether a person’s consumption of alcohol
or marijuana would affect the jurors’ assessment of that person’s testimony
or character. For example, the prosecutor asked: “[L]et’s say a witness were
to testify that they consumed alcohol. Would that affect the way that you
judge their testimony? Would that affect the way you would judge their
character?” A prospective juror (referred to by the parties as Juror 1)
responded: “I guess it could affect the credibility of their testimony if they
were impaired somehow. It would depend on what they were testifying to,
and how intoxicated they might have been, and how much that might have
impaired their ability to accurately observe and remember what they were
testifying to. But not credibility other than that. Not sort of character.”
As to marijuana, a different prospective juror (referred to by the
parties as Juror 2) stated: “I don’t have any strong feelings about marijuana
use or alcohol use, but I think that if there was a person who—I think it
depends on the extent of use. If there’s someone who says they smoke
marijuana, you know, every single day, I would probably have a judgment
about their character. [¶] . . . [¶] I think a lot of people use marijuana
recreationally, occasionally. I think that I have—I would have a feeling of
someone who gets high every day. I would feel, you know—I think that
reflects on their character.”
Another prospective juror (a juror we will call Juror 3), when asked
whether a person’s marijuana use would impact her view of the person’s
8
character, stated it would. Asked to elaborate, Juror 3 stated: “Because I
personally do not do drugs. . . . And I don’t know why, but it would affect my
perception of that person. And if they told me they do drugs, then I would
personally—that would be a negative [effect] on my judgment of them doing
drugs. Because I think—view them—it’s a negative for me to see—to have
to be interacting with people at that level because I don’t know what their
level is. But, you know, I try to maintain sober and they go into drugs. I
think there’s something different and I don’t know anything about drugs
myself.” Juror 3 was excused.
b. Closing Argument
In his closing argument, defense counsel argued T.S. was not a
credible witness, focusing in part on T.S.’s testimony that she was not
impaired despite her drinking and marijuana use on the day of the incident.
Counsel also argued the medical records did not show evidence of the
strangulation about which T.S. testified. Counsel then referred to voir dire,
stating the prosecution knew T.S. had “credibility issues” because “the
district attorney asked about alcohol and marijuana use during voir dire
and whether that would impact your assessment of [T.S.’s] character. You
don’t do that for someone who has three to four drinks over a 12-hour
period. No one is worried about impugning someone’s character who’s had
three or four drinks over a 12-hour period.” Defense counsel stated he was
not attacking T.S.’s character but was just arguing she was not a credible
witness.
In her rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor noted defense
counsel had discussed alcohol, “[a]nd then he said I don’t understand why
[the prosecutor] talked to you about alcohol during voir dire. Of course I
did, ladies and gentlemen. Of course I did. Studies show that jurors and
9
people automatically don’t believe victims when they learn that they’re
under the influence of alcohol or drugs—” Defense counsel stated he was
objecting “to this as improper evidence. This is not evidence.” The court
overruled the objection, stating, “This is argument of counsel. If I’ve already
indicated to the jurors that the argument of counsel is not evidence. This is
counsel’s interpretation of the case.”
The prosecutor continued: “And we all know this from reading things
in the newspaper, seeing things in the media. When people learn that a
victim is under the influence of alcohol, they’re no longer believed. We had a
juror who was, I think, seated in number 18 for a period of time who said
that. She said if she learned that someone was using marijuana, she would
automatically not be able to think that they were a good person or making
good decisions. I can’t remember exactly the word she used. She said she
had all these feelings about marijuana usage and she said that it would
affect her to the degree that she wouldn’t be able to be a good juror in this
case. [¶] [Wallace] is entitled to a fair trial, but so are the People. So is
[T.S.]. A jury, of fair and impartial people. And each of you promised me at
the beginning of this case that you would not hold it against [T.S.] the fact
that she was drinking and smoking marijuana. [¶] Every single piece of
evidence that you have heard over the course of this trial supports [T.S.].”
In arguing that the evidence supported T.S.’s credibility, the
prosecutor stated T.S. had made prior statements that were consistent with
her testimony; medical records reflected an injury to T.S.’s head; Fields
witnessed some of the incident and testified about it; Wallace’s actions after
T.S. fell and he came outside (first grabbing T.S. again and then fleeing)
supported that “there was domestic abuse inside of the apartment”; and
Wallace had a prior conviction for domestic violence.
10
During this argument, the prosecutor made statements about T.S.’s
credibility. As to T.S.’s statements to emergency personnel, the prosecutor
stated: “Why would [T.S.] lie to them? You have to give accurate
information to the people who are giving you medical care. She is telling the
truth.” Later, acknowledging inconsistencies between T.S.’s and Fields’s
statements (as to the words T.S. yelled after she fell, and as to whether
Wallace grabbed T.S.’s hair or her arm after he came outside), the
prosecutor stated “it’s my argument that that makes their testimony more
credible,” because it was clear they were not collaborating to provide
identical accounts.
The prosecutor later stated T.S. had been “open and honest” in
admitting her drug and alcohol use and describing other incidents of
domestic violence that she had not reported. The prosecutor stated “[a]ll of
this gives her more credibility.” Again noting that T.S. did not “get
[Wallace] in trouble” after the two prior domestic violence incidents, the
prosecutor stated: “Her goal is not to get the defendant [in] trouble. She is
an extremely credible witness. You saw the emotion on her and [Fields’s]
faces when they testified in court.” The prosecutor argued all the evidence
supported T.S.’s testimony, while “the only alternative explanation” was not
plausible—“that she jumped out of a window for no reason, breaking three
bones,” and she “immediately lied to the emergency personnel who arrived
on scene to give her medical care, that she lied at the preliminary hearing,
and now, more than three years later, she’s lying again.”
2. Legal Standards
“The standards under which we evaluate prosecutorial misconduct
may be summarized as follows. A prosecutor’s conduct violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial
11
with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.
Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the use
of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial
court or the jury. Furthermore, and particularly pertinent here, when the
claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the
question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed
or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.”
(People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)
3. Analysis
Wallace contends that, in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, she
improperly vouched for T.S.’s credibility and made improper references to
voir dire. Wallace also argues the prosecutor misstated the law (both in voir
dire and in her rebuttal argument) as to how jurors should evaluate the
impact of intoxication on T.S.’s credibility. We find no reversible error.
As an initial matter, we agree with the Attorney General that
Wallace’s arguments on this point are forfeited. A claim of prosecutorial
misconduct is forfeited where the defense fails to “ ‘make a timely and
specific objection to the alleged misconduct and request the jury be
admonished to disregard it.’ ” (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 797
(Peoples).) “This rule applies to asserted prosecutorial misconduct
committed during voir dire.” (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 740.)
“ ‘A defendant will be excused from the necessity of either a timely objection
and/or a request for admonition if either would be futile.’ ” (Peoples, at
p. 797.)
Wallace acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to the
prosecutor’s statements on the grounds he now raises on appeal and did not
12
ask the court to admonish the jury that the statements were improper.
Wallace makes a brief suggestion that objections might have been futile, but
he does not develop this argument, and we reject it. (Peoples, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 797 [“Without greater specificity as to why this particular
objection would have fallen upon deaf ears, we cannot conclude that it would
have been futile for defendant to object to statements made during the . . .
closing arguments.”].)
In any event, we find no misconduct. First, the prosecutor did not
improperly vouch for T.S.’s credibility. “ ‘ “[A] prosecutor is given wide
latitude to vigorously argue his or her case” ’ [citation] and ‘ “may make
‘assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of’ a witness ‘based
on the “facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor
either (1) suggests that evidence not available to the jury supports the
argument, or (2) invokes his or her personal prestige or depth of experience,
or the prestige or reputation of the office, in support of the argument.’ ”
(People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480.)
As outlined above, the prosecutor argued in detail that the evidence
supported T.S.’s credibility. This was proper argument. The prosecutor
emphasized T.S.’s prior consistent statements, the medical evidence
reflecting the injury to her head, Fields’s testimony, Wallace’s actions after
the incident, and his prior conviction for domestic violence. The prosecutor
did not suggest that evidence not available to the jury supported her
argument and did not invoke her personal prestige or experience as a basis
for the jury to find T.S. credible. And the prosecutor’s specific statements
highlighted by Wallace—that T.S. “is telling the truth” or “is an extremely
13
credible witness”— were made during, and were based on, the prosecutor’s
argument that the evidence supported T.S.’s credibility.
Wallace argues, however, that the evidence cited by the prosecutor
“did not resolve the issue of credibility,” and T.S.’s intoxication “better
explained” her actions in jumping out of the window. But it was not
improper for the prosecutor to urge the jury to consider the evidence
supporting T.S.’s testimony. As to the evidence of T.S.’s intoxication,
defense counsel was free to (and did) argue that it provided a basis to
discount T.S.’s credibility.
Turning to the prosecutor’s statements about intoxication specifically,
we again find no reversible error. Wallace takes issue with the prosecutor’s
statement in her rebuttal argument that jurors had “promised” that they
would not “hold it against” T.S. that she had been drinking and smoking
marijuana. He also faults the prosecutor for quoting (or paraphrasing) the
statements by a prospective juror (Juror 3, discussed above) about how she
would view a witness who used drugs. Wallace asserts these and other
statements in the prosecutor’s rebuttal (as well as some of the prosecutor’s
earlier questions during voir dire) misstated the law as to whether a
witness’s intoxication may be considered in assessing the witness’s
credibility. We disagree.
As Wallace notes, Evidence Code section 780 permits jurors to
consider various matters in assessing credibility, including a witness’s
ability to perceive or recall events, whether the witness has made prior
inconsistent statements, and the witness’s character for honesty or
14
dishonesty.4 The court’s instructions to the jury reflected this rule. In our
view, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors construed the prosecutor’s
comments about intoxication to mean they should not evaluate T.S.’s
testimony in accordance with these general principles governing witness
credibility.
The prosecutor did not argue jurors should not consider how well T.S.
could perceive or recall the events about which she testified. The prosecutor
did suggest that jurors should not “automatically” disbelieve a victim or
witness who was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In connection with
that point, the prosecutor referred to Juror 3’s response during voir dire that
a person’s marijuana use would negatively affect her view of the person’s
character. It was permissible for the prosecutor to urge jurors not to adopt
that approach. And, as the Attorney General notes (and as Wallace
concedes in reply), Juror 3 was excused during voir dire, so this case does
not present the particular concerns raised when a prosecutor quotes an
individual sitting juror during closing argument. (See People v. Freeman
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 517–518 [improper, but harmless, for prosecutor to
quote a sitting juror during argument; “[i]f counsel should not address
individual jurors by name, they should similarly not quote individual
4 Evidence Code section 780 states in part: “Except as otherwise
provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in determining the
credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove
or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including but
not limited to any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The extent of his capacity
to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about which he
testifies. [¶] (d) The extent of his opportunity to perceive any matter about
which he testifies. [¶] (e) His character for honesty or veracity or their
opposites. [¶] . . . [¶] (h) A statement made by him that is inconsistent with
any part of his testimony at the hearing.”
15
jurors”]; People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 324–326 [improper, but
harmless, for prosecutor to use a chart with quotes from individual jurors, in
part because it could pressure jurors to conform their verdict to their earlier
statements].) Similarly, the prosecutor’s questions during voir dire—which
we read as an effort to explore jurors’ attitudes about a witness’s alcohol or
marijuana use—did not improperly suggest to jurors that a witness’s
intoxication could not or should not be considered at all in assessing
credibility.
We acknowledge there is some ambiguity in the prosecutor’s
statement in her rebuttal argument that jurors should not “hold it against”
T.S. that she had been drinking and smoking marijuana, and it is puzzling
that the prosecutor linked this argument to a supposed “promise[]” by jurors
that they would not do so.5 But in the context of the prosecutor’s argument
as a whole, we do not think there is a reasonable likelihood the jurors
construed or applied this comment in an objectionable fashion. (See People
v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.) The comment followed the
prosecutor’s suggestion that jurors should not “automatically” discount (or
refuse to believe) a witness’s testimony because of intoxication. And the
prosecutor did not argue the converse—that T.S. should automatically be
believed. Instead, as noted, the prosecutor argued at length that the
evidence supported T.S.’s credibility. In this context, there is no reasonable
likelihood the jurors construed the prosecutor’s statement that they should
not “hold it against” T.S. that she consumed alcohol and marijuana as an
5 Neither party has pointed us to a passage in the transcript of the
voir dire proceedings where the prosecutor asked for such a promise.
Instead, as noted, during voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors
questions about how a witness’s alcohol or drug use would affect the jurors’
assessment of the witness’s credibility or character.
16
assertion that a witness’s intoxication could not be considered at all in
assessing credibility. We find no misconduct and no basis for reversal.6
Finally, although it is not necessary to our decision, the court’s
instructions bolster our conclusion that no reversible error occurred. The
court instructed the jurors (with CALCRIM No. 226) that they alone were to
judge the credibility of witnesses, using their “common sense and
experience.” Consistent with Evidence Code section 780, the instruction
stated jurors could consider any factor that reasonably tended to prove or
disprove the truth or accuracy of a witness’s testimony, including the
witness’s ability to perceive or remember events and any prior inconsistent
statements. In other instructions, the court emphasized that “[n]othing that
the attorneys say is evidence” and that “[i]f you believe that the attorneys’
comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my
instructions.” In our view, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors
construed the prosecutor’s remarks about intoxication or credibility (which,
again, were tied to a review of the evidence) as a claim that they should not
evaluate T.S.’s testimony as instructed by the court.
B. The Upper Term Sentence on Count 1
Wallace contends the court erred when it imposed the four-year upper
term for the count 1 corporal injury conviction, because the court relied on
aggravating factors that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, relied
on Wallace’s lack of remorse, and failed to consider mitigating evidence. We
conclude the sentence must be vacated because the court relied on an
6 Because we have addressed and rejected Wallace’s claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, we need not address the parties’ arguments as to
whether Wallace’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the
claim by objecting to the statements that Wallace now seeks to challenge on
appeal.
17
aggravating factor (the numerosity of Wallace’s prior convictions) that was
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore need not address
Wallace’s other challenges to the upper term sentence.
1. Additional Background
As noted, the jury did not find, and was not asked to find, the
aggravating factors that were alleged in the information, including that the
crime involved great violence or great bodily harm (rule 4.421(a)(1)), the
victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)), and Wallace took
advantage of a position of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)). In a bifurcated court
trial, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace suffered the
four prior convictions alleged in the information.
In her sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor recommended
imposition of the upper term on count 1 and argued Wallace’s prior
convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness under
rule 4.421(b)(2). Noting the jury did not make findings on other aggravating
factors, the prosecutor stated she was “solely relying” on rule 4.421(b)(2).
The prosecutor stated, however, that she believed other aggravating factors
had been proven at trial, including the great violence, vulnerable victim,
and position of trust factors. (Rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (11).)
At the sentencing hearing on September 8, 2022, the court imposed
the four-year upper term for the count 1 conviction of corporal injury to a
relationship partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Referring to rule 4.421(b)(2) (the
defendant’s prior convictions are “numerous or of increasing seriousness”),
the court found Wallace’s prior convictions were numerous and stated it was
imposing the upper term based on that finding. The court stated: “Factors
in aggravation related to the defendant, under 4.421(b)(2), the defendant’s
prior convictions as an adult are numerous or of increasing seriousness. I
18
find that they are numerous. [¶] The defendant’s prior convictions are
numerous. . . . For this reason the Court is imposing the aggravated term for
Count 1.” The court outlined Wallace’s four prior felony convictions between
1998 and 2011 and stated three of them resulted in prison sentences,
including a 2009 conviction for corporal injury to a relationship partner
under section 273.5, subdivision (a), the same offense for which he was
convicted in the present case.
The court stated that, although it was relying on Wallace’s numerous
convictions under rule 4.421(b)(2) to impose the upper term, the present
crime involved great violence and great bodily harm within the meaning of
rule 4.421(a)(1). The court stated: “Although the Court is sentencing the
defendant to the aggravated term based on the aggravating factor that I just
mentioned, which is his—which is the defendant’s prior convictions as an
adult are numerous, I would also note that this crime did involve great
violence and bodily harm and the defendant was convicted for this identical
offense and served two years in state prison for it on the previous conviction
for the 273.5.
“With regard to that factor—and as I indicated, I’m relying on the
numerous convictions, but the Court must note that the crimes in this case
under 4.421(a)(1) involve great violence, great bodily harm, and acts
displaying a high degree of callousness. The defendant’s actions against the
victim, [T.S.], evidenced great violence against a woman who is much
smaller than him, 178 pounds, and he was 350 pounds at the time of the
offense.” The court stated the trial evidence showed T.S. was violently
assaulted in the apartment and had to escape by jumping from a third-floor
window, sustaining significant injuries.
19
The court also stated: “Apparently, to this day the defendant has no
remorse for the harm caused by his actions, and he told the probation officer
as recently as September 1st of 2022, ‘I just feel like I was wrongly convicted
for something I didn’t do.’ ”
The court found no circumstances in mitigation.
2. Analysis
Wallace argues that, by imposing the upper term, the court violated
the rules governing determinate triad sentencing set forth in section 1170,
subdivision (b), as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 567),7 legislation that took effect on January 1, 2022.8 Upon
reconsideration of the issue in light of Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1076,
we agree.
“Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to specify that,
when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen
term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the
aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s stipulation
to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a
reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
record of conviction. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding Pen. Code,
§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3).)” (People v. Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.)
“Senate Bill 567 also added a provision that requires the court to impose the
low term if the defendant’s psychological, physical, or childhood trauma was
7 Wallace cites Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) on this
point, but it is Senate Bill 567 that made the relevant changes to
section 1170. (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44, fn. 11.)
8 As noted, Wallace was sentenced in September 2022, after Senate
Bill 567 had taken effect. This case does not involve retroactive application
of Senate Bill 567.
20
a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, ‘unless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
[so] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice.’ (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, adding Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(6);
see Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 3(c).)” (Ibid.)
In Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1069, our Supreme Court recently held
that under the federal Constitution, a defendant “was entitled to have a jury
determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and
whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court
could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term
sentence.” (Id. at p. 1085.) The court held that pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3)’s prior conviction exception, “a defendant is entitled to a
jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior
conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a
sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.” (Id. at p.
1086, fn. omitted.) Beyond that, the court had no occasion to be more
specific. There was no need to decide, for example, whether a trial court’s
finding as to the number of the defendant’s convictions fell within the prior
conviction exception to the jury trial right. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 1085, fn. 9.)
The Wiley decision was compelled by Erlinger v. United States (2024)
602 U.S. 821. There, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the
federally recognized prior conviction exception is a “ ‘narrow exception,’ ”
under which a “judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the
defendant was convicted of.’ ” (Id. at p. 838.) As relevant here, the inquiry
into the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions “involves
21
something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were
sustained and what elements were required to prove them.” (Wiley, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 1082.)
When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used
to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must
apply the Chapman standard of review. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730, 742–743; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; Wiley, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 1087.) Under the Chapman standard, a sentence must be
reversed “ ‘unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the
aggravating facts upon which the court relied . . . , or that those facts were
otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ ” (Wiley, at p.
1087.) “Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if ‘the record
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with
respect to the aggravating fact at issue.” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles here, we conclude the numerosity of
Wallace’s convictions should have been submitted to a jury in the absence of
an admission. The inquiry into numerosity (like the similar inquiry into
increasing seriousness that was at issue in Wiley) “involves something more
than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what
elements were required to prove them.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
1082.) The prejudice issue seems debatably close, to be sure, since, at least
arguably, four convictions, under any reasonable interpretation of the word
“numerous,”9 would probably lead a jury to reach the same conclusion the
9 Compare People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 191 (two
criminal convictions are not “numerous”) with People v. Searle (1989) 213
22
court did. But ultimately we believe the concept of numerosity is
sufficiently context dependent that we cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt how a jury would decide the issue when presented with the
circumstances of the prior convictions.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court committed prejudicial
error at sentencing by relying on the numerousness of Wallace’s prior
convictions in the absence of a jury determination or an admission that that
aggravating factor was true. We must therefore vacate the sentence and
remand for a full resentencing. We do not foreclose the possibility that
other aggravating factors, besides or in addition to the numerousness of
Wallace’s prior convictions, may be proved up upon remand.
C. The Stayed Sentence on Count 2
The court imposed an eight-month term for the false imprisonment
charge in count 2 and stayed that term under section 654. The eight-month
term is incorrect. Eight months is one third of the two-year middle term
applicable to the count 2 conviction for false imprisonment by violence,
which is punishable by a term of 16 months, two years, or three years.
(§§ 236, 237, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (h)(1).) But the “one-third-the-midterm
rule of section 1170.1, subdivision (a), only applies to a consecutive sentence,
not a sentence stayed under section 654.” (People v. Cantrell (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 1161, 1164.) The correct approach would be to impose one of
Cal.App.3d 1091, 1098 (three convictions are “numerous”); see Merriam-
Webster Dictionary Online (2025) (<https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/numerous> [as of Dec. 3, 2025] (“numerous” means
“consisting of great numbers of units or individuals”)); Collins Dictionary
Online (2025) (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/
numerous> [as of Dec. 3, 2025] (“numerous” means “[i]f people or things are
numerous, they exist or are present in large numbers”)).
23
the three full terms applicable to the offense (16 months, two years, or three
years) and stay execution of that sentence under section 654 (without
making any determination whether the term should run concurrently or
consecutively). Upon remand, if and as appropriate upon full resentencing,
the court should impose sentence in accordance with these principles.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The sentence is vacated and
the cause is remanded for a full resentencing.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
24
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.