Udani v. Samsung Electronics America CA2/3

CourtListener 10747029Calctapp03.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/3/25 Udani v. Samsung Electronics America CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NIMESH UDANI, B341326

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV20962)
v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
AMERICA, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maren E. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Spitz Law Group, Jeffrey Spitz; and Paul S. Rothstein for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hunton Andrews Kurth, Thomas R. Waksom, Brandon M.
Marvisi, Michael J. Mueller, and Grant H. Cokeley, for
Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In this class action lawsuit, the trial court conditionally
granted plaintiffs’ motion to file a third amended complaint
adding Nimesh Udani and two other individuals as class
representatives. Because the allegations relating to Udani did
not comply with the court’s conditions, the court granted
Samsung’s1 motion to strike Udani as a putative plaintiff. On
appeal, Udani argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing overly strict conditions on the proposed amendment and
by striking his claims. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from a putative class action originally
filed in 2020 by Manuel Rivera-Melo on behalf of California
consumers who purchased plasma televisions manufactured by
Samsung between January 2013 and November 30, 2014. The
complaint alleged that Samsung violated California’s Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly), which requires
manufacturers of certain products to “make available to service
and repair facilities sufficient service literature and functional
parts to effect the repair of a product for at least seven years
after the date a product model or type was manufactured.” (Civ.
Code, § 1793.03, subd. (b).) According to the complaint, Samsung
stopped manufacturing plasma televisions in late 2014 and
simultaneously stopped manufacturing certain parts needed to
repair those televisions. Rivera-Melo alleged that he took his
television to a Samsung Authorized Service Center (ASC) called
Service Quick in Anaheim in June 2016, and that the shop told

1 We refer to defendants Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. collectively as “Samsung.”

2
him the television could not be repaired because the parts were
no longer available.
In a January 2021 joint status report, Samsung asserted
that the Service Quick in Anaheim opened in 2017, and that the
shop had no record of Rivera-Melo ever contacting it.
Rivera-Melo filed a first amended complaint in February
2021. That complaint alleged Rivera-Melo attempted to get a
replacement part from the Anaheim Service Quick within the
seven-year period specified by Song-Beverly, but it did not
identify the date, month, or year of the visit.
In November 2021, a second amended complaint was filed
which added Eli Cesaletti as a class representative. Cesaletti
alleged that he took his defective television to an ASC sometime
in 2018. The second amended complaint again alleged that
Rivera-Melo sought to repair his television at Service Quick in
Anaheim, but it again did not specify the date, month, or year of
that visit.
According to the trial court, Rivera-Melo’s deposition
testimony was “inconsistent” with the allegations in the second
amended complaint. Specifically, Rivera-Melo testified that in
June 2016, he made a video of his defective television and showed
it to a different ASC called Dependable TV, which told him the
replacement part was unavailable. He testified that he visited
Service Quick in 2017 without his television, and when he
described the problem, Service Quick told him that the necessary
part was no longer made. The trial court found that Rivera-
Melo’s “testimony about the order of which repair shop he visited
first and when was changed when he was questioned by his own
counsel, and then changed again on re-direct.” Rivera-Melo also
refused to answer several questions at the direction of his

3
counsel. The trial court granted Samsung’s motion to compel
Rivera-Melo to answer certain of those questions at a second
deposition.
In August 2022, plaintiffs requested leave to file a third
amended complaint in order to replace the existing class
representatives with Udani and two other individuals. The
motion explained that in April 2022, Cesaletti had failed to
attend his deposition, and he later agreed to voluntarily dismiss
his individual claims with prejudice. The parties agreed to forgo
Rivera-Melo’s second deposition, and Rivera-Melo agreed to
voluntarily dismiss his claims without prejudice.
Samsung opposed the motion to amend, arguing that
replacing the class representatives “would allow Plaintiffs to
essentially start the case all over again, causing Samsung to lose
the benefits of years of investigation into the current class
representatives’ claims, increasing the burdens of discovery, and
further adding to the already substantial time and costs devoted
to this litigation.” Plaintiffs’ reply argued that substituting new
class representatives would not prejudice Samsung.
On January 30, 2023, the trial court issued a tentative
order granting leave to amend on the following condition: “at the
hearing on this motion, Plaintiff’s counsel must be able to discuss
in good faith the nature of the problem with each plaintiff’s
television, the parts required for repair, and the [Authorized
Service Center (ASC)] to whom their request for repair was
directed, so that Plaintiffs can further amend the complaint to
allege these facts within ten days.”2

2 The order was also subject to a second condition not
applicable to Udani.

4
At the January 31, 2023 hearing on plaintiffs’ motion,
Samsung asserted that plaintiffs’ counsel had not yet disclosed
when Udani contacted Samsung or any ASC, or whether
Samsung or an ASC had determined that the part necessary to
fix Udani’s television was unavailable. Samsung expressed
concern with this omission, particularly since Rivera-Melo and
Cesaletti had been unable or unwilling to “back up their
allegations.” The court then asked if plaintiffs would be able to
amend the complaint to identify “the number that Mr. Udani
called in, [and] the date that he called it . . . .” Plaintiffs’ counsel
responded: “Well, I’ll need 15 days, your Honor, to be able to
determine what -- whether that’s accurate or not, I mean whether
I’m able to provide that level of detail.” The court later
emphasized that the third amended complaint must allege “a
specific date and a specific phone number.” Plaintiffs’ counsel did
not object to this condition.
Following oral argument, the trial court ordered that the
third amended complaint “shall indicate (1) the nature of the
problem with each proposed Plaintiff’s television; (2) to the extent
a Plaintiff was told telephonically by ‘Samsung’ that parts were
unavailable, the date of that call and the number called; and (3)
to the extent an [ASC] was consulted and represented that
necessary repair parts were not available, the name of the ASC
and the date of the statement.” The court rejected Samsung’s
arguments that it would be unduly prejudiced by being forced to
conduct some discovery on facts unique to the proposed new class
representatives.
Plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint on February
10, 2023, naming Udani and one other new class representative
as plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that Udani “called

5
Samsung’s 1-800 number (1-800-SAMSUNG) in or around June
2016,” to report a problem with his television, and that “[a]t that
time, Samsung told UDANI that parts were not available to fix
his television.” The complaint stated that “[f]urther investigation
is required to determine whether UDANI additionally contacted
an ASC.”
On March 17, 2023, Samsung filed a combined motion to
strike and demurrer to the third amended complaint. The motion
argued that the complaint did not comply with the court’s
January 31, 2023 order. It asserted that the allegations as to
Udani “blatantly failed to comply with the Court’s stated
conditions” by failing to allege “the date he purportedly called
Samsung.”
Plaintiffs’ opposition to Samsung’s motion argued that the
third amended complaint “includes Plaintiffs’ allegations as to
their best recollection of when they spoke to Samsung and/or
their representatives and who they contacted.” The opposition
further asserted that Udani complied with the court’s order by
alleging that he contacted Samsung “[o]n or around June
2016 . . . .”
At the April 17, 2023 hearing on Samsung’s motion, the
trial court granted Samsung’s motion to strike Udani’s claim
from the third amended complaint. The court observed that
Samsung’s motion was procedurally defective because it
improperly combined a motion to strike and a demurrer into a
single filing, failed to include a requisite notice of motion, failed
to provide a meet and confer declaration, and failed to separately
identify the basis for the demurrer. The court nonetheless
treated Samsung’s filing as a motion to strike under Code of Civil
Procedure section 436, subdivision (b), which permits a court to

6
strike any portion of a pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity
with . . . an order of the court.”3 Because the third amended
complaint did not identify the date on which Udani contacted
Samsung, the court found that the complaint failed to comply
with the court’s order tentatively granting leave to amend. The
court determined that plaintiffs failed to “argue or show that
Udani can truthfully amend the TAC to comply with the
conditions for leave to amend set forth” in the order, and
therefore the court struck Udani’s claims without leave to amend.
Udani timely appealed.4

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
4 The court did not enter an order of dismissal nor a
judgment as to Udani. Ordinarily an order granting a motion to
strike is itself not appealable. (§ 904.1.) However, where, as
here, the order granting Samsung’s motion to strike “ ‘has the
effect of finally determining the issues relating to [Udani’s] rights
. . . the order is a final judgment as to him,’ and is appealable.”
(Johnson v. Threats (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 287, 289.) Because we
treat that order as a final judgment, Udani’s challenge to the
January 2023 interlocutory order conditionally granting leave to
amend is also properly before us.

7
DISCUSSION
Udani asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing unjust conditions on his right to amend the complaint
and, when he failed to comply with those conditions, by striking
Udani’s allegations from the third amended complaint. Under
the abuse of discretion standard, “ ‘a trial court’s ruling will not
be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless
the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior
Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 919.)
I. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
conditions on plaintiffs’ third amended complaint
Udani first argues the trial court abused its discretion by
requiring him to plead the specific date on which he called
Samsung’s customer service number, because this condition was
unjust. (§ 473, subd. (a)(1) [court has discretion to condition
amendments on “any terms as may be just”].)5 We disagree.
“The general principles governing the amendment of a
complaint apply to the decision whether to permit an amendment
naming a new class representative.” (Payton v. CSI Electrical

5 In addition to the language on which Udani relies, the
statute also provides that a court “may, in furtherance of justice,
and on any terms as may be proper,” allow an amendment
“adding . . . the name of any party.” (§ 473, subd. (a)(1).) Even if
Udani relied on this alternative standard, we would reach the
same decision. For the reasons discussed herein, the court’s
conditions were neither unjust nor improper, and therefore its
order was not an abuse of discretion under either standard.

8
Contractors, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 832, 848.) The court
“ ‘has wide discretion’ ” in this regard, “ ‘as a matter of policy the
ruling of the trial court in such matters will be upheld unless a
manifest or gross abuse of discretion is shown.’ ” (Tung v.
Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 747.)
When the trial court conditionally granted leave to amend,
this action was three years old, the complaint had been amended
twice, and two class representatives had voluntarily dismissed
their claims. According to the trial court, Rivera-Melo’s
deposition testimony was “inconsistent” with his own allegations
specifying the nature and timing of his attempts to repair the
television through a Samsung ASC. The trial court was
understandably concerned with ensuring that the proposed
substitute plaintiffs were suitable class representatives. As the
court explained at the hearing, it imposed conditions only to
ensure that the third amended complaint included “sufficient
information so that we can determine whether [the proposed
named plaintiffs] are adequate plaintiffs or not.” The trial court
chose reasonable conditions to achieve that end, and it did not
abuse its discretion in imposing those terms.6 (Cf. Fontenot v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 274,
disapproved of on another ground by Yvanova v. New Century
Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 939, fn.13 [no abuse of

6 As an alternative ground to affirm, Samsung argues that
Udani cannot show prejudice from the condition he allege a
specific date, because even if he is not a representative plaintiff
he can still assert a claim, either individually or as a member of
the class. We reject this argument because we cannot speculate
on either the timeliness of Udani’s individual claim or on the
outcome of a future motion for class certification.

9
discretion in conditioning leave to amend on attachment of
contract on which claims were based].)
In support of his argument that the trial court’s conditions
were unjust, Udani relies on Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank v.
Mueller Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 636 (Armenta). Armenta was
a qui tam action, meaning the plaintiff brought claims on behalf
of certain government entities. The plaintiff sought leave to
amend to assert claims on behalf of an additional 130
government entities. The trial court granted the request,
conditioned on each government entity responding to court-
ordered discovery which the appellate court described as “far
exceed[ing] that which would have been necessary to provide the
defendants with proper notice of the newly named entities’
claims.” (Id. at p. 643.) When 47 of the newly named entities
failed to provide that discovery, the court dismissed them from
the action. Reversing, the appellate court of appeal held that
“conditioning amendment upon each entity responding to an
extraordinarily detailed discovery demand was an unjust
condition. The trial court abused its discretion in imposing it.”
(Id. at p. 644.)
The condition imposed by the trial court in this case is far
less onerous than the one in Armenta. The court merely ordered
Udani to allege the date on which he complained to Samsung.
The circumstances of that complaint are a fundamental aspect of
Udani’s claim, and the date is a fact he should either be expected
to know or to determine by consulting records reasonably
available to him. This single factual allegation falls far short of
requiring Udani to respond to “extraordinarily detailed
discovery.” (Armenta, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 644.)

10
Similarly misplaced is Udani’s reliance on Sanai v. Saltz
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 746. In Sanai, the trial court granted
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted
plaintiff leave to amend on the condition that he provide
“ ‘admissible evidence’ ” to support that he complained to a
reporting agency, a required element of his claim. (Id. at p. 766.)
The court rejected the plaintiff’s sworn testimony that he
complained in writing, reasoning that if he “ ‘made written
complaints . . . there would be no need to rely on his oral
testimony.’ ” (Id. at p. 767.) The appellate court reversed,
reasoning that a court “is simply without power to demand, as
the condition for leave to amend, that a party present admissible
evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment.” (Id. at
p. 770.) Yet, requiring Udani to allege the specific date on which
he contacted Samsung is far short of demanding evidence that
could survive summary judgment. Indeed, in Sanai, the
appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by rejecting
the plaintiff’s sworn testimony; in contrast, here, the trial court
would have accepted Udani’s allegations so long as they were
sufficiently specific.
Udani also argues that the condition was unnecessary
because, in its January 31, 2023 order conditionally granting
leave to amend, the trial court found that naming new class
representatives would not prejudice Samsung. Udani overstates
this aspect of the court’s order. The trial court’s lack of prejudice
finding assumed that the third amended complaint would comply
with the court’s conditions. Specifically, in its analysis of
Samsung’s prejudice, the court reasoned that if plaintiffs could
specifically allege “the date” of their contacts with Samsung,
“only limited discovery will be needed” on that issue and the

11
parties would not be burdened by exploring that issue in
discovery. Udani’s failure to comply with the court’s order
necessarily means at least some additional discovery would be
needed, effectively negating the court’s lack of prejudice finding.
II. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Samsung’s motion to strike.
Udani also contends the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Samsung’s motion and striking Udani’s allegations from
the third amended complaint. We again find no abuse.
The trial court has discretion to “[s]trike out all or any part
of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with . . . an order
of the court.” (§ 436, subd. (b); Cal-Western Business Services,
Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.)
As we have discussed, the court entered an order granting
plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint on the condition
that Udani allege “the date” of his call, if any, to Samsung. The
third amended complaint alleged only that Udani called Samsung
“in or around June 2016.” The court correctly concluded that
“Udani’s pleading does not comply” with the conditions imposed
in the January 31, 2023 order. The trial court was well within its
discretion to strike Udani’s nonconforming allegations.
Udani does not argue that he pleaded the specific date of
his call to Samsung, as the order required. He instead argues
that he “substantially complied” with the order by identifying the
month, and that it was an abuse of discretion to strike his claim.
In essence, Udani is asking us to second-guess the trial court
ruling. We decline to do so. A trial court “has inherent and
statutory authority to control the order of proceedings, regulate
the order of proof, provide for the orderly conduct of the
proceedings, and control the litigation. [Citations.] The trial

12
court’s exercise of such powers will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” (People ex rel.
Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 23–24.) No such showing
appears on the record before us. Perhaps a different court would
have responded to Udani’s noncompliance more leniently. But we
cannot conclude the court abused its discretion by striking
allegations that plainly violated a court order.

13
DISPOSITION
The order striking Udani’s claims from the third amended
complaint is affirmed. Samsung is awarded its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

14

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.