CourtListener 10746879•People v. Sandusky CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Sandusky CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098754
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 16CF04009,
18CF04063, 18CF05428)
v.
OPINION ON TRANSFER
BRYAN FEDERICK SANDUSKY,
Defendant and Appellant.
After defendant Bryan Federick Sandusky admitted violating the terms of his
probation, the trial court sentenced him to seven years eight months in prison, executed
three previously suspended probation revocation fines, and imposed and suspended three
parole revocation fines. Defendant appealed, asking us to remand his case for
resentencing because: (1) the trial court failed to follow the required fact-finding
procedures before imposing an upper term sentence; and (2) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding his ability to pay the fines and fees imposed. We
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previously ordered the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment but
otherwise affirmed the judgment, but our Supreme Court granted review and ordered us
to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light of its decision in People v. Wiley
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley). Having done so, we conclude any errors in the
factfinding procedures used at defendant’s sentencing were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Because this appeal challenges only aspects of defendant’s sentence, we omit the
details of the underlying offenses.
In 2019, the trial court sentenced defendant for three criminal cases to a total term
of eight years eight months in prison, but the court suspended execution of the sentence
and placed defendant on probation. The court considered financial information provided
by defendant, which showed he had income of about $3,500 per month and personal
property worth $30,000, with monthly living expenses of around $2,200. The court
imposed three $30 conviction assessments; three $40 court operations assessments; a
criminal laboratory analysis fine of $50 plus $145 in penalty assessments; and three $300
probation revocation restitution fines. The court found defendant lacked the ability to
pay the drug program fee and the cost of the presentence report and did not impose those
amounts.
On appeal, this court reversed defendant’s sentence and remanded for the trial
court to strike a one-year enhancement and impose a shorter term of probation, pursuant
to newly enacted legislation. (People v. Sandusky (Sep. 30, 2021, C091228) [nonpub.
opn.].) On remand, the trial court struck a one-year enhancement and shortened
defendant’s term of probation, but otherwise did not change defendant’s sentence. The
same day, defendant admitted violating the terms of his probation by violating Health and
Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) and Vehicle Code section 14601.1.
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At the sentencing hearing for the probation violation, the trial court noted that it
had requested but not yet received certified records of defendant’s prior convictions from
the California Department of Justice. The court took judicial notice of its own records
showing defendant’s nine prior criminal convictions in that court, without objection. The
court then acknowledged that sentencing laws had changed since it had first imposed
defendant’s sentence and asked the parties whether the court could execute defendant’s
sentence consistent with the new law. Defendant argued the court could not impose an
upper term sentence because he “did not stipulate to any facts in aggravation nor were
they submitted to a finder of fact and found to be true.” Defendant also noted that the
prosecution had not presented a certified copy of his criminal record, so that alternative
method of proof was unavailable.
In response, the trial court asked whether “taking judicial notice of its own files
under Evidence Code [section] 452 would not be a sufficient certified record?” The
People argued: “Certification is generally put on for authentication purpose. If it comes
from the Court’s own file, seems kind of circular and bizarre to require some certification
versus what the Court has already maintained.” Defendant responded that the statute
required facts used to impose an upper term sentence be stipulated to, found true beyond
a reasonable doubt, or be proven by a certified record, which did not include judicial
notice. The court then asked whether the parties disagreed with any of defendant’s
criminal history as listed in the probation report, and neither party did.
Ultimately, the trial court found no mitigating factors and found “[d]efendant’s
[prior] convictions as an adult are aggravating factors.” Accordingly, the court selected
the upper term of four years in prison as the principal term. The court also imposed
consecutive sentences for the remaining offenses and enhancements, for a total prison
term of seven years eight months. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay all fines
and fees previously ordered in each of defendant’s three cases, executed the three
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previously suspended $300 probation revocation restitution fines, and imposed and
suspended three $300 parole revocation restitution fines.
Defendant appealed from the judgment. In his application for appointment of
counsel in this court, defendant indicated that he was incarcerated; earned $1,000 per
month from “Native American Per-Cap”; paid expenses of $700 per month comprising
$300 for rent or mortgage payments, $100 for food and clothing, $100 for transportation
and utilities, and $200 which defendant failed to explain; and owned $1,000 worth of
furniture.
This court issued an opinion ordering the trial court to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment but otherwise affirming the judgment. (People v. Sandusky
(June 28, 2024, C098754) [nonpub. opn.] [2024 Cal.App.Unpub. Lexis 4052], judg.
vacated and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th
1069.) Our Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review and ordered us to
vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light of its decision in Wiley. Defendant
filed a supplemental brief arguing that we should remand for resentencing because a jury
should have determined whether his nine prior convictions are “numerous.”
DISCUSSION
Defendant makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in selecting
an upper term sentence; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel failed to claim defendant lacked the ability to pay the fines and fees imposed; and
(3) we should order the trial court to remove a redundancy in the abstract of judgment.
The People respond that: (1) the trial court did not err in selecting an upper term
sentence or the error was harmless and (2) defendant has not demonstrated ineffective
assistance of counsel. The People concede the third issue. We conclude that any errors
in selecting an upper term sentence were harmless and that defendant has not
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demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with the parties that the trial
court should amend the abstract of judgment. We will otherwise affirm the judgment.
I
Upper Term Sentence
In his prior briefing, defendant attacked his upper term sentence in two ways.
First, he argued the trial court used a “non-existent” aggravating circumstance to support
its decision. Second, he argued that the trial court impermissibly made a subjective
determination that his prior convictions are numerous, which should have been made by a
jury. We concluded that the first argument lacks merit and, though the trial court erred
by not establishing the prior convictions in a permissible manner, this error did not
prejudice defendant.
In his supplemental briefing, defendant argues that Wiley establishes that the trial
court erred by not submitting the determination that his prior convictions are numerous to
a jury. Wiley expressly declined to decide this issue (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1085,
fn. 9), and we likewise need not decide the issue here because, even assuming the trial
court erred, any error was harmless under People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch).
A. “Non-Existent” Aggravating Circumstance
Defendant faults the trial court for not precisely restating an aggravating
circumstance listed in rule 4.421 of the California Rules of Court. (Rule citations that
follow are found in the California Rules of Court unless otherwise stated.)
We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court used a “non-existent”
aggravating circumstance for two reasons. First, in context, the trial court’s statement
that “[d]efendant’s [prior] convictions as an adult are aggravating factors” indicates that
the court considered the number of prior convictions, nine, to be aggravating, pursuant to
rule 4.421(b)(2). The court listed each of defendant’s nine prior convictions by case
number without referring to the offenses committed or any other fact underlying the
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convictions. Defendant fails to offer any other possible meaning for the trial court’s
statement, and we see none. Defendant’s presumption that the trial court did not mean to
invoke this rule of court conflicts with our duty on appeal to presume the trial court’s
order was correct and indulge “ ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions” ’ ” that support it.
(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666.)
Second, defendant misunderstands rule 4.421: the rule provides a list of suggested
aggravating circumstances for consideration at sentencing, not a list of “valid”
aggravating circumstances that makes all other circumstances invalid. The catch-all
provision in rule 4.421(c) makes this clear, as does rule 4.408, which explains, “[t]he
listing of factors in these rules for making discretionary sentencing decisions is not
exhaustive and does not prohibit a trial judge from using additional criteria reasonably
related to the decision being made.” (Rules 4.408(a), 4.421(c).) Additionally, our
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that a “trial court is not limited to the aggravating
circumstances listed in the rules.” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817, overruled
on another ground in Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1084.) Accordingly, the trial court
would not have erred even if it did use an aggravating circumstance not listed in rule
4.421.
B. Factfinding Under Penal Code Section 1170
Accepting the evident meaning of the trial court’s statement—that the number of
defendant’s prior convictions was an aggravating circumstance—defendant next argues
the trial court made this finding in violation of his statutory right to a jury trial. We
conclude the trial court erred by relying on facts not established in one of the manners
permitted by the statute.
Recent amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) (statutory section
citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated) limit sentencing
courts to imposing an upper term sentence only “when there are circumstances in
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aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3.) Subdivision (b)(3) of section 1170 provides an exception to this limitation,
permitting courts to “consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
Here, the trial court failed to use certified copies of the records of defendant’s
prior convictions, instead taking judicial notice of its own records, without any
certification as to the authenticity of those records. Certification generally requires
attestation “by a public employee, or a deputy of a public employee, having the legal
custody of the writing” that the writing is a correct copy of the record kept in the custody
of the court or other public entity. (Evid. Code, § 1530, subd. (a); see also Evid. Code,
§ 452.5.) While the fact of a prior conviction as asserted in a court judgment is a proper
subject of judicial notice (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 280), here the
Legislature demanded a more rigorous evidentiary procedure. Accordingly, the trial
court erred in basing its selection of the upper term sentence on uncertified court records.
C. Determining That Defendant’s Prior Convictions Are Numerous
Perhaps conceding that this error identified in our prior opinion is not prejudicial,
defendant instead focuses in his supplemental brief on the trial court’s determination that
his nine prior convictions were aggravating because of their number. Defendant contends
that a numerical tally of his prior convictions is a factual determination that “goes beyond
‘the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements.’ ”
As noted above, section 1170, subdivision (b) permits a trial court to impose an
upper term sentence only if: (1) “circumstances in aggravation of the crime . . . justify”
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its imposition and (2) “the facts underlying those circumstances” have been established in
compliance with the statute. The statute allows a sentencing court to “consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of
conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3)), but
this provision is subject to constitution limitations under the Sixth Amendment.
Specifically, “a judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than
determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ ” (Erlinger
v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838; accord Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1083-
1085.)
Defendant contends the Sixth amendment prevents a sentencing court from
considering the number of his prior convictions to be an aggravating circumstance that
justifies an upper term sentence unless a jury has first found the convictions to be
“numerous” beyond a reasonable doubt. Though defendant contends Wiley “firmly
vindicates” his position, the Wiley court expressly declined to determine whether “this
numerical tally” violates the Sixth Amendment. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1085, fn.
9.) Nevertheless, we conclude, like the court in Wiley, that we need not decide whether
counting prior convictions violates the Sixth Amendment to resolve this case.
C. Prejudice
Having identified one error—the trial court’s failure to use certified records to
establish defendant’s prior convictions—and having assumed a second error—the failure
to have a jury determine whether those convictions were numerous—we must next
determine whether these errors require vacating defendant’s sentence and a remand for
resentencing.
The first error, failure to use certified records of defendant’s prior convictions as
required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), was “purely one of state law,” so we apply
the harmless error test developed in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.
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(People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29; see Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1078 [jury
trial is not constitutionally required for prior convictions]; Erlinger v. United States,
supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838 [judge may “ ‘determine what crime, with what elements, the
defendant was convicted of’ ”]; cf. Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 26
[judge may consult judicial records to determine what elements defendant admitted with
guilty plea].) That means we must affirm the judgment unless “it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.” (Watson, at p. 836.)
Here, we see no reasonable probability of a more favorable result because
defendant admitted he did not disagree with anything in the records of his prior
convictions. We also presume the probation officer properly performed his statutory duty
in obtaining records of defendant’s prior convictions. (Evid. Code, § 664; § 1203, subds.
(b), (g).) Accordingly, nothing would have changed had the trial court waited for the
certified copies to arrive or presented the evidence in the probation report to the jury,
rather than taking judicial notice of the records. (See People v. Epps, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
pp. 29-30 [in the absence of contested factual questions, failure to have jury determine
truth of prior convictions “could not possibly have affected the result”].) This is a
technical error not affecting defendant’s substantial rights that the law requires us to
affirm. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 834; §§ 1258, 1404.) We also note
that, even using the more stringent test for constitutional error, this error would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant does not dispute the existence of
his nine prior convictions. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 761.)
Second, assuming that the jury should have found whether defendant’s prior
convictions were “numerous,” we must vacate and remand unless we conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of
the facts underlying the aggravating circumstances upon which the trial court relied to
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conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statute. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 743.)1
Had a jury been instructed to determine whether “[t]he defendant’s prior
convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are
numerous” under rule 4.421(b)(2), the jury also would have been instructed to understand
the word numerous using its “ordinary, everyday” meaning. (CALCRIM No. 200
(2025).) Numerous means “[a]mounting to a large number; many.” (American Heritage
Dict. (5th ed. 2022) <https://perma.cc/KQL3-XPYF> [as of Dec. 1, 2025].)
We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found that
defendant’s nine prior convictions are numerous. What constitutes “a large number” or
“many” depends on the context, but no rational juror could have determined that nine
convictions is not a large number of convictions. Convictions are bad outcomes that
people generally try to avoid entirely. If someone had crashed their car nine times or
started nine fights at school or broken nine bones, no reasonable person would find false
the proposition that the person had done these things numerous times.
Defendant directs us away from the number of convictions, contending that, “[i]n
performing a numerosity calculation, a rational juror is entitled to do more than simply
look at the raw number of convictions” and suggesting a jury counting convictions might
give less weight to misdemeanor convictions or older convictions. We reject this
1 The second part of the Lynch prejudice test does not apply here because the trial court
sentenced defendant after the effective date of the 2022 amendment to section 1170,
subdivision (b) that “altered the scope of the trial court’s discretion.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 743, 773.) “[W]hen the trial court was not aware of the full scope of its
discretionary powers at the time of the defendant’s sentencing, . . . ‘the appropriate
remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial
court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 770-771.) Here, the trial court was aware of the current statute
and indicated that defendant’s prior convictions justified an upper term sentence.
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position, concluding that “numerous” deals only with the number of convictions. In
contrast, the seriousness of convictions is accounted for by a different part of the
aggravating circumstance (Rule 4.421(b)(2)), and “the recency and frequency of prior
crimes” is accounted as a mitigating circumstance (Rule 4.423(b)(1)). We also note that
our Supreme Court in Lynch considered the age of prior convictions to be a factor
considered by the sentencing court when determining whether prior convictions justify an
upper term sentence, not a fact to be weighed by the jury when counting those
convictions. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 765.)
Because defendant’s prior convictions are undisputed and a jury would have found
them to be “numerous” beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not remand for resentencing.
II
Fines and Fees
Defendant next contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel failed to claim he lacked the ability to pay the fines and fees imposed, basing his
argument on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.
A defendant may not “automatically transform a forfeited claim into a cognizable
one merely by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson (2010)
49 Cal.4th 79, 121, fn. 14; see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202-1203.)
Rather, “[t]o establish constitutionally inadequate representation, a defendant must
demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s
representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the
defendant.” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696.)
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“[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”
(People v. Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122.) “ ‘When a defendant on appeal makes
a claim that his counsel was ineffective, the appellate court must consider whether the
record contains any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation provided by
counsel. “If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ [citation], the contention must
be rejected.” ’ ” (People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 845-846.) “ ‘Reviewing
courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ’ ” (People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.) “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or
futile motions” (Thompson, at p. 122), or for failing to object when “there was no sound
legal basis for objection,” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616; accord People v.
Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 127).
As an initial matter, defendant’s assertion that his trial counsel failed to ask the
trial court to consider his inability to pay all $2,205 in fines and fees is incorrect. To the
contrary, when the court imposed most of the fines and fees in November 2019,
10 months after the decision in People v. Dueñas, his counsel discussed defendant’s
finances with the court. The court considered financial information provided by
defendant, and defendant’s counsel additionally noted that defendant would be paying for
a residential drug program. Based on this information, the court found that defendant
lacked the ability to pay the court’s drug program fee and the cost of the presentence
report and did not impose those two amounts.
To the extent defendant argues his trial counsel performed ineffectively at the later
hearing by not objecting when the trial court executed the three previously suspended
$300 probation revocation restitution fines and imposed and suspended three $300 parole
12
revocation restitution fines, defendant has failed to establish that “there simply could be
no satisfactory explanation” for his counsel’s actions. Defendant’s counsel was
presumably aware of the financial information defendant had provided to the court,
which showed defendant had the ability to pay $900 in executed fines and would likely
have the ability to pay the additional $900 in suspended fines following his prison
sentence if his parole was revoked.
Defendant contends his indigency is “evidenced by the fact that he has qualified
for indigent counsel at trial and on appeal.” But the evidence to which defendant cites
indicates that he “was not” represented by an appointed attorney in the superior court.
Nor is this court’s appointment of counsel for defendant determinative because “a
defendant may lack the ‘ability to pay’ the costs of court-appointed counsel yet have the
‘ability to pay’ a restitution fine.” (People v. Douglas (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1385,
1397.) In fact, the document defendant submitted to this court shows he has a net income
of $300 per month, even while incarcerated, which supports counsel’s decision not to
argue defendant lacked the ability to pay the fines imposed. This amount would be
sufficient to pay the fines imposed in a matter of months, which means counsel could
have reasonably determined that objection to them would have been futile. Accordingly,
we cannot conclude trial counsel’s decision not to object fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
III
Abstract of Judgment
The parties agree, as do we, that the trial court should amend the abstract of
judgment to remove the statement, “Pay all previously ordered fines/fees/restitution in
Case A, B and C.” Because the trial court already specified all previously ordered fines
and fees on the abstract, this statement is redundant and could be construed in a way that
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doubles the fines and fees the court imposed. To avoid such confusion, we will order the
trial court to prepare an amended abstract without this statement.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment, removing the statement “Pay all previously ordered
fines/fees/restitution in Case A, B and C.” The trial court is further directed to forward a
certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
RENNER, J.
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