CourtListener 10746871•People v. Vindiola CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Vindiola CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B337660
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA083672)
v.
JEREMY MICHAEL VINDIOLA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2009, a jury convicted Jeremy Vindiola (defendant) of
the first degree murder of Edward Galvan (Galvan). The trial
court sentenced defendant to 77 years to life. More recently,
defendant filed petitions for relief pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6 (former section 1170.95), which concerns changes to
California’s murder statutes, and Penal Code section 1172.75,
which invalidates one-year prior prison term enhancements and
provides for resentencing.1 The trial court found defendant was
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law because his
trial jury was not instructed on any theory that would have
avoided the need to find malice in convicting him of murder. As
to the request for section 1172.75 relief, the court struck two
previously imposed one-year enhancements and resentenced him
without any additional changes to his original sentence. In this
consolidated appeal, we consider (1) whether denial of
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition was error because it is
possible the jury could have imputed malice to him in the absence
of instructions on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and (2) whether, as defendant contends
for the first time, the trial court should have imposed a lower
sentence at resentencing in light of his drug use at the time of the
crime.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct
On June 16, 2008, Galvan and Michael “Minor” Trejo
(Trejo), a local drug dealer who used his Covina apartment as his
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
base of operations, attacked Christopher “Spooks” Saucedo
(Saucedo) because they did not want him near Trejo’s apartment.
The following evening, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Trejo
again saw Saucedo in the area of his (Trejo’s) apartment. Trejo
also observed defendant’s automobile, a black Toyota Camry, and
Wilson Omar Alfaro (Alfaro)’s vehicle, a white Nissan SUV,
parked one behind the other. Moments earlier, Alfaro had come
to Trejo’s apartment to complain about the poor quality of the
methamphetamine he recently purchased from Trejo. Although
he saw defendant’s vehicle, Trejo did not see defendant.
After spotting Saucedo, Trejo asked his brother to contact
Galvan, who arrived shortly thereafter. Because both Trejo and
Galvan considered Saucedo an “enemy,” they went outside and
confronted him. As they moved across the street, Trejo thought
Saucedo was “acting funny”—he was just holding a cell phone but
not looking at or talking on it and the screen was not illuminated.
Because both Galvan and Trejo thought Saucedo might be
“strapped” and have “something on him,” i.e., a firearm, the two
men closed to within 10 feet and then “stood [their] distance.”
The two men asked Saucedo if he was armed and he indicated he
was not. The two men then began “yelling” and “talking shit” to
Saucedo, who did not respond.
As Galvan and Trejo were yelling at Saucedo, Alfaro
approached Galvan, said “I’ll smoke your bitch ass,” and opened
fire. At the same time, defendant came out from crouching
behind his car, and he too opened fire. Galvan was shot twice,
once in the head, which was fatal, and once in his right buttock,
which was not. Trejo fled and was not injured. Alfaro left the
scene in his vehicle, and defendant and Saucedo left in
defendant’s automobile.
3
B. Defendant’s Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
In a single-count amended information, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney charged defendant and Alfaro with
Galvan’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The amended information
alleged defendant and Alfaro each personally and intentionally
used and discharged a handgun which caused great bodily injury
and death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and that defendant had
suffered two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant and Alfaro were tried jointly. In addition to law
enforcement officers and the medical examiner who performed an
autopsy on Galvan’s body, the prosecution presented testimony
from a number of residents of and visitors to the neighborhood on
the night of the murder who witnessed by sight and/or sound
Galvan’s murder and defendant and Alfaro’s escape thereafter.
After the presentation of evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury on first and second degree murder. The only
theory of murder presented in the instructions was malice
murder; there were no instructions on felony murder or murder
pursuant to the natural and probable consequences doctrine.2
The court also instructed the jury on accomplice liability,
including aiding and abetting principles. The court gave CALJIC
No. 3.00, which provided: “Persons who are involved in
committing or attempting to commit crime are referred to as
2
The prosecution maintained the shooting was a pre-
planned first degree murder in which defendant and Alfaro used
Saucedo to lure Galvan into a vulnerable position. The defense at
trial was self-defense and/or defense of Saucedo. The court
accordingly gave self-defense and voluntary manslaughter
instructions.
4
principals in the crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent
or manner of participation, is equally guilty. Principals
include[ ]: [¶] 1. Those who directly and actively commit or
attempt to commit the act constituting the crime; or [¶] 2. Those
who aid and abet the commission or attempted commission of the
crime.” The court also gave CALJIC No. 3.14, which provided:
“Merely assenting to, aiding, or assisting in the commission of a
crime without knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator and without the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the crime is not
criminal. Thus, a person who assents to, or aids, or assists in, the
commission of the crime without that knowledge and without the
intent or purpose is not an accomplice to the commission of the
crime.” The court additionally gave CALJIC No. 3.31, explaining
that “there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct
and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator.
Unless this specific intent exists the crime or allegation to which
it relates is not committed or is not true.”
Deliberating less than a day, the jury found defendant and
Alfaro guilty of first degree murder and found true all of the
firearm allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to 77
years to life (25 years to life for the murder, which was doubled
for a prior “strike” conviction, plus 25 years to life for the section
12022.53, subd. (d) firearm enhancement, plus two one-year prior
prison term enhancements pursuant to section 667, subdivision
(b)).3
3
The trial court sentenced Alfaro to 50 years to life.
5
On direct appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed
the judgment. (People v. Vindiola (Apr. 25, 2011, B220180)
[nonpub. opn.].) Among other things, defendant had challenged
the aiding and abetting instruction and its equally guilty
language as inconsistent with authority (see, e.g., People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111) holding an aider and abettor must
share the murderous intent of the perpetrator. This court held
the argument was both forfeited and nonprejudicial in any event.
Specifically, this court held, using the Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard, that “the evidence adduced at trial
in support of a first degree murder conviction against each
defendant was strong and showed that defendants and [Saucedo]
lured Galvan and Trejo outside in order to kill them. There is no
indication or suggestion that when defendants fired at Galvan
and Trejo they harbored different mental states. Accordingly,
even if the trial court had not instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 3.00, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have
convicted defendants of first degree murder.”
C. Defendant’s Requests for Resentencing Relief
1. Defendant’s section 1172.6 petition
In 2022, defendant filed a form section 1172.6 resentencing
petition alleging he could not be convicted of murder because of
intervening changes to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019.4 The People opposed the petition and argued defendant
4
In his section 1172.6 petition, defendant requested that the
trial court appoint counsel to represent him. The court complied
with the request and appointed defendant’s trial counsel to
6
was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was
convicted not pursuant to a theory of felony murder or as an aider
and abettor under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, but as an “actual perpetrator.”
In his reply, defendant maintained he was eligible for
resentencing relief “despite the fact there were no jury
instructions allowing the jury to impute malice to [defendant]
and the jury found [defendant] was an actual shooter in the
incident.” Although the jury was not instructed on felony murder
or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, defendant
argued the instructions that were given nonetheless permitted
the imputation of malice and urged the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing. Defendant did not identify which
instructions purportedly permitted the imputation of malice and
cited to only one case in support of his jury instructions
argument, People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972.
At an April 2024 hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6
petition, the defense submitted on the filed briefs. The trial court
interjected with a question, asking the defense to identify the
jury instruction that allowed the jury to impute malice. The
defense conceded there was no such instruction but maintained
the request for relief should still be granted. The court followed
up, highlighting the Langi case the defense cited and explaining
that its reading of the jury instructions in this case, unlike Langi,
identified no instruction that allowed the jury to impute malice.
The defense agreed. The trial court then found defendant failed
to make a prima facie showing and denied the section 1172.6
represent him in both the section 1172.6 and 1172.75
proceedings.
7
resentencing petition without ordering an evidentiary hearing.
The court explained: “There was no natural and probable
consequences instruction given, no aiding and abetting
instructions given, no jury instruction that I could find that
allowed the jury to impute malice. [¶] In addition, it was found
to be true that [defendant] personally discharged the firearm.”
2. Defendant’s section 1172.75 motion
In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
notified the trial court that defendant was potentially eligible for
re-sentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (Senate Bill 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)), which, among other things, retroactively
invalidated certain former section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements.5 (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In a brief filed after he was appointed counsel, defendant
urged the trial court to vacate the two one-year section 667.5
prior prison term enhancements and strike the 25-year
enhancement for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
finding. Defendant argued this relief was justified because of his
history of drug abuse, his relatively young age at the time of
5
Senate Bill 483 added what is now section 1172.75 to the
Penal Code. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
Section 1172.75 requires CDCR to inform trial courts of inmates
serving sentences with one or more now-invalid prior prison term
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Once a court receives this
information and confirms that the inmate’s sentence includes an
invalid enhancement, it “shall recall [their] sentence and
resentence” them. (Id., subd. (c).)
8
Galvan’s murder,6 and his efforts at rehabilitation while in
prison, which included earning an AA degree.
In its opposition, the People conceded the two prior prison
enhancements should be stricken but opposed any further
reduction in defendant’s sentence because his criminal history
and conduct while incarcerated for Galvan’s murder showed he
remained a threat to public safety. The People related that in
2012, defendant, with another inmate, physically attacked a third
inmate, striking the victim in the head and torso and refusing to
stop when ordered to do so, and that in 2014 defendant had been
found guilty by prison officials of conspiracy to commit murder.
The People related further that an investigation by prison
officials revealed defendant was a member of EME, a Mexican
prison gang, and that defendant held a position of authority
within EME. In addition, in 2022, defendant was found in
possession of manufactured alcohol.
On May 29, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the
section 1172.75 notification. Defendant addressed the court,
stating that he was “no longer[ ] involved in [his] old lifestyle”
and that he had changed his life in order to be a role model for
his sons. The court observed that while obtaining an AA degree
was “admirable,” defendant had not enrolled in any substance
abuse rehabilitation programs while in prison and had not
renounced his gang association or participated in any gang
rehabilitation classes. In light of defendant’s participation in
prison violence, the lack of any evidence showing a renunciation
of his gang involvement, and the absence of any evidence he was
6
At the time of Galvan’s death, defendant was 23 years old.
9
under the influence of drugs at the time of Galvan’s murder, the
court found it was not in the interest of justice to reduce
defendant’s sentence beyond vacating the one-year prior prison
term enhancements. In holding the full resentencing section
1172.75, subdivision (c) requires when legally invalid
enhancements have been imposed, the court recalled defendant’s
original sentence, vacated the two one-year prison term
enhancements, and resentenced defendant to 75 years to life in
prison.7
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
section 1172.6 petition because certain ambiguities in the jury
instructions “could have” allowed the jury to convict him of first
degree murder under a theory by which malice was imputed to
him based solely on his participation in the crime. Had the trial
court given defendant an opportunity to present any new
evidence beyond the record of the original trial at a section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing, the argument would be
foreclosed by this court’s prior finding on direct appeal that the
trial evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant and Alfaro shared the same mental state required for
conviction of first degree murder. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 451-452 [discussing issue preclusion].) But the trial
court denied the petition on the theory that defendant was
7
Defendant noticed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling on
his section 1172.75 motion. We granted defendant’s motion to
consolidate both of his appeals for briefing, argument, and
decision.
10
ineligible as a matter of law and did not ask defendant if he had
any new evidence he could present. We therefore conclude a
remand is required to clarify the state of the record. If the trial
court confirms, at a hearing following issuance of an order to
show cause or by way of seeking an advance proffer from
defendant, that there is no new evidence materially bearing on
the question of defendant’s mental state at the time of Galvan’s
murder, denial of the petition will again be warranted. If the
contrary is true, the trial court must re-adjudicate the petition in
accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
Defendant additionally contends the trial court abused its
discretion under section 1172.75 when it declined to do more than
vacate two one-year prior prison term enhancements because the
court “failed to note that the shooting occurred in the context of a
drug rip-off that occurred earlier that day.” According to
defendant, the drug rip-off evidence “fairly implies that the
shooting was related to [defendant’s] drug abuse since he was
helping Alfaro try to obtain actual drugs rather than the bunk
drugs Trejo originally sold Alfaro.” Defendant, however, never
raised this argument in the trial court. We accordingly reject it
as forfeited.
A. A Remand Is Required to Determine Defendant’s
Eligibility for Section 1172.6 Relief
Section 1172.6, in relevant part, provides that “person[s]
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” may file a petition to have that
conviction vacated under certain circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd.
11
(a); People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724; see also id. at
731 [clarifying that the language in § 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3)
referencing changes to murder and attempted murder law made
effective January 1, 2019, “‘does not require a showing that a
claim [for] relief . . . arises from no other cause’”; it means “‘only
that the 2019 changes supply a basis for the claim and so are a
cause’”].) If the petition contains all the required information,
including a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible
for relief based on the requirements of subdivision (a), the
sentencing court, after briefing by the parties, must hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at 450.) Importantly, at such a hearing, a
defendant and the People have the right to “offer new or
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief, the sentencing court “looks beyond the face of
the petition” to the record of conviction, which “‘necessarily
inform[s] the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . , allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.’” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549,
563, quoting People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) As part
of the record of conviction, jury instructions “will generally
inform the prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6.” (Antonelli,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at 723; see also id. at 731 [“In assessing section
1172.6 petitions from individuals convicted following jury trials,
the jury instructions will be critical”].) Only where “the petition
and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief,” may the court deny the petition. (People v.
12
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; accord, Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at 450.)
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a petition for
resentencing at the prima facie review stage, including its
determination that the record of conviction establishes as a
matter of law that the petitioner is not entitled to resentencing.
(People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170, disapproved
on another ground in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 569 & fn. 12.)
Defendant contends the “equally guilty” language of
CALJIC No. 3.00, when read with other instructions, such as
CALJIC 17.31, could have allowed the jury to find him guilty of
first degree murder “based on his intent to aid and abet a lesser
crime than first[ ]degree murder, thus imputing Alfaro’s mens
rea to [defendant].” In so arguing, defendant relies heavily on
Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972.
In Langi, the defendant was part of a group that beat and
robbed the victim, who ultimately fell, hit his head, and died.
(Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 975.) Langi, who was tried
separately, argued at trial that he did not throw the fatal punch,
and his jury was instructed on aiding and abetting and second
degree murder. (Id. at 977.) The jury convicted him of robbery,
battery, and second degree murder, and his subsequent section
1172.6 petition was summarily denied. (Ibid.)
The reviewing court assumed the jury had convicted Langi
as an aider and abettor. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 980.)
It then found CALJIC Nos. 3.01 (aiding and abetting) and 8.31
(second degree murder) were ambiguous and permitted the jury
to find Langi guilty on a theory under which malice was imputed
to him based solely on his participation in the crime. (Langi,
supra, at 981-982.) The court observed that while the aiding and
13
abetting instruction stated a person aided and abetted a crime if
the person acted with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and with the intent to commit or encourage the crime,
“the second-degree-murder instruction specified that the direct
perpetrator of that crime need not act with the unlawful intent of
causing death.” (Id. at 982.) The perpetrator’s unlawful purpose
could instead have been “only to strike or to injure, or conceivably
only to embarrass, the victim.” (Ibid.) “Since the perpetrator’s
purpose need not have been to kill the victim, the aider and
abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been
knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill.” (Ibid.) Because
the aiding and abetting instruction did not require the jury to
find the defendant personally acted with malice, the appellate
court concluded the jury could have convicted Langi as an aider
and abettor merely because he intended to aid or assist in the
beating of the victim. (Id. at 983.)
Defendant’s argument that the aiding and abetting
instructions in this case include an ambiguity (or flaw) that is
sufficiently akin to the problem in Langi focuses on the absence
of a requirement that the jury find defendant personally
harbored malice. Insofar as the Attorney General emphasizes
defense counsel’s concessions at the section 1172.6 hearing and
argues the point is forfeited, the argument has some force. But
we hold the point was minimally preserved by the citation to
Langi in the defense written submissions.
On the merits, it is impossible on the present record to
accept defendant’s contention that the jury could have convicted
him by imputing Alfaro’s malice to him (assuming Alfaro was the
actual killer) without contradicting this court’s prior holding that
any instructional error was harmless because the evidence
14
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant and
Alfaro shared the same mental state—i.e., a premeditated intent
to kill. Ordinarily, this would preclude defendant’s argument.
(See, e.g., Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at 451-452; see also People v.
Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246 [discussing the law of the
case doctrine].) The twist here, however, is that section 1172.6
permits a defendant to introduce new evidence at an evidentiary
hearing and allows a court to deny a section 1172.6 petition
before such a hearing only if the defendant is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 971-
972.) Because—with the right new evidence—it is theoretically
possible that a court could find defendant did not share the
mental state required to be convicted of malice murder, we will
vacate the trial court’s order and remand with directions to afford
defendant an opportunity to come forward with any new evidence
that could materially impact the conclusion about his mental
state that this court previously drew. This opportunity may come
either at a hearing following issuance of an order to show cause
or in response to a request from the court for a proffer of any such
evidence that would be presented should an order to show cause
issue.
B. Defendant Forfeited His Section 1172.75 Claim by
Failing to Raise It in the Trial Court
“‘In general, the forfeiture rule applies in the context of
sentencing as in other areas of criminal law.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856.) “[In] People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331 [ ], [our Supreme Court held that] a defendant
forfeits on appeal any ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’
15
in the absence of objection below. [Citations.]” (People v. Wall
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1075.) That is the case here. Defendant
did not raise the “drug rip-off” evidence in his section 1172.75
briefing in the trial court or in his statement to the court at the
hearing. At the hearing, his attorney did not raise the drug rip-
off evidence in his argument and did not object to the court’s
omission of such evidence when it explained the reasons for its
ruling. The absence of any objection or argument on the specific
ground now advanced on appeal results in forfeiture. (See, e.g.,
People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 416 [a “defendant’s
failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground he
now raises forfeits the claim on appeal”].)
Defendant alternatively suggests his attorney was
constitutionally ineffective by failing to raise the forfeited
argument. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a
defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel's representation
was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2)
counsel’s representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e.,
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings,
the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see also
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688.)
Defendant makes no serious attempt at either of these
demonstrations. Instead, he raises his ineffective assistance
claim in a subheading but offers no supporting argument in the
text that follows. An argument like defendant’s that “does not
even attempt to explain how counsel’s failure to object fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness or how the failure to
object resulted in prejudice” does not suffice, and “[w]e will not
16
address a claim that defendant has failed to develop.” (People v.
Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 467; see also People v. Bonin
(1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 857, fn. 6.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition is vacated and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
I concur:
KIM (D.), J.
17
People v. Vindiola, B337660 c/w B338387
HOFFSTADT, P. J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of the appeal
regarding defendant’s section 1172.75 petition. However, I
disagree with its disposition of the appeal of defendant’s section
1172.6 petition. In my view, we need not reach the res judicata
effect of our prior decision on appeal because the jury instructions
themselves foreclose as a matter of law any possibility that the
jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder without also
finding that he personally harbored malice aforethought. The
jury in this case was not explicitly instructed on any theory that
would allow it to impute malice to defendant, such as the theories
of felony-murder or natural and probable consequences liability.
The jury was instructed that direct aiders and abettors are
“equally” guilty as perpetrators, which People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972, 983 deemed insufficient to foreclose the
possibility that the jury might impute the perpetrator’s malice to
the aider and abettor. But the jury in this case was also
instructed that a person could not be a direct aider and abettor
unless they acted with “the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime,” and a
person could not be convicted of first degree murder unless they
acted with a “clear, deliberate intent . . . to kill.” To me, these
additional instructions ensured that the jury’s first degree
murder verdict necessarily rested on its finding that defendant
personally harbored malice. I would therefore affirm the
summary denial of section 1172.6 relief, rather than remand for
further proceedings.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
2
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