Noon v. Fuentes

CourtListener 10746156Calctapp02.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filled 11/18/25; certified for publication 12/2/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

B339872
LUCIE NOON, et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV15649)

v.

FERMIN M. FUENTES,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Reversed.
Law Offices of Clemente Franco and Clemente Franco for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
TamerLawCorp. and Steven Tamer for Defendant and
Respondent.
At issue in this case is whether a landlord who wrongfully
evicts tenants from six of his units, without notice, is protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute because he filed an unlawful detainer
action against the tenant of a seventh unit who, alone, was
behind on her rent. We hold this conduct is not protected.
Plaintiffs and appellants Lucie Noon (Noon), Hugo Batres
(Hugo), Haroldo Batres (Haroldo),1 Rigoberto Mena (Mena), and
Tolentino Sales (Sales) (appellants) rented units one, three, four,
five, and six in a building (the Property) owned by defendant and
respondent Fermin Fuentes. In July 2022, they were forced from
their homes when sheriff’s deputies executed a writ of possession
after Fuentes obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment
against the tenant of unit seven. Appellants sued Fuentes for
wrongful eviction and other claims, alleging he concealed the
unlawful detainer proceedings from them and unlawfully
terminated their tenancies.
Fuentes filed a special motion to strike the operative first
amended complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of
Civil Procedure, section 425.16,2 arguing that all of appellants’
claims arise from protected activity—the prosecution of an
unlawful detainer action. The trial court granted the motion as
to 10 of appellants’ 11 causes of action, and they appealed. We
conclude that appellants’ claims do not arise from protected
activity and therefore reverse.

1 Because two of the appellants share a surname, we refer to them
by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
2 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Appellants’ First Amended Complaint
We summarize the relevant factual allegations of the
operative first amended complaint below.
The Property, located at 1210 Magnolia Avenue in Los
Angeles, is a “large single family home” subdivided into at least
seven units. Appellants allege the Property is subject to the Los
Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO, Los Angeles Mun.
Code, §§ 151.00, et seq.) which permits evictions only in 14
enumerated circumstances3 and only where the landlord complies
with specific notice requirements. (Id., § 151.09,
subds. (A)(1)-(14), (C).)
With the exception of brothers Hugo and Haroldo,
appellants did not know each other before renting their units.
None of the appellants was a subtenant. Each rented directly
from Fuentes under separate oral lease agreements and moved
into their numbered units at different times. Noon rented unit
one in 1999. Hugo rented unit three in 2000, and Haroldo rented
unit four in 2000. Mena rented unit five in 2016, and Sales
rented unit six in 2019. Each paid monthly rent to Fuentes in
differing amounts, and some paid security deposits. Celia

3 Failure to pay rent is one of the enumerated reasons for evicting
a tenant (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.09, subd. (A)(1)); however, emptying a
property of tenants so a private owner can sell it is not. “A landlord’s
failure to satisfy the eviction requirements in LARSO provides the
tenant with an affirmative defense to the former’s unlawful detainer
action.” (Roxbury Lane LP v. Harris (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th Supp. 9,
14.)

3
Roxana Moreno Cisneros (Cisneros)4 and her partner, Jorge
Aldana (Aldana), rented unit seven, but Cisneros moved out in
mid-2021.
In September 2021, Fuentes informed appellants he was
selling the Property and told them they had to vacate within 60
days. He offered appellants “cash for key[s].” When none of them
accepted, he began “a campaign of harassment and threats to
force [them] to vacate.”
In November 2021, Fuentes filed an unlawful detainer
complaint against Cisneros alleging nonpayment of rent. Though
Cisneros was the only tenant behind on rent, Fuentes sought
possession of the entire Property, not just unit seven. Around
this time, Fuentes removed the unit numbers from the apartment
doors.
Appellants were never served with the unlawful detainer
and knew nothing of the eviction action against Cisneros.
Fuentes purported to serve Cisneros by delivering papers to
someone named “Maria Lopez,” who did not live at the Property.
Appellants suspected nothing and restored the unit numbers to
their doors.
Fuentes secured defaults against the unlawful detainer
defendants in February and May 2022, respectively, but never
served the requests for default on appellants. Fuentes again
removed the unit numbers from the doors to “g[i]ve the
impression that the . . . Property was one single family home
rather than the multi-unit property he created and rented.”

4 Celia Roxana Moreno Cisneros is identified as “Celia Roxana
Moreno” in the first amended complaint but appellants refer to her as
“Cisneros” in their opening brief and their opposition to the anti-
SLAPP motion.

4
On May 9, 2022, Fuentes obtained a judgment of possession
against Cisneros and unnamed occupants. The judgment
described the entire Property, not just unit seven. Fuentes did
not notify appellants of the judgment. Soon after, he requested
and obtained a writ of possession for the entire Property.
On July 6, 2022, sheriff’s deputies executed the writ and
ordered appellants from the Property. Fuentes did not inform
deputies that the writ should apply only to unit seven, that there
were multiple units at the Property, and that appellants were not
included in the unlawful detainer case. Appellants allege they
had not seen or been served with a notice to vacate, and some of
them had paid rent for July 2022.
Appellants became homeless and were unable to retrieve
most of their personal property. Subsequently, appellants
checked with the court but were “told there were no evictions
against them.”
In July 2023, appellants filed this action and thereafter,
filed the first amended complaint. They assert causes of action
for (1) wrongful eviction; (2) breach of covenant of quiet
enjoyment (tort); (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment
(statute); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED);
(5) violation of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 15610.30;
(6) forcible entry; (7) forcible detainer; (8) violation of Civil Code,
section 1950.5; (9) fraud; (10) violation of Civil Code, section
789.3; and (11) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL),
Business and Professions Code, section 17200, et seq.

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B. The Anti-SLAPP Motion
1. Fuentes’s Motion
Fuentes filed a special motion to strike all of the causes of
action. He argued that appellants’ claims arise from the
unlawful detainer case, which was protected activity. He also
argued that appellants could not demonstrate their claims have
at least minimal merit.

2. Appellants’ Opposition
Appellants submitted declarations in support of their
opposition. Each attested to renting a specific unit with a unit
number displayed on the door. Each unit had its own kitchen
and either a bathroom or access to a shared bathroom. When
Fuentes corresponded with appellants during their tenancies, he
referred to their particular unit numbers.
After announcing that he was selling the Property, Fuentes
offered rent and cash waivers to appellants that in some cases
exceeded $5,000. None of them accepted.
Fuentes’s verified unlawful detainer complaint, filed on
November 29, 2021, attached a copy of a written agreement
showing that two tenants, Cisneros and Aldana, rented
“Apt. No. 7” at the rate of $950 per month. However, the only
named defendant was Cisneros, and Doe defendants 1 to 10 were
described as “subtenants.” Fuentes alleged the defendants failed
to pay rent at the monthly rate of $950 pursuant to the attached
agreement but did not mention unit seven in the body of the
complaint. Instead, Fuentes alleged that Cisneros was in
possession of the entire premises at “1210 Magnolia Ave.”
Fuentes alleged that a 15-day notice to pay rent or quit had
been served on Cisneros and “All Occupants” in her care. The

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proof of service he filed indicates that Cisneros was personally
served with the notice at unit seven on September 28, 2021, but
nothing in it suggests it was mailed to appellants at their units.
The proofs of service of the summons, complaint, and
prejudgment claim of right to possession form state that copies of
these papers were left with a “Maria Lopez,” but again, there is
no mention of appellants or any indication that the documents
were mailed to their units. Appellants also were not listed
among the persons to whom the requests for entry of default were
mailed, and Fuentes’s counsel did not represent that copies were
mailed to their units.
On May 12, 2022, a clerk’s default judgment was entered
against Cisneros and “all occupants of the premises . . . .”
Fuentes was awarded “possession of the premises located
at . . . 1210 Magnolia Ave. Los Angeles, CA 90006.” The same
day, Fuentes applied for and obtained a writ of possession, listing
Cisneros as the judgment debtor and omitting unit seven from
the address of the premises.
In late May or early June 2022, Hugo and Haraldo noticed
the numbers were missing from all of the apartment doors and
replaced them. Shortly thereafter, the numbers were removed
again.
Appellants attested that when sheriff’s deputies executed
the writ of possession on July 6, 2022, they were unaware of the
unlawful detainer case. They had not seen Cisneros at the
Property for more than a year, and never knew a tenant named
Maria Lopez.
Though not a plaintiff, Cisneros furnished a declaration.
She described moving out in February 2021 because Fuentes was
harassing her. She informed Fuentes of her departure and that

7
she was no longer with Aldana, and she provided Fuentes with
her new address in June 2021. Cisneros denied being served
with a notice to pay or quit or notice to pay rent in connection
with her rental of unit seven. She attested that she no longer
lived at the Property when the unlawful detainer case was filed,
when the complaint was served, or when the request for entry of
default was mailed. She denied knowing anyone named Maria
Lopez.
In their opposition to the motion, appellants argued that
their claims arose from Fuentes’s “removal of Plaintiffs from
their apartments through fraudulent means, without providing
notice or following the unlawful detainer process.”
The trial court, however, was persuaded that appellants
were actually parties to the unlawful detainer action, even
though Fuentes had alleged nonpayment of the rent that was due
under the lease of unit seven only. The court found appellants’
allegation that the unlawful detainer action “‘against another
tenant’” was “inconsistent with the allegation that [Fuentes]
obtained a judgment ‘against [Cisneros] and unnamed
occupants.’” Fuentes’s action, the court reasoned, was protected
activity under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.
The trial court granted the motion as to 10 of appellants’ 11
causes of action. It found that, except for the eighth cause of
action alleging a failure to return security deposits, Fuentes had
shown that the claims arise from protected activity, namely, “the
prosecution of the subject unlawful detainer action.”
The court found that the burden shifted to appellants to
make a prima facie showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment. Appellants did not meet their burden, the court found,
because they did not address the litigation privilege or provide

8
any argument demonstrating how they would prevail on each
cause of action.
Appellants timely appealed from the order granting the
anti-SLAPP motion.

C. Governing Law
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” An “‘act in furtherance of a person’s right
of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue’” is
defined to include written statements made “before a . . . judicial
proceeding” or “in connection with an issue under consideration
or review” by a “judicial body” and other conduct “in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(1), (2), (4).)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal
merit.’” (Ibid.) An order granting an anti-SLAPP is reviewed
de novo. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
788.)

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DISCUSSION
A. Prong One
“The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity
each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity
is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson).) “A ‘claim may
be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the
wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step
leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “To determine whether a claim arises from
protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the
challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those
elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Courts then must evaluate whether the
defendant has shown any of these actions fall within one or more
of the four categories of acts’ protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute. (Ibid.; § 425.16, subd. (e).)
In this first step analysis, we “‘consider the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.’” (Area 51 Productions, Inc. v.
City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 594; § 425.16,
subd. (b)(2).) To determine whether a claim arises from protected
activity, we disregard its label and instead examine its gravamen
by identifying the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing
conduct that provides the foundation for the claim. (Area 51,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 594.) Prelitigation
communications may provide evidentiary support for the
complaint without being a basis of liability, and the mere fact
that an action was filed after protected activity took place does
not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of

10
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal,
LLC v. City of Oakland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 738, 753; Area 51,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 594–595.)

B. Analysis
Appellants argue that, “[a]t bottom, this case is based on
the fraudulent termination of a tenancy.” They argue that they
are “seek[ing] redress because [Fuentes] terminated their
tenancies and effectuated an eviction without resorting to the
judicial process—which, if anything, is the opposite of petitioning
activity.” We agree.
To be sure, the unlawful detainer action is heavily
referenced in the first amended complaint. However, “a tenant’s
complaint against a landlord filed after . . . the filing of a
complaint for unlawful detainer does not arise from those
particular activities if the gravamen of the tenant’s complaint
challenges the decision to terminate the tenancy or other conduct
in connection with the termination apart from the . . . filing of an
unlawful detainer complaint.” (Ulkarim v. Westfield LLC (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1279 (Ulkarim); Marlin v. Aimco Venezia,
LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 161 [“Terminating a tenancy or
removing a property from the rental market are not activities
taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free
speech”]; see Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1288
[complaint challenging landlord’s removal of apartment from
rental market and fraudulent eviction of tenant was not premised
on initiating or prosecuting unlawful detainer action].5)

5 Fuentes cites a single case, Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 275, 281, to support his argument that appellants’ claims

11
Here, the gravamen of appellant’s claims is not Fuentes’s
filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer against the tenants of
unit seven, but rather, his improper termination of appellants’
tenancies to accommodate a sale of the Property. Appellants’
wrongful eviction claim requires them to establish their
peaceable possession of their units and Fuentes’s forcible entry.
(Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1039–1040.) “If a tenant is forcibly removed
from premises without judicial process, such tenant can sue for
wrongful eviction” and obtain damages. (Munoz v. MacMillan
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648, 655.)
We cannot find from the record before us that appellants
were parties to the unlawful detainer action against Cisneros and
“unnamed occupants.” First, the only basis for the unlawful
detainer action was the alleged nonpayment of rent as to unit
seven. That allegation could not support the eviction of tenants

arise from protected activity. Birkner concluded that a tenant’s
complaint “arose from” protected conduct because the “‘sole basis for
liability’” was the landlord’s service of a notice to terminate a tenancy
and a refusal to rescind the notice. (Id. at p. 283.) However, Birkner
“ha[s] been criticized for failing to recognize that the critical
consideration is whether the claim is based on defendant’s protected
free speech or petitioning activity. The mere fact that a claim may
have been triggered by protected activity (such as service of unlawful
detainer papers) does not necessarily mean it arose from that activity.”
(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The
Rutter Group 2025), ¶ 7:598; see Ulkarim, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1279–1280 [“Birkner [citation] failed to explain why the tenants’
complaint was not based on the landlord’s decision to terminate the
tenancy, which was not protected activity, rather than on the service of
the notice of termination”].)

12
in other units in the building. Nor can we find that appellants
were lawfully served and given notice as “unnamed occupants.”
The unlawful detainer complaint itself defines the unnamed
defendants as “subtenants.” None of appellants, apparently,
were subtenants, as they had individual rental agreements with
Fuentes for separate units. Indeed, the written lease agreement
with Cisneros defines the premises she was renting as
“Apt. No. 7.” The only “unnamed occupants” legally served with
the unlawful detainer action would have been unnamed
occupants of unit seven.6
Appellants’ allegations and evidence indicate they were
occupying units in a multi-unit building pursuant to separate
rental agreements. Fuentes’s stated reason for wanting
appellants to vacate—to facilitate his sale of the Property—was
not a reason for eviction permitted by the LARSO, and his cash
for keys offers suggest that he understood this. Appellants allege

6 Section 415.46 provides a procedure to notify unnamed potential
occupants of eviction proceedings. “At the time the named defendants
are served with summons and complaint [citation], landlords also have
the option of serving a ‘prejudgment claim of right to possession’ form,
attached to a copy of the summons and complaint, on unnamed adult
occupants of the premises. This procedure effectively shifts the burden
to the unnamed occupants to add themselves as defendants to the
action by timely filing a claim of right to possession.” (Friedman, et al.,
Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2025),
¶ 8:131.1.) Nothing in the record indicates that appellants were served
with the claim of right form in the manner required by this section.
(See § 415.46, subd. (c)(2).) Indeed, according to their allegations,
appellants were not unknown to Fuentes. If the unlawful detainer
action was truly meant to evict everyone living in the Property,
Fuentes knew where to find the other tenants, according to appellants.
They had separate lease agreements with him and had been paying
rent to him for years.

13
that when he could not convince them to leave voluntarily,
Fuentes resorted to deceptive and fraudulent conduct to
terminate their tenancies in violation of LARSO.
Fuentes first concealed the unlawful detainer actions from
appellants and removed indicia of multiple living units from the
premises before the sheriff’s lockout. When the sheriff’s deputies
arrived to evict appellants, they were misled by Fuentes into
believing that the apartment building was merely one unit and
that the writ of possession applied to appellants. In response to
Haroldo’s truthful statement to a sheriff’s deputy that he had not
received anything from the court, Fuentes’ falsely stated that
Haroldo was “‘playing games,’” misleading the deputy into
believing the writ required the lockout of not only Cisneros, but
appellants too. These acts do not arise from filing and
prosecuting the unlawful detainer case against the tenants of
unit seven, which was merely one “‘step leading to some different
act for which liability is asserted.’” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 884.)7
The other claims incorporate these allegations by reference.
Though these claims are cast differently and under distinct legal
theories, the unlawful termination of appellants’ tenancies is the
indispensable feature of all of them.
In the claims for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
the unlawful termination of appellants’ tenancies is the alleged
act of breach. In the IIED claim, the same conduct is alleged to
have caused appellants emotional distress. In the elder abuse
claim, Mena alleges this conduct constituted the taking of his

7 To hold differently would deprive appellants of any legal process
to challenge their eviction. Not parties to the unlawful detainer action,
they could not defend against it or appeal the final judgment.

14
property with fraudulent intent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30,
subd. (a)(1) [financial abuse of an elder adult occurs when a
person “[t]akes,” “appropriates,” or “obtains” the real property of
an elder adult “for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or
both”].) The same conduct supplies the elements of a forcible
entry and forcible detainer, as required by these causes of action.
(Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 607; § 1172.) In the fraud
claim, appellants rely on Fuentes’s concealing the unlawful
detainer proceedings to establish the element of concealment or
suppression of a material fact. (See Hambrick v. Healthcare
Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.)
The above-described conduct is alleged to be the means by which
Fuentes “prevent[ed] [appellants] from gaining reasonable access
to” their units in violation of Civil Code, section 789.3,
subd. (b)(1). Finally, the same conduct is the basis for appellants’
UCL cause of action, which alleges that Fuentes engaged in
unlawful business practices by violating Civil Code sections 19278
and the provisions of the LARSO provisions governing evictions
(L.A. Mun. Code, §§ 151.09, 151.10.)
In sum, Fuentes fails to demonstrate that any of these
causes of action is based on the unlawful detainer action. He has
failed to carry his first prong burden.

8 “An agreement to let upon hire binds the letter to secure to the
hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the
hiring, against all persons lawfully claiming the same.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1927.)

15
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting Fuentes anti-SLAPP
motion is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order
and enter a new order denying the motion. Appellants shall
recover their costs on appeal.

**VAN ROOYEN, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

** Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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Filed 12/2/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

LUCIE NOON, et al., B339872
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV15649
v.
ORDER GRANTING
FERMIN M. FUENTES, PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent.

THE COURT*

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on November 18, 2025,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. Good cause
appearing, it is ordered that the opinion in the above-entitled matter be
published in the Official Reports.

*ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J. VAN ROOYEN, J. **

** Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.

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