People v. Walker CA2/8

CourtListener 10746028Calctapp02.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/2/25 P. v. Walker CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B324921

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA090187)
v.

KAALAN WALKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan Kline and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Kaalan Walker appeals from his judgment of conviction of
sexual offenses against multiple victims, many of whom were
young, aspiring models that Walker offered to photograph. On
appeal, Walker argues: (1) the trial court erred in overruling a
defense objection to the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory
challenge against a Black juror; (2) the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of Walker’s online search history; (3) the trial
court erred in excluding proffered impeachment evidence; (4) the
trial court erred in excluding proffered character evidence;
(5) there was cumulative error; and (6) this court should conduct
an independent review of sealed transcripts for any discoverable
material under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531
(Pitchess). Walker also asserts there are certain clerical errors in
the abstract of judgment. We conclude Walker has failed to show
any error requiring the reversal of his convictions. We modify the
abstract of judgment to correct the clerical errors identified by
Walker, and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Charges
In an amended information, Walker was charged with six
counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code1 § 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 1, 3,
5, 8, 11, & 15), two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor more than three years younger (§ 261.5, subd. (c); counts 2
& 10), one count of sexual penetration by force (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A); count 18), one count of contact with a minor for a
sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 22), two counts of rape

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

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while the victim was intoxicated (§ 261, subd. (a)(3); counts 23 &
25), and one count of assault with intent to commit a sexual
offense (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 24). As to seven of the counts, it
was alleged that the acts were committed against multiple
victims. (§ 667.61, subd. (b) & (e).) The information also alleged
numerous aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)
& (c)).
2. Prosecution evidence
2.1. Forcible rape of minor M.C. (count 1)
In 2013, when M.C. was 16 years old, she received a direct
message from Walker on Twitter. Walker’s Twitter account
indicated that he was a music artist, which M.C. believed was
legitimate because the account was verified with a blue check
mark. Walker offered M.C. $5,000 to appear in a music video,
and M.C. agreed to meet with him in person to discuss the offer.
Prior to the meeting, Walker asked M.C. her age. M.C. told
him that she was a minor, in high school, and did not drive. At
Walker’s direction, M.C. took a train to downtown Los Angeles,
and he picked her up from the station in his car. While M.C. was
in the car, Walker bragged about himself and celebrities with
whom he had worked. Walker drove M.C. to an apartment
building, and then took her upstairs to a closed lounge area.
Once inside the lounge, Walker told M.C. that he took
massage classes and wanted to show her some things that he
learned. M.C. was uncomfortable but agreed to a massage.
While M.C. was lying on her stomach, Walker sat on top of her
and began massaging her back. When Walker moved his hands
toward her lower body, M.C. repeatedly asked him what he was
doing. She also said “No,” and tried to turn. Walker continued
touching M.C.’s buttocks and vaginal area. Walker then forcibly

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pulled down M.C.’s pants, and inserted his penis inside her
vagina. M.C. began to cry and shake with fear. At some point,
Walker stopped. M.C. told Walker that she wanted to leave, and
he drove her to a train station.
M.C. initially did not report the incident because she felt
ashamed that she lied to her parents about where she was going.
In 2018, M.C. saw Walker at a club and decided to confront him,
but she lost him in the crowd. M.C. later told her cousin what
happened, and her cousin sent her a news article about Walker.
After reading the article, M.C. disclosed the assault to her
parents and then reported it to the police.
2.2. Unlawful sexual intercourse with minor
Aliyah G. (count 2)
In 2017, Aliyah G. was 16 years old and an aspiring model.
She began following Walker’s Instagram account after she came
across photos that he took of another model. Based on Walker’s
Instagram posts, Aliyah believed he was a professional
photographer. At some point, Walker sent Aliyah a direct
message on Instagram, asking if she wanted to do a photo shoot.
Aliyah agreed. Prior to meeting Walker, Aliyah told him she was
16 years old.
On the day of the photo shoot, Walker arranged for an Uber
to bring Aliyah to his apartment complex. Aliyah asked her
friend, Camille, to accompany her to the shoot. When the girls
arrived, Walker took them to a recreational area near a pool.
He told Aliyah that they would go to his apartment for the photo
shoot, but her friend had to stay in the recreational area. Walker
then brought Aliyah to his apartment, where he took photos of
her for about 30 minutes.

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After the photo shoot, Walker told Aliyah that he wanted to
talk to her inside his bedroom. He claimed that he knew Drake
and other celebrities, and that he would take her to a party
where she could network with them. Walker asked Aliyah about
her sexual experience, and she told him that she was a virgin.
Walker explained that the people at the party would not like
someone who lacked sexual experience, and repeatedly asked
Aliyah if she wanted him to “pop [her] cherry.” Although Aliyah
told Walker “no” at least five times, he persisted in asking her.
Aliyah eventually agreed to have sex with Walker because she
“didn’t know what else to do.”
After Aliyah undressed, Walker said that he was going to
record them having sex with his phone, and she agreed. At
Walker’s direction, Aliyah orally copulated him, and he then
penetrated her vagina with his penis. Afterward, Aliyah
returned to the recreational area, and told Camille that she had
sex with Walker.
A year later, Aliyah disclosed the incident to her mother.
She then went to a Planned Parenthood clinic and told a nurse
that she had nonconsensual sex with an older man. Aliyah
described the sex as nonconsensual at that time because she
repeatedly said “no” to Walker and only “gave in” after he
continued to pressure her. Aliyah later reported the incident to
the police.
After Aliyah testified at the preliminary hearing, the video
that Walker recorded of their sexual activity was posted on a
social media platform. In the video, Aliyah is seen smiling and
giggling. At trial, Aliyah testified that she had consensual sex
with Walker, but she also felt that he “preyed on” her in a
“premeditated” way.

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2.3. Unlawful sexual intercourse with minor
Gianna R. (count 10)
In 2017, Gianna R. was 16 years old and a child actor.
She was interested in expanding her career into modeling.
Gianna first heard from Walker when he sent her a direct
message on Instagram, asking if she wanted to do a photo shoot.
She assumed he was a legitimate photographer because his
account was verified with a blue check mark. Gianna agreed to
the shoot. She told Walker that she was 16 years old, and
wanted professional headshots.
On the day of the photo shoot, Gianna went to Walker’s
apartment complex with her family. When they arrived, Walker
brought them to a common area near the pool. Gianna’s mother
told Walker that Gianna had just turned 16, and was interested
in modeling for major brands such as Vogue and Victoria’s Secret.
Walker pointed out that those magazines had a minimum age
requirement so Gianna would have to wait until she turned 18 to
submit photos to them. Walker also bragged about his own
success in Hollywood and the celebrities that he knew, including
Halle Barry and Drake.
At Walker’s direction, Gianna’s family waited outside by
the pool while he took headshots of Gianna in the common area.
As the shoot progressed, Walker told Gianna that she would have
to take more revealing photos if she wanted to model for Vogue or
Victoria’s Secret. Although Gianna was uncomfortable, she
agreed to pose for some photos in her bra and underwear.
Walker then said that if Gianna wanted to be successful in the
industry and to meet his friend Drake, she would have to film a
sex video. Gianna repeatedly declined Walker’s offer, but when
he continued to push the issue, she agreed.

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Walker told Gianna’s family that he was going to take her
to the other side of the building for additional photos. He instead
brought Gianna to his apartment, which had a mattress on the
floor in the living room. Walker directed Gianna to record them
with his phone and remove her clothing. Walker then penetrated
her vagina with his penis. Afterward, Walker told Gianna not to
tell anyone that they had sex. He also said that he would be
sending the video to Drake, which would make Gianna famous.
Walker accompanied Gianna back to the pool area, and she left
with her family. Gianna did not tell anyone at that time what
occurred.
A few months later, Walker called Gianna and told her that
he was backstage at a Drake concert, and asked her to come and
meet him. Gianna did not believe Walker, and blocked his phone
number to avoid further contact. The following year, Gianna
disclosed to her mother what happened with Walker. Her mother
then took Gianna to the police to report the incident.
2.4. Forcible rape and rape while the victim was
intoxicated of Kimberly Q. (counts 11 and 23)
In 2017, Kimberly Q. was 18 years old and working as a
model while attending college in New York. She received a direct
message from Walker on Instagram, asking if she was interested
in a photo shoot. He offered her a rate of $200 per hour for a six-
hour shoot to take place in Los Angeles. He also offered to
reserve a hotel room for her and to reimburse her for the cost of
her flight. Based on Walker’s Instagram profile, which was
verified with a blue check mark, Kimberly believed he was a
professional photographer. After communicating with Walker for
a few weeks, Kimberly agreed to a date for the photo shoot.

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When Kimberly arrived in Los Angeles, she took a Lyft to
Walker’s apartment complex. After Walker brought Kimberly
into his apartment, he repeatedly offered her alcohol and told her
that it would help her feel more confident. Kimberly was
uncomfortable because she never had alcohol before, but she
agreed and proceeded to drink three glasses of hard liquor. At
Walker’s request, Kimberly also agreed to pose for photos in her
bra and underwear. Kimberly then changed into another outfit,
and Walker continued to photograph her in an area outside the
apartment complex.
At some point during the photo shoot, Kimberly began to
feel unbalanced and collapsed to the floor due to the alcohol she
consumed. Walker helped Kimberly up, guided her back to his
apartment, and placed her on his bed. Kimberly blacked out, and
when she woke up, her body felt paralyzed and her pants had
been removed. Walker then removed Kimberly’s underwear and
penetrated her vagina with his penis. Kimberly repeatedly told
Walker to stop, but he refused.
After the assault, Kimberly continued to fall in and out of
consciousness. When she woke up again, she checked her phone
and saw that a message had been posted from her Instagram
account, recommending that others follow Walker’s account.
Kimberly did not write that post. Later, Walker took Kimberly’s
phone and replied to text messages that she received from friends
checking in on her. After Walker returned the phone to her,
Kimberly texted a friend, “I think I just got raped. Just save this
conversation. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] He’s looking at my phone so just save
all of this for me.”
The next morning, Kimberly pretended that she had no
memory of the assault so that Walker would allow her to leave.

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After she returned to New York, Kimberly went to the hospital
and disclosed to the staff there that she was raped while under
the influence of alcohol. At that time, she submitted to a sexual
assault forensic exam. A few weeks later, Kimberly reported the
rape to the police. Prior to making the police report, she asked
Walker to reimburse her for her plane ticket, but he did not do so.
Kimberly also told Walker in a text message that she
“remember[ed] everything,” and that he “took advantage” of her
while she was drunk.
2.5. Forcible rape of Paris L. (count 15)
In 2016, Paris L. was 21 years old and working as a model.
She received a direct message from Walker on Instagram, asking
to book her for a magazine photo shoot. Paris believed the
request was legitimate because Walker had a large Instagram
following and his account was verified with a blue check mark.
Walker told Paris the payment for the photo shoot would be
$3,000, but did not provide other details. He asked to meet in
person to discuss the shoot, and Paris agreed to the meeting.
When Paris arrived at Walker’s apartment complex, he told
her that he did not want to discuss business in public, and then
took her to his apartment. Once inside the apartment, Walker
showed Paris photos of other models, and said that these women
maintain a luxurious lifestyle by having sex with famous rappers.
He also said that the rapper, Drake, wanted to pay her $95,000 to
serve as an escort for him, with Walker receiving a percentage of
that fee. Paris declined the offer.
Later in the conversation, Walker told Paris that he
wanted to see what her body looked like to confirm if she was the
right fit for the photo shoot. After removing her dress in the
bathroom, Paris went to the living room in her bra and

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underwear. Walker told Paris to lie on the mattress so that he
could give her a massage. Paris replied that she did not “want to
do anything” and needed to leave soon. Walker was persistent,
however, and Paris felt that she had to comply. Once Paris was
face down on the mattress, Walker began to massage her. Paris
repeatedly told Walker that she did not want to have sex with
him. She also tried to move away, but Walker pinned her down
with his body. Walker moved Paris’s underwear to the side, and
after putting on a condom, he penetrated her vagina with his
penis. Paris told Walker to stop, but he refused. At one point,
Walker dumped money on top of Paris. He then said, “The longer
you comply, the more money you’re going to get. Anything that
touches the floor, you can keep.” Paris told Walker that she did
not want his money.
After the assault, Walker put some money in Paris’s purse.
She again said that she did not want his money, and that she was
not a prostitute. In response, Walker told Paris, “ ‘You’re not a
prostitute. Prostitutes fuck all kinds of men. You only fuck a
few.’ ” He added, “ ‘I shouldn’t have to worry about you; you
should worry about me.’ ” As soon as Paris got to her car, she
called her friend and told her that she had been raped.
The following day, Paris stated in a text message to Walker
that she told him to stop many times and that he did not do so.
Walker replied that Paris was indecisive so he was not sure what
she wanted, and that he apologized if he disrespected her. Later
that day, Paris reported the incident to the police.
2.6. Assault of Isabel I. (count 24)
In 2018, Isabel I. moved to Los Angeles to pursue a career
as a singer/songwriter. She was living with her new boyfriend,
Jordan, who was Walker’s photographer and friend. Isabel knew

10
Walker was a recording artist, rapper, and actor. In July 2018,
Isabel received a call from Walker on Jordan’s phone. Walker
said that he heard one of her songs and liked her voice, and
invited her to the studio in his apartment to record some music.
Isabel agreed.
When Isabel arrived at the apartment complex, Jordan
brought her upstairs to Walker’s unit and then left in her car to
go to a photo shoot. After Jordan left, Walker asked Isabel about
her Instagram account, and told her that she needed to sexualize
her image to succeed in the music industry. He also talked about
well-known female artists whom he claimed became famous by
performing sexual acts. Walker said that he knew Isabel was a
sexual person because he saw videos of her on Jordan’s phone.
He suggested that he could help her with her music career if she
agreed to have sex with him. Walker then became more direct,
and repeatedly asked Isabel to perform oral sex on him for
money. Isabel told Walker that she was not interested.
At some point, Walker pushed Isabel onto the bed and
began masturbating over her. He briefly left the room when he
received a call from Jordan, ordering Isabel in an aggressive tone
not to move. Isabel complied because she was afraid and
suspected that the situation was a setup arranged by Jordan.
When Walker returned, he forced Isabel to orally copulate him
until he ejaculated in her mouth.
Afterward, as Isabel was leaving the apartment, Walker
followed her and said, “Jordan’s loyalty lies with me.” Isabel
went downstairs where Jordan was waiting in her car. While
driving home with Jordan, Isabel began to cry and told him that
Walker was not his friend. She did not disclose the assault to
Jordan at that time because she was afraid that he was involved.

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The next day, Isabel had a painful swollen throat, and believed
that Walker had given her a sexually transmitted disease. At
that point, she told Jordan what happened. Isabel then went to
the emergency room where she disclosed the assault to the
hospital staff and received treatment for gonorrhea. Isabel later
reported the assault to the police.
2.7. Rape while the victim was intoxicated of
Desiree B. (count 25)
In 2014, when Desiree B. was 18 years old, she went to a
nightclub in downtown Los Angeles. Desiree was part of a group
that took a party bus to the nightclub, and she drank a lot of
alcohol while on the bus. By the time she arrived at the
nightclub, she was very drunk and security refused to allow her
inside. While the rest of the group went inside the nightclub,
Desiree remained outside on her own.
At some point, a young Black man approached and offered
to help Desiree get into the nightclub through a back area.
Desiree was still drunk at the time, and agreed to go with the
man. He instead led her to an outdoor parking lot where she
ended up in the back seat of a car. The man also got into the car
and was suddenly on top of Desiree, forcing her on her back.
Scared and confused, Desiree told the man to stop and tried to
push him away. The man held Desiree down, and then
penetrated her vagina with his penis.
After the assault, Desiree got out of the car and went back
to the party bus. She did not tell anyone on the bus what
happened to her. The next morning, Desiree was in a lot of pain
and discovered a cyst in her vaginal area that she did not have
prior to the assault. A few days later, she visited a Planned
Parenthood clinic and disclosed the assault to a nurse who then

12
reported it to the police. Desiree submitted to a sexual assault
forensic exam, which revealed vaginal bruising and redness.
She also provided the police with the dress that she was wearing
when the assault occurred.
Several years later, in 2018, a detective contacted Desiree
and informed her that there was a match to the DNA collected
from her sexual assault exam. At that time, Desiree was shown a
photographic lineup, and she selected Walker as her possible
assailant because he was the youngest person in the photos.
Desiree did not recognize Walker at trial and did not recall seeing
him before. She testified that she could not remember the details
of the assault because she was intoxicated and was “blacking out
a lot” when it occurred.
2.8. Prior uncharged offenses
The prosecution presented evidence of three uncharged
sexual offenses committed by Walker. Jamie H. testified that, in
2015, she met Walker backstage at a music concert, and that he
invited her to an afterparty to meet one of the performers.
Walker instead took Jamie to an empty apartment where he held
her against her will and raped her. Dalia S. testified that, in
2014, she and a friend socialized with Walker at a party in the
apartment complex where she lived, and that Walker later drove
them to a convenience store. After dropping off Dalia’s friend,
Walker drove his car to a parking lot, locked the rear doors, and
then raped Dalia in the back seat. Jada E. testified that, in 2016,
she was 17 years old and an aspiring model, and that Walker
contacted her on Instagram about a photo shoot. While Jada was
at Walker’s apartment for the scheduled shoot, he started to
massage and sexually molest her, and told her she needed to

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perform sexual acts to succeed as a model. When Jada began to
cry and begged him to stop, Walker raped her.
2.9. Police investigation
In 2017, Los Angeles police detective Karen Widman was
assigned to investigate the sexual assault report that Kimberly
made against Walker. During that investigation, Detective
Widman learned of the reports made by three other
complainants, including Isabel and Paris. Walker was first
arrested on September 11, 2018, and provided a DNA sample at
that time. In October 2018, the police issued a press release
announcing that Walker was under investigation for a series of
sexual assaults and requesting that the public contact a tip line
with any relevant information. As a result of the press release,
Detective Widman was contacted by a number of other
complainants, including M.C., Aliyah, Gianna, Jamie, Dalia, and
Jada.
In late 2018, Detective Widman learned that there was a
DNA match to Walker for the 2014 sexual assault reported by
Desiree. Walker’s DNA also matched the DNA recovered in the
sexual assault exams performed on Kimberly and Jamie. Walker
was arrested a second time on March 25, 2019.
During the investigation, the police searched two
apartments associated with Walker, and seized a computer and
multiple cell phones. Data extracted from Walker’s computer
showed that, in April 2018, he visited a pornography website and
searched for “raped” videos. Walker also visited that same
pornography website on two of his cell phones. He searched the
website for “fucking this girl from Instagram” videos in August
2018 and “tricked into f’g” videos in September 2018 prior to his
first arrest. He again searched the website in March 2019 prior

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to his second arrest for videos on “exploited girl talked into sex
with pervert photographer,” “rape,” “begged not to rape,” and
“fake photo shoot.”
3. Defense evidence
Walker testified at trial on his own behalf. According to his
testimony, Walker was born in 1995, and was a dancer, musician,
actor, and photographer. In 2018, he had roles in two movies,
including one starring Halle Berry. Walker’s Instagram and
Twitter accounts were verified with blue check marks because he
was considered a “person of influence” at the time. Walker either
resided at or had access to the apartment complexes where the
alleged crimes took place.
Walker admitted that he contacted several of his accusers,
including M.C., Aliyah, Gianna, Kimberly, Paris, and Jada, on
Instagram, and offered them a business opportunity to appear in
a photo shoot or music video. Walker testified that he met
Desiree and Jamie at music concerts, met Dalia at a party, and
knew Isabel through his best friend, Jordan. Walker admitted
that he engaged in sexual activity with each of the accusers, but
testified that all of the encounters were consensual. As to the
accusers who were minors at the time of the sexual activity,
Walker admitted that Gianna told him she was 16 years old, but
denied knowing the ages of M.C. or Aliyah.
Walker testified that he was arrested in September 2018,
and then rearrested in February 2019 while he was out on bail.
He stated that, following his first arrest, he searched online for
pornographic videos related to rape because he wanted to
understand the sexual offenses that he was accused of
committing. Walker admitted, however, that he conducted some
of the searches prior to his first arrest. He also testified that he

15
lied to some of the accusers to impress them, and that he believed
this led them to make false accusations against him. Walker
stated: “I feel like my personal opinion, the reason why they are
all accusing me, I did some childish stuff. I lied. I said the
dumbest things to get them to sleep with me. I said whatever
possible to be able to look cool and sleep with these girls, and
when I made them false promises and said I would do all of this
stuff for them, I didn’t do any of it. And looking back, now that
I’m in a committed relationship—I’ve been with my fiancée for
three years—I realize that I was stupid.”
The defense also introduced evidence of statements made
by some of the accusers during their interviews with the police.
In her interview, Paris indicated that she removed her clothes at
Walker’s request and voluntarily lay down on his mattress, and
that she was not physically restrained by Walker but rather felt
powerless. Desiree stated that she was unsure if there was any
penetration during the assault. Kimberly acknowledged that she
initially did not want to press charges and changed her mind
after she contacted Walker. Aliyah told the police that she
agreed to have sex with Walker because she thought it could help
her career. M.C. stated that she believed she told Walker her
age, but she was not certain.
4. Jury verdict and sentencing
The jury found Walker guilty of the forcible rape of M.C.
(count 1), unlawful sexual intercourse with minor Aliyah
(count 2), unlawful sexual intercourse with minor Gianna
(count 10), forcible rape and rape while the victim was
intoxicated of Kimberly (counts 11 & 23), forcible rape of Paris
(count 15), assault with intent to commit oral copulation of Isabel
(count 24), and rape while the victim was intoxicated of Desiree

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(count 25). As to counts 1, 11, and 15, the jury also found true
the allegation that Walker committed crimes against multiple
victims. The jury found Walker not guilty of three of the charged
counts, and the trial court dismissed two other counts because
the named victims elected not to testify.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the
aggravating factor allegations that certain victims were
particularly vulnerable, and that certain offenses indicated
planning, sophistication, or professionalism, and included
threats, intimidation, or false imprisonment. The trial court
sentenced Walker to an aggregate term of 45 years to life plus
five years in state prison.
Walker filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Objection to peremptory challenge
Walker contends the trial court erred when it overruled his
objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 to the
prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse an African
American prospective juror (“Juror No. 96”). Walker also claims
the error deprived him of his federal and state constitutional
rights to an impartial jury. We conclude the trial court did not
violate Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 or Walker’s
constitutional rights in overruling the objection.
1.1. Relevant Background
In her jury questionnaire, Juror No. 96 indicated that she
was a registered nurse and married, and had no prior knowledge
of the case. When asked about her ability to decide the facts of
the case, Juror No. 96 appeared to respond that “[t]he facts of the
case should be based on evidence,” and that her “feelings may be
skewed or influenced to make a decision.” When asked if she

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held any views concerning African Americans such that she could
not be a fair and impartial juror in this case, Juror No. 96 replied
“Yes,” and then explained, “Because African Americans [are]
alway[s] marginalized, and most times unfair[ly] treated in our
judicial system.”
During voir dire, the trial court asked Juror No. 96 about
the statement in her questionnaire that African Americans are
marginalized and unfairly treated in the judicial system, and
whether she could be fair to both sides and base her decision in
the case solely on the evidence presented in court. Juror No. 96
replied: “The reason I mentioned that, I know it’s a rape case. I
think just from facts is the facts are convincible to me, I would—
accepting facts. But at the same time from, from what I have
been seeing, my experience with jurors, I feel especially the
African American has been facing this for a long time. I don’t
know if I would be able to just base it on facts because I know the
judicial system, the way they have been treated from Black Lives
Matter, I think it has a big influence. So I don’t know if I would
be able to overlook that as a juror. So that’s why I wrote that and
I hope it’s not offensive to anyone here.” The court noted that
“[w]hat we really need to know is whether you can be fair to both
sides.” In response, Juror No. 96 stated, “Yes, I can. Yes.”
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 96 to clarify her statement
that she could not base her decision solely on the facts because of
her belief that Black males have been unfairly treated by the
justice system. Juror No. 96 replied, “Well, I’ll base it on the
facts but also my opinion and bias remains, but I’ll base the
judgment on the facts.” When asked by the prosecutor whether
“that bias [is] going to seep into [her] decision-making process,”
Juror No. 96 answered: “I hope it wouldn’t. But at the same

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time, it’s better to hear from the witnesses so that way I can be
convinced by the witnesses, and if I feel that there is facts and
my bias can be waived, so that’s the way I feel.” The prosecutor
also sought clarification on Juror No. 96’s statement that her
feelings may be skewed or influenced to make a decision. Juror
No. 96 stated: “I don’t know how to explain it. To me, my—the
facts is what matters to me, the evidence would matter to me.
But at the same time, if I have any doubts or any feeling of not
believing all the facts, that would influence my decision.” In
response to further questioning, Juror No. 96 confirmed that she
was more skeptical of evidence that would come from the
government, that she trusted the prosecution less than the
defense “depending on the case,” and that she would start this
case from a position of not trusting the prosecution. Juror No. 96
also indicated that she had a financial hardship because her
husband was leaving his job.
Defense counsel asked Juror No. 96 if she could be fair to
both sides after hearing the facts of the case. She responded,
“Yes.” The prosecutor then asked Juror No. 96 to clarify that
response given her prior comments about not trusting the
prosecution and the government. Juror No. 96 explained that she
did not mistrust every person in the government or believe every
case in the judicial system was unfair, but rather she was basing
her opinion on her “experiences in the U.S.” and the “facts that
[B]lack people haven’t been treated fairly in some cases.” Juror
No. 96 added, “I can base my decision on facts. But at the same
time, I still have that opinion.”
The prosecutor challenged Juror No. 96 for cause, arguing
that “she specifically said that she doesn’t trust the Government,
she’s skeptical of the Government, and she does not trust or is

19
skeptical of evidence that comes from the prosecution side.”
The prosecutor further argued that Juror No. 96 stated in her
questionnaire that she felt that Black males were treated
unfairly in the justice system, and that she “didn’t waiver from
that” position during voir dire. The trial court noted that Juror
No. 96 did make those statements, but “she later said she could
be fair to both sides.” The court also acknowledged that “[t]here
was some hesitation” in her demeanor in answering voir dire
questions, but found that it did not justify a challenge for cause.
The court stated, “[G]iven the totality of what she said and the
way she acted, it might support a [peremptory], but I’m not going
to grant the for cause request at this point.”
The prosecutor later exercised a peremptory challenge to
excuse Juror No. 96. Defense counsel objected under Code of
Civil Procedure section 231.7, arguing that Juror No. 96 was
African American and that “there is a class of discrimination.”
In explaining the reasons for excusing Juror No. 96, the
prosecutor stated: “She made statements that she believes the
justice system was unfair to [B]lacks. She believes that [B]lacks
are marginalized. She thinks [B]lack males are treated unfairly.
She’s more skeptical of evidence that comes from the
Government. She doesn’t trust the People or the Government.
She can’t base her decision—I remember her saying it’s not going
to be fact-based, that what she knows about the criminal justice
system is going to come into play. She actually stated that she
didn’t think or she wasn’t sure she could overlook any of that.
And I asked her several questions with respect to that, and she
waffled back and forth, but our main issue is that she really does
believe that the Government—evidence that comes from the
Government or from the People, who we are, can’t be trusted.

20
Additionally, she indicated after we talked to her last time about
her financial hardships, and again, she brought that up today.”
The prosecutor added that the Juror No. 96 also expressed that
“her opinion on bias will remain, and that essentially indicates
that she cannot be fair to the People or the evidence that the
People intend on presenting.” The prosecutor further noted that
the current panel included three Black female jurors.
The trial court overruled the objection, stating: “I’m just
noting that not all the reasons that you stated are presumptively
invalid, but to the extent the juror did express a lack of trust in
law enforcement, I think that could be considered a presumptive
[invalid] reason. However, I do agree that the reasons that
you’ve given as a whole provide, in the Court’s view, clear and
convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would
view your reasons for excusing this juror as not related to the
juror’s membership in the group, both being [B]lack or female,
and based on that, and that’s either a membership in the group
or perceived membership in the group. [¶] So I do think it’s
highly probable that overall your reasons are unrelated to
conscious or unconscious bias[,] [are] specific to the juror and do
bear on that juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.” The court
also agreed with the prosecutor’s assertion that “the People have
passed now on three separate [B]lack jurors who obviously are
not similarly situated to this person and the reasons that are
provided to this person.”
The impaneled jury consisted of three Black females, two
Asian females, one Indian or Pakistani male, one Hispanic male,
three White males, and one White female. Walker is Black, four
or five of the victims are Black, and one of the prosecutors in the
case is Black.

21
1.2. Governing law
Both state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on
race. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v.
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).) “A three-step inquiry
governs the analysis of Batson/Wheeler claims. ‘First, the trial
court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima
facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory
challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the
burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the
challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the
court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful
discrimination.’ ” (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 433.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted Code of
Civil Procedure section 231.7 “to establish ‘a new process for
identifying unlawful bias in the use of peremptory challenges
during jury selection’ because studies showed that the existing
Batson/Wheeler analysis . . . was inadequate to prevent racial
discrimination.” (People v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534,
539–540.) The statute prohibits the exercise of peremptory
challenges “to remove a prospective juror on the basis of . . . race,
ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national
origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership . . . in
any of those groups.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (a).) If
either a party or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory
challenge, “the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall
state the reasons [it] has been exercised.” (Id., subd. (c).) The
trial court then “evaluate[s] the reasons given to justify the
peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances.
The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall

22
not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible
justifications. . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) If the court determines
“there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable
person would view” the prospective juror’s membership in a
cognizable group “as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge, then the objection shall be sustained.” (Ibid.)
An “objectively reasonable person” is defined as one who
“is aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful
discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential
jurors in the State of California.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7,
subd. (d)(2)(A).) “ ‘[S]ubstantial likelihood’ means more than a
mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.”
(Id., subd. (d)(2)(B).) The statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive
list of circumstances the court may consider in making its
determination. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
Subdivision (e) of the statute provides that certain reasons
given for the use of a peremptory challenge are “presumed to be
invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can
show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively
reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a
prospective juror’s” membership in the cognizable group, and
“that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 231.7, subd. (e).) These presumptively invalid reasons include
“[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with
law enforcement or the criminal legal system,” and “[e]xpressing
a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or
that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory
manner.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)–(2).) Clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption exists when the court, “bearing in

23
mind conscious and unconscious bias,” determines “that it is
highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a
peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious
bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Id., subd. (f).)
We review de novo the trial court’s overruling of an
objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, “with the
trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial
evidence.” (Id., subd. (j).) In applying this standard of review, we
do not impute to the trial court any factual findings that it did
not expressly state on the record. (Ibid.) Moreover, we consider
only those reasons actually given by the party exercising the
peremptory challenge, and we may not speculate as to reasons
that were not given. (Ibid.) If we conclude the trial court erred
in overruling the objection, “that error shall be deemed
prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case
remanded for a new trial.” (Ibid.)
1.3. The trial court did not err in overruling the
objection to the prosecution’s use of a
peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 96
Walker argues the prosecution improperly exercised a
peremptory challenge based on Juror No. 96’s race in violation of
Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7. The record reflects the
prosecution’s stated reasons for excusing Juror No. 96 included
that (1) she “believes the justice system was unfair to [B]lacks”
and “[B]lack males are treated unfairly,” and (2) she is “more
skeptical of evidence that comes from the Government” and
“doesn’t trust the People or the Government.” As the People
concede, these reasons were presumptively invalid under the
statute because they expressed a “distrust of . . . the criminal

24
legal system” and a “belief . . . that criminal laws have been
enforced in a discriminatory manner.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)–(2).)
Therefore, we must consider whether the prosecution overcame
that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. (Id.,
subd. (e).) That is, we must determine whether “it is highly
probable that the reasons given for the exercise of [the]
peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious
bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Id., subd. (f).) We
conclude the People made the requisite showing in this case.
Juror No. 96 repeatedly acknowledged in both her jury
questionnaire and voir dire responses that she would have
difficulty setting aside her beliefs about the unfair treatment of
African Americans in the judicial system and her distrust of the
government and the prosecution. She also was equivocal in her
statements about whether she could decide the case based solely
on the evidence presented at trial. When asked by both the trial
court and defense counsel if she could be fair to both sides, Juror
No. 96 answered “Yes.” However, when asked specifically how
her beliefs about the unfair treatment of African Americans
might affect her ability to judge the case, she stated, “I don’t
know if I would be able to just base it on facts because I know the
judicial system,” and “I don’t know if I would be able to overlook
that as a juror.” When asked to elaborate on these remarks,
Juror No. 96 again equivocated, stating, “I’ll base it on the facts
but also my opinion and bias remains.” In response to further
questioning, she also admitted she would be more skeptical of
evidence presented by the government and would start the trial
from a position of not trusting the prosecution. Even after
extensive voir dire, Juror No. 96 remained noncommittal about

25
her ability to set aside her personal feelings about the criminal
justice system and serve as a fair and impartial juror. Indeed, at
the conclusion of her voir dire, she stated, “I can base my decision
on the facts. But at the same time, I still have that opinion.”
On this record, the trial court properly found that it was
highly probable that the prosecution’s stated reasons for excusing
Juror No. 96 were unrelated to bias, and were instead specific to
that juror and bore on her ability to be fair and impartial in this
case. As a result, the trial court did not err in determining that
the prosecution overcame the presumption of invalidity under
Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 by clear and convincing
evidence. (See People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1, 17
[presumptive invalidity overcome where prospective juror
“expressed frustration with law enforcement’s handling of his
cousin’s murder case, and doubt as to whether he could keep that
experience from influencing his decisions as a juror”]; People v.
Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 544 [presumptive invalidity
overcome given prospective juror’s “repeated acknowledgement
that she would have difficulty setting aside her bias against law
enforcement officers to fairly consider their testimony, despite
her initial statements she could be fair”].)
We further conclude that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, there is not a substantial likelihood that an
objectively reasonable person would view Juror No. 96’s race as a
factor in the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge against
her. While Juror No. 96 is the same race as Walker, who is
African American, she also is the same race as four or five of the
victims and one of the prosecutors in the case. Moreover, as the
trial court recognized, the prosecution did not exercise
peremptory challenges against three other prospective Black

26
jurors, and twice accepted them as part of the panel prior to
excusing Juror No. 96. The impaneled jury ultimately included
three Black female jurors. The record also reflects that, before
exercising the peremptory challenge, the prosecution thoroughly
questioned Juror No. 96 regarding her beliefs about the unfair
treatment of African Americans in the judicial system and her
lack of trust in the government. The prosecution’s stated reasons
for excusing Juror No. 96 based on her inability to be fair and
impartial in this case were well-supported by the record.
In challenging the trial court’s ruling, Walker asserts the
court only gave conclusory reasons for overruling his objection to
the peremptory challenge. We disagree. After hearing the
prosecution’s reasons for excusing Juror No. 96, the court noted
that the lack of trust in law enforcement was a presumptively
invalid reason for the peremptory challenge. The court then
found that the reasons articulated by the prosecutor as a whole
provided “clear and convincing evidence that an objectively
reasonable person would view [the] reasons . . . as not related to
the juror’s” race or gender, and that it was “highly probable that
overall [the] reasons are unrelated to conscious or unconscious
bias” and instead are “specific to the juror and do bear on that
juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.” The court also found that
the prosecution did not exercise peremptory challenges on three
other Black female jurors. The court thus applied the correct
standard of proof and determined that the prosecution’s stated
reasons for excusing Juror No. 96 met that standard under Code
of Civil Procedure section 231.7.
Walker also claims the trial court’s ruling was inconsistent
with the factual findings it made in denying the prosecution’s for-
cause challenge to Juror No. 96. This claim likewise lacks merit.

27
In ruling on the challenge for cause, the trial court noted that
Juror No. 96 “said she could be fair to both sides.” Based on that
statement, the court declined to dismiss the juror for cause.
However, the court also made clear that the totality of Juror
No. 96’s statements and demeanor during voir dire “might
support a peremptory” challenge. The denial of the for-cause
challenge earlier in the case did not preclude the trial court from
later determining that, based on the totality of those
circumstances, the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to
excuse the juror did not violate Code of Civil Procedure
section 231.7. As the People correctly point out, the statute
“applies only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause.”
(People v. Aranda (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 311, 313.) Considering
the entire record, an objectively reasonable person would
determine that the prosecution exercised the peremptory
challenge because of Juror No. 96’s inability to be fair and
impartial in this case. The trial court accordingly did not err in
overruling Walker’s objection under Code of Civil Procedure
section 231.7.
Walker contends the prosecution’s use of a peremptory
challenge against Juror No. 96 also violated his federal and state
constitutional rights. However, under the three-step
Baston/Wheeler framework,“ ‘[t]here “is a rebuttable presumption
that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the
burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible
discrimination.” ’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735,
766.) The first step requires the defendant to “ ‘make out a prima
facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In his
opening brief, Walker does not argue that he made a prima facie

28
showing of race discrimination in the prosecution’s exercise of its
peremptory challenge. Rather, he merely asserts that because
“the prosecution’s justification for the excusal of . . . Juror No. 96
was not race-neutral, for the same reasons given above in the
section 231.7 analysis, reversal is required.” This is insufficient
to establish a prima facie case under Batson/Wheeler.
Furthermore, given our conclusion that an objectively reasonable
person would not view race as a factor in the prosecution’s use of
a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 96, “it necessarily
follows that the evidence was insufficient to permit the trial
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”
(People v. Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) The trial
court’s ruling on the peremptory challenge therefore did not
violate Walker’s constitutional rights.
2. Admission of evidence of Walker’s online search
history
Walker argues the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of his online search history of pornography
because it constituted improper character evidence, was
irrelevant, and was unduly prejudicial. Walker also asserts the
admission of this evidence violated his constitutional rights to
due process and free speech. We find no abuse of discretion or
constitutional violation in the admission of the evidence.
2.1. Relevant background
During trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence
of 15 search terms that Walker used while visiting a certain
pornographic website. Defense counsel objected on the grounds
that it was improper character evidence and that the prejudicial
effect of its admission outweighed any probative value. The
prosecution argued that because Walker searched for

29
pornography that depicted the same type of sexual offenses at
issue in the case, the evidence was probative of his state of mind,
was not character evidence, and was not unduly prejudicial.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court
ruled that a portion of the online search history was admissible.
The court concluded that Walker’s online searches concerning
rape, exploited girls, and fake photo shoots were “relevant
circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s specific sexual desires,
in this case regarding rape and exploiting young women as a
photographer, and by extension the actions by which he might
gratify those sexual desires.” The court further concluded that
the evidence was not unduly prejudicial because the jury would
not be shown the actual pornographic videos, the activity itself
was not illegal, and the searches were not remote in time relative
to the charged offenses. The court also indicated that it would
give an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury.
The trial court later instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 375, which provided in relevant part: “The People presented
evidence that the defendant’s cellphone contained certain
internet searches relating to a pornographic website. If you
decide that the defendant conducted those searches, you may, but
are not required to, consider that evidence for the limited purpose
of deciding whether: [¶] The defendant acted with the intent
required to commit the offenses charged in this case; or [¶] The
defendant had a motive to commit the offenses charged in this
case. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose. [¶]
Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad
character or is disposed to commit crime.”

30
2.2. Governing law
The rules governing the admissibility of evidence are well-
established. Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code,
§ 350.) Relevant evidence is defined as evidence “having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.)
Evidence is relevant when it “ ‘ “tends ‘logically, naturally, and by
reasonable inference’ to establish material facts such as identity,
intent, or motive.” ’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931.)
The trial court, however, may exclude relevant evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence is unduly prejudicial when it
“ ‘tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an
individual,’ ” while having only slight probative value with regard
to the issues. (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587.)
Under Evidence Code section 1101, “evidence of a character
trait is not admissible to demonstrate conduct on a particular
occasion, but such evidence is admissible ‘when relevant to prove
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a
defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or
attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good
faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her
disposition to commit such an act.’ (Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (b).)” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 38–39.) When
reviewing the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence to
show motive or intent, “ ‘ “ ‘a court must consider: (1) the
materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative

31
value of the . . . evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the
existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the
evidence is relevant.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th
327, 358.) To be admissible, “ ‘the uncharged misconduct must be
sufficiently similar to the charged offense to support the inference
that the defendant probably acted with the same intent in each
instance.’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 398.)
“ ‘We review the trial court’s rulings on relevance and the
admission of evidence under Evidence Code sections 352 and
1101 for abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Parker, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 39.) “We do not disturb the trial court’s ruling
unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made in a ‘ “patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 358.)
2.3. The trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence of Walker’s online search history
Walker contends the trial court should have excluded the
evidence of his online search history of pornography because it
was inadmissible character evidence under Evidence Code
section 1101, was irrelevant under Evidence Code section 350,
and was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code
section 352. Walker claims the prosecution failed to prove his
online searches reflected a motive or intent to actualize any of the
fantasies that were depicted in the pornography. This claim
lacks merit.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that evidence of
sexually explicit images possessed by a defendant may be
relevant to proving motive or intent in prosecutions involving
sexual offenses. (See People v. Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 39;
People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 129; People v. Memro (1995)

32
11 Cal.4th 786, 864.) In People v. Memro, for instance, the
defendant was charged with felony murder based on a killing
during the commission of a lewd act with a child. (People v.
Memro, at p. 862.) The trial court admitted certain magazines
and photographs that were found in the defendant’s possession
and depicted male youths in sexually graphic poses. (Id. at
pp. 864–865.) The Supreme Court held that the trial court did
not err in admitting this material under Evidence Code
section 1101 because “the photographs, presented in the context
of defendant’s possession of them, yielded evidence from which
the jury could infer that he had a sexual attraction to young boys
and intended to act on that attraction.” (People v. Memro, at
p. 865.) The Supreme Court also concluded that, while the
evidence “would undoubtedly be disturbing to most people,” it
was not substantially more prejudicial than probative, “for its
value in establishing defendant’s intent . . . was substantial.”
(Ibid.; see also People v. Parker, at p. 39 [trial court did not err in
admitting sexually explicit images found in defendant’s
possession because a jury could infer he “intended to engage in
specific sexual acts with [the victim] based upon the images he
possessed”]; People v. Clark, at p. 129 [trial court did not err in
admitting pictures from a pornographic book found in defendant’s
home because it “was probative of defendant’s interest in that
matter”].)
In this case, the trial court reasonably concluded that
Walker’s online search history was admissible under Evidence
Code section 1101 because it was relevant to proving his intent to
commit the charged crimes. “A plea of not guilty puts in issue
every material allegation of the accusatory pleading—including
the intent with which [the defendant] engaged in the charged

33
conduct.” (People v. Ranlet (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 363, 375; see
People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 29.) Walker placed his
intent at issue by pleading not guilty to the sexual offenses
charged. The prosecution sought to prove Walker’s guilt by
showing that he targeted young women and girls primarily on
Instagram, deceived them into believing they were attending a
professional photo shoot, and then sexually assaulted them after
luring them to his apartment. The pornographic material that
Walker searched for online shared significant similarities with
the victims’ accounts of the sexual assaults. Walker specifically
searched a pornography website for the titles “raped” or “rape,”
“fucking this girl from Instagram,” “tricked into f’g,” “exploited
girl talked into sex with pervert photographer,” “begged not to
rape,” and “fake photo shoot.” Based on these online searches,
the jury could infer that Walker intended to rape the women and
girls that he tricked into meeting him under the false pretense of
a photo shoot.
The trial court also reasonably concluded that the evidence
of Walker’s online search history was not unduly prejudicial
under Evidence Code section 352. The court did not admit the
entirety of the search history proffered by the prosecution, and
instead limited the evidence to searches that related to the types
of sexual acts at issue in this case. Further, as the trial court
noted, the actual pornography was not shown to the jury.
Rather, the evidence was confined to testimony and data
extraction reports from a law enforcement officer who relayed the
search terms that were entered on specific dates when Walker’s
device visited a certain pornographic website. As a result, the
evidence did not consume an undue amount of time, nor did its
admission create a risk of confusing the issues or misleading

34
the jury. While the jury may have found Walker’s interest in
pornographic depictions of rape to be disturbing, the evidence of
his online activity was no more inflammatory than the testimony
of the victims who described in detail the circumstances of the
sexual assaults against them. Moreover, the trial court gave a
limiting instruction that directed the jury not to consider the
evidence of Walker’s internet searches for an improper purpose.
We presume the jury followed the instruction. (People v. Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 30.) Under these circumstances, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
We likewise reject Walker’s claims that the admission of
the evidence violated his constitutional rights to due process and
freedom of speech. The “ ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of
evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a
[defendant’s] constitutional rights.’ ” (People v. Lindberg (2008)
45 Cal.4th 1, 26.) For instance, “ ‘[t]he admission of relevant
evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so
prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally
unfair.’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 949.) Here, the
trial court reasonably found that Walker’s online search history
was relevant to the charged offenses and not unduly prejudicial.
Thus, there was no due process violation. The admission of the
evidence also did not violate Walker’s right to free speech. As the
Supreme Court has explained, the admission of pornographic
materials possessed by a defendant does not violate the First
Amendment because the “defendant is not being punished for his
possession of the materials, and he cannot shelter under a free
speech privilege when the sexually graphic material was relevant
to the charged offenses.” (People v. Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 38.) Walker’s constitutional claims therefore fail.

35
3. Exclusion of proffered impeachment evidence
regarding Aliyah
Walker challenges the trial court’s ruling denying his
request to call Aliyah’s friend, Camille, as an impeachment
witness. He contends the proffered testimony that Aliyah told
Camille that she had consensual sex with Walker was admissible
to impeach Aliyah as a prior consistent or inconsistent statement.
He also claims the exclusion of the evidence violated the “Right to
Truth-in-Evidence” provision in the California Constitution and
deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and to
present a defense. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling.
3.1. Relevant background
In count 2, Walker was charged with unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor, Aliyah. Following Aliyah’s trial
testimony, the defense sought to call Camille, the friend who
accompanied Aliyah to her photo shoot with Walker, as a witness.
Defense counsel explained that Camille would testify that, after
Aliyah came back from Walker’s apartment, she told Camille that
she had sex with Walker and that she did so to help her career.
Defense counsel argued that the proffered testimony “directly
impeaches Aliyah” because “Aliyah testified she was raped.”
In opposing the request, the prosecution asserted that Aliyah’s
statement to Camille that she had sex with Walker was not
inconsistent with her trial testimony because Aliyah did not
testify that she was raped, but rather that she consented to sex
with Walker after he pressured her. The prosecution also argued
that the rest of Aliyah’s statement to Camile was not relevant
because Aliyah admitted in her trial testimony that she told the
police that she had sex with Walker to help her career, and

36
Detective Widman would be testifying to that effect when called
as a witness.
The trial court denied Walker’s request to call Camille as
an impeachment witness. The court concluded that the proffered
testimony was not relevant to any disputed issue because Aliyah
repeatedly testified that she had consensual sex with Walker,
and in any event, consent was not an element of the charged
offense involving Aliyah. The court noted that Aliyah’s statement
that she had sex with Walker to help her career was marginally
relevant to her credibility, but was subject to exclusion under
Evidence Code section 352 because Detective Widman would be
testifying that Aliyah made this statement to her during a police
interview.
3.2. Governing law
Evidence of a statement that was made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay and is generally
inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) A prior statement that is
inconsistent with a witness’s trial testimony is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule provided that the witness had an
opportunity to explain or to deny the statement while testifying
or has not been excused from giving further testimony. (Evid.
Code, §§ 1235, 770, subd. (a).) A prior statement that is
consistent with a witness’s trial testimony also is admissible as a
hearsay exception if it predates an inconsistent statement used to
impeach the witness’s testimony, or the witness’s testimony has
been challenged as recently fabricated or influenced by an
improper motive. (Evid. Code, §§ 1236, 791, subd. (b).)
“ ‘The proponent of proffered testimony has the burden of
establishing its relevance, and if the testimony is comprised of

37
hearsay, the foundational requirements for its admissibility
under an exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations.] Evidence is
properly excluded when the proponent fails to make an adequate
offer of proof regarding the relevance or admissibility of the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 413.) “ ‘ “As
with all relevant evidence, . . . the trial court retains discretion to
admit or exclude evidence offered for impeachment.” ’ ” (People v.
Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 46.) “A trial court’s ruling to admit or
exclude evidence offered for impeachment is reviewed for abuse of
discretion and will be upheld unless the trial court ‘exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v.
Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 705.)
3.3. The trial court did not err in excluding the
proffered evidence regarding consensual sex
with Aliyah
Walker argues that Camille’s testimony that Aliyah told
her that she had consensual sex with Walker should have been
admitted as impeachment evidence. He contends that, to the
extent Aliyah testified that the sex was nonconsensual, Camille’s
testimony was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.
Alternatively, he claims that, to the extent Aliyah testified that
the sex was consensual, Camille’s testimony was admissible as a
prior consistent statement because Aliyah’s statement to Camille
about consensual sex predated other out-of-court statements that
she made about nonconsensual sex. We conclude the trial court
acted well within its discretion in excluding the evidence.
As the trial court observed, the proffered testimony of
Camille was not relevant to any disputed issue at trial. Walker
was not charged with the forcible rape of Aliyah. Rather, he was

38
charged in this count with having unlawful sexual intercourse
with a minor more than three years younger in violation of
section 261.5, subdivision (c). Because consent was not an
element of the offense involving Aliyah, the court reasonably
could find that Aliyah’s statement to Camille about having
consensual sex with Walker had no “tendency in reason to prove
or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)
Moreover, Aliyah’s prior statement to Camille was not
inconsistent with her trial testimony. Aliyah testified at trial
that Walker did not use any force, fear, or threats against her,
and that although she felt “coerced,” she ultimately agreed to
have sex with him. Aliyah also testified that she told Camille
that she had sex with Walker as soon as she came back from his
apartment, and that she did not feel sad or upset at that time.
As the trial court noted, “[T]he point was made many times
during Aliyah’s testimony that it was consensual.”
Walker’s alternative claim that the proffered testimony was
admissible as a prior consistent statement also fails. He asserts
that Aliyah’s statement to Camille that she had consensual sex
with Walker preceded inconsistent statements that she made to a
Planned Parenthood nurse and Detective Widman that the sex
was not consensual. The record reflects, however, that Aliyah’s
statements on the matter were more nuanced. Aliyah testified
that, when she visited a Planned Parenthood clinic, the nurse
asked a series of questions about her sexual history, including
whether she ever had nonconsensual sex. Aliyah explained that
she answered “yes” to that question because she felt “coerced”
and “pressured” to “give in” to having sex with Walker, even
though no force or fear was used. Aliyah further admitted that,

39
during an interview with Detective Widman, she said that she
agreed to have sex with Walker because she thought it would
help her succeed in the modeling industry. In her trial
testimony, Detective Widman recalled that Aliyah struggled to
clearly articulate why she had sex with Walker. Aliyah told the
detective that she felt “pressured” and “coerced,” but she also said
that she ultimately agreed to have sex with Walker because she
thought “it could help promote her career.” When considered in
their full context, Aliyah’s prior statements on the issue of
consent were not inconsistent with her trial testimony. The trial
court therefore did not err in excluding this evidence.
Walker claims that the exclusion of the proffered evidence
violated the California Constitution’s “Right-to-Truth-in-
Evidence” provision, which states that “relevant evidence shall
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.” (Cal. Const., art I,
§ 28, subd. (f)(2).) Because the trial court properly found that the
evidence was not relevant to the charged offenses, this claim
lacks merit. Walker also asserts that the exclusion of the
evidence violated his constitutional rights to due process and to
present a complete defense. However, “[a]s a general matter, the
ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the
accused’s right to present a defense.” (People v. Johnson (2022)
12 Cal.5th 544, 607.) While “ ‘a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant
probative value in [his] favor [citations], “ . . . the proffered
evidence must have more than ‘slight-relevancy’ to the issues
presented.” ’ ” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865.)
Here, the trial court reasonably determined that Aliyah’s prior
statement to Camille was not relevant to the issues being tried
and was not admissible for impeachment purposes. On this

40
record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate
Walker’s constitutional rights in excluding the evidence.
4. Exclusion of proffered character evidence regarding
Walker’s sexual activity with other women
Walker next contends the trial court erred in precluding
him from calling Camille and his fiancée, Hannah Rossignol, to
testify as character witnesses. He argues the testimony of these
witnesses was admissible as evidence of his good character under
Evidence Code section 1102 because they each would testify that
they engaged in an act of consensual sex with him. Walker also
asserts the exclusion of this evidence violated the California
Constitution’s “Right-to-Truth-in-Evidence” provision, as well as
his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and to
present a defense. We conclude the trial court did not err in
excluding the proffered testimony.
4.1. Relevant background
In addition to calling Camille as a witness to impeach
Aliyah’s testimony, the defense sought to present evidence that,
on the same night that Aliyah had sex with Walker, Camille also
had consensual sex with him. Defense counsel explained that he
anticipated that Camille would testify that Walker raped her,
and that he would then impeach Camille with a video recording
of the encounter showing that her sexual activity with Walker
was consensual. The prosecution objected, arguing that Camille
was not named as a victim in the counts being tried to the jury,
so the evidence that she had consensual sex with Walker was not
relevant to the charged offenses and was unduly prejudicial
under Evidence Code section 352.
The trial court ruled that the proffered testimony regarding
Camille was inadmissible. The court stated: “Camille is not

41
relevant. There is nothing relevant that . . . [¶] would survive a
352 analysis of bringing in someone who is not charged [as a
victim] to say that they had consensual sex with the Defendant.”
When defense counsel noted that he expected Camille would deny
that she had consensual sex with Walker, the court added: “All
you’re bringing in Camille for is to show the jury that she’s lying.
And she’s not charged in the case; so it has nothing to do with the
other victims.”
The defense later sought to call Rossignol, Walker’s fiancée,
to testify that she met Walker under similar circumstances as the
alleged victims and that they had consensual sex. The
prosecution argued that evidence of consensual sex between
Walker and his fiancée was not relevant, asserting: “So if they
are presenting character evidence and they are trying to do that
in order to rebut an [Evidence Code section 1108] situation and
say that he’s not a rapist, that’s one thing. But to say, ‘He lied to
me, I had sex with him. . . .’ So talking about whether he has
consensual sex has no relevance in this case.” In response,
defense counsel asserted that Rossignol’s testimony was “not
character evidence” because he was “not going to ask her, ‘what is
. . . his reputation? What do you think about him?’ ” Instead, the
defense intended to use Rossignol’s testimony “to show that there
is similar conduct as to how they met and what they did when
they first met and what Mr. Walker said to her, which is very
similar to what we’ve heard the alleged victims say, but with
clearly a different result.”
The trial court denied Walker’s request to call Rossignol as
a witness, ruling: “My view is . . . that there [are] circumstances
that have no relevance to these victims that are alleged in this
case. [¶] You know, if the only purpose of her testimony is to

42
testify as to how they met, their specific circumstances, and even
if there is some similarity in how they met with how [Walker]
met some of the victims, it[] still in my view would not be
relevant. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he thing is, even if they met under
similar circumstances to some of the victims, he didn’t rape her
. . . . If it’s not [Evidence Code section] 1108 evidence, it’s not
relevant—it has no specific relevance to this case.”
4.2. Governing law
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), sets forth the
general rule that “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his
or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct)
is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.” (Ibid.) One exception to this general rule is
contained in Evidence Code section 1102. It provides, in relevant
part, that “evidence of the defendant’s character or a trait of his
character in the form of an opinion or evidence of his reputation
is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if such evidence is: [¶]
(a) Offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in conformity
with such character or trait of character.” (Ibid.)
This exception to the general bar on character evidence
“allows a criminal defendant to introduce evidence, either by
opinion or reputation, of his character or a trait of his character
that is ‘relevant to the charge made against him.’ [Citations.]
Such evidence is relevant if it is inconsistent with the offense
charged . . . and hence may support an inference that the
defendant is unlikely to have committed the offense.” (People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1305 (McAlpin).) While evidence
of the defendant’s character, in the form of an opinion or evidence
of his reputation, is permitted under Evidence Code section 1102,

43
specific instances of the defendant’s conduct are not admissible.
(McAlpin, at p. 1309–1310.) Moreover, even where the proffered
evidence meets the requirements of Evidence Code section 1102,
the trial court retains the discretion to exclude it under Evidence
Code section 352. (McAlpin, at p. 1310, fn. 15.) We review the
trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of character evidence
under Evidence Code sections 352, 1101, and 1102 for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 39; People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 437.)
4.3. The trial court did not err in excluding the
proffered evidence regarding consensual sex
with other women
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in McAlpin, Walker
argues that the testimony of Camille and Rossignol regarding
their consensual sexual encounters with him was relevant and
admissible under Evidence Code section 1102. That decision,
however, does not support Walker’s argument. In McAlpin, the
defendant was charged with lewd conduct with a child. (McAlpin,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1294.) At trial, the defendant sought to
call several character witnesses, including two women who
previously had long-term relationships with him and also had
daughters of their own. (Id. at p. 1304.) Both women would
provide opinion testimony that the defendant was not sexually
deviant, and would base their opinion on “(1) their assertedly
normal personal sexual experiences with defendant, and (2) their
observations of defendant’s conduct with their daughters during
the period of their relationship.” (Id. at p. 1305.)
The Supreme Court in McAlpin held that, to the extent the
women’s proffered testimony “was based on their private sexual
experiences with defendant rather than on their observation of

44
his behavior with their daughters, the trial court could disallow
it . . . .” (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1309.) However, to the
extent the testimony “was based on their direct observation of
defendant’s behavior with their daughters, it was both a proper
subject of lay opinion testimony and relevant to the charge of
child molestation.” (Ibid.) As the Supreme Court further
explained: “A fair reading of the offer of proof shows that the
women witnesses would not have limited their testimony to
specific instances in which defendant had the opportunity to, but
did not, molest their daughters. Instead, the witnesses proposed
to testify that they observed defendant’s behavior with their
children throughout the course of their relationship with him,
and their opinion that he is not a person given to lewd conduct
with children arose from that experience as a whole. Thus
viewed, the proffered testimony was intended to prove the
relevant character trait not by specific acts of ‘nonmolestation,’
but by the witnesses’ opinion of that trait based on their long-
term observation of defendant’s course of consistently normal
behavior with their children. [Citation.] The trial court should
have allowed such testimony.” (Id. at pp. 1309–1310.)
In this case, however, Walker did not propose calling either
Camille or Rossignol to testify about their personal observations
of his behavior over the course of their relationships with him.
Rather, he sought to elicit testimony from each woman about the
specific occasion when she first met Walker and had consensual
sex with him. Indeed, there was nothing in Walker’s offer of
proof for Camille to suggest that she had any interaction with
him apart from the one instance of sexual activity that occurred
on same date that Walker had sex with Aliyah. Rossignol, on the
other hand, was in a long-term relationship with Walker and

45
presumably could offer an opinion about his character based on
her direct observations of his conduct during their relationship.
However, in describing Rossignol’s proposed testimony to the
trial court, defense counsel made clear that he did not intend to
ask her to provide an opinion about Walker’s character. Instead,
Rossignol would testify about the first time that she had sex with
Walker “to show that there is similar conduct as to how they met
and what they did when they first met and what [he] said to her.”
Accordingly, for both Rossignol and Camille, the proffered
testimony concerned a specific instance in which an individual
who was not a named victim in the case had consensual sex with
Walker in order to prove that he was not the type of person who
would have had nonconsensual sex with the named victims. Such
evidence was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1102.
(McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1309; see also People v. Felix
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 426, 431 [Evidence Code “[s]ection 1102
creates an exception . . . in criminal cases for evidence ‘in the
form of an opinion or . . . reputation,’ but not specific instances of
conduct”].)
Here, the trial court reasonably could conclude that the
evidence that Camille and Rossignol had consensual sex with
Walker on a prior occasion was not relevant to the charged
offenses and did not constitute admissible character evidence
under Evidence Code section 1102. In the case of Camille, the
trial court also reasonably could conclude that the evidence was
unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 given that
the defense planned to impeach Camille with a sex video that she
made with Walker in the event she denied engaging in an act of
consensual intercourse. Under these circumstances, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered

46
testimony of both women. For these same reasons, the exclusion
of the evidence did not violate the California Constitution’s
“Right-to Truth-in-Evidence” provision, nor did it deprive Walker
of his constitutional rights to due process and to present a
defense.
5. Cumulative error
Walker asserts the cumulative effect of the claimed errors
deprived him of due process of law and a fair trial. “Cumulative
error is present when the combined effect of the trial court’s
errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant. [Citations.]
Although a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not
entitled to ‘a perfect one.’ ” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th
989, 1017.) Here, Walker received a fair trial and has failed to
show any cumulative error requiring reversal of his convictions.
6. Pitchess review
Prior to trial, Walker filed a motion for discovery under
Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, seeking evidence of misconduct by
Detective Widman, the lead investigator on the case. The trial
court ordered an in camera hearing on the motion. After
conducting an in camera review of the requested materials, the
trial court found that there were no discoverable records to be
disclosed.
On appeal, Walker has requested that we conduct an
independent review of the sealed record to determine whether
any discoverable material was withheld. We reviewed the sealed
record of the proceedings, and conclude the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in ruling there was no Pitchess material
to be disclosed. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.)

47
7. Clerical errors in the abstract of judgment
In supplemental briefing, Walker asks this court to correct
certain clerical errors in the abstract of judgment. Specifically,
Walker asserts that the abstract of judgment misidentifies the
offense in count 1 as “Forcible rape-child victim over 14 years,”
the offense in count 2 as “Forcible rape-child over 14,” and the
offenses in counts 23 and 25 as “Rape by use of drugs.” Walker
also asserts that the abstract of judgment for the determinate
sentences misidentifies his race as “Hispanic” rather than
“Black.” The People do not oppose the corrections to the abstract
of judgment requested by Walker, and we agree that these
clerical errors should be corrected.
The abstract of judgment accordingly must be modified to
list the offense in count 1 as “Forcible rape,” the offense in
count 2 as “Unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor,” and the
offenses in counts 23 and 25 as “Rape by use of intoxication.”
The abstract of judgment for the determinate sentences also must
be modified to list Walker’s race/national origin as “Black” rather
than “Hispanic.”

48
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect that the conviction in
count 1 is for “Forcible rape,” the conviction in count 2 is for
“Unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor,” and the convictions
in counts 23 and 25 are for “Rape by use of intoxication.” The
judgment is further modified to identify Walker’s race/national
origin in the abstract of judgment for the determinate sentences
as “Black.” As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The superior
court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment,
and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

49

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