Sanchez v. Thompson CA2/1

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Filed 11/24/25 Sanchez v. Thompson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

CARISSA SANCHEZ et al., B334619

Plaintiffs and Appellants (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC622709)
v.

JAMES P. THOMPSON,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kristin S. Escalante, Judge. Affirmed.
Campbell & Farahani, Frances M. Campbell and Nima
Farahani for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________
Defendant James P. Thompson, as the attorney for Carol
Burch, filed three successive unlawful detainer actions seeking to
evict plaintiffs and appellants Carissa Sanchez and Ramielyn
Milo from the Santa Monica apartment plaintiffs rented from
Burch. In the unlawful detainer actions, the complaints filed by
Thompson alleged that plaintiffs violated their lease and Santa
Monica law by subleasing a portion of the apartment on a short-
term basis via Airbnb. All three unlawful detainer actions ended
in favor of the tenants, who then filed suit against Thompson and
others1 for violating Santa Monica’s tenant harassment
ordinance, alleging Thompson sought to evict them despite
knowing there was no basis for doing so. Before the trial court,
both sides agreed that plaintiffs’ case was equivalent to an action
for malicious prosecution, and that Thompson’s liability for
violating the ordinance depended on plaintiffs’ proving he lacked
probable cause for filing the unlawful detainer actions.
After a bench trial on the issue of probable cause, the court
entered judgment in favor of Thompson. Although Santa Monica
law does not allow tenants to be evicted for illegal use of a
property unless they have been convicted of a crime for doing so
(see Santa Monica Rent Control Charter Amend., § 1806(a)(6))
(Charter Amendment section 1806), the court determined that an
attorney might reasonably conclude that state law preempted
Santa Monica law on this issue, and Thompson therefore had
probable cause to file suit.

1 The other named defendants were Burch and Burch’s
property manager, Miller & Desatnik Management Co., Inc.
(Miller & Desatnik). Burch and Miller & Desatnik are not
parties to this appeal.

2
Plaintiffs now challenge that conclusion. They argue that
Thompson lacked probable cause for seeking to evict them for
breaching their lease, and that the trial court erred by finding
Thompson had a tenable argument for preemption. In addition,
they contend their Airbnb activity at most amounted to a
regulatory violation, not an unlawful use of the property
sufficient to justify eviction. Finally, they contend the trial court
erred by justifying its finding of probable cause in part on
another superior court judge’s conclusion that state law
preempted Santa Monica’s restriction on evictions for illegal
activity. We find plaintiffs’ arguments unpersuasive and affirm.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
A. Trial Court Proceedings
On June 9, 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that
Thompson and Burch violated the Santa Monica tenant
harassment ordinance by seeking to evict them from their
apartment without justification.2
Thompson filed a special motion to strike the complaint
under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 416.25).3 He
argued plaintiffs’ complaint was based on activity protected by
the statute, i.e., his filing of the unlawful detainer actions, and
that plaintiffs could not show a probability of prevailing on the
merits because, among other reasons, the Santa Monica

2 The complaint also alleged retaliation by a landlord in
violation of Civil Code section 1942.5 against Burch and Miller
& Desatnik. Because those defendants are not party to this
appeal, we do not address that portion of the complaint.
3 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

3
ordinance restricting eviction on the basis of illegal activity was
preempted by state landlord-tenant law (§ 1161, subd. (4)).
The trial court (Judge Barbara A. Meiers) granted the anti-
SLAPP motion. The court agreed with Thompson that state law
preempted Santa Monica’s restriction on evictions based on
illegal activity because the ordinance imposed an additional
procedural barrier to eviction not included in the state unlawful
detainer statutes.
We reversed. We concluded that “plaintiffs’ complaint sets
forth facts stating a cause of action for malicious prosecution, and
plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on that
cause of action.” (Sanchez v. Thompson (June 12, 2018, B279708)
[nonpub. opn.].) Our opinion did not address the issue of
preemption. Instead, we reasoned that plaintiffs had “shown a
probability of establishing that Thompson lacked probable cause
to file the third unlawful detainer action after the court sustained
plaintiffs’ demurrer in the first action on the merits and
Thompson could not cure the defect by amendment. To the
extent Thompson believed the court’s ruling in the first unlawful
detainer action was incorrect, his recourse was to appeal the
ruling, not file duplicate unlawful detainer actions against
plaintiffs, hoping to achieve a different result for his client.”
(Ibid.) Furthermore, “[p]laintiffs also made a prima facie
showing of malice, sufficient to establish a probability of
prevailing on a malicious prosecution claim. A reasonable
inference from the evidence is that Thompson filed the third
unlawful detainer action knowing it lacked probable cause (after
his client’s defeat in the first action) to see if plaintiffs would give
up and vacate the apartment, as plaintiffs allege in the
complaint—i.e., for an improper purpose.” (Ibid.)

4
After our reversal of the order granting the special motion
to strike, proceedings resumed in the trial court, and the case
was assigned to Judge Kristin S. Escalante. The parties agreed
to bifurcate the case, beginning with a bench trial on the issue of
probable cause. If plaintiffs succeeded in showing that Thompson
lacked probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer claims, the
case would proceed to a jury trial on the remaining issues.
B. Bench Trial Findings of Fact
In its statement of decision at the conclusion of the bench
trial, the court described the facts of the case as follows.
Plaintiffs raise no substantial evidence challenge to these factual
findings; on appeal they dispute only the legal implications that
flow from them.
“Ms. Sanchez testified she leased a two-level unit in Santa
Monica at 519 Idaho Avenue, Number 4 . . . . Paragraph 14 of the
rental agreement provided: ‘Tenant shall not let or sublet all or
any part of the premises, or assign this lease or any interest in it
without the prior written consent of the [l]andlord. This includes
any and all roommate changes.’
“Ms. Sanchez lived in the unit with her roommate plaintiff
Ramielyn Milo, who had been approved by the landlord. The top
floor contained Ms. Sanchez’s bedroom, the common areas, and
kitchen. The downstairs had a separate entrance. It was about
the size of a studio apartment and had Ms. Milo’s bedroom and
her bathroom.
“Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Milo listed the downstairs portion of
the apartment on Airbnb. The upstairs portion was not part of
the Airbnb rental. Ms. Milo stayed at her boyfriend’s when her
portion of the apartment was rented by an Airbnb patron. Ms.
Sanchez and Ms. Milo rented out the downstairs portion of the

5
apartment approximately four times, each time for a few days.
They did this for about a month prior to October 8, 2015. Either
Ms. Sanchez or Ms. Milo [was] staying in the upstairs portion
when Airbnb patrons rented out the downstairs portion of the
unit.
“Ms. Sanchez did not seek or obtain a business license
before renting the property out on Airbnb and did not collect or
remit any occupancy tax.
“On October 8, 2015, . . . Thompson, an attorney, sent a
three-day notice to cease to Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Milo. The
notice was sent to 505 Idaho Ave., #4, which was the wrong
address. It said:
“ ‘Please take notice that your occupancy . . . may be
terminated after service of this notice upon you and you may be
required to quit and surrender possession . . . no later than three
(3) days after service of a subsequently served notice to terminate
on you.
“ ‘This is intended as notice to cease activity and/or remedy
breaches of your rental agreement and violations of law. This
notice is being served upon you for the reason or reasons below:
“ ‘1. Unlawful assignment and/or sublet of subject premises
to vacation renters without any consent from landlord in
violation of [p]aragraph 14 of your [r]esidential [l]ease
[a]greement . . . .
“ ‘2. Violation of Law/ using the premises for an unlawful
activity: Santa Monica Municipal Code, [a]rticle 6 which requires
a business license for home sharing; and [a]rticle 9 which
requires that the host also be in the home or rental unit at the
same time as the home sharing; and that the [c]ity of Santa

6
Monica requires the payment of a “[t]ransient [t]ax” by the host
for home sharing.’
“The notice then explained the basis for the property
manager’s conclusion that the property had been used as an
Airbnb rental, including that the property manager had observed
a lock box on the front door; had seen unauthorized visitors with
suitcases entering and exiting the property; had asked the
visitors why they are entering the unit and the visitors had
responded they had rented it on Airbnb; and the property
manager had located an advertisement for the property on
Airbnb for a vacation rental of the unit.
“The notice then stated: ‘In accordance with the
requirements of Santa Monica Municipal Code section 1906(b),
you are required to cease and remedy the above-described
violations of your rental agreement and/or law, including but not
limited to permanent removal of the lockbox from the front door
of the rental unit; permanent cessation of advertising and
subletting unit.’
“The notice was signed by Mr. Thompson.
“Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Milo received the notice on
October 15, 2015, and stopped offering the unit on Airbnb
immediately.
“On October 22, 2015, Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Milo were
served with a three-day notice to terminate, purportedly served
under . . . section 1161, subdivision 4. It stated in relevant part:
“ ‘Please take notice that your occupancy of the above-
described premises is hereby terminated as of the date three (3)
days after service of this notice upon you are and you are hereby
required to quit and surrender possession thereof to the

7
undersigned no later than three (3) days after service of this
notice upon you.
“ ‘This is intended as a three (3) day legal notice for the
purpose of terminating your tenancy in accordance with . . .
section 1161[, subdivision ](4). This notice is being served upon
you for the reasons below:
“ ‘1. Unlawful assignment and/or sublet of subject premises
to vacation renters without any consent from landlord in
violation of [p]aragraph 14 of your [r]esidential [l]ease
[a]greement dated 5/20/12 . . . .
“ ‘2. Violation of Law/ using the premises for an unlawful
activity: Vacation Rental. Santa Monica Municipal Code,
[a]rticle 6.20.030 prohibits vacation rentals/ transient occupancy:
“No person . . . shall undertake, maintain, authorize, aid,
facilitate or advertise any Vacation Rental Activity.” [’]
“The notice was again signed by Mr. Thompson.
“On November 20, 2015, Mr. Thompson filed an unlawful
detainer lawsuit on behalf of his clients against Ms. Sanchez and
Ms. Milo. The lawsuit was based on the October 22, 2015 notice
to terminate. The action was dismissed after the court sustained
a demurrer. The demurrer and the unlawful detainer court’s
ruling were not introduced into evidence in the present trial, and
there was no evidence presented as to their contents.
“On January 11, 2016, Thompson served a new 3-day notice
to terminate. The heading on the notice stated: ‘3-day Notice to
Terminate ([§] 1161[, subd. ](4)) (Unlawful Purpose); [Charter
Amendment section] 1806(a)(4) (Use for any illegal purpose);
[Santa Monica Municipal Code part] 6.20.030 (Vacation Rental).’
The body of the notice stated in relevant part:

8
“ ‘Please take notice that your occupancy of the above-
described premises is hereby terminated as of the date three (3)
days after service of this notice upon you are and you are hereby
required to quit and surrender possession thereof to the
undersigned no later than three (3) days after service of this
notice upon you.
“ ‘This is intended as a three (3) day legal notice for the
purpose of terminating your tenancy in accordance with . . .
section 1161[, subdivision ](4). This notice is being served upon
you for the reasons below:
“ ‘2. Violation of Law/ using the premises for an unlawful
activity: Vacation Rental. Santa Monica Municipal Code,
[a]rticle 6.20.030 prohibits vacation rentals/ transient occupancy:
“No person . . . shall undertake, maintain, authorize, aid,
facilitate or advertise any Vacation Rental Activity.”
“ ‘On or about October 2, 2015, [p]roperty manager Erin
Burch . . . observed many unauthorized visitors with suitcases
entering and exiting the subject unit. The [m]anager asked the
visitors why and how these visitors were entering the unit and
was informed that they had rented the unit on a day/vacation
basis on Airbnb from “Ramie” for vacation rental of the unit.’
“The notice was again[ ] signed by Mr. Thompson.
“On January 22, 2016, Mr. Thompson filed a second
unlawful detainer action against Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Milo. The
action was based on the January 11, 2016 notice. The action was
voluntarily dismissed after a demurrer was served (but not filed).
Again, the demurrer is not in evidence. There is no evidence as
to the content of the demurrer.
“On March 22, 2016, Mr. Thompson filed a third unlawful
detainer action. This action was also based on the January 11,

9
2016 notice. The demurrer to the complaint was sustained with
leave to amend and was subsequently dismissed when no
amended complaint was filed. Again, there is no evidence as to
the content of the demurrer or the ground on which it was
sustained.”
C. The Trial Court’s Decision
Based on these facts, the trial court found that “plaintiffs
failed to establish that . . . Thompson lacked probable cause in
instituting the first, second and/or third unlawful detainer
actions. The court thus finds in favor of [Thompson] and against
plaintiffs.”
Although the Santa Monica charter forbids evictions based
on a tenant’s “using or expressly permitting a controlled rental
unit to be used for any illegal purpose” unless the tenant is
“convicted” of such an offense (Charter Amend., § 1806(a)(4)), the
court reasoned that Thompson had probable cause to file an
unlawful detainer action against plaintiffs because a reasonable
attorney could have believed there was a tenable claim that that
provision of the charter was preempted by state law.
The court supported its conclusion regarding probable
cause with a survey of cases on the preemption of local law in
eviction matters, which we now set forth. The state unlawful
detainer statutes (§ 1161 et seq.) establish procedures a landlord
must follow when seeking to evict a tenant. In Birkenfeld v. City
of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, the Supreme Court held that
municipal laws altering these procedures or imposing new
procedures for evictions interfere with and are preempted by
state law. On the other hand, because the state statutes are
procedural in nature, they do not prevent local governments from
creating new substantive defenses to an unlawful detainer action.

10
(Id. at pp. 147-152.) Thus, the city of Berkeley’s charter
amendment requiring a landlord to obtain a certificate of eviction
from the local rent control board prior to initiating an unlawful
detainer action was preempted because it “raise[d] procedural
barriers between the landlord and the judicial proceeding.” (Id.
at p. 151, fn. omitted.) On the other hand, the city’s ban on
evicting tenants in good standing upon the end of their lease term
was not preempted because it created a substantive defense to
eviction. (Id. at p. 152.)
In Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v.
City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 741, the court applied
Birkenfeld to an Oakland ordinance that “limit[ed] a landlord’s
right to initiate an eviction due to certain tenant conduct by
requiring that the specified conduct continue after the landlord
provides the tenant written notice to cease.” (Rental Housing
Assn., supra, at pp. 762-763.) The court held that “[t]hese notice
requirements . . . regulate the substantive grounds for eviction,
rather than the procedural remedy available to the landlord once
grounds for eviction have been established. If the tenant ceases
the offending conduct once notified by the landlord, there is no
good cause to evict. The requirements for a warning notice are
therefore not preempted by the unlawful detainer statutes.” (Id.
at p. 763, fn. omitted.) The court differentiated the warning
notice required in Oakland from the certificate of eviction in
Birkenfeld on the ground that “the warning notice requirements
of [the Oakland ordinance] do not involve prefiling review by a
local administrative agency or impose ‘elaborate prerequisites’ on
the commencement of an unlawful detainer proceeding.” (Rental
Housing Assn., supra, at p. 763.)

11
The trial court also analyzed San Francisco Apartment
Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
510, which involved a San Francisco ordinance barring certain
forms of no-fault eviction during the school year at units where a
child under the age of 18 or an educator resided. (See id. at
p. 513.) In analyzing this ordinance, the San Francisco
Apartment Assn. court recognized that the distinction between
procedural and substantive defenses is “ ‘ “ ‘shadowy and difficult
to draw’ in practice” ’ ” and “elusive at best.” (Id. at p. 516 &
fn. 2.) Ultimately, however, the San Francisco Apartment Assn.
court concluded the ordinance was primarily substantive and
thus not preempted. Although it “has a procedural impact,
limiting the timing of certain evictions,” the primary function of
the law was to give tenants who belonged to a protected class “a
substantive defense to eviction.” (Id. at p. 518.)
After reviewing this case law, the trial court turned to the
case at hand. In the court’s view, Thompson’s argument for
preemption “would almost certainly be a losing argument” on the
merits. The Santa Monica charter amendment at issue
“effectively eliminates use of a property for an illegal purpose as
a ground for eviction, except in the very rare circumstance in
which a tenant is criminally convicted of such use,” and a court
applying Rental Housing Assn., San Francisco Apartment Assn.,
and similar cases would most likely view it as a permissible
elimination of a substantive ground for eviction. In addition, the
trial court noted that it is difficult to categorize the Santa Monica
law as creating a procedural hurdle to eviction “because a
landlord has no ability to file criminal charges against a tenant to
obtain a conviction.”

12
Nevertheless, the court concluded Thompson’s position that
preemption applied was not untenable or frivolous. The court
noted that the issue was a matter of first impression, in that “no
court has applied the [substantive vs. procedural] standard to the
provision at issue here or to any substantially similar provision.
A conclusion that an argument is untenable or frivolous is
essentially an argument that a litigant should not be permitted
to even raise the issue in court. There are strong policy
arguments for allowing issues of first impression to be argued
and determined in court, even if the outcome seems relatively
clear based on analogous precedent.”
In addition, the trial court echoed statements in prior case
law that the distinction between procedural and substantive
defenses is “ ‘ “ ‘shadowy and difficult to draw’ in practice” ’ ” and
“elusive at best.” (San Francisco Apartment Assn. v. City and
County of San Francisco, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 516 & fn. 2.)
The trial court stated that the Santa Monica restriction on
evictions for illegal conduct has some characteristics of a
procedural restriction “because before the use of an illegal
purpose can be used as a ground for eviction, certain procedural
events have to occur. Specifically, a prosecuting body has to file
criminal charges and prosecute to conviction. And the fact that
the landlord has no control over such procedures arguably makes
the procedural hurdles even greater than those at issue in
Birkenfeld.”
Next, the court noted that apart from Birkenfeld itself, the
cases developing the procedural-substantive distinction were all
decided by the Court of Appeal. “While the superior court is
bound by Court of Appeal decisions, sister districts or divisions of
the Court of Appeal are not so bound and may decline to follow

13
other Court of Appeal decisions.” To the extent a case like Rental
Housing Assn. strongly suggested Thompson’s position was
incorrect, on appeal Thompson “could credibly argue that [it] was
wrongly decided under Birkenfeld.”
Finally, the court noted that Judge Meiers, who granted
Thompson’s anti-SLAPP motion, agreed with Thompson that the
Santa Monica charter amendment was preempted. Judge Meiers
concluded that barring a landlord from evicting a tenant for
illegal use of a property without proof of a criminal conviction
was functionally identical to the requirement to obtain a
certificate of eviction before filing an unlawful detainer, the
restriction that the court in Birkenfeld held to be preempted. The
trial court reasoned that “[t]he fact that Judge Meiers ruled that
way establishes plaintiffs cannot prove all ‘reasonable attorney[s]
would agree’ Thompson’s preemption argument is ‘totally and
completely without merit’ because a [s]uperior [c]ourt judge
accepted the argument.”
The trial court addressed two additional issues. First, the
court addressed plaintiffs’ argument that, regardless of whether
the Santa Monica restriction on evictions was preempted, there
was no reasonable basis for seeking to evict plaintiffs because
their Airbnb activities did not constitute “using the premises for
an unlawful purpose” (§ 1161, subd. (4)). The Santa Monica
Municipal Code distinguishes between a “Vacation Rental,” in
which a resident rents out all or a part of a dwelling unit “for
exclusive transient use of 30 consecutive days or less” (Santa
Monica Mun. Code, former pt. 6.20.010(c), italics added),4 and

4 This section of the Santa Monica Municipal Code has
subsequently been amended in ways not relevant to this opinion.

14
“Home-Sharing,” in which “residents host visitors in their homes,
for compensation, for periods of 30 consecutive days or less, while
at least one of the dwelling unit’s primary residents lives on-site,
in the dwelling unit, throughout the visitors’ stay.” (Id., former
pt. 6.20.010(a).) Vacation rentals are forbidden under the code,
whereas home-sharing is permitted if the resident obtains a
license for doing so.
Plaintiffs argued that their listing fit the definition of
home-sharing and, thus, they had done nothing more than fail to
obtain a license. The trial court found that Thompson could have
made a tenable argument to the contrary: “a landlord could
tenably argue that [the] plaintiffs’ activity did not constitute
‘home-sharing’ at all, but instead fell within the [c]ity’s general
ban on short-term vacation rentals. Plaintiffs testified that they
rented out the downstairs portion of the unit only, which had its
own bedroom, bathroom, and separate entrance. They did not
rent out the upper portion of the unit, which had the shared
living spaces and Ms. Sanchez’s bedroom and bathroom. Thus,
the Airbnb subtenants were not sharing common living spaces
with any permanent residents; instead, they had the exclusive
use of a separate portion of the property with its own separate
entrance. A persuasive argument could be made that the term
‘home-sharing’ as used in the ordinance contemplates that the
subtenants will be inhabiting common living space with the
permanent residents, and that the Airbnb rentals at issue here
do not qualify because they do not advance the stated purpose of
the exception to the ban on Airbnb rentals for ‘home-sharing.’ . . .

(See Santa Monica Ord. Nos. 2616 & 2748, amending & revising
ch. 6.20 of Santa Monica Mun. Code.)

15
Even if not persuasive, such an argument would be, at the very
least, tenable.”
Finally, the trial court addressed an issue suggested by our
opinion reversing Judge Meiers’s grant of Thompson’s anti-
SLAPP motion, i.e., that Thompson’s remedy when the trial court
sustained the demurrer to his first unlawful detainer action was
to appeal, and that he had no tenable basis for filing a second or
third unlawful detainer action.
The court explained that plaintiffs had not argued that
Thompson’s second and third unlawful detainer filings were
frivolous for this reason. Indeed, “in the trial of the present
matter, no evidence was presented regarding the bases for the
demurrers in any of the unlawful detainer actions or the court’s
ruling on the demurrers. There was no evidence presented about
anything that happened at the hearings on the demurrers.” The
court continued: “Accordingly, based on the record presented at
the trial, the court cannot conclude that the second and third
actions were not tenable because they were barred by any
preclusive effect disposition of the first action. It is possible, for
example, that the trial court sustained the demurrer in the first
action because of technical problems with the initial notices,
including the fact that one of the notices attached to the
complaint had the wrong address on it.”
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Legal Background
“ ‘In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of
review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally

16
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.’ ” (Lopez v. La
Casa de Las Madres (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 365, 378, quoting
Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)
Plaintiffs argue, and we agree, that, although they alleged
a violation of the Santa Monica tenant harassment ordinance,
their case is in essence a malicious prosecution matter, and the
issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding
that Thompson had probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer
actions. “We apply the same legal precepts the trial court does in
assessing probable cause. A litigant will lack probable cause if he
or she either (1) ‘ “relies upon facts which he has no reasonable
cause to believe to be true,” ’ or (2) ‘ “seeks recovery upon a legal
theory which is untenable under the facts known to him.” ’ ”
(Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
1242, 1257.) This is a “low standard” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert &
Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 826) and, in general, “the tort [of
malicious prosecution] is disfavored both because of its ‘potential
to impose an undue “chilling effect” on the ordinary citizen’s
willingness to report criminal conduct or to bring a civil dispute
to court’ [citation] and because, as a means of deterring excessive
and frivolous lawsuits, it has the disadvantage of constituting a
new round of litigation itself.” (Id. at p. 817.)
To the extent the facts are undisputed, “ ‘ “the question of
whether there was probable cause to institute [an] action is
purely legal” ’ ” (Medley Capital Corp. v. Security National
Guaranty, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 33, 47-48), and “[o]ur
review is de novo.” (Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 757,
794.) We apply a more deferential standard to factual questions,

17
however, because “[w]e do not literally sit in the same seat the
trial court does when making th[e probable cause] assessment on
appeal, [and] there can sometimes be antecedent factual issues a
trier of fact must decide concerning what the malicious
prosecution defendant knew or should have known upon filing
suit.” (Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1257; accord, Medley Capital Corp., supra, at
p. 48.)
B. Plaintiffs Forfeited Any Claim Based on Eviction for
Breach of Lease
As described above, the primary issue before the trial court
in deciding probable cause was whether a reasonable attorney
could conclude that the Santa Monica law restricting evictions on
the basis of illegal activity was preempted by state law. In their
appellate brief, plaintiffs argue that Thompson lacked probable
cause for a different reason that they did not litigate below. They
note that, in the unlawful detainer complaints, Thompson sought
to evict plaintiffs not only because they had engaged in illegal
activity, but also because they breached their lease, which
forbade subletting.
Under Santa Monica law, a landlord may not evict a tenant
for breaching her lease unless “[t]he tenant has continued, after
written notice to cease, to commit” the breach. (Charter Amend.,
§ 1806(a)(2), italics added.) The trial court found that “Ms.
Sanchez and Ms. Milo received the notice [to desist from listing
the unit] on October 15, 2015, and stopped offering the unit on
Airbnb immediately,” and as far as we have seen, Thompson
never argued otherwise.
Plaintiffs argue Thompson must have known Santa Monica
law prevented him from evicting them on the basis of breach of

18
lease. Nor was there a claim that this provision of the law was
preempted. During a hearing at the conclusion of the bench trial,
the trial court asked Thompson’s attorney, “there’s no argument
that [Charter Amendment section 1806(a)(2)] is preempted so
we’re never going to be in a land where [it] does not apply, right?”
Thompson’s attorney responded, “Correct.” In plaintiffs’ view,
this shows Thompson lacked probable cause for seeking to evict
them for breaching their lease. Plaintiffs argue further that this
alone should have been sufficient to give them victory at the
bench trial. (See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 671
[“a suit for malicious prosecution lies for bringing an action
charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of
those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable
cause”], citing Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d
43.)
We need not address this argument because, as plaintiffs
conceded during oral argument, they failed to present it before
the trial court. As a result, they forfeited it. “ ‘As a general rule,
theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the
first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the theory
(or theories) on which their cases were tried. This rule is based
on fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the
opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal . . . .’ ”
(Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 982, 997.) If plaintiffs had squarely presented an
argument that Thompson lacked probable cause to seek to evict
them for breaching their lease, Thompson and his attorney might
have chosen an entirely different defense strategy. At a
minimum they would have had an opportunity to present
evidence and argument on this claim, and the trial court would

19
have had a chance to address it. After having proceeded through
bench trial on one theory, plaintiffs cannot now argue for the first
time on appeal that we should award them victory on a new and
different theory. “ ‘ “Bait and switch on appeal not only subjects
the parties to avoidable expense, but also wreaks havoc on a
judicial system too burdened to retry cases on theories that could
have been raised earlier.” ’ ” (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn.,
supra, at p. 997.)
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate the Trial
Court Erred in Its Conclusion on Preemption
Plaintiffs’ appellate brief contains a detailed analysis of
case law in support of the proposition that “[s]ection 1806(a)(4) of
the . . . Charter Amendment is not preempted by . . . section
1161[, subdivision ](4).” The trial court largely agreed with that
assessment, writing in its statement of decision that “[i]f a court
were to consider this on the merits . . . , Thompson’s argument
[for preemption] would almost certainly be a losing argument.”
The court then clarified, “But that is not the question here. The
question here is whether the argument is so utterly lacking in
merit—i.e., frivolous—that a litigant should not be permitted to
even raise it.”
The trial court’s observation about the question to be
addressed was correct, and plaintiffs mostly ignore this key
question in their brief. Although they argue at length in favor of
their view on preemption, they do not respond at all to the trial
court’s reasoning as to why the opposing position, even if unlikely
to succeed on the merits, was not frivolous. “[I]t is a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to

20
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) By failing even to address the trial court’s
arguments, plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden. In any
event, we find no fault with the trial court’s reasoning. The
distinction between substantive and procedural restrictions on
evictions is indeed often difficult to draw, and to the best of our
knowledge, no published opinion has addressed the validity of a
restriction like the one at issue here.
Nor do we agree with plaintiffs’ contention that the trial
court adopted a standard “of legal tenability . . . so broad that all
malicious prosecution cases based on lack of legal tenability
would be eliminated if [it] were imposed.” Plaintiffs’ claim is
based on a colloquy during closing arguments during which the
trial court asked the parties questions about the case and
expressed tentative views about what constituted a tenable legal
argument on the issue of preemption; their claim is not based on
the court’s actual statement of decision, which plaintiffs
essentially ignore. Statements of preliminary views are
irrelevant in light of the court’s subsequent statement of decision.
(Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 577, 591 [a court’s comments before a final ruling
“may never be used to impeach” that ruling].) The purpose of the
statement of decision is to give the trial court “an opportunity to
place upon [the] record, in definite written form, its view of the
facts and the law of the case.” (Whittington v. McKinney (1991)
234 Cal.App.3d 123, 127.) It “ ‘is our touchstone to determine
whether or not the trial court’s decision is supported by the facts
and the law.’ ” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th
277, 287.) Plaintiffs’ failures to cite the statement of decision and

21
to seek to rebut its findings suggest plaintiffs have no basis for
challenging the court’s analysis and conclusions regarding
Birkenfeld and the subsequent cases on state preemption of local
eviction laws.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Placing Undue
Emphasis on Another Jurist’s Views
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by basing its finding
of probable cause in part on Judge Meiers’s determination when
deciding the anti-SLAPP motion that Santa Monica’s restriction
on evictions for illegal activity was preempted by state law.
Because probable cause is an objective standard, plaintiffs argue
“the trial [court] should have looked to the merits of the
underlying [unlawful detainer] actions from a reasonable
attorney’s perspective, and determined for itself whether any
reasonable attorney would have considered the three repetitive
. . . actions meritorious, rather than considering what the earlier-
assigned jurist in this case thought about the preemption issue
raised for the first time in the malicious prosecution case.”
This is a false distinction. Probable cause is indeed an
objective standard, in that it depends not on “whether the
attorney bringing the prior action believed the case was tenable,”
but rather on whether “ ‘any reasonable attorney would have
thought the claim tenable.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert &
Chidester, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817.) We are as aware as
anyone that trial judges (as well as appellate justices) are not
infallible, but it would be bizarre to hold that actual success in
convincing a judge of the merits of an argument is irrelevant to
whether a reasonable attorney would think a claim is tenable.
(Cf. id at p. 818 [“Claims that have succeeded at a hearing on the
merits, even if that result is subsequently reversed by the trial or

22
appellate court, are not so lacking in potential merit that a
reasonable attorney or litigant would necessarily have recognized
their frivolousness”].) The trial court here took Judge Meiers’s
prior decision as one piece of evidence that Thompson’s claims
were tenable. The court did not err in doing so.5
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Finding a Reasonable
Attorney Could Have Viewed Plaintiffs’ Actions as
Illegal Activity
Finally, plaintiffs contend their rental of a portion of their
apartment was only a regulatory violation, not an unlawful
purpose sufficient to sustain an unlawful detainer action. Once
again, plaintiffs ignore the trial court’s reasoning in rejecting this
argument in its statement of decision. The court found that an
attorney could reasonably argue that plaintiffs’ actions
constituted illegal vacation renting, not merely unlicensed home-
sharing. Plaintiffs do not challenge this conclusion, which is
based on the court’s factual findings regarding the layout of the
apartment and the portion of it rented to Airbnb tenants. The
court also noted that in Chen v. Kraft, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th
Supp. 13, the appellate division of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court held that the sublease of a portion of an
apartment on Airbnb contrary to municipal law could indeed

5 Plaintiffs make a similar argument regarding the trial
court’s reliance on Chen v. Kraft (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th Supp. 13
that fails for the same reason. In Chen, the court held that
renting a portion of an apartment on Airbnb in violation of
municipal law could constitute illegal activity in an unlawful
detainer action. (Id. at p. Supp. 21.) The trial court reasoned
that the existence of this case showed that Thompson had a
tenable basis for seeking to evict plaintiffs.

23
constitute an illegal purpose in an unlawful detainer action. (Id.
at p. Supp. 21.) The trial court stated that “[d]uring closing
arguments, plaintiffs’ counsel argued the Chen v. Kraft case was
wrongly decided, but that does not matter here. The fact that
there is a published appellate division opinion standing for the
proposition shows that the argument is at least tenable.”
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any error in this reasoning.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their
own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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