CourtListener 10741457•People v. Hampton CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Hampton CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099690
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CRF17-00011)
v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
GARY GRANT HAMPTON, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Gary Grant Hampton, Jr., was convicted in 2017 of multiple sexual
offenses against his ex-wife. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an
aggregate term of 26 years and eight months, including the upper term on the principal
count, five years for a prior serious felony enhancement, and three years for three prior
prison term enhancements.
In 2021, this court affirmed his convictions but remanded the matter for the trial
court to strike the prior prison term enhancements and reconsider the prior serious felony
enhancement. On remand, the trial court in 2021 struck the prior prison term
enhancements and continued the matter. In 2023, defendant argued he was entitled to
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 (statutory section citations that follow are
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found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated). Later that year the trial court struck the
prior serious felony enhancement but again imposed the upper term on the principal
count, even though aggravating circumstance had not been proven pursuant to section
1170, subdivision (b).
In an unpublished opinion, we struck a $500 domestic violence fee imposed under
section 1203.097 and affirmed the judgment as modified, reasoning that aggravating
circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as required under section
1170, subdivision (b) during a section 1172.75 resentencing when the trial court
originally imposed the upper term. (People v. Hampton (June 23, 2025, C099690)
[nonpub. opn.].)
The California Supreme Court subsequently granted review and transferred the
matter back to us with directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider in light of People
v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez). By separate order, we vacated our decision.
In supplemental briefing after transfer, defendant agues the trial court erred in
imposing the upper term on the principal count because no aggravating circumstance had
been proven pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d). The People acknowledge that
defendant’s case is “not final for sentencing purposes,” but asks us to affirm the judgment
because Lopez “does not counter [our previous] holding” regarding section 1172.75. We
agree with defendant that the trial court erred and will remand the matter for
resentencing.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In October 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of rape of a drugged victim (§ 261,
subd. (a)(3)) and spousal abuse with a prior qualifying conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1)).
In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true that defendant had a prior strike
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)); a prior serious felony (former § 667,
subd. (a)); and three prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
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The following month, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an
aggregate term of 26 years and eight months, as follows: 16 years for rape (the upper
term of eight years doubled due to the strike), five years consecutive for the prior serious
felony enhancement, three years consecutive (or one year each) for the three prior prison
term enhancements, and two years and eight months consecutive (one-third the middle
term of four years, doubled due to the strike) for the spousal abuse count. The court
explained it was imposing the upper term due to the following aggravating factors: the
crimes involved cruelty and viciousness, the victim was vulnerable due to domestic
violence and her intoxication (which defendant induced), defendant exhibited violent
conduct, defendant had numerous prior convictions, defendant had served prior prison
terms, defendant was on post-release community supervision at the time of the crimes,
and defendant’s prior performance on all forms of supervision was unsatisfactory. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) [rule citations that follow are
found in the California Rules of Court unless otherwise stated].) The court also imposed
various fines and fees, including a $500 domestic violence fee (§ 1203.097), a $250
domestic violence prevention program fee (§ 1463.27), and $1,200 in additional fees and
fines.
On appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded the matter for
the trial court to: (1) strike the prior prison term enhancements under Senate Bill No. 136
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) and (2) consider its new discretion to strike the prior serious
felony enhancement under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). (People v.
Hampton (Aug. 17, 2021, C086081) [nonpub. opn.].)
In December 2021, the trial court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements
and continued the case to consider whether the prior serious felony enhancement should
be dismissed. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation subsequently notified
the trial court that defendant was eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.
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In its briefing, the prosecution asked the trial court to strike the (already
dismissed) prior prison term enhancements but otherwise leave the sentence unchanged.
Citing section 1170, subdivision (b), the prosecution argued the court could consider the
aggravating circumstances of defendant’s criminal history and prior prison terms.
In his briefing, defendant argued he was entitled to a “full re-sentencing” pursuant
to section 1172.75 and People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857. He asked the trial court to
strike the prior prison term enhancements, strike the prior strike, strike the prior serious
felony enhancement, and impose the lower term of three years on the principal count.
An October 2023 updated probation report listed the same aggravating
circumstances that the trial court had relied on in originally sentencing defendant. (Rule
4.421(a)(1), (3), (b)(1), (2), (3), (4), & (5).) The report recommended striking the three
(already stricken) prior prison term enhancements and declining to strike the prior serious
felony enhancement. The report further recommended the middle term on the principal
count, explaining that section 1170 now required the middle term unless defendant
stipulated to aggravating factors or a trier of fact found them true beyond a reasonable
doubt.
During the October 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial court struck the prior serious
felony enhancement and sentenced defendant to prison for an aggregate term of 18 years
and eight months, including the upper term on the principal count. The trial court’s basis
for imposing the upper term is unclear, as it gave various reasons throughout the course
of the hearing. The court initially noted there had been changes to section 1170 and
“how the Court can consider aggravating factors.” The court then explained it was
selecting the upper term “based upon the proof of the aggravating factors that were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt” during the trial, including six “serious” felony
convictions starting in 2004. Based on a certified RAP sheet, the court also found
defendant’s criminal history showed “serious and worsening type of criminal behavior
over a period of time.” In addition, defendant had been on supervised release when he
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committed the current crimes and had “numerous” prior parole violations. However, the
court subsequently stated it found “seven different” aggravating circumstances “relating
to both the crime and the defendant.” The prosecution subsequently argued the court
could only consider four aggravating circumstances, namely that defendant had numerous
prior convictions, had served a prior prison term, was on supervised release when the
crime was committed, and had previously performed unsatisfactorily while on parole.
The court responded that it believed it could also consider the victim’s vulnerability since
defendant had been convicted of rape of an intoxicated person. The prosecution said
there was an “argument to be made for that,” but asked the court to focus on the four
aggravating circumstances proven by the certified RAP sheet. Ultimately, the court
decided to impose the upper term because “the aggravating factors I’ve already pointed
out and listed. . . on balance outweigh the mitigating factors.”
The trial court found defendant was unable to pay non-mandatory fines and fees.
It imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a corresponding $300 parole
revocation fine (suspended unless parole is revoked) (§ 1202.45). It further ordered all
other previously imposed fines and fees to remain in place.
In July 2024, appellate counsel sent a letter to the trial court requesting it strike the
fees imposed under sections 1203.097 and 1463.27, as well as the $1,200 in additional
fines and fees. Defendant noted that each of these sections contain an ability-to-pay
clause, and the trial court had found defendant unable to pay non-mandatory fines and
fees. The following month, the trial court issued an amended abstract of judgment
reflecting it had stricken the $250 section 1463.27 fee and the $1,200 in additional fines
and fees. However, the $500 section 1203.097 fee remained. The abstract also listed
multiple prior prison term enhancements with the notation that the punishment had been
stricken for each enhancement, even though the instructions on the form state: “DO NOT
LIST ENHANCEMENTS FULLY STRICKEN by the court.”
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Defendant timely appealed. After defendant filed his notice of appeal, in
September 2025, the trial court issued an amended abstract of judgment that does not
contain the $500 section 1203.097 fee. The abstract also does not list the stricken prior
prison term enhancements.
DISCUSSION
In Lopez, our Supreme Court held that a criminal judgment does not become final
for purposes of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 when an appellate court affirms a
conviction, but leaves sentencing issues pending before the trial court following remand.
(Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 392.) During the resentencing on remand, “the benefits of
supervening ameliorative legislation apply retroactively.” (Id. at p. 393.)
Here, multiple relevant supervening ameliorative sentencing laws came into effect
while defendant’s case was on remand from this court for sentencing issues. At the time
of defendant’s original sentencing in 2017, former section 1170 left the selection of
whether to impose the lower, middle, or upper term “within the sound discretion of the
court” and instructed the court to “select the term which, in the court’s discretion, best
serves the interests of justice.” (Former § 1170, subd. (b).) The sentencing court was
permitted to consider the “record in the case, the probation officer’s report, other reports
. . . , and statements in aggravation or mitigation . . . , and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Ibid.)
As amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1,
2022, section 1170 now generally provides for midterm sentences and prohibits upper
term sentencing unless the circumstances in aggravation are stipulated to by the
defendant, proven to a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt, or relate to a prior
conviction that is established by a certified record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-
(3); see also rule 4.421 [setting forth circumstances in aggravation that a court may
consider in sentencing]; see also People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082 [absent
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waiver or stipulation, aggravating factors such as the increasing seriousness of a
defendant’s prior convictions and unsatisfactory performance on probation must be found
true beyond a reasonable doubt “before those facts can be used to justify an upper term
sentence”].) In selecting an appropriate term, the trial court must set forth on the record
the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed. (§ 1170, subds. (b)(5), (c).)
Prior prison term enhancements have also changed since 2017. When defendant
was originally sentenced, former section 667.5, subdivision (b) required a one-year
enhancement for each prior prison term served for “any felony.” (§ 667.5, former subd.
(b).) Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to
only impose prior prison term enhancements on those who have previously served a
sentence for certain sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature added what is now section 1172.75
(subsequent references are to the current section), which generally invalidates sentence
enhancements imposed under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), with some
exceptions not relevant here. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3 [adding
former § 1171.1]; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12 [renumbering former § 1171.1 to § 1172.75].)
Under section 1172.75, when presented with a person eligible for relief, a trial court shall
“recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) The statute
requires the court to apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council, as well as “any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) In addition, “[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court
may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in
aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).)
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In Brannon-Thompson, the defendant was originally sentenced in 2018 to the
upper term. (People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 462 (Brannon-
Thompson).) In 2022, the trial court resentenced the defendant pursuant to section
1172.75 and reimposed the upper term even though the aggravating circumstances had
not been proven according to section 1170, subdivision (b)’s evidentiary standards.
(Brannon-Thompson, at pp. 462-463.) This court found that the plain language of section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) indicated the Legislature “intended the new burden of proof
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply only if the trial court is imposing the
upper term for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing.” (Brannon-Thompson, at
pp. 466-467.) As such, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) creates “an exception to the
general rule that the trial court must apply ameliorative changes in the law at a section
1172.75 resentencing.” (Brannon-Thompson, at p. 467.)
To the extent the trial court here relied on this exception when it reimposed the
upper term during the 2023 resentencing even though not all of the various aggravating
factors had been proven according to section 1170, subdivision (b)’s evidentiary
standards, it erred. Unlike Brannon-Thompson, defendant’s case was on remand from
this court for sentencing issues, including directions to strike the prior prison term
enhancements, which the trial court did in December 2021 (or before section 1172.75
came into effect). (People v. Hampton, supra, C086081) [nonpub. opn.].) As such, when
the trial court proceeded to resentence defendant in 2023, his sentence already lacked any
enhancements imposed pursuant to former section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant
accordingly was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2023, making the
provision inapplicable. Instead, per Lopez, defendant was entitled to “the benefits of
supervening ameliorative legislation,” including the new evidentiary standards of section
1170, subdivision (b). Given that we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury using that same standard would have found true all of the various aggravating factors
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relied upon by the trial court when it reimposed the upper term in 2023, we will reverse
and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with Lopez. (Wiley, at p. 1087.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s resentencing order is vacated and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with Lopez. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ROBIE, J.
KRAUSE, J.
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