CourtListener 10740541•People v. Sheridan CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/21/25 P. v. Sheridan CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100716
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62188756)
v.
CHRISTOPHER DAVID SHERIDAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury found defendant Christopher David Sheridan guilty of possessing a
controlled substance for sale, the trial court placed him on probation. Defendant
contends the conviction must be reversed for two reasons: (1) the primary evidence in
the trial was the fruit of an unlawful traffic stop and detention; and (2) the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting overly prejudicial evidence of an uncharged offense.
He also challenges a probation condition as an improper delegation of judicial authority.
1
We reject defendant’s challenges to his conviction but agree that the probation
condition is impermissibly vague. We remand for the trial court to strike or modify the
condition and otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2022, the Folsom Police Department obtained a warrant to
search defendant’s car and home. In support of the warrant, a Folsom detective presented
an affidavit relying on the following statement by a Folsom police officer (the officer).
On November 12, 2022, the officer was on patrol when he saw defendant driving
while holding a cell phone in his hands with the screen illuminated. The officer stopped
defendant under Vehicle Code section 23123 (section 23123). He asked defendant “not
less than 3 times” about his residence, and defendant “refused to answer until . . . the 3rd
time.” Defendant refused to provide registration and insurance and “began to become
frustrated that he had to talk with [the officer].” The officer believed defendant’s
“behavior to be nervous” and knew “suspects will become nervous and attempt to delay
officers[’] requests to prevent detection of possible weapons and contraband.” He told
defendant to turn the car off and give him the key. Defendant pulled away when the
officer tried to grab the key and wouldn’t let it go. The officer then asked defendant to
interlace his fingers behind his head and get out of the car, but defendant refused. When
asked if there were any weapons inside the car, defendant admitted there was a firearm in
his backpack. The backpack was searched (the traffic stop search) and had inside a
loaded revolver, two cell phones belonging to defendant, over $4,000 in cash, and four
pill bottles for “Tank Jr.” for 90 Xanax pills but contained over 400 unmarked pills in
total with white powder flaking off. The officer believed that defendant was in
possession of Xanax for sale and would possess additional illegal items at his home.
Law enforcement executed the warrant on November 15, 2022, searching
defendant’s home and his car located in front (the warrant search). Based on the evidence
2
found, defendant was charged in Placer County with possessing for sale alprazolam, a
controlled substance. (Health & Safety Code, § 11375, subds. (b)(1), (c)(12).)
In August 2023, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the
traffic stop search occurred without a warrant (the first motion). On the date set for the
hearing, there was a “joint request to reset” as well as a motion to continue that the court
granted, but there is no reporter’s transcript for the proceeding. Two days later, defendant
filed a second motion to: (1) quash the warrant used to conduct the warrant search,
(2) controvert the affidavit used as the basis for the warrant, and (3) suppress the
evidence seized under the warrant. According to defendant’s opening brief, the second
motion was prompted by the prosecution providing a warrant for the home search. Citing
Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks), the second motion argued that the
affidavit underlying the warrant contained material misstatements and omissions and the
remaining content failed to establish probable cause.
The prosecution filed an opposition to the second motion, arguing that defendant
merely “quibbled” with the officer’s descriptions but provided no evidence of material
falsehoods or omissions. Also, in the prosecution’s view, defendant’s admission of an
unsecured firearm in the car justified further search.
At the next hearing, defendant confirmed that the second motion revised the first
and was the “paperwork to be considered.” He also confirmed the hearing would consist
of “argument only.” Relying on the officer’s body camera footage from the traffic stop
search, defendant insisted there were numerous false statements in the supporting
affidavit that went “toward the probable cause of the stop in the first place” and suggested
the search conducted after the stop was unnecessary and unreasonable. He argued that
“once those statements [were] taken out, there [was] no probable cause for the stop” and
“no evidence to show that [defendant] was even on a phone at the time.” As a result, the
traffic stop search was unconstitutional and “everything afterwards should be dismissed
as a fruit of the poisonous tree,” including the warrant. He ended his argument as
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follows: “There was no reason to unreasonably detain [defendant] based off false
information. And thus, the warrant should be traversed and the language should be
changed, the search warrant that was based off that should be quashed, and the evidence
should be suppressed.”
In opposition, the prosecution argued that defendant did not make a substantial
showing to justify a Franks hearing because none of the identified statements were
materially false. In his view, the officer’s impressions were simply different than
defendant’s.
The trial court received the body camera footage and transcript into evidence.
According to that footage, the traffic stop occurs at night. The officer walks up to
defendant’s car, shines a flashlight on the driver’s side, knocks on the driver’s window,
and tells defendant he was stopped because he was “on [his] phone.” The officer then
asks for defendant’s driver’s license, which defendant provides a few seconds later. The
officer asks if defendant still lives in Lincoln. Defendant responds but the response is
inaudible, and the officer then asks defendant if still “live[s] in Lincoln though,”
emphasizing the word “lives.” At this point in the footage, defendant is not visible.
Defendant appears to say “umm, yes,” and the officer asks, “is that a yes or a no, you
seem a little hesitant?” Defendant responds, “yes.” The officer then asks for license and
registration, and defendant confirms he has “all that stuff.” The officer asks, “Can I have
it please?” The officer then shines his flashlight into the car for a few seconds, showing
defendant holding an open wallet. The officer lowers the flashlight, reflecting light on
one of defendant’s hands, and asks, “Is everything ok?” Defendant responds, “I’m all
good bro, I’m just complying with everything you’re asking.” The officer moves the
flashlight to the officer’s other hand and asks, “. . . did I do something or--” Defendant
gestures toward the glove box and says, “[inaudible], I gotta unbuckle, I gotta go in the
glovebox, you have two officers on me, you guys have your hands on your weapon.”
Only defendant’s hand gestures are visible in the footage at this point. The officer
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interjects, “My hand’s in my pocket.” Defendant responds, “Alright, [inaudible] just
checking, I can’t see—.” Then the officer says, “OK, hey man, let’s start over ok. The
reason I pulled you over is because you were on your phone. I’ve already identified that,
ok. I’ve been very nice to you. I just asked for ID. I need your, your legally— Alright,
turn the car off for me dude.” The officer shines the light directly in the car and says,
“give me the keys, give me the keys” Defendant pulls the key out of the ignition and the
officer put his hand inside the window. The camera is now pointed parallel to the car.
When the camera turns back, we see both defendant and the officer holding the key and
hear defendant say, “wait, wait” and the officer say, “give me -- ok, nope, we’re not doing
this, nope. Put your hands on your head dude. Interlace your fingers behind your head.”
After taking the matter under submission, the court denied the second motion in
September 2023, finding insufficient evidence of materially false statements needed to
trigger a Franks hearing.
During the jury trial held in October and November 2023,1 the Folsom detective
testified regarding the evidence found in the warrant search. He and his team found
loaded firearms in a dresser next to a bed, a plastic bag filled with empty prescription
bottles in the living room, and a large amount of marijuana. After defendant refused to
provide access to a gun safe located in his room, the fire department sawed it open. In
the safe, the Folsom detective and his team found two shotguns, a large amount of
ammunition, over 300 unmarked alprazolam pills in three or four pill containers, and over
$4,000 in cash in a smaller safe. And in the center console of defendant’s vehicle parked
at the home, they found about $20,000 in cash bundled in rubber bands.
The Folsom detective testified that (1) alprazolam sold on the street is commonly
in the form of white, unmarked pills with three “squares” on them, representing four
1 This was the second jury trial. The first occurred in September 2023 and ended in a
mistrial.
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doses; (2) unmarked pills raise a suspicion of illegal narcotic sales; and (3) it is common
for drug dealers to place the substances they are selling in prescription bottles and to
carry large amounts of cash and firearms on their person and in their homes.
A criminalist conducted representative sample testing for the pills collected at the
traffic stop search and the warrant search and confirmed they were alprazolam.
According to a narcotics detective expert, alprazolam is the generic version of Xanax.
Defendant’s fiancé testified that the cash found in the warrant search was hers,
explaining that her employment compensated her in cash, she could potentially make
$1,000 a day, and she didn’t put all the cash she earned in the bank. She owned firearms
to protect herself and her money, and defendant had two phones because she gave him
one, but it was “kind of glitching,” and he ended up buying a new one. According to
fiancé, defendant owned two dogs. Both were called Tank, Jr. as their “bloodline name”
and both were aggressive. Fiancé saw prescription bottles with Tank, Jr.’s name on them
and gave both dogs one pill of alprazolam three times a day to calm them.
Defendant also presented evidence that three veterinarians prescribed alprazolam
for “Tank” for anxiety between February 29, 2020 and July 20, 2021.
On November 13, 2023, the jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense.
After considering the probation report, the sentencing briefs, and three letters, the trial
court placed defendant on probation and selected certain probation conditions from the
court’s standardized order. The selected conditions required defendant to: (1) abstain
from use or possession of intoxicants or marijuana; (2) not be in any place where alcohol
or marijuana is the primary item of sale; (3) abstain from use or possession of narcotics,
controlled substances, or drug paraphernalia without a valid medical prescription;
(4) submit to drug, narcotic, and alcohol testing as directed by the probation officer;
(5) seek and maintain gainful employment; (6) not annoy, harass, or contact any
prosecution witnesses to the crime or who testified at trial; (7) stay away from a
particular veterinarian’s place of work, home, or vehicle; and (8) “enter into and continue
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such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program
as directed by the probation officer or as specifically ordered as a term of probation, and
shall not leave or terminate such programs without the permission of the probation
officer” (the program condition).
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Traffic Stop and Detention
Defendant contends the evidence from the warrant search was the fruit of an
unlawful traffic stop and prolonged detention. The People contend defendant forfeited
this contention by failing to assert it in the trial court. We agree with the People.
A. Forfeiture
“ ‘[W]hen defendants move to suppress evidence under [Penal Code] section
1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court of the specific basis for their
motion.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 235.) “[I]f defendants
detect a critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must
object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.”
(People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130.) For example, “if defendants have a
specific argument other than the lack of a warrant as to why a warrantless search or
seizure was unreasonable, they must specify that argument as part of their motion to
suppress [evidence] and give the prosecution an opportunity to offer evidence on the
point.” (Ibid.) “The determinative inquiry in all cases is whether the party opposing the
motion had fair notice of the moving party’s argument and fair opportunity to present
responsive evidence.” (Id. at p. 135.)
Here, the first motion challenged the traffic stop search on the basis that it
occurred without a warrant. Defendant then revised that motion with the second motion
and confirmed that the second motion was the only motion at issue. The second motion
7
did not challenge the traffic stop. Instead, it sought to traverse the affidavit underlying
the search warrant, citing Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154 and arguing that several of the
officer’s affidavit statements were false and made deliberately or with reckless disregard
for the truth. As so presented, the revised motion required the trial court to determine
whether defendant had made a “substantial preliminary showing” of false statements that
were necessary to a finding of probable cause. (Franks, at pp. 155-156.) If defendant
had made that showing, he would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing to test the
veracity of the affidavit. (Ibid.) But the trial court found that defendant failed to make
the necessary showing, and defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal.
Instead, defendant contends the traffic stop and detention were unlawful based on
an unreasonable mistake of law and unreasonable, prolonged, and overbroad detention.
Such a contention would have required the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
(see Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (c)(1)), but defendant affirmed he was offering argument
only. Although he proceeded to orally argue that the traffic stop and detention were
unlawful, the People were not given advance notice of the specific basis of those
arguments or a fair opportunity to present responsive evidence. (Williams, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 129 [defendants must precisely pinpoint the subject matter of the proof].)
Indeed, the trial court never ruled on the propriety of the stop and detention, and
defendant did not insist on a ruling. In these circumstances, we concluded defendant
forfeited his challenges to the traffic stop and detention.
B. Ineffective Assistance
Anticipating our forfeiture conclusion, defendant contends his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to proceed with a challenge to the traffic stop and detention. We
disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must establish two
elements: (1) trial counsel’s representation was deficient because it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) the
8
deficiency resulted in prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th
342, 389.) If defendant makes an insufficient showing on either element, his ineffective
assistance claim fails. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.)
In support of both elements, defendant requests us to take judicial notice of a
separate case filed in Sacramento County that charged defendant with the same offense
based on the evidence collected at the traffic stop search (the Sacramento case).
Specifically, he seeks judicial notice of the following documents from the Sacramento
case: (1) the complaint, (2) the reporter’s transcript of the July 2024 hearing granting
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the court’s order dismissing the case.
He argues these documents show there was no satisfactory explanation for trial counsel’s
failure to make the same motion in this case and that failure caused prejudice.
We grant defendant’s request for judicial notice in part and deny it in part. A court
is free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including
the existence of a trial court’s factual findings. (Kilroy v. State of California (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 140, 147.) Applying that principal here, we take judicial notice of the
existence of the identified documents from the Sacramento case and the fact that
defendant successfully moved to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop search in that
case. But defendant also asks us to expand judicial notice and accept the findings from
the Sacramento case as indisputably true, thereby showing that the same motion in this
case would have been granted. (See People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488 [where a
defendant claims ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth
Amendment claim, the prejudice prong requires the defendant to prove that the claim is
meritorious].) This is not a proper use of judicial notice. (Kilroy v. State of California, at
pp. 147-148 [a court may not accept as indisputably true a factual finding made after a
contested adversary hearing except where the finding is relevant for purposes of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case]; see Professional Engineers v.
9
Department of Transportation (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590.) In this regard, defendant’s
request for judicial notice of the Sacramento case documents is denied.2
Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and California Rules of Court, Rule
8.252, defendant also asks us to take judicial notice of and make determinations of fact
based on the following documents: (1) the motion to suppress testimony offered in the
Sacramento case and (2) trial counsel’s declaration that at the time of the first and second
motions, he was unaware of case law supporting a motion to suppress the traffic stop
evidence, including People v. Spriggs (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 150, that “held that
holding a cell phone with an illuminated screen while driving does not violate . . . section
23123.”
Defendant again requests more than we can grant. Although the power to make
factual determinations on appeal lies within a reviewing court’s discretion (Diaz v.
Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1213), that
power will be exercised only to enable the appellate court to affirm the judgment, not
lead to a reversal. (Estate of Schluttig (1950) 36 Cal.2d 416, 422.) This power is also
exercised rarely and only in “exceptional circumstances.” (Charisma R. v. Kristina S.
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 301, 308.) Those circumstances are not present in the context of
defendant’s ineffective assistance claim. When such a claim is raised on direct appeal,
the trial record must affirmatively establish the deficiency of trial counsel’s
representation. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) But here, defendant relies
on evidence outside the trial record that we cannot consider on direct appeal. (People v.
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 703, fn. 1.) Defendant’s claim is more properly addressed
in a habeas corpus proceeding that can extend to matters outside the record. (Ibid.) For
these reasons, defendant’s request for judicial notice and determinations of fact is denied.
2 Because we limit judicial notice to the existence of these documents, we deny the
People’s request to file supplemental briefing.
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Based on the record properly before us for consideration, defendant does not
convince us that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. We review trial counsel’s performance with deferential scrutiny,
indulging a strong presumption that his conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance and recognizing the many choices that attorneys make in handling
cases and the danger of second-guessing an attorney’s decisions. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689.) Based on that deference, “we will not find
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason
for counsel’s . . . omissions.” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926 [emphasis
added].) Here, the four corners of the trial record combined with the judicially noticed
records do not establish ineffective assistance. (See Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 703,
fn. 1 [appeal is limited to the four corners of the record on appeal].)
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, “a detention must be supported by reasonable
suspicion the person is involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Zaragoza (2016)
1 Cal.5th 21, 56.) Reasonable suspicion means “ ‘ “the detaining officer can point to
specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances,
provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in
criminal activity.” ’ ” (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053-1054.) If the
detaining officer’s justification for the stop is based on a mistake – either factual or legal
– then the resulting search or seizure is still lawful under the Fourth Amendment as long
as the officer’s mistake is objectively reasonable. (Heien v. North Carolina (2014)
574 U.S. 54, 60.) “To be reasonable is not to be perfect, . . . so the Fourth Amendment
allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway
for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’ ” (Id. at pp. 60-61.)
Here, trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that the prosecution would
have offered persuasive evidence and arguments in opposition to a motion to suppress the
traffic stop evidence. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509 [“competent
11
counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue
those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem
appropriate under the circumstances”].) The record does not indicate trial counsel knew
how the officer would testify at a motion to suppress hearing (see People v. Mendoza
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267), including how he would describe the moments in the
body camera footage when defendant is not visible or his responses are inaudible. Also,
we cannot assume the officer would testify in precisely the same way he testified over
nine months later in the Sacramento case, nor can we assume a different trial court would
have made the same findings. (See People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975 [when
reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, the reviewing court must
“defer to its factual findings if supported by substantial evidence”]; People v. Suff, supra,
58 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054 [reasonableness of detention depends on totality of
circumstances].)
We also presume trial counsel knew of the following principles: (1) a “traffic stop
is lawful at its inception if it is based on a reasonable suspicion that any traffic violation
has occurred” (Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499,
510); and (2) “an officer’s reliance on the wrong statute does not render his actions
unlawful if there is a right statute that applies to the defendant’s conduct” (In re Justin K.
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 700). (See People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1105
[counsel is presumed competent and informed as to applicable law].) Based on that
knowledge, trial counsel could have predicted that the prosecution would persuasively
argue that the officer intended to cite defendant for violating Vehicle Code section
23123.5 (section 23123.5), the statute that immediately follows section 23123, the statute
the officer did cite. (Compare Spriggs, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 150, 156 [section 23123
only prohibits listening and talking on a cell phone unless the phone is used in hands-free
mode] with People v. Porter (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 927, 934 [section 23123.5 “prohibits
all use of a handheld phone’s functions while driving”].)
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In a supplemental brief, defendant addresses the impact of Porter. Specifically, he
cites the Porter court’s clarification that a driver can still hold a phone “that is turned off
or is turned ‘on’ but has the screen locked so applications and notifications are
inaccessible by the driver.” (Porter, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 944.) In defendant’s
view, this clarification shows there is (1) no way the officer could have had a reasonable
suspicion that defendant committed a traffic infraction and (2) no reason why competent
trial counsel would not object to the evidence collected from the stop.
We are unpersuaded by defendant’s supplemental brief. The body camera from
the traffic stop indicates the officer saw defendant driving while “on” his phone, and we
cannot say this behavior clearly falls outside section 23123.5 under Porter or rendered
the stop improper given the principle that a “traffic stop is lawful at its inception if it is
based on a reasonable suspicion that any traffic violation has occurred.” (Brierton, supra,
130 Cal.App.4th at p. 510). Moreover, the suppression motions were filed in 2023, well
before Porter was decided, but after section 23123.5 was enacted with language
“susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,” as Porter explains, and an intent
to “mitigate issues that arose after” Spriggs. (Porter, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 935;
Assem. Com. On Transportation, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1785 (2015-2016 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Apr. 5, 2016, pp. 2-3.)
Based on those considerations, trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that
an attack on the traffic stop search “would not be successful, and therefore could have
decided to focus . . . [on] the argument that the warrant affidavit contained intentionally
or recklessly false statements.” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 563.)
II
Admission of 2016 Evidence
A. Additional Background
The prosecution moved to admit evidence of a 2016 search of defendant’s home in
which police found 88 alprazolam pills, over $19,000 in cash, and hundreds of pills
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resembling alprazolam dissolving in the toilet (the 2016 evidence). In support, the
prosecution argued this evidence provided circumstantial evidence of defendant’s intent
as to the charged offense. Defendant objected on various grounds, including that the
2016 evidence was dissimilar and violated Evidence Code section 352.
The court granted the prosecution’s motion, concluding the 2016 evidence was
“relevant and highly probative as to both intent and lack of mistake” and “[t]he cases
[were] quite similar in nature given the type of drug at issue, the large amount of cash
found and the fact [that the] items were found at . . . defendant’s home on both
occasions.” After analyzing the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, the court
found the probative value was not substantially outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice,
noting that the 2016 evidence was not remote, would not occupy a significant amount of
time, and would not confuse the jury.
During the trial, a Placer County detective testified that he helped with a
residential search warrant at defendant’s home in 2016. He and his team had to force
open an outer gate and the front door. After entering, the Placer detective saw defendant
walking out of a bathroom. The Placer detective searched the bathroom and found
“between 200 to 300” pills “dumped into the toilet.” The jury saw a picture of the
dissolving pills. Elsewhere in the home, the team found 88 similar-looking pills, multiple
firearms, and over $19,000 in cash. The Placer detective testified that illicit narcotic sales
is a cash-based business and that “drug dealers will have firearms . . . in easy reach of
wherever they’re staying.”
The court later instructed the jury regarding the 2016 evidence: if the prosecution
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had committed the prior
uncharged act, then the jury could consider the evidence for the limited purpose of
deciding whether defendant acted with intent to possess alprazolam for sale as to the
charged conduct and whether defendant’s actions as to the charged conduct were the
result of mistake or accident.
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In closing argument, the prosecution argued that drug dealers flush illegal drugs
when police arrive because the drugs dissolve: “that’s why drug dealers do it, and that’s
why [defendant] did it in 2016.” The prosecution urged that defendant’s 2016 conduct
gave the jury “an insight into [defendant’s] intent [in] this case.”
Defense counsel countered that there was “no actual evidence presented”
regarding the 2016 conduct: “[a]ll we had [were] white things in the toilet. That’s all we
had. Everything else – nothing was tested. It did not match. . . . It’s more likely than not
that he had no intent that day and there’s not enough evidence to support anything in that
case.”
B. Analysis
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) makes evidence of uncharged crimes
admissible when relevant to demonstrate a fact other than disposition to commit a crime,
such as intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. Here, defendant does not
dispute the relevance of the 2016 evidence but contends it was unduly prejudicial under
Evidence Code section 352. We disagree.
Before admitting evidence of uncharged crimes, the trial court must weigh the
probative value of the evidence against its potential to create substantial risk of undue
prejudice. (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 326; Evid. Code, § 352.) We review
the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion and do not disturb the ruling “unless it was
arbitrary, capricious, or made in a ‘ “patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.) Here, the
trial court acted within its discretion.
The factors weighed under Evidence Code section 352 include the degree of
similarity between the uncharged act and the charged offense, the remoteness of the
uncharged act, whether the uncharged act is particularly inflammatory relative to the
charged offense, whether the uncharged evidence emanates from a source independent of
the charged evidence, the possibility of confusion of issues, and consumption of time.
15
(People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047; People v. Robinson (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1345, 1352.) Defendant focuses on two of these factors: the inflammatory nature of the
2016 evidence and the possibility of confusion of issues. Specifically, he contends the
2016 evidence was more inflammatory than the charged conduct because it suggested
defendant destroyed evidence and refused to cooperate with law enforcement. And he
contends the 2016 evidence increased the risk of confusion because (1) the jury did not
hear whether defendant sustained a conviction for the acts covered by the 2016 evidence;
(2) the defense that defendant raised in this case also arguably applied to the 2016
evidence; (3) the pills found dissolving in the toilet in 2016 were never chemically
identified; and (4) there was no conclusive evidence that defendant intended to sell the
flushed pills.
We are not persuaded by defendant’s contentions for three reasons. First,
defendant overstates the inflammatory nature of the 2016 evidence compared to the
warrant search evidence. Defendant was not particularly cooperative with the November
15, 2022 warrant search. He refused to provide access to a gun safe in his room,
prompting law enforcement to seek the help of the fire department to gain access.
Second, the evidence that defendant was flushing pills in 2016 was highly probative of
his knowledge of the illicit nature of the pills, regardless of whether they were alprazolam
or another controlled substance. (See People v. Meza (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1745-
1746 [unlawful possession of controlled substance for sale requires proof of possession
with intent to sell and knowledge of the substance’s presence and illegal character].) And
third, when combined with the evidence of weapons and large sums of cash, the evidence
was also highly probative of his intent regarding the pills. (See ibid.)
We also reject defendant’s suggestion that the 2016 evidence needed to provide
“conclusive evidence” of an intent to sell to avoid confusing the jury. The case on which
defendant relies required “sufficient evidence,” not conclusive evidence, of a “culpable
. . . act and points of similarity tending . . . to establish a culpable mental state [or negate
16
a defense] in the charged offense.” (People v. Winkler (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1102,
1162.) As covered, the 2016 evidence was probative of defendant’s knowledge and intent
and included multiple points of similarity with the evidence of the charged offense,
including a significant amount of cash, multiple guns, and large quantities of pills found
in defendant’s home. Because we reject defendant’s contention regarding the
inflammatory nature of the 2016 evidence, we also reject his contention that the jury was
more likely to punish him for the 2016 acts. It’s unlikely “the jury’s passions were
inflamed by the evidence of defendant’s uncharged offenses” because “the [evidence]
describing defendant’s uncharged acts . . . was . . . no more inflammatory than the
[evidence] concerning the charged offenses.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380,
405.)
In sum, defendant overlooks the balance of factors a court must consider under
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. (See People v. Christensen (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 781, 799 [uncharged evidence not so severe that it should excluded
without a consideration of other factors].) He also overlooks that the court provided a
limiting instruction on the purpose for which the jury could use the 2016 evidence. Such
an instruction mitigates the possibility of undue prejudice. (People v. Thomas (2023)
14 Cal.5th 327, 363.) Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court acted
within its discretion in admitting the 2016 evidence.
III
Validity of Program Condition
Defendant contends the program condition of his probation must be stricken
because it constitutes an improper delegation of judicial authority. Specifically, he
contends the condition is invalid in three ways. Applying de novo review, we address
each challenge separately. (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902.)
First, relying on Smith, defendant contends the probation condition gives probation
the discretion to require him to attend residential treatment as opposed to outpatient
17
treatment. We disagree because Smith is distinguishable. In Smith, the defendant was
given two years of supervised probation. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 900.) The
trial court imposed substance abuse-related probation conditions, including the condition
that the defendant “participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including
residential [treatment], as directed by the probation officer.” (Id. at p. 901.) The
reviewing court concluded that “treatment/therapy/counseling . . . including residential
treatment” improperly delegated to probation the discretion to decide whether the
defendant needed to attend residential treatment as opposed to outpatient treatment.
(Ibid.) The court remanded for the trial court to either “strike the words ‘including
residential’ ” or specify that the court was requiring residential treatment. (Id. at p. 905.)
Here, the program condition does not expressly identify residential treatment as a
possibility, so we elect to construe the condition to eliminate the possibility of residential
treatment. (See United States v. Mike (10th Cir. 2021) 632 F.3d 686, 696 [courts will
construe non-specific, all-encompassing conditions in a manner that does not make them
infirm]; see People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 501 [reviewing court will not invalidate
a probation condition as unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable and practical
construction can be given to the language].)
Second, defendant contends the program condition permits probation to dictate the
strenuousness of probation compliance. We disagree. People v. Penoli (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 298 is instructive. There, the reviewing court rejected a similar
contention. (Id. at pp. 308-309.) We agree with that court’s reasoning: “Should the
probation officer make a determination favorable to defendant, defendant will suffer no
legal injury. An unfavorable determination, on the other hand, will be inherently subject
to judicial review. That is, if the probation officer concludes that the defendant has not
successfully completed the program, he or she must bring the matter to the court’s
attention by petition to revoke, extend, or modify probation. (See [Pen. Code,] § 1203.2,
subd. (a).) . . . If proceedings are instituted, the defendant may challenge the probation
18
officer’s interpretation of the facts.” (Penoli, at p. 309, italics omitted.) We also presume
a probation officer will not interpret a probation condition arbitrary or irrationally; if a
probation officer acts contrary to that presumption, the defendant can file a petition for
modification of the condition. (People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 658.) In
short, the “ultimate determination of compliance must necessarily be made by the court,
at which time any undue deference to the probation officer’s opinion may be challenged
and, if necessary, appealed.” (Penoli, at p. 310.)
And third, defendant contends the program condition does not “illuminate[] for
[defendant] the nature and extent of psychiatric, psychological, or educational programs
the court deemed appropriate.” As to the extent of the program, we disagree. Defendant
fails to sufficiently explain what he means by the term extent, and we do not develop
arguments his behalf. (See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270,
277.) But we do agree with defendant that the nature of the required program is
impermissibly vague. “[I]t is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements
imposed on the probationer.” (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) Although a
probation condition need not be set forth with “ ‘mathematical certainty,’ the language
used must have ‘ “reasonable specificity.” ’ ” (Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)
Here, such specificity is lacking. The program choices for the probation officer are open-
ended, ranging from education to psychological and psychiatric to drug, alcohol, or other
rehabilitation. This is too vague to pass muster, and the People do not suggest we can
interpret it more narrowly in light of other probation conditions, the probation report, or
the trial court’s commentary. (See Smith. at pp. 902-903 [reviewing court can consider
context and trial court’s comments to determine whether a condition is unconstitutionally
vague].) Without meaningful guidance from the record, the open-ended program
condition cannot be “saved by permitting the probation department to provide the
necessary specificity.” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358.) We
19
remand for the trial court to either strike this condition or specify the type of program to
which defendant may be subject.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to either (1) strike the program condition
or (2) modify the condition to specify the type of program to which defendant may be
subject. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
DUARTE, J.
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