People v. Leon CA4/1

CourtListener 10740430Calctapp21.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/21/25 P. v. Leon CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084519

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN407998)

ZAHIR VLADIMIR LEON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for
resentencing.
Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C.
Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Zahir Vladimir Leon of two counts of assault with a

deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 & 2) and found true
that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of those
counts (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). We conclude the injury to the victim in count 2,
which the emergency room doctor described as a “superficial laceration,” is
not sufficient to support the enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision
(a). Consequently, we reverse the true finding, strike the one year imposed
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), associated with count 2, and remand
for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion anew with
the changed circumstance. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On November 17, 2019, around 5:30 p.m., L. Avila pulled into the
driveway of her Oceanside home with her two young children in the car.
O. Martinez, the children’s father, and A. Moreno were standing near the
driveway. Avila got out when “out of nowhere,” Leon came around the corner
saying, “Fuck Mesa” to Martinez and Moreno. Avila recognized Leon as
someone she had seen twice before in the neighborhood. She later identified
Leon from a photographic line-up.
Leon ran up, “[w]aving his arms around” and “moving them downwards
in a striking motion.” He chased Martinez and Moreno down the street and
they “started fighting.” Avila saw Leon had a knife. She took her children
inside the house and quickly went back outside. By then Martinez and
Moreno were running back to the house, “saying that they were bleeding.”
Martinez told her he had been stabbed in the shoulder. Both men were later

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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treated at the hospital. When she saw the men again, Avila saw Martinez
had “a little wound” to his back left shoulder area and Moreno had “a little
wound behind his back.”
Avila’s home is inside the territory of the “Varrio Mesa Locos” (Mesa)
criminal street gang. In 2019, Leon, a documented member of the “Center
Street Locos” (Center Street) criminal street gang with the moniker “Little
Boy,” lived in the heart of Mesa territory. Although Mesa and Center Street
“coexisted” in 2017 and 2018, signs of tension later arose between the two
gangs.
In October 2019, a gang suppression officer conducted a field interview

with Leon after observing him walking in Mesa territory “gloved up,”2 which
in the officer’s experience indicated a gang member who is “actively trying to
get into some sort of fight or are prepared for some sort of fight.” When Leon
saw the officer’s patrol vehicle, he dropped a folding knife onto the ground.
In December 2019, while out on bail for the assault charges against Martinez
and Moreno, the same officer saw Leon “throwing his arms up” at someone on
a bicycle, “like one would when they’re challenging someone to a fight.” As
the officer approached in his patrol vehicle, Leon ran and “cover[ed] up his
right hand or ben[t] his right hand up towards his wrist and readjust[ed] his
sleeve several times.” Leon was found with a knife about 12 inches long with
a seven-to-eight-inch blade.
The parties stipulated that Center Street is a criminal street gang

within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (f).3 Leon and Center

2 Leon was wearing yellow gloves on both hands.

3 “ ‘For purposes of this trial, the parties hereby stipulate to the
following: Center Street is a criminal street gang within the meaning of

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Street were subject to a gang injunction in 2019. A gang expert testified a
Center Street gang member’s violent attack on a Mesa gang member in Mesa
territory would benefit Center Street by weakening a rival gang.
The jury found Leon guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on
Martinez (count 1) and Moreno (count 2) in violation of section 245,
subdivision (a)(1). It found true the allegations he personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) in the commission of both counts,
and that he committed these offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). As to his subsequent possession of a kitchen knife,
the jury convicted Leon of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 21310; count
3) and found true he committed the offense while he was released from
custody on bail or on his own recognizance in another matter (§ 12022.1,
subd. (b)).
Additionally, as to counts 1 and 2, the jury found the existence of three
aggravating circumstances within the meaning of California Rules of Court,
rules 4.421(a)(1) (the offenses involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,

Penal Code Section 186.22[, subdivision] (f) as an ongoing organized group of
more than three persons with a common name whose primary activities are
the commission of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury, robbery, and witness intimidation. [¶ ]
Center Street gang members have collectively engaged in a pattern of
criminal activity within three years of November 17, 2019, within the
meaning of Penal Code Section 186.22[, subdivision] (e), as its members have
committed the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, and witness
intimidation on separate occasions by two or more members, and these
offenses commonly benefited the gang, and the common benefit was more
than reputational.’ ”

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viciousness, or callousness), 4.421(a)(8) (the offenses were carried out with
planning, sophistication and professionalism), 4.421(b)(1) (defendant engaged
in violent conduct, i.e., “an unprovoked attack on strangers, which indicates a

serious danger to society”).4
At sentencing in June 2024, the trial court imposed a total prison term
of 14 years. The sentence consisted of the upper term of four years on count
1, a consecutive one-third the middle term for one year on count 2, and a
concurrent middle term of two years on count 3; plus consecutive terms of five
years for the gang enhancement and three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement on count 1, and a consecutive term of one year for the great
bodily injury enhancement on count 2. The court struck punishment for the
gang enhancement on count 2 and struck all fines and fees based on its
finding of compelling and extraordinary circumstances.
DISCUSSION
Leon contends substantial evidence does not support the jury’s true
findings on the great bodily injury enhancements associated with counts 1
and 2. We agree the injury sustained by Moreno—a “superficial laceration”—
is not sufficient to support a great bodily injury enhancement within the
meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (section 12022.7(a)), provides, “Any
person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than
an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be
punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state

4 In April and July 2023, criminal proceedings were twice suspended and
reinstated. Both times, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Leon’s
competency under section 1368, the court appointed a doctor to evaluate, and
Leon was found mentally competent to stand trial.

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prison for three years.” Section 12022.7, subdivision (f)(1), provides, “ ‘great

bodily injury’ means a significant or substantial physical injury.”5 Great
bodily injury “ ‘is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.’ ”
(People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702; see also People v. Sandoval
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 357, 361 [noting that great bodily injury is “significant
or substantial physical injury that is more than minor or moderate”].)
In People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58 (Cross), our Supreme Court reaffirmed
the jury’s critical role in determining whether an injury amounts to great
bodily injury. As the Cross court explained, “A fine line can divide an injury
from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet
the description. Where to draw that line is for the jury to decide.” (Id. at
p. 64 [cleaned up].) The Cross court further explained that case law
“acknowledges that a great bodily injury determination by the jury rests on
the facts as presented at trial in the context of the particular crime and the
particular injuries suffered by the victim.” (Id. at p. 65.) The Cross court
added, “Proof that a victim’s bodily injury is ‘great’—that is, significant or
substantial within the meaning of section 12022.7—is commonly established
by evidence of the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the resulting pain,
or the medical care required to treat or repair the injury.” (Id. at p. 66.) And
the court clarified, “to be significant or substantial the injury need not be so
grave as to cause the victim ‘ “permanent,” “prolonged,” or “protracted” ’
bodily damage.” (Id. at p. 64.)

5 At the time of the offenses, the relevant language was contained in
former section 12022.7, subdivision (f). Given the absence of any change in
the language at issue, we quote the current statute for purposes of clarity
here and throughout this opinion.

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We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
jury’s true finding on a section 12022.7(a) enhancement under the same
standard that applies to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction. (People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750.) “In
considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Substantial evidence is
evidence that reasonably inspires confidence and is of solid value.” (People v.
Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307 [cleaned up].) And as our high court
explained in Escobar, whether the harm resulting to the victim constitutes
great bodily injury is a question of fact for the jury. (Escobar, at p. 750.) “If
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s finding of great bodily injury,
we are bound to accept it, even though the circumstances might reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) However, “ ‘[t]he
substantial evidence rule mandates consideration of the weight of the
evidence before deferring to [any] conclusions drawn from the evidence by the
trier of fact.’ ” (Collins, at p. 307.)
Here, neither Martinez nor Moreno testified at trial. Avila’s testimony
did not provide much on the nature of their injuries, describing each men’s
injury only as “a little wound.” The police officer who responded to the
hospital to speak with the victims testified each sustained one apparent “stab
wound[ ].” The People introduced photographs taken of the victim’s injuries
at the hospital, and the parties stipulated to the admission of the subpoenaed
medical records for both victims. Notably, the People did not offer any

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witness to meaningfully explain the significance of the photographs or
medical records.
We find insufficient evidence to support a finding that Moreno suffered
great bodily injury. One photograph showed a puncture wound of an
undetermined size to Moreno’s back and another photograph showed
bandaging to Moreno’s back. According to his medical records, Moreno was
initially admitted to Tri-City Medical Center for treatment of a “2 cm
laceration to [the] left mid back” with “no uncontrolled bleeding.” He
complained of “mild pain,” received “[w]ound care,” and x-rays were normal.
He was transferred to Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla for a “higher level
of care,” but the Tri-City medical records do not indicate why. At Scripps, the
attending doctor observed a “1.5 cm linear stab wound to [the] back” and
concluded his injury was “a superficial laceration with no penetration even
close to the chest wall or the fascia.” (Boldface omitted, italics added.) Two
hours after admission to the Scripps hospital, Moreno was discharged home.
Considering the three types of evidence discussed in Cross, Moreno’s
1.5 or 2 centimeter “superficial laceration,” without more, is not a “significant
or substantial physical injury.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (f)(1); see Cross, supra, 45
Cal.4th at p. 66.) The severity of the injury was described by the attending
doctor as “superficial,” and the photographic evidence does not add more;
Moreno’s pain was “mild”; and, based on the evidence in the record, the
medical care required to treat or repair his injury consisted of no more than
bandaging. (Cross, at p. 66.)
Contrary to the People’s assertion, “[t]he mere wound alone is [not]
sufficient to support the great bodily injury finding.” And although the
parties’ comparison with other cases is of limited utility in our review of the
sufficiency of the evidence in this case, we note even the cases relied on by

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the People show why the nature of Moreno’s injury is insufficient for a great
bodily injury finding. (See People v. Bustos (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1747, 1755
[“multiple abrasions, lacerations and contusions”]; People v. Corona (1989)
213 Cal.App.3d 589, 592 [“severely swollen” jaw, cuts on arms, face and chin,
“bruises on . . . neck, head, and back”]; People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98
Cal.App.3d 830, 836 [multiple contusions causing painful swelling and
discoloration a day later]; compare People v. Martinez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d
727, 735–736 [evidence of superficial lacerations held not sufficient to prove
great bodily injury].)
Although on appeal all evidence must be viewed in the light favorable
to the judgment, the evidence must still be substantial and inspire
confidence. We conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
true finding that Moreno suffered great bodily injury under section
12022.7(a).
But we reach a different result as to the section 12022.7(a)
enhancement involving Martinez in count 1. Although a photograph of
Martinez depicted an approximate 1 centimeter wound to his left shoulder,
the Tri-City Medical Center records described his wound as a “3 cm
laceration” to the left shoulder requiring six sutures after a wound
exploration revealed no nerve, muscle, or tendon damage. Martinez also
reported “mild” pain. Although a very close call, we conclude these
circumstances provide sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s finding of great
bodily injury as to Martinez. Thus, we are bound to accept it, even though
the circumstances might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the jury’s true finding on the great
bodily injury enhancement and strike the one-year sentence under section
12022.7(a) associated with count 2. When part of a sentence is stricken on

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review, on remand for resentencing “a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances.” (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681,
citing People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 [“upon remand for
resentencing after the reversal of one or more subordinate counts of a felony
conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the
defendant's sentence on the counts that were affirmed, including the term
imposed as the principal term”].)
DISPOSITION
The true finding under section 12022.7(a) associated with count 2 is
reversed and the one–year sentence imposed under section 12022.7(a) for
count 2 is stricken. The judgment is affirmed as modified, and the matter is
remanded for a full resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its
sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

DO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

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