CourtListener 10739910•Masjedi v. Valdez CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/20/25 Masjedi v. Valdez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
SAEED MASJEDI, B340847
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, (Los Angeles County
and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV11253)
v. ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE,
ELIZABETH VALDEZ, MODIFYING OPINION, AND
DENYING REHEARING;
Defendant, Cross-complainant, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
and Respondent.
THE COURT:
Appellant Saeed Masjedi’s request for judicial notice, filed
November 10, 2025, is granted.
The opinion filed on October 27, 2025, is modified as
follows:
On page 6, footnote 4 is revised to read as follows:
4 The minute order indicates no court reporter was
present for the hearing. The settled statement from the
hearing contains no information regarding any arguments
Masjedi made on the substance of the anti-SLAPP motion.
There is no change in the judgment. Appellant’s petition
for rehearing is denied.
____________________________________________________________
WEINGART, J. ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
2
Filed 10/27/25 Masjedi v. Valdez CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
SAEED MASJEDI, B340847
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, (Los Angeles County
and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV11253)
v.
ELIZABETH VALDEZ,
Defendant, Cross-complainant,
and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jill Feeney and Michelle C. Kim, Judges. Dismissed in
part and affirmed in part.
Saeed Masjedi, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant,
and Appellant.
Law Offices of Ashton R. Watkins, Ashton Ryan Watkins;
Law Office of Bruce Adelstein and Bruce Adelstein for Defendant,
Cross-complainant, and Respondent.
Plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant Saeed Masjedi
challenges a trial court order denying his special motion under
the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)1 to strike a
cross-complaint filed by defendant, cross-complainant, and
respondent Elizabeth Valdez. Valdez was Masjedi’s landlord, and
she alleges Masjedi waged a campaign of harassment against her
after she sought to evict him. We affirm because Masjedi has
failed to show via reasoned argument that the trial court erred in
denying his anti-SLAPP motion. Indeed, both before the trial
court and in his appellate briefing, Masjedi has set forth his
position in only the most conclusory manner. We also grant
Valdez’s motion for appellate sanctions because Masjedi’s appeal
is frivolous and, by his own admission, undertaken for delay and
to harass Valdez. (§ 907.)
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The conflict between the parties arose over a kitchen water
leak. In 2014, Masjedi rented a condominium from Valdez in the
Rampart Village neighborhood of Los Angeles. At some point in
2023, Masjedi replaced the refrigerator Valdez had originally
provided in the unit. Masjedi claims he did so with Valdez’s
consent; Valdez denies this. The water filter for the new
refrigerator was not installed correctly, causing a leak into a
neighboring unit and to the complex’s parking garage. A
neighbor notified Valdez of the leak, as did a representative of
the homeowners’ association. Valdez alleges that when she and a
handyman went to inspect the unit, they discovered that Masjedi
1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
had tampered with the electrical wires and had changed the locks
without Valdez’s permission. According to Valdez, Masjedi
became belligerent, ordered Valdez and the handyman to leave,
and attempted to push Valdez out.
Valdez sent Masjedi a letter telling him that he would need
to vacate the apartment to allow for repairs to the water pipes
and drywall, along with “lots of other repairs.” According to
Valdez, Masjedi left her a voicemail stating that he would not
allow workers to enter the unit.
On May 19, 2023, shortly after he received the notice to
vacate, Masjedi filed suit against Valdez, alleging causes of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful
retaliation.2 He claimed he noticed a leak under the kitchen sink
in June 2022 and complained to Valdez about it. Rather than fix
it, Valdez “undertook a course of retaliatory misconduct” against
Masjedi, including making harassing phone calls, unlawfully
entering the apartment and refusing to leave, and threatening to
cut off the utilities and evict him.
Valdez filed an unlawful detainer action against Masjedi.
According to Valdez, Masjedi responded by beginning a
“campaign of harassment against me, which included[] sending
me threatening letters, calling my telephone at all hours, yelling
and berating me.” Valdez, who is 79 years old, declared, “I was so
afraid of him that I suffered headaches, sleep disturbances,
anxiety and nervousness. I did not want to see him, because he
could overpower me easily and physically hurt me given my age
2 Masjedi’s original complaint was not included in the
appellate record. We sua sponte augment the record to include it.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
3
and his size.” Valdez also alleged Masjedi’s actions caused her to
suffer increased cardiac palpitations, requiring medicine. Valdez
alleged that on July 20, Masjedi sent an email to his neighbor at
the condominium complex informing her that he was suing
Valdez and that he did not want the neighbor to “get involve[d] in
any[ ]way in our litigation, or you will be part of [the] litigation
and that is not what you want.” In the email, Masjedi continued:
“I do not want you [to] spy or pass on any information to [Valdez]
or testify in her behalf. Enjoy your happy life and do not make it
complicated for nothing. [¶] Litigation is costly and
unpredictable and dang[e]rous. [¶] The reason I am mentioning
this is because her attorney indicated that they have [a] witness,
and I do not know [if] it is [a] bluff or who it is, and I just wanted
to make sure we have [an] understanding.” Valdez alleged that
twice during proceedings in the unlawful detainer suit, Masjedi
yelled at her in the courthouse hallway, “drop your lawsuit, or I
sue your ass.”
Valdez prevailed in the unlawful detainer action, and the
superior court entered judgment in her favor on September 29,
2023. According to Valdez, before Masjedi vacated the
condominium, he cut the pipes under the kitchen sink, pulled out
the electrical wires, took all the light bulbs, vandalized a bedroom
window, and failed to return the keys to the unit and to the
parking garage. Valdez “interpreted this violence as a message
to me that he could also be violent to me physically as well. This
has in turn caused me a lot of emotional distress.”
On February 2, 2024, Valdez filed a cross-complaint against
Masjedi alleging causes of action for elder abuse, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. On May 23, Masjedi filed the motion at issue
4
in this appeal, which he titled as a motion to dismiss the cross-
complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16) and the
litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)). The memorandum
in support of the motion was two pages long and included only
conclusory arguments. The memorandum claimed that Masjedi
“is entitled . . . to have the [c]ross-[c]omplaint . . . dismissed
because . . . each [c]ause of [a]ction is based upon the privileged
publication/broadcast by the [p]laintiff’s communications
concerning the course of litigation and/or in anticipation of
litigation, as reflected in the [c]ross-[c]omplain[t]’s page 2, at
lines 4, and at lines 8 through 15.” These lines of the cross-
complaint, however, had nothing to do with communications
concerning or in anticipation of litigation.3 Masjedi cited two
cases in support of his position regarding the litigation privilege,
Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 and Rusheen v. Cohen
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, but he did not explain how these cases
related to Valdez’s accusations.
3 Instead, these passages had introductory allegations
about the parties. Page two, line four said, “references will be
made to certain allegations therein in this [c]ross-[c]omplaint.”
Page two, lines eight to 15 said Valdez was “the owner of
residential real property, located at 244 S. La Fayatte [sic] Park
Place, Unit 103, in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, 90057 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘property’). Ms. Valdez was at all relevant times, a senior over
the age of sixty-five (65) years old. [¶] (2) Cross-[d]efendant,
Saeed Masjedi, an individual (hereinafter referred to as ‘cross-
defendant’), was at all relevant times, a resident of the City and
County of Los Angeles, and he was a tenant of the ‘property’ until
a judgment order was entered on September 29, 2023 in favor of
Ms. Valdez and against [Masjedi].”
5
The memorandum’s discussion of the anti-SLAPP statute
was likewise brief. Masjedi did not target any particular
allegation(s) in the cross-complaint. He instead stated without
elaboration that “[e]ach [c]ause of [a]ction of the subject [c]ross-
[c]omplaint is barred by the anti-SLAPP statute . . . . Each
[c]ause of [a]ction of the subject [c]ross-[c]omplaint incorporates
the allegation made by Valdez that each [c]ause of [a]ction is
based upon (1) the [p]laintiff’s exercise of the [p]laintiff’s federal
constitutional First Amendment right of [f]reedom of [s]peech,
and/or (2) the [p]laintiff’s exercise of the [p]laintiff’s federal
constitutional First Amendment right of [p]etitioning activity, as
an impermissible effort primarily aimed at chilling the
[p]laintiff’s federal constitutional rights.” Masjedi again cited
two cases, Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35
Cal.4th 180, 192 and Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113-1117, but did not
explain how they related to the case.
After a hearing,4 the trial court denied the motion on
June 18, 2024, finding that Masjedi had failed to show that the
allegations in the cross-complaint were based on protected
activity. The court reasoned that “Masjedi’s alleged conduct
making harassing phone calls to Valdez[] and damaging the unit
Valdez rented to him do not fall within the scope of any of” the
categories of conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Masjedi’s “conduct does not become protected activity merely
because it took place after Valdez filed her unlawful detainer
4 The minute order indicates no court reporter was present
for the hearing, and the record does not include a settled
statement regarding what occurred during it.
6
action or after Masjedi commenced his own lawsuit. Because
these acts are not among the acts described in . . . section 425.16[,
subdivision ](e), they are not protected activities.” The court
concluded further that Masjedi’s alleged email to his neighbor
was “not protected activity because the activity is illegal as a
matter of law” as it constituted dissuading a witness in violation
of Penal Code section 136.1.5 The court explained that “[t]he
language in the email was intended to dissuade [the neighbor]
from testifying or appearing in this litigation because Masjedi
specifically threatened [the neighbor] not to be involved in the
litigation in any way, including testifying on Valdez’s behalf.
Masjedi does not dispute that he sent this email.”
Following the court’s denial of his anti-SLAPP motion,
Masjedi filed what he characterized as a motion under section
663 to set aside the court’s decision. In the motion, Masjedi
claimed for the first time that he had not been served with
Valdez’s cross-complaint. He also alleged that the court’s
decision was wrong on the merits because all of the allegations in
the cross-complaint were “based upon communications, and
communicative conduct, related to, and generated by, Valdez’s
unlawful detainer action.” Masjedi claimed that his email to the
neighbor was an exercise of his First Amendment right to free
speech and was not illegal.
On August 28, 2024, the trial court denied the motion,
noting that section 663, which allows for motions to set aside a
5 That section makes it a crime, among other things, to
“[k]nowingly and maliciously attempt[] to prevent or dissuade
any witness . . . from attending or giving testimony at any trial,
proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law.” (Pen. Code, § 136.1,
subd. (a)(2).)
7
judgment, decree, or special jury verdict, “is inapplicable here.”
Even if the motion were interpreted as a motion for
reconsideration under section 1008, subdivision (a), the court
concluded that Masjedi “has not met his burden [of]
demonstrating any basis to vacate or modify the . . . [o]rder,” and
that he was “attempting to reargue issues raised” at the time of
the anti-SLAPP hearing. That same day, Masjedi filed a notice of
appeal stating he was appealing the court’s order denying his
section 663 motion, “with that [section] 663 [m]otion having been
made pursuant to the June 18, 2024 . . . order denying [his
m]otion to [d]ismiss the [c]ross-[c]omplaint pursuant to . . .
[s]ection 425.16 and Civil Code [s]ection 47[, subdivision ](b).”
On August 18, 2025, Valdez filed a motion with this court
seeking sanctions for Masjedi pursuing a frivolous appeal. A few
days later, Masjedi emailed Valdez’s appellate counsel that the
sanctions motion had “encourage[d]” Masjedi because it showed
“my [e]vil tactics inflicting legal costs to [Valdez] is [sic] working,”
that Masjedi would continue to inflict legal costs until Valdez
paid him “the half million dollar[s] she owes me” for committing
housing violations and crimes against him, and stating that
Masjedi had a legal right to appeal. Masjedi ended the email in
pertinent part, “for every dollar I spend to inflict, it costs your
client $20 to respond, and I intend to drag you [for five] years in
[the] court system and inflict as much as possible legal costs (to
[Valdez]), so advise your client she will be drag[ged] in appeal
courts for [a] long time. [S]o she better start considering to pay
my half million dollar [sic] she owes me.”
8
DISCUSSION
A. We Construe Masjedi’s Notice of Appeal Liberally
Masjedi purports to appeal from the trial court’s denial of
what he characterized as a motion under section 663 to set aside
the judgment. As the trial court noted, however, there was no
judgment in this case, and, thus, his motion was more properly
construed as a motion under section 1008 to reconsider the
court’s order denying his special motion to strike. Interlocutory
orders such as orders denying motions for reconsideration
generally are not appealable. (Benton v. Benton (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 212, 217.) We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider
an appeal from the court’s August 28, 2024 order, denying
Masjedi’s section 663/1008 motion, and dismiss his appeal from
that order. (Lemaire v. All City Employees Assn. (1973) 35
Cal.App.3d 106, 110.)6
However, “ ‘ “notices of appeal are to be liberally construed
so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what
[the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the
respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.” ’ ”
(K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875,
882; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) In this case, it
is clear that by filing his appeal, Masjedi also intended to
6 For this reason, we also lack jurisdiction to consider
Masjedi’s argument, raised for the first time in the section
663/1008 motion, that service of the cross-complaint upon him
was improper. In any event, we note that Masjedi did not file a
motion to quash pursuant to section 418.10, and that his failure
to make such a motion at or before the time he filed the special
motion to strike waived any argument concerning alleged service
issues. (§ 418.10, subd. (e)(3).)
9
challenge the trial court’s ruling on his anti-SLAPP motion as
that order was explicitly referenced in the notice. Further, his
notice of appeal was timely filed as to the denial of the anti-
SLAPP motion. Valdez was not misled by the notice of appeal—
in her appellate brief, she acknowledges the rule of liberal
construction of notices of appeal, and she argues in support of the
trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. In recognition
of “ ‘the strong public policy favoring the hearing of appeals on
the merits’ ” (K.J., supra, at p. 882), we construe Masjedi’s notice
of appeal to include the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. The
denial of such a motion is “appealable immediately, rather than
as part of an appeal from a final judgment.” (Benton v. Benton,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 217; see § 425.16, subd. (i).)
B. Masjedi Has Not Shown the Trial Court Erred by
Denying the Anti-SLAPP Motion
Masjedi’s opening brief includes one sentence of argument
against the trial court’s anti-SLAPP and litigation privilege
ruling: “Clearly, the communicative acts sued upon in the
[c]ross-[c]omplaint of Valdez, of my supposedly (1) asking for a
date, (2) sending letters, (3) making telephone calls, (4) yelling,
(5) communicating to Valdez that she must drop her lawsuit or
else ‘I will sue your ass[,’] and (6) sending an e-mail to a third
party telling them to not get involved in the litigation, involve the
exercise of the constitutional First Amendment [r]ights of
[f]reedom of [s]peech, and of [p]etitioning to fall within the scope
of both . . . [s]ection 425.16 and Civil Code [s]ection 47[,
subdivision ](b), requiring the dismissal of the [c]ross-[c]omplaint
of Valdez, and that her counsel not be entitled to any attorney
fees or costs.”
10
Masjedi does not elaborate on this one-sentence argument.
He cites no case law. He makes no effort to address the trial
court’s reasoning in rejecting the same contentions. His failure to
do so dooms his appeal because “it is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court [order or] judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-
609.) To meet this burden, “ ‘an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) “ ‘The appellate
court is not required to search the record on its own seeking
error.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) An
appellant “is not exempt from the foregoing rules because he is
representing himself on appeal in propria persona.” (Ibid.)
Masjedi’s single-sentence argument is insufficient to show
the trial court erred in its application of the anti-SLAPP statute.
Not all speech is protected by the statute. Section 425.16 protects
“ ‘act[s] in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.’ ” (Id., subd. (e).) To prevail in an
anti-SLAPP motion, a “defendant must establish [first] that the
challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) “ ‘[T]he defendant’s
act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been
an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’
[Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after
protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from
11
that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Park
v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1063.) If the defendant meets his burden of
showing that the plaintiff’s claim arises from protected activity,
“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each
challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient
and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving
evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s
showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken.”
(Baral, supra, at p. 396.)
Masjedi’s single assertion that “the communicative acts
sued upon in the [c]ross-[c]omplaint . . . involve the exercise of the
. . . First Amendment [r]ights of [f]reedom of [s]peech[] and of
[p]etitioning” fails to address the points described above and does
not show the trial court erred. In addition, Masjedi does not
mention or substantively address the second step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis, i.e., whether the evidence that Valdez submitted
in opposition to his anti-SLAPP motion was sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment on the portions of her claim that, in Masjedi’s
view, arose from protected activity.
C. We Impose Sanctions on Masjedi for Filing a
Frivolous Appeal
Valdez filed a motion in this court for sanctions on the
ground that Masjedi filed an appeal that “was frivolous or taken
solely for delay.” (§ 907.) We gave notice that we were
considering sanctions (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(c)), and
we now impose sanctions payable to Valdez as part of the costs on
appeal, along with additional sanctions payable to the clerk of
this court.
12
The test for appellate sanctions under section 907 includes
both a subjective and an objective component. The objective test
asks whether “ ‘ “ ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that the
appeal is totally and completely without merit.’ ” ’ ” (Malek
Media Group, LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817,
834.) The subjective component focuses on the appellant’s
conduct to determine whether the appellant acted solely for an
improper motive, “ ‘to harass the respondent or delay the effect of
an adverse judgment.’ ” (In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 510, 516.) Either of these tests alone can be
sufficient to support sanctions, “but the two tests are ordinarily
used together, with one sometimes providing evidence relevant to
the other.” (Malek Media Group, LLC, supra, at p. 834.) In this
case, there is ample evidence to justify sanctions under both
standards.
Starting with the objective component, Masjedi fails to
identify any communication arguably protected by the litigation
privilege and cites only to introductory allegations about the
parties which the litigation privilege clearly does not cover. With
regard to the anti-SLAPP statute, Masjedi moved to strike the
entire cross-complaint. “Where a defendant moves to strike the
entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument,
specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected
activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden
so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not
arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108.) Here, there are obvious claims in the
cross-complaint that do not arise from protected activity such as
vandalism, property destruction, and harassing phone calls.
Further, Masjedi’s failure to provide any meaningful argument
13
for reversing the trial court’s decision shows that his appeal is
objectively frivolous. (See Malek Media Group, LLC v. AXQG
Corp., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 835 [the “appeal is objectively
frivolous because it is devoid of factual or legal support”].)
This in turn supports a finding under the subjective
standard: “ ‘ “the total lack of merit of an appeal is viewed as
evidence that [the] appellant must have intended it only for
delay.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong, supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 516.) If there was any doubt, the email from
Masjedi to Valdez’s attorney following the filing of the motion for
sanctions confirms Masjedi’s subjective intent. Masjedi does not
deny the authenticity of this email, in which he wrote that “for
every dollar I spend to inflict, it costs your client $20 to respond,
and I intend to drag you [for five] years in [the] court system and
inflict as much as possible legal costs (to [Valdez]), so advise your
client she will be drag[ged] in appeal courts for [a] long time.”
We recognize that “sanctions should be ‘used most
sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct’ ” (In re
Marriage of Gong & Kwong, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 518)
because “ ‘[i]ndiscriminate application of section 907 could deter
attorneys from vigorously representing their clients, and deter
parties from pursuing legitimate appeals.’ ” (Malek Media
Group, LLC v. AXQG Corp., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) In
this case, however, Masjedi’s failure to advance even the most
rudimentary arguments in favor of his case, coupled with his
open acknowledgment that he is intentionally misusing the
appellate process to maliciously inflict economic losses on Valdez,
is sufficiently egregious to justify sanctions.
One of Valdez’s attorneys declared that he had spent 25.5
hours working on the appeal and anticipated spending six
14
additional hours preparing for and attending oral argument. At
the attorney’s standard billing rate of $650 per hour, this would
yield a total cost of $20,475. We find this amount reasonable and
add this amount to the costs awarded to Valdez on appeal. (See
§ 907.) In addition, we impose “sanctions, payable to the clerk of
the court, to compensate the state for the cost to the taxpayers of
processing a frivolous appeal.” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 175, 192.) Because this appeal is relatively
straightforward and does not involve a lengthy record, we impose
$5,000 in sanctions, an amount less than courts typically impose
for conduct such as Masjedi’s. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal from the order dated August 28, 2024, on
Valdez’s motion under section 663, is dismissed. The trial court’s
order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. In addition to
her ordinary costs on appeal, Valdez is awarded $20,475 in
sanctions under section 907 as further costs on appeal. Masjedi
is also ordered to pay $5,000 in sanctions to the clerk of the court
no later than 15 days after the date the remittitur is filed to
compensate the state for the cost of processing a frivolous appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
15
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